

government agencies with an interest in Iraq and its weapons of mass destruction. My understanding is that I have remained a DCSO from 1992 to date.

Since my promotion to DCSO in 1992, and indeed for the three years prior to that, I was involved in investigations of noncompliance with the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) by the Soviet Union and provided the technical lead for Soviet inspections. In 1989 I was involved with the secret debriefing of a senior Soviet defector and as a direct consequence I was intimately involved in the intelligence and diplomatic process that led a secret joint UK/US investigation of Soviet biological warfare facilities in 1991. I provided the technical lead in those inspections. After the establishment of an agreement between Russia, the United States, and the United Kingdom in 1992 I provided the technical and the diplomatic lead to UK/US investigations of Russian BWC noncompliance in 1992, 1993, and 1994.

In 1991 I led the first ever publically acknowledged biological weapons inspection, in Iraq, the first step in the disarmament of Iraq under UN Security Council Resolution 687 which defined conditions for the cease-fire agreement after the Gulf War. As Chief Inspector I had unprecedented privileges and responsibilities as a senior representative of the United Nations. Subsequently, in 1994, I defined the parameters and protocol for monitoring of Iraq's military and civilian industry, academic and research institutions, and medical facilities to determine Iraq's capability to sustain a biological weapons programme. In 1995 I led the landmark inspection which visited and evaluated every known site associated with Iraq's biological programme, after Iraq was forced to acknowledge its biological weapons programme, determining and appraising the physical capability that Iraq had to produce biological weapons. I participated in a total 37 inspections in Iraq, leading many as Chief Inspector including all the key definitional investigations, and I am the most experienced inspector that UNSCOM had. I also took part in all technical discussions between the Government of Iraq and the United Nations in New York and Baghdad between 1991 and 1998. In 1995, as a result of my experience, judgement, insight, astuteness and credibility, I was appointed Senior Advisor to UNSCOM on biological weapons and I held that position until December 1999 when UNSCOM was dissolved. During the period from 1991 to 1998 (when UNSCOM was finally expelled from Iraq) I worked continuously with commitment, dedication, enthusiasm, and diligence working abroad eight months a year, mainly in a war zone, mostly at short notice and under remarkably difficult and hazardous conditions. This has been done to the detriment of my family commitments, personal relationships, and career. It has however led to recognition by the United Nations, the arms control community, intelligence services, and indeed the media, of my pivotal and considerable role in this process. I have contributed extensively to an activity of extraordinary international importance with my judgements central to the major stumbling block with regards to Iraq - its biological weapons. In 1996 the exceptional nature of my work was honoured by the award of CMG (Companion of the most distinguished order of St. Michael and St. George) in the Queen's Birthday Honours. It is an honour given in recognition of important confidential services to foreign affairs at a senior level.

All of this appears to have passed by without recognition by DERA management and human resources. In 1999 (22nd April) I discussed the issue of my grading with Paul Taylor, Director Chemical and Biological Defence (CBD), Porton Down, seeking consideration of promotion from grade five to grade four. Despite a sympathetic reception no action followed. The issue was twice raised again with Paul Taylor in the course of