

Loftus, Paul (LDR-LON)

From: David Kelly [REDACTED]
Sent: 05 March 2003 10:44
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: RE: [REDACTED]



bw voice
revised doc

Attached is the revised copy and comments. I would prefer to remain truly anonymous since I am deeply involved in the disarmament process

Come back to me if there are any further comments. I am working at home today but will be in London tomorrow and will not access email.

Best wishes,

David

-----Original Message-----

From: [REDACTED]
Sent: 05 March 2003 05:22
To: [REDACTED]
Subject: [REDACTED]

David

I've re-arranged this somewhat - but not altered anything, I hope - in order to give it a more newsy feel since this project is now called Iraqi Crisis Report [REDACTED] but only because it was one parenthetical phrase too many. I just couldn't make it elegant.

There are a couple of questions in bold type.

Could you write in an identification of your anon self that includes something current that will explain why we cannot use the real name. Or explain why we are being anon

Do you agree that New York is a better dateline than London.

All objections taken on board and reincorporated of course

in many, many thanks.

Express yourself with cool emoticons <http://messenger.msn.co.uk>

David

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Again many, many thanks

[REDACTED]

The editing improves It is difficult to account for anonymity without providing strong indicators since there are not too many candidates! I would prefer no explanation and the line below is the best I can do if an explanation is truly needed

This article has been written by a former weapons inspector who is currently a consultant and adviser to International Institutions and the media.

New York - In the last week, Iraq has begun destroying its stock of al-Samoud II missiles, missiles that have a range greater than the UN-mandated limit of 150 kilometers This is presented to the international community as evidence of President Saddam Hussein's compliance with United Nations weapons inspectors.

But Iraq always gave up materials once it was in its interest to do so. Iraq has spent the past 30 years building up an arsenal of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) The current threat presented by Iraq militarily, with either conventional or unconventional weapons, is modest – but it has never given up its intent to develop and stockpile such weapons for both military and terrorist use.

Today Iraq shows superficial cooperation with the inspectorates. Weapons such as 122mm rockets specific for chemical and biological use have been discovered and the destruction of proscribed missiles and associated engines, components and gyroscopes has begun. Iraq has established two commissions to search for documents, and weapons under the direction of Rasheed Amer, a former head of Iraq's concealment activities, and a commission has started to recover weapons from Iraqi unilateral destruction sites dating back to 1991. *These sites are contentious since it was illegal for Iraq to destroy without UN supervision and it was done as a part of Iraq's concealment of programmes* Amer Al-Sa'adi - formerly responsible for conserving Iraq's WMD, now its principal spokesman on its weapons - continues to mislead the international community.

It is difficult to imagine cooperation being properly established unless credible Iraqi officials are put into place by a changed Saddam.

Yet some argue that inspections are working and that more time is required, that increasing the numbers of inspectors would enhance their effectiveness Others argue that the process is inherently flawed and that disarmament by regime change is the only realistic way forward.

The UN has been attempting to disarm Iraq ever since 1991 and has failed to do so It is an abject failure of diplomacy with the split between France, China and Russia on one hand, and Britain and the United States on the other, creating lack of "permanent five" unity and resolve. More recently Germany, a temporary yet powerful member of the Security Council, has exacerbated the diplomatic split.

The threat of credible military force has forced Saddam Hussein to admit, but not cooperate with, the UN inspectorate So-called concessions - U2 overflights, the right to interview - were all routine between 1991 and 1998. After 12 unsuccessful years of UN

supervision of disarmament, military force regrettably appears to be the only way of finally and conclusively disarming Iraq

In the years since 1991, during which UNSCOM and the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) destroyed or rendered harmless all known weapons and capability under UN Security Council Resolution 687, Iraq established an effective concealment and deception organisation which protected many undisclosed assets. In October 2002, Resolution 1441 gave Saddam Hussein an ultimatum to disclose his arsenal within 30 days. He admitted inspectors and with characteristic guile provided some concessions, but still refuses to acknowledge the extent of his chemical and biological weapons and associated military and industrial support organisations

World leaders state with monotonous regularity that 8500 litres of anthrax VX, 2160 kilograms of bacterial growth media, 360 tonnes of bulk chemical warfare agent, 6500 chemical bombs and 30,000 munitions capable of delivering chemical and biological warfare agents remained accounted for from activities up to 1991. **THIS SOUNDS AS IF IT IS NOT THE CASE. CAN WE RE-WORD IT? See end note** Less easy to determine is the extent of activity undertaken since 1991. In its 12,000-page "disclosure" submitted to the inspectors in December 2002, Iraq failed to declare any proscribed activities

There are, however, indications that the programmes continue

Iraq continues to develop missile technology especially fuel propellants and guidance systems for long-range missiles. Iraq has recovered chemical reactors destroyed prior to 1998 for allegedly civilian activity, built biological fermenters and agent dryers, and created transportable production units for biological and chemical agents and the filling of weapons. Key nuclear research and design teams remain in place even though it is assessed that Iraq is unable to manufacture nuclear weapons unless fissile material is available

War may now be inevitable. Regime change may be an effective means of disarming Iraq, but that will depend on the successor administration. The proportionality and intensity of the conflict will depend on whether regime change or disarmament is the true objective. The US, and whoever willingly assists it, should ensure that the force, strength and strategy used is appropriate to the modest threat Iraq now poses.

Since some WMD sites have not been unambiguously identified, and may not be neutralised until war is over, a substantial hazard may be encountered. Sites with manufacturing or storage capabilities for chemical or biological weapons may present a danger and much will depend on the way that those facilities are militarily cancelled and subsequently treated

Some of the chemical and biological weapons deployed in 1991 are still available, albeit on a reduced scale. Aerial bombs and rockets are readily available to be filled with sarin, VX and mustard or botulinum toxin, anthrax spores and smallpox. More sophisticated weaponry such as spray devices associated with drones or missiles with separating warheads may be limited in numbers, but would be far more devastating if used

Perhaps the real threat from Iraq currently comes from covert use of such weapons against troops or by terrorists against civilian targets worldwide. The link with Al-Qaeda is disputed but is, in any case, not the principal terrorist link of concern. Iraq has long trained and supported terrorist activities and is quite capable of initiating such activity using its security services. The future threat still remains Iraq's development of WMD to military maturity which undoubtedly will be the case unless the regime is changed

The challenge over the next few weeks will be to keep the inspection process in perspective whilst diplomatic wrangling continues. It should be an exclusively a technically objective exercise but it has become highly politicised by Iraq, the Security Council and the Heads of the Inspectorate. The presentation of the key disarmament issues by the inspectorate in the next few weeks, should the Security Council request them, will generate further divisions over their significance.

THIS SOUNDS AS IF IT IS NOT THE CASE. CAN WE RE-WORD IT? - It is meant to sound sceptical – they are the figures from the 1999 Butler report which are estimates based in no small part on Iraqi fabricated data; they are not the truly important issues which are declaring the extent and scope of the programmes in 1991 and now, the personalities, “committees” and organisations involved. You could substitute **state with monotonous regularity** with **state with authority** since the amounts are recognised as issues

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