(a) Did the Government behave in a way which was dishonourable or underhand or duplicitous in revealing Dr Kelly's name to the media, thereby subjecting him to the pressure and stress which were bound to arise from being placed in the media spotlight?

(b) If the Government did not behave in a way which was dishonourable or underhand or duplicitous in revealing Dr Kelly's name to the media, did the Government fail to take proper steps to help and protect Dr Kelly in the difficult position in which he found himself?

[22 September, page 25, line 4]

What I suggest to you is that there was a deliberate Government strategy to leak Dr Kelly's name into the public arena without appearing to do so, by a combination of the press statement, the question and answer material, the Prime Minister's official spokesman press briefing and other leaks which appear to have taken place to the press. That is what I suggest.

Q & A

Who is the official?

The official works in MoD.

What is his name and current post?

We wouldn't normally volunteer a name.

If the correct name is given, we can confirm it and say that he is senior advisor to the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat.

How long has he been in MoD?

He has been in his current position for 3 to 4 years. Before that he was a member of UNSCOM.

Did the official play any part in drawing up the dossier?

He was involved in providing historical details of UNSCOM's activities prior to 1998.

Is he a senior figure?

He is not a member of the SCS - he is a middle-ranking official.

Is he still working for MoD?

Yes.

Is he in Iraq?

No, though he visited Iraq recently for a week.

Is he a member of the ISG?

No.

Do you believe he is the single source?

It is not for us to say - only the BBC can confirm that.

So he hasn't volunteered to being the source?

No. He volunteered that he met Mr Gilligan and discussed the September dossier.

It is unprecedented for a Government Department to make a statement of this sort. Why have you done it?

There is no comparable situation that springs to mind. We have set out the facts as they have been put to us, on an issue of considerable public concern. The official involved volunteered the information to us.

Can we interview the individual?

No - this is not appropriate as the consequences will be dealt with by MoD internally.

Will he be disciplined/sacked?

Appropriate management steps will be taken. On the basis of our current understanding of the situation, he will not be sacked.

Where did he meet Mr Gilligan?

He says they met in the Charing Cross Hotel, central London.

In what form did this official come forward?

The official approached his line manager, which is the standard procedure for raising concerns. He has also been interviewed by the relevant members of senior staff.

Why has the official come forward now?

It followed his reading of the detailed evidence Mr Gilligan gave to the FAC.

What was it in that evidence that made the official consider that his conversation might be relevant?

The official felt that a number of elements of the conversation he had with Mr Gilligan were consistent with Mr Gilligan's evidence to the FAC when describing his single source. Though a number were not. For details - see the statement.

Are you suggesting Mr Gilligan deliberately "sexed up" his story?

We are making no accusations. We are merely setting the information that has been put to us.

When did he come forward?

At the beginning of last week.

Why has it taken you a week to produce the information?

It was necessary to arrange for the official to be interviewed to establish, as far as we can, the details of his meeting with Gilligan.

When was he interviewed?

On Friday and Monday.

Which senior staff were informed?

The PUS was informed on Thursday. He informed the Secretary of State that evening.

When were No 10 told and if they were, why?

No 10 were told on Friday. It is only natural that they would be informed of a development on an issue of major concern.

Which other government departments were told?

As you would expect, Cabinet Office and FCO.

Why did you not tell the FAC over the weekend?

A further interview was required and that took place on Monday afternoon.

What if the BBC deny he is the source?

We have not claimed he is - I refer you back to our statement.

Can the FAC/ISC interview him?

We will be willing to consider any such request.

Were No 10 involved in this announcement?

The decision to issue a statement was made by the MoD.

How can you be sure that there has been no breach of the OSA?

On the basis of the information we have been given, there is no evidence to suggest a breach.

[18 August, page 46, line 1]

A …. We had formed a view - I think there was a consensus amongst those closely involved in this issue in the department, really from the beginning, on two points: really that ultimately the MoD would have to make a public statement, would have to offer a public statement and that, secondly, Dr Kelly's name was likely to come into the public domain. If that is the case, which we believed it to be, we had to agree an approach whereby we could handle that situation.

[18 August, page 48, line 12]

A. We had discussed the whole issue of handling the name; and essentially Martin and I had - and essentially there were two issues. One, that it was possible that Dr Kelly's name would emerge; and the second issue was that during that process or at the same time as or even before, there were a group of other individuals who had similar backgrounds to him who might be identified incorrectly and on whom the media spotlight would fall and in a case related to this particular issue, that spotlight would be very strong. We agreed therefore that we were not prepared to have that situation, that it would be unfair on others.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. So accordingly, if you decide on that policy that you cannot have a situation whereby people are wrongly identified and subjected to a lot of attention from the media, it follows, therefore, that if an incorrect name is put to you, that you will have to reject it.

