

## Clare Sumner

---

**From:** Daniel Pruce  
**Sent:** 14 August 2003 20:17  
**To:** Clare Sumner  
**Subject:** FW: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Philip Bassett  
**Sent:** 11 September 2002 10:34  
**To:** Daniel Pruce; Alastair Campbell  
**Cc:** Matthew Rycroft, Godric Smith  
**Subject:** RE: DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

Very long way to go, I think. Think we're in a lot of trouble with this as it stands now.

-----Original Message-----

**From:** Daniel Pruce  
**Sent:** 11 September 2002 10:04  
**To:** Alastair Campbell  
**Cc:** Matthew Rycroft, Philip Bassett, Godric Smith  
**Subject:** DRAFT DOSSIER (J SCARLETT VERSION OF 10 SEPT)

It's getting there, but needs more work. My initial thoughts on this latest draft:

### Ownership:

- the foreword is good but whose voice is it? Do we need a minister to sign it off? Probably not. Who will issue the text? Us? The Cabinet Office? Why don't we issue it in the name of the JIC? Makes it more interesting to the media,

### Saddam:

- I think we need to personalise the dossier onto Saddam as much as possible - for example by replacing references to Iraq with references to Saddam;
- in similar vein I think we need a device to convey that he is a bad and unstable man. The section on Saddam's Iraq (pp9-11) could be expanded into a psychological profile and presented as such;
- and a few quotes from Saddam to demonstrate his aggressive intent and hatred of his neighbours and the West would help too;

### Feel:

- our aim should also be to convey the impression that things have not been static in Iraq but that over the past decade he has been aggressively and relentlessly pursuing WMD while brutally repressing his own people. Again the dossier gets close to this - but I think some drafting changes could bring this out more,

### Intelligence:

- Section 6, the one based on intelligence, is the one that readers will go to first. This draft already plays up the nature of intelligence sourcing. I think we could play this up more. The more we advertise that unsupported assertions (eg Saddam attaches great importance to the possession of WMD) come from intelligence the better. The history of JIC Assessments will help too. And why not an annex on the work of the intelligence services (we could draw from material already in the public domain)?;

### Witness accounts:

- the material in Annex A on HR abuses is powerful - we might bring elements of it into the body of the dossier;
- in similar vein can we add copies of original documentation, if necessary with parts blanked out, to add to the feeling that we are presenting real evidence?;

### Weapons: