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NOTES OF A MEETING ON DAVID KELLY'S MEETING WITH
ANDREW GILLIGAN - 4 JULY 2003

Present:

Mr Richard Hatfield, Personnel Director
Dr Bryan Wells, DCPAC
Dr David Kelly, CPAC Special Adviser

Gilligan's evidence to FAC

1 Hatfield said that he wanted to go through the Transcript of Gilligan's evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee and ask Kelly whether he could have been the source of what Gilligan said. He went through Gilligan's answers seriatim.

2. Q398 answer. Hatfield observed that Gilligan's meeting with his source might match his meeting with Kelly. In particular, the meeting had been Gilligan's initiative, and the source was quite closely connected with the issue of Iraqi WMD. Hatfield acknowledged that Kelly's account did not match Gilligan's descriptions of the source as someone he had known for some time, and that he had met several times and spoken on the phone from time to time; but Gilligan could have been embellishing.

3. Q417. Hatfield observed that the description of the source as a "British official who was involved in the preparation of the Dossier" matched Kelly. Kelly accepted this, but said that he had never acknowledged his role in the Dossier to anyone outside Government, although some might have guessed.

4. Q418 answer. Hatfield observed that the description of the source as "longstanding" and "one of the senior officials in charge of drawing up the Dossier" did not match Kelly, but again Gilligan could have been exaggerating.

5. Q449. Hatfield asked direct if Kelly had ever said that the "45 minute" assessment was put into the Dossier at a late stage (ie the week before publication, as Gilligan had alleged). Kelly replied that he had not been aware of the assessment (that some of Iraq's WMD could be ready within 45 minutes of an order) until he read it in the published version of the Dossier. He had not been involved in the final preparations of the Dossier (he had not been in London during August, but had been in

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September) The only late issue he had been involved in was responding to a request on whether from his perspective there was anything else to add to the Dossier. He had suggested adding passages on smallpox, but this had not been taken up. Hatfield double-checked - Kelly was saying that he was not aware of the 45 minute assessment until it was published and had no knowledge of the process by which it had been brought into the Dossier. Kelly confirmed

6. Q451 answer. Hatfield asked again if Kelly was the source of the "allegations" about the sexing-up of the Dossier. Kelly replied that he was not.

7. Q453 answer. Hatfield asked if Kelly had discussed he had discussed with Gilligan the issue of Uranium being sought from Niger. Kelly said he thought it had, but he was not involved in the issue and would not have offered his own view (his own position was that he had nothing other than the IAEA view). Hatfield asked again in relation to Q454 answer: Kelly replied that he did not (and would not have) offered the view that this assessment was based on "unreliable information"

8. Q455. Hatfield asked again if Kelly had been the source of the allegations about the "45 minute claim". Kelly reiterated that he was not

9. Q457 answer. Hatfield asked if there had been an exchange in which he identified Alistair Campbell as the person from No 10 who had asked for the Dossier to be changed to include the "45 minute claim". Kelly said that he had not said anything like the quotation that Gilligan attributed to the source: he did not have "wishes" in relation to the contents of the Dossier.

10. Q461 answer. Hatfield asked if the source's quote (that the "45 minute claim" had confused conventional and CBW deployment times) reflected Kelly's views. Kelly replied that he had no opinion on the "45 minute claim". He did not know what the original source was

11. Q463 answer. Hatfield asked if Kelly shared the source's view that Downing Street had spoiled its case by exaggeration. Kelly replied that he had not said that the Dossier was exaggerated. He had taken the line that the threat from Iraqi WMD was current and specific.

12. Q478. Hatfield observed that Kelly had already denied alleging that the 45 minute claim was unreliable.

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13 Q486 answer. Hatfield asked if Kelly shared the source's views that weapons at 45 minutes deployment would have been found by now because they could not be deeply concealed Kelly replied that this was not a statement he would make

14 Q511 answer Hatfield asked if Kelly was of the view that Iraq had not been able to weaponise CBW Kelly replied that this was not his assessment Hatfield asked if Kelly shared the source's views that it was 30% likely that there had been a Iraqi CW programme in the 6 months before the conflict Kelly replied that he had no doubt that Iraq had a CW programme, but this was the sort of assessment he might make purely to weapons production. Hatfield probed. Gilligan was specifically quoting his source – had Kelly used those actual words? Kelly said that he had not, but accepted that it could be an inaccurate summation of what he might have said Hatfield asked whether Kelly could have been the source of Gilligan's quotation in the Q545 answer (that it was more likely that Iraq had a BW programme, but that it was small) Kelly replied that he would not have used those terms, but that the statement could be a loose paraphrase of his views.

15. Q559 Hatfield observed that Kelly did not match Gilligan's confirmation that his source was someone in the intelligence services

16. Q565 answer. Kelly observed that Gilligan's description of the meeting's duration as being "a couple of hours, perhaps, an hour and a half" did not match the meeting he had been at his strong recollection was that it had been around 45 minutes

17 Hatfield summed up. There appeared to be consistencies between parts of Gilligan's testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee, and what Kelly says that he said to Gilligan. In particular, the meeting was set up at Gilligan's initiative, and Kelly had acknowledged that the statement that it was 30% likely that there was a CW programme in the 6 months before the conflict was consistent with his views. But there were significant discrepancies. In particular, Kelly denied having any knowledge of the "45 minutes claim" until after the Dossier was published, and denied having any knowledge of the process by which that assessment was included; he also denied giving any opinion that the evidence that Uranium had been sought from Niger was based on unreliable information. In addition, Kelly was not of the view that Iraq had not been able to weaponise CBW. There were other, minor inconsistencies with

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Gilligan's testimony: Kelly had not met Gilligan "several times", was not "long-standing, well-known" to Gilligan, and was not in the intelligence services, but Gilligan might well have wished to embellish. Hatfield said that overall, his judgement was that if there were a single source for Gilligan's information, then it was not Kelly. Kelly's words may have been part of the background to Gilligan's stories, but on the basis of what he had testified, he was satisfied that Kelly was not the source of the most significant allegations.

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