MR KNOX: Is not all this a bit of a charade though, because as soon as you make it plain to the press: give me the right name and I will tell you if you have the right answer, you are doing effectively exactly the same thing by an incorrect means as what you could do directly and just give the name out?

A. No, I think we had - you know, we had not had Dr Kelly - the idea of Dr Kelly's name being made public had not been discussed with him. The time that you would have had to consider it, between when he was consulted about the final version of this statement and when it went out, would have been insufficient for him to consider it properly and to make what other arrangements he needed.

One of the purposes for saying to people that we would be prepared to confirm the right name was going back to what I have originally said, which was that we were seeking to avoid the people who were not involved being named in the media, and the only way we could seek to do that was to make it clear to journalists we would correct wrong names so they did not get into the public domain.

Q. Did you tell Dr Kelly as far as you were aware you would be adopting this strategy, namely confirming to journalists his name if they managed to come up with it?

A. I did not speak to Dr Kelly at any point.

Q. Do you have any reason to suppose he was told this?

A. He was certainly told on more than one occasion, as I understand, that his name was likely to come into the public domain.

Q. I know, but was he told that this strategy would be adopted by the MoD press office?

A. Not to my knowledge.

LORD HUTTON: I should make it clear perhaps to the press that if I put certain questions to you that it does not mean at all I have reached any conclusion on the point. I have to consider a number of possibilities. I understand your reasoning in saying if a number of names are considered and they are not the correct names, the spotlight would fall unfairly on them; and therefore the thinking was: well, to avoid that, if we are given names which are incorrect, we will say so. But another way of looking at it is that if you adopt that approach, when the press do learn the correct name the spotlight falls very fiercely indeed on that particular person. Let us say you have six people whose names are being discussed in the press. People will then realise that certainly it is very general speculation and the individuals named may well not be the correct people at all. Certainly there is no particular person who would be regarded necessarily as being the actual civil servant concerned. But did you give any consideration to the fact that by permitting Dr Kelly's name to come out, he would be subjected to very intense media speculation?

A. Yes, I mean, there are two points I would like to make.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Certainly.

A. The first is that whilst you might suggest that if a number of names are bandied around they would not be subjected to a great deal of media interest and concentration, I think because the profile of this subject was so large, I think actually that it would have had a lot of media attention, which would have been most unhelpful and most unfair.

The second point is, though, that we were certainly concerned for Dr Kelly. It is not as if, you know, we agreed this approach just because it was purely the best way to avoid other people being named, and accordingly, as I say, he had been made aware on two occasions that we were likely to have to make a statement, his name would come into the public domain. On the evening of the 8th July, Dr Kelly was rung by the chief press officer to alert him to the level of media interest that had arisen following the issue of our statement, to make sure that she had - or rather he had her contact number, made clear she was available to offer advice 24 hours a day, and also to suggest to him he might wish to consider staying with friends. So we were very mindful of that, and for the reasons I have given why we did not think it was fair the media spotlight would fall on others, we were aware that spotlight would be heavy and he would need guidance on how to deal with that.

[18 August, page 65, line 17]

Q. What I think might look strange is obviously you decide not to name him outright but you give all these clues and it is inevitable, is it not, once you have given all these clues, the press are going to get the right name if you have told them "I will confirm it"?

A. As I say, I do not accept this material was offered on the basis of it offering clues. There are several other points I would make. One is if, as you seem to be trying to suggest or others may suggest, all we were doing was planting lots of hints about the real identity of the unnamed official, then it is surprising on the other hand that (a) it took journalists 24 hours at least to work it out and (b) that they were ringing, putting quite a large number of names to us. So those two things seem to be slightly contradictory.

Q. It might be thought you did not want to be thought to be seen naming him directly, is that right?

A. No, I do not accept that. As I say, we had taken a decision that he would not be named in the statement and therefore we were not - you know, we were not offering anything more that would seek to undermine that decision, I can assure you.

[18 August, page 113, line 24]

Q. …can I just ask you a series of questions about Dr Kelly's name coming out into the public domain? I mean, was one of the reasons that Dr Kelly's name was wanted to be put into the public arena was to correct - was to show that Mr Gilligan was wrong about what he claimed to have been told?

