

Clare Sumner

From: Daniel Pruce
Sent: 14 August 2003 20:23
To: Clare Sumner
Subject: FW: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

-----Original Message-----

From: Philip Bassett
Sent: 11 September 2002 15:27
To: Godric Smith, Daniel Pruce, Alastair Campbell
Cc: Matthew Rycroft
Subject: RE: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

Agree with Godric

& also

- think it needs to be written more in officialese, lots of it is too journalistic as it now stands, with some of it (eg opening chapter as a biog of Saddam !) reading like STimes at its worst eg para 11 "emeshed", "web" or para 13
- needs much more weight, writing, detail even the stuff marked as new (section 6) is only 12 pages at best out of a bundle of 56 (& that's at best eg p35 is all old UNSCOM stuff) It needs to be at least good as LISS, which it isn't yet, and at least as good as things like *Saddam's Secrets*, the book on the hunt for Iraq's hidden weapons, by an ex-UNSCOM and ex-UNSCOM advsier, which I'm not sure it is
- pictures in the text don't get the right feel what about making them look more report-like, less journo-like, by putting them all the end, as appendices ?
- crucially, though, it's intelligence-lite It feels like this is the least possible intelligence material the intell people are prepared to let go (despite the fact that we say at a couple of points eg para 2 that it's everything the Govt knows on the issue - which it clearly isn't) All intelligence material tends to read like unevidenced assertion, and we have to find a way to get over this a) by having better intelligence material (and better flagged-up) and b) by having more material (and better flagged-up) and c) more convincing material (eg by printing some of it eg as appendices, with names, identifiers etc blacked out
- it needs to end At the moment, it just stops (on p42) A conclusion, saying something - making a case which is compelling At the moment, it isn't

-----Original Message-----

From: Godric Smith
Sent: 11 September 2002 12:35
To: Daniel Pruce, Alastair Campbell
Cc: Matthew Rycroft, Philip Bassett
Subject: RE: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

I think there is material here we can work with but it is a bit of a muddle and needs a lot more clarity in the guts of it in terms of what is new /old In each area we need to distinguish between the two and better source (as much as we can) to intelligence It needs to be more factual if anything, less assertion based, with the rhetoric stripped out as I think this undermines it

-----Original Message-----

From: Daniel Pruce
Sent: 11 September 2002 10:04
To: Alastair Campbell
Cc: Matthew Rycroft, Philip Bassett, Godric Smith
Subject: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

It's getting there, but needs more work My initial thoughts on this latest draft

Ownership:

- the foreword is good but whose voice is it? Do we need a minister to sign it off? Probably not Who will issue the text? Us? The Cabinet Office? Why don't we issue it in the name of the JIC? Makes it more interesting to the media,

Saddam:

- I think we need to personalise the dossier onto Saddam as much as possible - for example by replacing references to Iraq with references to Saddam,

- in similar vein I think we need a device to convey that he is a bad and unstable man. The section on Saddam's Iraq (pp9-11) could be expanded into a psychological profile and presented as such,

- and a few quotes from Saddam to demonstrate his aggressive intent and hatred of his neighbours and the West would help too,

Feel:

- our aim should also be to convey the impression that things have not been static in Iraq but that over the past decade he has been aggressively and relentlessly pursuing WMD while brutally repressing his own people. Again the dossier gets close to this - but I think some drafting changes could bring this out more;

Intelligence:

- Section 6, the one based on intelligence, is the one that readers will go to first. This draft already plays up the nature of intelligence sourcing. I think we could play this up more. The more we advertise that unsupported assertions (eg Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of WMD) come from intelligence the better. The history of JIC Assessments will help too. And why not an annex on the work of the intelligence services (we could draw from material already in the public domain)?,

Witness accounts:

- the material in Annex A on HR abuses is powerful - we might bring elements of it into the body of the dossier,

- in similar vein can we add copies of original documentation, if necessary with parts blanked out, to add to the feeling that we are presenting real evidence?,

Weapons:

- wherever we refer to them (either what the inspectors found or what we think he has) I think we should also describe their destructive capacity as well - eg. p 26 UNSCOM found enough chemical warfare agent to kill x thousand people or contaminate an area the size of Wales

Do you want to meet and discuss today? Separately I'm in touch with the FCO on production and distribution. We also need to develop a handling plan to get expectations in the right place before we launch

Danny