

KELLY: Reflects an enormous(?) lack of objectivity.

WATTS: Has your assessment of whether that's -- as to how important that is -- changed from your -- I think it was 1990 you went down to 45% -

KELLY: Oh, in terms of the likelihood of being (*inaudible*) I think it's probably down to 40.

WATTS: Really, it's still that low?

KELLY: Oh yeah. Yeah, I --

WATTS: Is that still because you don't have the right information or because you --

KELLY: Well, I have more than I had before, but I still don't have the right information

WATTS: Right.

KELLY: So until this team reports back, and (*inaudible*) whether they've actually finished their job (*inaudible*) as you know (*inaudible*).

WATTS: Mmm.

KELLY: And till they come back and actually give their (*several inaudible words*) But whatever you think it is, it's certainly something(?) very unusual (*inaudible*).

WATTS: So where do you stand on the Rumsfeld point about the possibility of the weapons having been destroyed before the war started?

KELLY: Well, it is a possibility. I (*inaudible*) -- I find it difficult to comment. I mean, it is a possibility (*inaudible*) Saddam Hussein(?). Erm, I mean it may be that they had such a small arsenal that it was determined that there would(?) be (*inaudible*) and therefore (*inaudible*) required to embarrass Bush. I'm not sure (*inaudible*) such a trivial thing; I don't (*inaudible*) to rationalise why they were destroyed when they worked so hard to (*inaudible*) conceal(?) them (*inaudible*).

WATTS: Or I suppose there's some evidence that Saddam was a fairly strategic thinker, so if he decided, you know, that this was it, (*inaudible*) instruments recorded that he had nothing.

KELLY: Yeah, yeah.

WATTS: Erm, (*inaudible*) that's the only way you could make any sense out of it.

STW/3/0009