A. Not Dr Kelly's name. I mean, the fact that someone had come forward certainly, as again I referred to that Kevin Tebbit letter of Friday made it clear: if we had these facts, we should make them public. One just has to think for a second what would have happened if we had not made them public and what we would have been accused of in those circumstances in terms of a cover up.

[18 August, page 123, line 21]

A. You recall from the previous meeting what we had been discussing was how we should make the fact that someone had come forward public because we thought it would be wrong to withhold that information. So we were clear it was going to become public. The manner in which we had discussed doing it in the first meeting was that letter to the ISC. That was now no longer possible since the ISC did not want us to do it that way, so we had to look at other means of doing so.

Q. What were those other means? First of all with the ISC, how did you sort that out?

A. Well, with the ISC we adopted the idea that had been put to us by them, that we could refer at the end of our press release to the fact that this individual was willing to be interviewed by them. But in terms of how we would make it public we reverted to the idea of a press release, which is what had been sent to us by the MoD the previous evening.

Q. So the 8th July, because the ISC are not happy with you publicising the letter to them -

A. Hmm.

Q. - you are now going back to the Ministry of Defence press release?

A. That is correct.

Q. You, in fact, produced some Q and A material. Can I take you to CAB/1/59? You can see that there is an e-mail. Can you tell everyone who that e-mail is to and from?

A. Yes, the first one in the sequence is from our Parliamentary private secretary, the person who deals with Parliamentary affairs, to me. Then it is replied from me to her.

Q. Right. What is the first one about?

A. Well, they are both about a Q and A on the issue of this official coming forward.

Q. Right. And why were you drafting this?

A. Well, it turns out, having spoken to this official subsequently, this was actually a misunderstanding. There was - this official thought she was drafting a Q and A for the Prime Minister's questions on Wednesday, which is her job to prepare for that. I thought she was drafting a more general Q and A on this issue.

Q. Right. So these are draft - if you turn to page 60, you can see most of these will need to be answered by MoD: "When was the PM made aware that the individual had come forward? And by who?" You can see it appears to be directed towards questions to the Prime Minister.

A. Yes.

Q. So these are drafts of what was understood, then, to be an issue that might be raised at Prime Minister's Questions, is that right?

A. That is correct. It was a rather sort of a - not a terribly well-developed piece of work. It was a very rapid series of quick fire questions and even less series of responses which I e-mailed back very quickly, but this piece of work did not go anywhere subsequently.

[18 August, page 148, line 8]

Q. You discussed it. Can you tell us what the gist of those discussions were?

A. Yes. I think there were two things that we discussed particularly. The first was whether or not we should make the fact that an official had come forward - whether we should make this available to the Foreign Affairs Committee and also to the ISC, the Intelligence and Security Committee, because we knew that they were both meeting to discuss the issue of the allegations in Mr Gilligan's broadcast.

[18 August, page 149, line 18]

MR DINGEMANS: And so there is discussion about the ISC and FAC. And were any conclusions reached?

A. The conclusions were that they should certainly consider whether we should make this information available to them. No conclusion was reached in the sense that we decided that we definitely should; but we were concerned that this was important, perhaps material, to their enquiries and we should therefore consider very carefully whether to make this information known to them.

[18 August, page 152, line 6]

Q … … the sudden concern to ensure that Dr Kelly should appear before the FAC, or the Government should be seen to be cooperating with the FAC, seems on the face of it inconsistent with the attitude that had been displaced (sic) [displayed] before.

A. Well, I can only speak for myself but I would have thought that we should certainly make the fact available to the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee that this had happened. It would be for him then to decide what he wanted to do with that knowledge. But if I had been asked for my advice at that stage, I would have said that since there had been a major Public Inquiry conducted by the Foreign Affairs Committee on this issue, if someone had come forward who seemed to be potentially very important we must at least consider, which is what we were discussing on that Friday night, whether that fact should be made available to him.

[18 August, page 162, line 24]

Q. Did that influence your thinking of the matter, namely the understanding that Dr Kelly was happy for his name to go forward?

A. It seemed to me important that he should be consulted on this, yes.

Q. Important that he should be consulted; but his reported answer or the answer reported to you, that was obviously a factor in your approach to it, is that right?

A. Yes, it was a factor in my approach. But I have to be honest with you, I thought it very unlikely that if the conclusion was reached that Dr Kelly might well be Andrew Gilligan's source, that it would be possible to shield his name from public knowledge.

