

NOTES OF A MEETING ON DAVID KELLY'S MEETING WITH
ANDREW GILLIGAN - 7 JULY

Present.

Mr Martin Howard, DCDI
Mr Richard Hatfield, Personnel Director
Dr Bryan Wells, DCPAC
Dr David Kelly, CPAC Special Adviser

1. Hatfield started by saying that he wanted the meeting to cover two issues. The first was to follow up the discrepancies between Gilligan's account of the meeting with his source, and Kelly's account of his meeting with Gilligan. The second issue was that MOD may wish to make a public statement, and he wished to discuss that with Kelly. The meeting was structured to follow Hatfield's comparative analysis circulated under his minute of 8 July to PS/PUS.
2. Serials 2 and 3. Hatfield said that Kelly had described the IISS Seminar in September 2002 as being the first time that he had consciously met Gilligan. Hatfield probed whether Kelly had indeed never met Gilligan before. Kelly replied that he could not recall having spoken to Gilligan before then. They certainly had not had a meeting or a purposeful discussion. Hatfield probed further; surely Kelly could not have forgotten such a meeting. Kelly replied that he could not recall one.
3. Hatfield then asked about the meeting between Kelly and Gilligan in February 2003. Kelly replied that the meeting was held at the Charing Cross Hotel and lasted for 45 minutes to 1 hour. It had taken place at Gilligan's suggestion. He could not recall having had any further contact until May.
4. Howard asked whether Kelly talked to journalists a lot. Kelly replied that he would have people contact him 3-4 times a week. Many of the calls were quite simply asking technical details. Howard commented that a non-technical discussion with Gilligan would therefore have stuck out.

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5 Serials 4 and 5 Hatfield asked Kelly to describe in detail his involvement in the Government's dossier of September 2002. Kelly said that to his recollection the idea of a dossier arose in April 2002. He had drafted his contributions (described in his letter of 30 June) during May and June 2002. He then recalled that the subject went into limbo. He was on leave for two weeks in August and then on duty in New York and consequently was not involved in any work during that month. His only subsequent involvement was when he was asked by DIS (in September) to look at the passages on biological weapons and consider whether anything extra could be added. He had suggested including a discussion of Smallpox, but that was subsequently rejected on the grounds of there being inadequate intelligence. That was the sum of his involvement. Howard asked if he had contacted in order to check textual amendments. Kelly replied that he had not. Howard also asked if Kelly had discussed the dossier with DIS staff. Kelly replied that he could not recall any in depth discussion. He recalled that there had not in any case been much discussion of the dossier at the time. He reminded the meeting that he had never acknowledged outside Government that he had contributed to the dossier.

6 Serial 6 Hatfield asked how Kelly described himself to Gilligan. Kelly replied that he assumed Gilligan would know that he was a senior adviser to DPACS/DCPAC. People had all sorts of ideas about his role; he continued to have a high profile on UNSCOM/UNMOVIC work, and a number of people believe that he was an intelligence officer. Hatfield asked if Gilligan thought that he was part of the intelligence agencies. Kelly replied that he could not exclude that possibility although he would not describe himself as such and would not have encouraged Gilligan to think it.

7. Serial 10. Howard asked if Gilligan had taken notes of the meeting. Kelly replied that Gilligan had produced a small notebook and pencil and had taken some notes but these were not copious.

8. Serial 8. Hatfield recalled that Kelly had been clear that the May meeting with Gilligan had lasted 45 minutes. He asked the basis for this. Kelly replied that the meeting had been fixed for 17.00 hours. He clearly recalled Gilligan

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turning up at 17.15. He believed that he left at about 18.00 to catch the 18.30 Paddington train.

9 Serial 11. Hatfield referred to the quotation from Gilligan's source that the dossier was "transformed the week before it was published to make it sexier". He asked Kelly if he had said this or something similar. Kelly said that he had not described the dossier as having been transformed the week before publication, and could not recall using the term "sexier". Hatfield probed: had Kelly said anything that could be construed as being that quotation? Kelly said that he could not recall; his memory was that discussion of the dossier was fleeting. Hatfield commented that the flavour of Gilligan's evidence to the FAC was that the meeting concentrated on the dossier. That was why the differing accounts of the meeting's length were important: a longer meeting would have allowed more discussion of the issues. Howard referred to the passage in Kelly's letter of 30 June where he said that the "45 minutes claim" was included in the dossier for "impact". Was this the exact word used or was it a paraphrase? Kelly replied that he would use that word on occasion, but could not recall if he had said it to Gilligan. But he would not use the phrase to imply criticism. He meant it in the sense that the claim was in the forward signed by the Prime Minister, rather than simply in the body of the text. It therefore had "impact" in that sense.

