

08/07/2003

	<u>Subject</u>	<u>Gilligan Account</u>	<u>K Account</u>	<u>Comment</u>
1	Nature of Single Source (SS)	SS closely connected with Iraq WMD [A398, A418]. Currently serving official [A430]	K has had long involvement with UNMOVIC in particular	Fits K well but could also fit many others.
2	Nature of Single Source (SS)	Known SS for sometime, met several times, spoken on phone from time to time A398 Source of longstanding, well-known to me, [A418, A421]	First conversation in coffee break of IISS seminar September 2002. Subsequently met G in February and May 2003, before and after G's period in Iraq. G has not been in touch since May 22.	Suggests K is not SS but not conclusive; could be exaggeration/misrepresentation by Gilligan.
3	Nature of Single Source (SS)	A year since met SS face to face [A399] Had discussion with him 4 months before Sept dossier published (Gilligan article)	First spoke to Gilligan in Sept 2002. Two subsequent meetings (see above)	Not consistent with K as SS. Both Gilligan comments refer to approx May 2002 (also overlooks the meeting with Kelly in February 2003)
4	Nature of Single Source (SS)	SS was one of senior officials in charge of drawing up the dossier. [A419]	K contributed to background/historic parts of dossier. No involvement in intelligence component. K says that he has never acknowledged any role in the dossier to anyone outside government, although some might have guessed.	Not a description of K. And not consistent with his account of his talk with Gilligan. In particular, K denies claiming any role in preparing the dossier to Gilligan.  [K's business card describes him as Senior adviser to PACS]
5	Nature of Single Source (SS)	SS was in the absolute mainstream of the issue [A489]	K was not in the mainstream of the issue - but see comment	Not conclusive - K might have implied he was more involved than he was

7500/1/0057

08/07/2003

6	Nature of Single Source (SS)	"You approached ... a member of the intelligence services?" "Yes ... Absolutely Yes" [A559, 560"] Gilligan then appears to backtrack a little by referring to the broader description used on the Today programme	K is not a member of the intelligence services and could not be construed as such.	<u>If Gilligan's original A559 was correct, K is not SS</u>  The question is did he reveal more than he meant or did he simply make a slip.  Note: Times story of 5/7/03 suggests G's source is a military expert based in Iraq as part of US led survey group. K has made a brief visit to Iraq only <u>Consistent with K as SS</u>
7	The Meeting with SS	Gilligan initiated meeting, not specifically to discuss 45 minutes but Iraq generally [A556]	Gilligan initiated meeting, to talk about his experience in Iraq	<u>Consistent with K as SS</u>
8	The Meeting with SS	Meeting lasted 1.5 to 2 hours	Meeting lasted about 45 minutes	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>
9	The Meeting with SS	Took place in London Hotel [Gilligan article]	Charing Cross Hotel (suggested by Gilligan)	<u>Consistent with K as SS</u>
10	The Meeting with SS	Gilligan took contemporaneous notes - but can't say how extensive. He has been referring to the broadcast summary. But see comment.	G took some notes.	<u>Apparently consistent but</u> Recent media speculation suggests that G did not have paper and pencil and wrote up the discussion with SS afterwards <u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>
11	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	SS said that draft dossier was "transformed a week before it was published to make it sexier" [Q449 - drawn from Today programme and repeated in A518]	K denies making this claim. K did not see the intelligence component of the dossier before it was published.	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>
12	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	SS spoke of his concern that the dossier had been made "sexier" and Gilligan asked for specific examples. [A557]	K only admits to commenting on the 45 minute claim in response to G	<u>Not consistent with K's account of his meeting</u>