Q. Why is that?

A. Because I was struck by the article in The Times on Saturday the 5th which, if I recall, was a front page article which clearly showed that the press were very interested in who Andrew Gilligan's source or sources might be. And it seemed to me that it was unlikely given the level of press and public interest, that if somebody had come forward in this sort of way that their name was likely to remain secret.

Q. If you had known, for example, that Dr Kelly was less than happy about his name coming out, if that had been his view, would that have affected your views on whether his name should be given to the FAC or ISC?

A. I think if I had known he was unhappy about it, it would have perhaps qualified the way that we spoke or indicated to the chairs of those Committees; but I would still have taken the view that we should make it known to the chairman and the chair of the ISC, the chairman of the FAC, that someone had come forward.

[18 August, page 175, line 10]

Q … …. what is concluded at this meeting that started at about 11.30 on Tuesday 8th July?

A. I think the conclusion was that we should inform the chair of the ISC, since the ISC was still conducting its enquiries and it was therefore a live Inquiry, and that this should be done by means of a letter to Ann Taylor, who is the chair, and that it should probably go from David Omand and that this letter, I think, should be copied to Donald Anderson, the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Q. Right. I think you have explained why Ann Taylor is going to get the letter, because she has an ongoing Inquiry. Why is it going to be copied to Donald Anderson?

A. Because, as I think I said earlier, we felt that it was very important that we were not in the position of apparently withholding key information from the Foreign Affairs Committee, which had just spent several weeks investigating this matter when something that was perhaps very important had just emerged and that as a courtesy, to say the least, we should tell the chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee what had happened.

[19 August, page 137, line 4]

A. I was telephoned by Geoff Hoon about a different matter. He was actually just phoning up to offer his support and solidarity in advance of Monday. He asked me whether Jonathan Powell had mentioned I think from memory he thought the source issue. I said: no he had not, what is that? He explained somebody had come forward, that this person had admitted meeting Mr Gilligan in I think he said at that time in a hotel, that the person had acknowledged saying some of the things that had been reported by Mr Gilligan but had insisted that he had not said other things. Again, I cannot remember if this was what Mr Hoon said to me but certainly then or subsequently I was told that related specifically to this person, saying they had never said anything in relation to me.

Q. Right. And did Mr Hoon share what his initial instinct was in relation to this matter?

A. His initial instinct was I think he felt this was serious and this was a serious disciplinary matter and this person, if it was the source, had clearly caused the Government considerable difficulty and embarrassment by saying something to a reporter that was not true, but then went on to say - and this, I think, accorded with my instinct at the time - that he was in all probability telling the truth in saying that he did not say all of these things.

If I can just explain why I felt that. I had always felt about this story that Mr Gilligan probably did have a source, but that he exaggerated the source and he exaggerated what the source said. So it kind of fitted with the feeling I had had about this. I think what Mr Hoon was saying was his initial instinct was this person has to be dealt with severely but then actually thought: well, he has come forward, he has come forward in the spirit of openness and honesty and he is claiming he has been misrepresented if he is the source.

Spoke to Hoon who said that a man had come forward who felt he was possibly Gilligan's source, had come forward and was being interviewed today. GH said his initial instinct was to throw the book at him, but in fact there was a case for trying to get some kind of plea bargain. Says that he'd come forward and he was saying yes to speak to AG, yes he said intel went in late, but he never said the other stuff. It was double-edged but GH and I agreed it would f*** Gilligan if that was his source. He said he was an expert rather than a spy or a full-time MOD official. GH and I agreed to talk tomorrow.

[19 August, page 138, line 15]

Q. You use a specific phrase in your diary. I am going to have to ask you just to relate that and explain it.

A. I have used in my diary - the reason I did not use it in answer to you now is I think it does risk being unfair to Mr Hoon. He actually said his initial instinct was, as I say, to be severe in this regard but there was a case for trying to get some kind of plea bargain. That is what I recorded.

Q. A plea bargain with?

A. In relation to the person who had come forward. In other words, the person had been honest and open in coming forward, had acknowledged some of the, if you like, offences that were being described, but was adamant he had not been responsible for others.

Q. Why do you say that is likely to be misinterpreted or unfair?

A. Because I think it carries a suggestion that Mr Hoon was saying to me: I think we can do some kind of deal with this guy, and that is not what he was saying.

Q. Did you have any view about what this was likely to do to Mr Gilligan?

A. I felt that if this person was the source, and Mr Hoon had explained to me that the person was not a member of the Intelligence Services, was not centrally involved in the drawing up of the dossier, I therefore felt that if this person was the source then it was probably the only way that we were actually going to be able to establish the truth, namely that the allegations of May 29th were false, because of course Mr Gilligan had told the Select Committee they were based on a single source.

