

Alison Blackshaw

From: Mark.Sedwill [redacted]
Sent: 11 September 2002 12:28
To: Charles Gray [redacted]
Cc: Edward Chaplin [redacted],
Ed Owen [redacted],
dmanning [redacted], matthew rycroft [redacted],
acampbell [redacted]
Subject: CONF: Dossier 10/9 Version - Comments



ATT08668.htm

Charles,

Handling and Timing

I have sent this out to the Foreign Sec's party to see whether they think it is along the right lines (tone, content etc). [redacted]
[redacted]

I spoke to Alastair Campbell earlier about timing. He agreed we need to keep our options open on bringing forward publication from w/b 23 September (which would coincide with the possible recall of Parliament) to next week [redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted]

Drafting Comments

The draft looks to me to be heading in the right direction and is much better than earlier drafts. I think the tone could move further in the direction of factual analysis.

Specific comments:

Foreword Suggest we get upfront UNSCR 687's demand that Iraq disarm. We need to make a key issue Saddam's defiance of the UN (one thing which distinguishes him from other dictators and holders of WMD), his persistent obstruction of the weapons inspectors and the 23/27 obligations (and however many specifically on WMD) unmet.

Executive Summary Looks pretty good. Could be tweaked a bit in places. The first bullet of para 6 (the importance of WMD) should be strengthened to explain the centrality of WMD to SH's rule - the projection of power etc. I am a supporter of para 8, although I would drop the last phrase which takes it into policy rather than analysis. This document needs to set out the problem rather than the solution. People should conclude that for themselves.

Sections 1 & 2: I would combine these. Most of Section 2 (paras 1-12) should go after para 7 of Section 1. Paras 13-15 of Section 2 should follow Para 10 of Section 1. The passage on Saddam's Iraq (paras 8-15 of Section 1) needs amplifying. A wiring diagram showing the structure of the regime, the role and nature of the SRG, SSA (explaining that they are modelled on the SS and Gestapo etc) and Saddam's fedayeen etc, pictures of Saddam in his various guises (para 14). Crucially this section should explain the role of WMD in the political mythology which has sustained the regime, implicitly why giving it up would amount to a change of regime and how responsibility for WMD rests with those parts of the apparatus on which Saddam depends for

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his own security [REDACTED]

Section 3 looks pretty good. I would depersonalise it a bit. Maybe use "the regime" instead of "SH" more. Para 5 could become a text box explaining more vividly the effects of the various agents. It does not sit very easily amidst the narrative.

I would combine Sections 3 and 4 to demonstrate more explicitly the link between UNSC action and persistent Iraqi obstruction. I would put in a text box listing UNSCRs, Iraq's non-compliance or late compliance with them. I would expand the history of weapons inspections. It is an interesting story and would give the media a better feel for the difficulties they faced and the persistence of the Iraqi obstruction - Hussein Kamal and the chicken farm etc. [REDACTED] We might also get a couple of ex-inspectors to recount their experiences. Could we get the UK's UNSCOM Commissioner to do a piece? The blocking by armed guards of Ritter's team's attempt to get access to the SSA in October 1997 to track BW after the Iraqis had tried to run off with documents would be a good vignette. [REDACTED] Include Annex C.

Section 6 is the crux of this and needs to be as factual as possible. I would lose the sub-title "Why are we concerned?" We need a very simple table somewhere (perhaps to be repeated in the Executive Summary) bringing together the unaccounted stuff with what we know since. This should be brief enough to get onto the Sky wall ie, no more than 5 bullets.

Annex A. Suggest this is divided up into so it is obviously a set of case histories.

Annex B should come into the main text - probably into the amplified Section 2.

Annex C should be brought into the combined Section 3 & 4.

Hope this is useful.

Mark

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