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PERMANENT UNDER-SECRETARY OF STATE

D/PUS/12/3 (294)

*copy: John Scarlett
Steve Rowcliffe*



11 July 2003

Dear David,

ANDREW GILLIGAN AND THE SINGLE SOURCE

In my letter of 5 July, I said I would forward more detailed records of our interviews with Dr Kelly when the process was completed. A follow up session took place on 7 July.

Rather than burden you with all the narrative, I thought it would be more helpful for you to have the enclosed analysis of the key points from Kelly's account – and a comparison with Gilligan's account of what his 'Single Source' had told him.

Our discussion with Dr Kelly also covered internal issues – ie his breach of MOD regulations in talking to the press without authority, and the personnel management/disciplinary consequences of doing so. This is another reason for sending you the analysis rather than the records themselves.

*Yours ever,
Kevi*

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CAB/11/0100

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	Subject	Gilligan Account	K Account	Comment
1	Nature of Single Source (SS)	SS closely connected with Iraq WMD [A398, A418]. Currently serving official [A430]	K has had long involvement with UNMOVIC in particular	<u>Fits K well</u> but could also fit many others.
2	Nature of Single Source (SS)	Known SS for sometime, met several times, spoken on phone from time to time A398 Source of longstanding, well-known to me, [A418, A421]	First conversation in coffee break of IISS seminar September 2002. Subsequently met G in February and May 2003, before and after G's period in Iraq. G has not been in touch since May 22.	<u>Suggests K is not SS but not conclusive</u> : could be exaggeration/misrepresentation by Gilligan.
3	Nature of Single Source (SS)	A year since met SS face to face [A399] Had discussion with him 4 months before Sept dossier published (Gilligan article)	First spoke to Gilligan in Sept 2002. Two subsequent meetings (see above)	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u> . Both Gilligan comments refer to approx May 2002. (also overlooks the meeting with Kelly in February 2003)
4	Nature of Single Source (SS)	SS was one of senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier. [A419]	K contributed to background/historic parts of dossier. No involvement in intelligence component. <u>K says that he has never acknowledged any role in the dossier to anyone outside government, although some might have guessed.</u>	Not a description of K. And <u>not consistent</u> with his account of his talk with Gilligan. In particular, K denies claiming <u>any</u> role in preparing the dossier to Gilligan. [K's business card describes him as Senior adviser to PACS]
5	Nature of Single Source (SS)	SS was in the absolute mainstream of the issue [A489]	K was not in the mainstream of the issue - but see comment	<u>Not conclusive</u> - K might have implied he was more involved than he was

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13	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	SS said "classic example was ... WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes... not in original draft ... included against their wishes because it wasn't reliable" [Q449 - drawn from Today programme][also Q/A 455 and A457]	K denies making this claim. K did not see the intelligence component of the dossier before it was published.	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u> (K has however admitted a different comment about the 45 minute claim - see serial 18)
14	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	G says that the 45 minute story and the uranium story were the only two dossier items discussed [A492]	K admits a limited reference to 45 minute story, in response to G and does not recall discussing uranium (although it was mentioned by G)	<u>Not conclusive</u> - but Gilligan's account of the "45 minute" part of the conversation appears very different to K
15	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	In response to Sir J Stanley, Gilligan repeats that it is SS who is alleging that the JIC connived in embellishing the dossier. [Q451/452]	K denies making any such allegation.	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>
16	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	G asked "So how did this transformation happen" The answer was "Campbell" [Q457]	K denies accusing Campbell (or commenting on media allegations)	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>
17	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	SS said that "Downing Street officials had asked repeatedly if anything could be added to the original draft [A457]	K denies saying this.	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>

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22	The uranium claim	SS "cutting" about the claim that Uranium south from Africa.[A453/454] SS believed documents on which allegation rested were forged [A466]	K does not recall talking about uranium although Gilligan referred to it. K knows nothing about the uranium story other than what has appeared publicly and did not (and would not) offer the view that it was based on unreliable information.	This suggests that K is not the SS, but is <u>not conclusive</u> given the open media comment about the Uranium story
23	SS wider claims about scale of Iraqi threat	SS believes that Iraqis had not managed to weaponise CBW [A511]	K denies saying this and believes the opposite	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>
24	SS wider claims about scale of Iraqi threat	SS says it is 30% likely that there was a CW programme in the six months before the war and more likely that there was a small BW programme [A511, A543]	K admits that this might sound similar to his views but actually he is much more (100%) confident that Iraq had CW programmes. (The 30% figure would be akin to K's views about the actual weapons <u>production</u> although he had certainly not used those words)	On both occasions, Gilligan attributes exact words to SS, reducing the chance of any misunderstanding. <u>Inconclusive</u> but suggests K not SS although he might have been taken as providing general collateral for SS on this point.
25	SS wider claims about scale of Iraqi threat	SS believed that Iraq WMD programme was smaller and less imminent than claimed by HMG.	K denies saying this. On the contrary he agrees with the dossier's assessment that the threat was "current and specific"	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>

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