MOD/1/0058

08/07/2003

13	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	SS said "classic example was ... WMD were ready for use in 45 minutes... not in original draft ... included against their wishes because it wasn't reliable" [Q449 - drawn from Today programme][also Q/A 455 and A457]	K denies making this claim. K did not see the intelligence component of the dossier before it was published.	Not consistent with K as SS (K has however admitted a different comment about the 45 minute claim - see serial 18)
14	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	G says that the 45 minute story and the uranium story were the only two dossier items discussed [A492]	K admits a limited reference to 45 minute story, in response to G and does not recall discussing uranium (although it was mentioned by G)	Not conclusive - but Gilligan's account of the "45 minute" part of the conversation appears very different to K
15	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	In response to Sir J Stanley, Gilligan repeats that it is SS who is alleging that the JIC connived in embellishing the dossier. [Q451/452]	K denies making any such allegation.	Not consistent with K as SS
16	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	G asked "So how did this transformation happen" The answer was "Campbell" [Q457]	K denies accusing Campbell (or commenting on media allegations)	Not consistent with K as SS
17	SS accusation of "sexing-up" dossier	SS said that "Downing Street officials had asked repeatedly if anything could be added to the original draft [A457]	K denies saying this.	Not consistent with K as SS

MOD/1/0059

08/07/2003

18	The 45 minute claim	SS says that the 45 minute claim comes from a "single [Iraqi] source and was not reliable" [A457, A461, Q/A 478,479, A505, A507] SS believed that the [Iraqi] source for the intelligence had "made a mistake .. confusing conventional and CBW missiles .. He did not believe that any missiles had been armed with CBW that would .. be fireable at 45 minutes notice. [A461]	K denies saying this or talking about the Iraqi source. Indeed, he denies knowing anything about the [Iraqi] source for the intelligence.  Also denied  <b>K admits commenting, in response to G, that he did know of a weapon system that matched this claim.</b>	Gilligan is very specific, quoting his source's words and K is equally specific that he knew nothing about this aspect at all.  <u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>  BUT  <b>K's admission could well have been taken as collateral for the claim attributed to SS</b>  <u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>
19	The 45 minute claim	Gilligan gives more detail about what the Iraqi source of the 45 minute claim is supposed to have said [A481] and says specifically that this was why SS did not believe claim. [A483]	K denies saying this. He denies knowing (or speculating) about the [Iraqi] source for the intelligence	Although K's comment might have been seen as collateral for this, too
20	The 45 minute claim	SS said that if any weapon had been held at 45 minutes it would be found by now [A 486]	K denies saying this and does not believe it	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>
21	The 45 minute claim	Gilligan says that SS is "the centre" of his 45 minute story but is supported by other things [A525]		K's admitted comment might part of this wider collateral.

M00/1/0060

08/07/2003

22	The uranium claim	SS "cutting" about the claim that Uranium south from Africa. [A453/454] SS believed documents on which allegation rested were forged [A466]	K does not recall talking about uranium although Gilligan referred to it. K knows nothing about the uranium story other than what has appeared publicly and did not (and would not) offer the view that it was based on unreliable information.	This suggests that K is not the SS, but is not conclusive given the open media comment about the Uranium story
23	SS wider claims about scale of Iraqi threat	SS believes that Iraqis had not managed to weaponise CBW [A511]	K denies saying this and believes the opposite	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>
24	SS wider claims about scale of Iraqi threat	SS says it is 30% likely that there was a CW programme in the six months before the war and more likely that there was a small BW programme [A511, A543]	K admits that this might sound similar to his views but actually he is much more (100%) confident that Iraq had CW programmes. (The 30% figure would be akin to K's views about the actual weapons production although he had <u>certainly not used those words</u> )	On both occasions, Gilligan attributes exact words to SS, reducing the chance of any misunderstanding. <u>Inconclusive</u> but suggests K not SS although he might have been taken as providing general collateral for SS on this point.
25	SS wider claims about scale of Iraqi threat	SS believed that Iraq WMD programme was smaller and less imminent than claimed by HMG.	K denies saying this. On the contrary he agrees with the dossier's assessment that the threat was "current and specific"	<u>Not consistent with K as SS</u>

MOD/1/0061