

JP/9

MEMO

20030630 kelly 22.5.03

was transformed in the week before it was published, to make it sexier
the class was the 45 mins most things in dossier were solid but that was single-source one source
said it took 4 minutes to set up a missile assembly.. and that was misinterpreted

conv not w/ missiles loaded

most people in intel weren't happy w/ it, because it didn't reflect the considered view they were put
forward

Campbell

real info not reliable, against wishes
not in orig draft

10-15 yrs ago there was a lot of info, with the concealment and deception op there was far less
information

war was a tragic failure of diplomacy, no direct effort to engage Iraq
it was a football for everyone

it was small because you didn't conceal a large program, and because it was actually quite hard to import
things

the sanctions were effective, they did limit the programme

in one of the gas - chemical reactors not destroyed by UNSCOM, gas lined chamber to promote chemical
reactions - were being used again by the Iraqis, recovered, taken
at al Mutahanna, not properly destroyed by UN, recovered by Iraqis, taken to Fallujah, and used for non-
banned purposes.

the 18 chemical missiles were reported by Blix, but downplayed. Blix thought they were leftovers

I think it's 30% likely that Iraq had active CW program in the 6 months to a year
likelihood that there was CW

not much coming out of detainees, despite financial incentives they are in quite good conditions
in me

there has been proliferation - not in terms of people walking across the Iraqi border with 20 shell casings,
but supply chain knowledge, plans

isg headed by a major general, below him 2 one starts, British and Australian

we don't have a great deal of knowledge than we had before

1500 - 100 British casings, 10-20 Aussies - not all experts, about 20 of the British are

It is a big handicap not to be able to draw on the expertise of Russian and German experts

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