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MEMO

20030626 kelly 22.5 03 in one of the jan - chemical reactors not destroyed by UNSCOM, glass lined chamber to promote chemical reactions - were being used again by the Iraqis, recovered, taken at al Muthanna, not properly destroyed by UNSCOM, recovered by Iraqis, taken to Fallujah, and used for non-battle purposes.

the 18 chem missiles were reported by Blix, but do not appear to have been destroyed. Blix thought they were leftovers

I think it is 30% likely that Iraq had active CW prog in the 6 m to a year likely that there was

not much coming out of detainees, despite financial incentives. they are

the dossier was transformed in the week before it was published, to make it sexier the classic was the 45 mins. most things in dossier were solid but that was a single-source one source said it took 4 minutes to set up a missile assembly.. and that was misinterpreted

conv not wind, no ev missiles loaded

most people in intel weren't happy with it, because it didn't reflect the considered view they were putting forward

Campbell

real but not reliable, against wishes

10-15 yrs ago there was a lot of info, with the concealment and deception operation there was far less information

war was a tragic failure of diplomacy, no direct effort to engage Iraq it was a football for everyone

it was small because you don't conceal a large program, and because it was actually quite hard to import things

the UN sanctions were effective, they did limit programme

there has been proliferation - not in terms of people walking across the Iraqi border with 20 shells, but supply chain knowledge, plans

isg headed by a major general, below him 2 one starts, British and Australian

we don't have a great deal of knowledge than we had before

1500 - 100 Brits, 10-20 Aussies - not all experts, about 20 of the Brits are

it is a big handicap not to be able to draw on the expertise of Russian and German experts

isg by

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