

source protection. As is natural in the JIC drafting process, there was debate about a number of the issues in the dossier, but agreement was reached on the final text, including the use of the intelligence about the deployability of CBW within 45 minutes. This intelligence came from a line of reporting judged to be reliable and was consistent with standing JIC judgements. It was included by the drafters and approved by the JIC. It's inclusion was not suggested by No 10. The report was highlighted in the same terms in a JIC Assessment of 9 September. This 9 September Assessment also reflected other recently received intelligence which was recorded in the dossier under that heading, "Recent Intelligence".

7. The assessment of Iraq's current capabilities was handled separately from the historical and human rights chapters. Parts 2 and 3, which were not intelligence based, were initially prepared by the FCO and subsequently edited by Assessments Staff. The work on Part 1 was led by the Assessments Staff from the beginning.

8. JIC members were asked to consult Ministers during the drafting process as appropriate. Comments were received from Ministers and from No 10 [REDACTED]
[REDACTED]
[REDACTED]

9. The Foreword was drafted by you. I, and some JIC members, commented on your draft before it was finalised.

10. The JIC agreed that all intelligence-based sections in the document would be submitted to it before they were finalised. The draft assessment was discussed at the JIC on 11 and 18 September. The final draft was circulated to JIC members on 19 September and subsequently agreed by them. It was sent by me to Alastair Campbell on 20 September (Flag C). I regarded this as the formal moment at which I was taking responsibility for the contents. I noted to Alastair that the draft