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FOR ATTN

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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1. Under Saddam Hussein, Iraq has developed chemical and biological weapons, acquired missiles allowing it to attack neighbouring countries with these weapons, and tried hard to develop a nuclear bomb. Iraq has admitted to all these programmes to acquire weapons of mass destruction. And Saddam has used chemical weapons, both against Iran and against his own people.
2. Information about Iraq's weapons of mass destruction is already in the public domain from UN reports and from Iraqi defectors. A valuable assessment was provided by the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) on 9 September. The publicly available evidence points clearly to Iraq's continued possession of chemical and biological agents and weapons from before the Gulf War. It shows that Iraq has refurbished sites formerly associated with the production of chemical and biological agents. And it indicates a continuing Iraqi ability to manufacture these agents, and to use bombs, shells, artillery rockets and ballistic missiles to deliver them. The IISS report also judges that Iraq could assemble nuclear weapons within months of obtaining fissile material from foreign sources.
3. We endorse much of this analysis, which is largely based on information available prior to the de facto expulsion of UN inspectors in 1998. But significant additional information is available to the government from secret intelligence sources, described in more detail in this paper. This intelligence cannot tell us about everything. But it provides a fuller picture of Iraqi plans and capabilities. It shows that Saddam Hussein attaches great importance to possessing weapons of mass destruction which he regards as the basis for Iraq's regional power. It shows that he does not regard them only as weapons of last resort. He is ready to use them, including against his own population, and is determined to retain them. Intelligence also shows that Iraq is preparing plans to conceal evidence of these weapons from any renewed inspection, including by dispersing incriminating documents. And it allows us to judge that Iraq

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- has continued to produce chemical and biological agents;
- has military plans for the use of chemical and biological weapons, some of which could be ready within 45 minutes of an order to use them. Saddam and his son Qusay have the political authority to authorise the use of these weapons;
- has developed mobile laboratories for military use, corroborating earlier reports about the mobile production of biological warfare agents;
- has assembled specialists to work on its nuclear programme;
- has pursued illegal programmes to procure controlled materials of potential use in the production of chemical and biological weapons programmes;
- has sought significant quantities of uranium from Africa, despite having no civil nuclear programme that could require it;
- is covertly trying to acquire technology and materials which could be used in the production of nuclear weapons, including specialised aluminium controlled because of its potential use in enriching uranium;
- has retained up to 20 Al Hussein missiles, capable of carrying chemical or biological warheads;
- is deploying its Al-Samoud liquid propellant missile, and has used the absence of weapons inspectors to work on extending its range beyond the limit of 150km imposed by the United Nations;
- is producing the solid-propellant missile Ababil-100, and is making efforts to extend its range;
- has constructed a new engine test stand for missiles capable of threatening Israel and all Iraq's Gulf neighbours as well as the UK Sovereign Bases in Cyprus and NATO members (Greece and Turkey);
- has pursued illegal programmes to procure materials for use in its illegal development of long range missiles;
- has begun dispersing its most sensitive weapons, equipment and material.

4. These judgements have been endorsed by the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC). More details on the judgements, and on the development of the JIC's assessments since 1998, are set out later in this paper.

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5. The importance of denying Saddam access to weapons of mass destruction was recognised by the United Nations in a series of Resolution between 1991 and 1998. The paper sets out the key UN Security Council Resolutions, accepted by Iraq, which required the destruction of these weapons. It also summarises the history of the UN inspections regime. This includes both the extent of Saddam's capabilities uncovered by the inspectors and Iraq's history of dishonesty, deception, intimidation and concealment in its dealings with the UN inspectors.

6. But the threat from Iraq does not depend solely on the capabilities we have described. It arises also because of the violent and aggressive nature of Saddam's regime. His record of internal repression and external aggression gives rise to unique concerns about the threat he poses. The paper briefly outlines his rise to power, the nature of his regime and his history of regional aggression. Vivid and horrifying accounts of Saddam's human rights abuses are also catalogued.

7. The paper briefly sets out how Iraq is able to finance its weapons programme. Drawing on illicit earnings generated outside UN control, Iraq generated income of some \$3 billion in 2001.

8. The paper concludes with a summary table setting out key points on Iraq's capabilities.