

From: Alastair Campbell
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JOHN SCARLETT

Cc: Jonathan Powell
David Manning
PMOS
Jim Poston
PS/Foreign Secretary
PS/Defence Secretary
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PS/DG of Security Servi
[REDACTED] (GCHC)
John Williams (FCO)
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Stephen Wright (FCO)
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Martin Howard (MOD)
David Omand (CO)

At our discussion this morning, we agreed it would be helpful if I set out for colleagues the process by which the Iraq dossier will be produced.

The first point is that this must be, and be seen to be, the work of you and your team, and that its credibility depends fundamentally upon that.

The second is that you are working on a new dossier, according to the structure we agreed at the meeting last week, to meet the new circumstances which have developed over recent weeks and months. Therefore, the rush of comments on the old dossier are not necessary or totally relevant. People should wait for the new one, which will be more detailed and substantial.

The structure we agreed last week was roughly as follows:

- why the issue arose in the first place
- why the inspection process was necessary
- the history of concealment and deception
- the story of inspectors, leading to their departure
- the story of weapons unaccounted for, and what they could do
- a section on ballistic missile technology
- CW/BW
- nuclear
- the sanctions regime, and how the policy of containment has worked only up to a point
- illicit money
- the repressive nature of the regime
- why the history of the man and the regime (Iraq/Iran; chemical weapons on his own people; Kuwait; human



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