

RESTRICTED - STAFF

Flag
Top DS
cc. [unclear]



Jonathan Powell:
V. Price

MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Old War Office Building
Whitehall, London SW1A 2EU
Telephone (Direct Dialling) 020 7218 2407
(Switchboard) 020 7218 9000

From: Martin Howard
Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence

Minister may
find this of interest
8/7

CDI 2/12/5/2

John Scarlett
JIC Chairman
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London

cc David Manning
Alistair Campbell
David [unclear]
D.C.

8 July 2003

GILLIGAN ACCUSATIONS: DR DAVID KELLY

You asked for a short note on Dr Kelly's views of the Iraqi WMD programme and the Government's dossier, published last September. What follows reflects points made by David Kelly in his letter in which he admitted to his meeting with Gilligan on 22 May, and from interviews conducted with him by MOD.

According to Dr Kelly, based on his extensive and authoritative knowledge of Iraq's WMD programme, notably its biological programme, he believes that the September dossier was a fair reflection of open source information and appreciations about Iraq's WMD programme. He claims that he has never attempted to undermine Government policy as he was personally sympathetic to the war because he recognised from a decade's work the menace of Iraq's ability to further develop a non-conventional weapons programme. He feels no unease over the dossier because it is completely coincident with his personal views on Iraq's unconventional weapons capability.

On the 45 minute deployment issue, Kelly says that his standard view is that he does not know the intelligence and is not familiar with an Iraqi weapons system that matches that sort of timescale.

CAB/1/0075

RESTRICTED - STAFF

RESTRICTED - STAFF

The only other point that we have elicited from Dr Kelly is that he believes there is a 30% chance that Iraq had specific CW production capability in the six months before the war and that it was more likely that there was a small BW production programme. This is not dissimilar to the views ascribed by Gilligan to his source in his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee (see answer to Q511). It is worth pointing out that Kelly distinguishes between production and possession where he believes that it is nearer 100% likely that there was some existing CW in Iraq's possession.

I hope this is helpful. Happy to discuss further if you wish.

A copy goes to Sir Kevin Tebbit's office.

CAB/1/0076

RESTRICTED - STAFF

Jonathan Powell
cc Alastair Campbell
David Manning
Paul Sumner

RESTRICTED - STAFF



MINISTRY OF DEFENCE
Old War Office Building
Whitehall, London SW1A 2EU
Telephone (Direct Dialling) 020 7218 2407
(Switchboard) 020 7218 9000

From Martin Howard
Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence

See over the page
and the attached extract
from Gilligan evidence
to the HSC.

CDI 2/12/5/2

John Scarlett
JIC Chairman
Cabinet Office
70 Whitehall
London

Note also that Kelly
may state his view, if given
the chance by the HSC. But the
8 July 2003

transcripts are not for BW production

Dear John,

It is not clear (to me) how widely the HSC
will go in their questioning.

GILLIGAN ACCUSATIONS: DR DAVID KELLY

You asked for a short note on Dr Kelly's views of the Iraqi WMD programme and the Government's dossier, published last September. What follows reflects points made by David Kelly in his letter in which he admitted to his meeting with Gilligan on 22 May, and from interviews conducted with him by MOD

15/7

According to Dr Kelly, based on his extensive and authoritative knowledge of Iraq's WMD programme, notably it's biological programme, he believes that the September dossier was a fair reflection of open source information and appreciations about Iraq's WMD programme. He claims that he has never attempted to undermine Government policy as he was personally sympathetic to the war because he recognised from a decade's work the menace of Iraq's ability to further develop a non-conventional weapons programme. He feels no unease over the dossier because it is completely coincident with his personal views on Iraq's unconventional weapons capability

On the 45 minute deployment issue, Kelly says that his standard view is that he does not know the intelligence and is not familiar with an Iraqi weapons system that matches that sort of timescale

CAB/1/0077

RESTRICTED - STAFF

The only other point that we have elicited from Dr Kelly is that he believes there is a 30% chance that Iraq had specific CW production capability in the six months before the war and that it was more likely that there was a small BW production programme. This is not dissimilar to the views ascribed by Gilligan to his source in his evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee (see answer to Q511). It is worth pointing out that Kelly distinguishes between production and possession where he believes that it is nearer 100% likely that there was some existing CW in Iraq's possession

I hope this is helpful. Happy to discuss further if you wish.

A copy goes to Sir Kevin Tebbit's office.

Yours
Meester

CAB/1/0078