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Director of Communications and Strategy

12 June 2003

*Re* *Andrew*

Thank you for your reply of 11 June 2003. There are several outstanding issues you have failed to address, to which I would like responses.

Firstly, you have not answered my questions about Andrew Gilligan's obvious ignorance about intelligence issues. So I repeat - do you accept that what Andrew Gilligan said last week about the composition and role of the JIC was inaccurate? What, if anything do you intend to do about it?

Secondly, on the '45 minute' claim, you acknowledge it was indeed from a single source, for which I am grateful. I therefore believe it does conflict with your guideline that "*programmes should be reluctant to rely on only one source*". Given this acknowledgement please can you explain to me how you can reach the conclusion that this guideline has been upheld? As I know that the source of this specific piece of information is not a member of the JIC, nor was directly involved in the publication of the dossier, would you accept that an emphatic denial from the Chairman of the JIC carries more weight than Mr Gilligan's single uncorroborated anonymous source?

Furthermore, the Intelligence and Security Committee report, published this week, also confirms Mr Gilligan's story was wrong.

*"In September 2002 some intelligence was declassified and used to produce a dossier on the Iraqi WMD programme. The Agencies were fully consulted in the*

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