10 Serial 13. Howard asked if Kelly had seen the intelligence report relating to the "45 minutes claim". Kelly replied that he had not. Howard asked if Kelly was aware that there was intelligence on the subject. Kelly replied that he was not, until the issue was in the public domain. Hatfield referred to the quote from Gilligan's source which said that "WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes....not in original draft....included against their wishes because it wasn't reliable". Did Kelly say this? Kelly replied that he could not believe that he would have said this: he did not say that it was not in the original draft; and he didn't know the wishes of the intelligence services. Hatfield asked what question Gilligan was asking Kelly to respond to when the "45 minute claim" came up. Kelly replied that they were discussing why WMD had not been used during the conflict. He had explained his own view which was that weather conditions had prevented use early in the campaign, and breakdown of C2 had prevented its use in the later

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commented that this was different from Gilligan's description to the FAC. Kelly continued that he wondered now if he had been led on by Gilligan. His stock answer on the "45 minutes claim" was that in the early 90s, Iraq had a policy to fill to use. But this still required transportation of the stored armaments to launch sites for their use. All this was time-consuming. He therefore could not relate the claim to anything he knew of. But he recognised that he was not familiar with all the systems.

11 Serial 14. Hatfield asked Kelly about his discussions on uranium imports from Niger. Kelly said that so far as he could recall it was not discussed in depth. He would not have said anything other than to note the IAEA observations on the issue.

12 Serial 16. Hatfield asked if Kelly had discussed with Gilligan the role of Alastair Campbell in the dossier. Kelly replied that, as he had said in his letter of 30 June, Gilligan did raise the involvement of Campbell and Kelly said that he was unable to comment. Hatfield asked in what context the role of Alastair Campbell had been raised. Kelly replied that it was in the context of the editing process of the dossier. Hatfield asked what Kelly meant by being "unable to comment". Kelly replied that it would have been a dismissive response. Hatfield asked specifically if Kelly had himself referred to "Campbell". Kelly replied that he had not

13. Serial 17. Hatfield asked if Kelly had said that Downing Street "had asked repeatedly if anything could be added to the original draft". Kelly replied that he had not.

14. Serial 18. Hatfield asked if there had been any discussion of the Iraqi source for the "45 minutes claim". Kelly replied that he had no idea who the source was and did not speculate on that source with Gilligan. Hatfield asked Kelly if he had told Gilligan that Iraq had not been able to weaponise CBW. Kelly replied that he had not said this and he believed otherwise.

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15 Serial 24. Hatfield asked Kelly if he would have said whether that there was a 30% probability of there being a CW programme in the six months before the war. Kelly replied that 30% was the sort of figure he would use as the probability for there having been a current production programme. He was 100% certain that there had been a chemical weapon programme.

16. Serial 25 Hatfield asked if Kelly had said or believed that the Iraqi WMD threat was smaller and less imminent than that claimed by the government. Kelly replied that he believed the threat was both current and specific

17. Howard asked if Kelly was aware of anyone else who could have been a source for Gilligan. Kelly replied that he was not aware of any sources. He was aware that some points of his description of the meeting with Gilligan matched those of Gilligan's description of his meeting with the source. Kelly said that he was concerned that Gilligan would try to hang the other stories on to him.

18 Howard asked if anybody from the BBC, and in particular Gilligan, had tried to contact Kelly since the meeting on May 22. Kelly replied that Gilligan had not tried to contact him. The only BBC person he could recall having contacted him was Susan Watts, a science editor

19. Hatfield said that it was likely that the department would need to make some public statement on Kelly's involvement with Gilligan. He passed Kelly a draft press release and Kelly confirmed that he was content with its terms. Hatfield said that although Kelly was not named in the press release his identity may become known in due course. Kelly replied that he acknowledged this: in his letter of 30 June he had said that a friend at RUSI had alerted him to the possibility of his being considered as Gilligan's source.

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PRESS STATEMENT

An individual working in the MOD has volunteered that he met with Andrew Gilligan on 22 May to discuss Iraq in general. This was one week before Gilligan's story claiming that the Iraq dossier was "sexed up". The account of the meeting given by this official does not match the account given by Gilligan of his "single source".

This was an unauthorised contact which is being dealt with appropriately by line management.

There is no reason to suspect that a breach of security is involved

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