

WMD capabilities, the history of UN inspections in Iraq, and other papers. As of late July/early August whether and when to proceed with publication of any of these drafts remained undecided.

September 2002

5. On 3 September you announced that the Government's assessment of Iraq's WMD capabilities would be made public in the next few weeks. Over the next few days discussions took place between David Manning, Alastair Campbell, myself and our respective teams about the appropriate structure for the dossier. At meetings on 5 and 9 September (attendance list for 5 September meeting at Flag A) it was agreed that this should cover the history of Iraq's WMD programmes, the history of the inspection process, an account of current capabilities and an account of the nature of the regime to include its record of severe human rights abuse. The purpose was to present a more detailed account of Iraqi capabilities to be placed in the wider context. Unlike the previous drafts, it would refer specifically to intelligence material. It was agreed that since this would now be an intelligence-based document I, as JIC Chairman, rather than OD Secretariat would be in charge of the process. These agreements were set out in detail in Alastair's note to me of 9 September (Flag B).

6. The drafting of the revised document was co-ordinated by Julian Miller working with representatives of Departments, including DIS, SIS, GCHQ, and FCO. There were two meetings of two to three hours each, numerous exchanges of drafts and constant consultations between the experts concerned. With the agreement of the Agencies, representatives from the No 10 (Danny Pruce) and FCO Press Offices (John Williams, Paul Hamill and James Paver) were involved. The aim was to ensure that the public assessment deployed the intelligence effectively, taking account of the reliability of the information and the demands of