[19 August, page 144, line 24]

Q. Can I then turn to 6th July, which is the Sunday? How would you describe you spent most of this particular weekend? Who were you speaking to over this particular weekend?

A. Well, I was - the FAC was due to report on Monday so I was working on that, and certainly talking to Jack Straw, I think, at some point during the day on that. I also spoke, over that weekend, to the Prime Minister, Geoff Hoon and Jonathan Powell about the issue of the source.

Q. And what was your view about that matter?

A. My view was that, as I said earlier, it was probably - if this person was the source, it was probably the only way that this issue was going to be properly bottomed out. I suggested to the Prime Minister two proposals - I cannot remember exactly when these were, but the first - my first instinct, and I think Geoff Hoon's as well, was that if this development came out over that weekend the Foreign Affairs Committee were going to accuse us of having covered it up. And I was suggesting that, in confidence, not the name and I did not know the name at that point, but that Donald Anderson possibly be informed that there had been this development and that it might be relevant to the way that he framed his report on Monday which, as you say, had already gone to the printers by then.

And the second proposal I made was that the BBC governors be told in advance of their meeting on the Sunday evening.

Q. And why were you keen, as it were, to get the fact that a source or a possible source had come forward out to either the FAC or the BBC?

A. Because I thought that that development ought to have a material effect upon the outcome of those two events on the assumption that this was the source.

Q. And did the Prime Minister accept your advice in that respect, or yours and Mr Hoon's views in that respect?

A. No. No, he did not.

Q. What was his view?

A. His view - he could see the point and we had a discussion about it; and he said: I hear what you say, I can see that if it comes out - and the thing to understand about this, is that these - I mean, Government departments do leak and these kind of things can get out and he was worried that that might happen there over that weekend. So the Prime Minister said: I hear what you say about the cover-up point, I hear what you say about the BBC, but you have to leave this to Sir Kevin Tebbit and David Omand to handle. And I was guided by that instruction.

Q. Did you think that was the right approach?

A. I felt - at the time I am not sure that I did, but I think I do now.

Q. Did Mr Hoon think that was the right approach?

A. I think he felt, like I did, that the - this was a development that could, at that time, possibly have been communicated to these bodies. But he too - I think he discussed it - he certainly discussed it with Jonathan Powell. He may well have discussed it with the Prime Minister as well. The Prime Minister's view was very, very clear and everybody understood it from the word go.

[19 August, page 150, line 9]

MR DINGEMANS: What are you saying should have been adopted?

A. I have to admit this is, in part, a hindsight point.

Q. Yes.

A. But it is a thought that I had at the time, which I probably did not articulate as forcefully as I normally do articulate proposals that I have, because I was being instructed by the Prime Minister just to stay a little bit distant from this, because I was so centrally involved in relation to the events concerning the Foreign Affairs Committee.

I feel, and I think this is something Godric Smith in his own way did articulate at the time but again maybe we did not push this in the way that we should, but in these difficult situations where you are dealing with individuals as well as institutions and individuals who are not necessarily, as Mr Dingemans said, used to dealing with some of the things that we are used to dealing with all the time, then clarity is always best, and I completely understand why the Ministry of Defence had the strategy that they had in relation to if you like the two stage statement because Dr Kelly had said he did not want to be in that first wave, he had made that clear, we were told.

But I think again, and I emphasise this is with an element of hindsight, that probably what I feel I maybe should have expressed more forcefully at that time is: look, if you are in this kind of situation you do have to have some element of control over the process here. You cannot just let this sort of dribble out in a way that you are not clear how it is then going to unfold. So I think the desired outcome, given that everybody, including it seems Dr Kelly, understood that it is likely because of the importance of this development he was likely to be identified, he was likely to have to appear at one or both Select Committees, far better it would have been for that to be announced properly, cleanly, straightforwardly and then you can actually put in place all the proper support that somebody who is not used to this kind of pressure can then maybe better deal with it.

LORD HUTTON: But that is going to subject the individual to very great pressure. He is going to be put into the full glare of the media.

A. I accept that, but I think the judgment that was being reached by everybody involved in these discussions is that was going to happen because since Dr Kelly's death, I mean, parts of the media have been trying to give the impression: you know that they would never have been interested in this issue if it had not been for this clue, that clue and all the rest of it. The media were in full pursuit of this story and it was going to happen. I am afraid it is just the way of the world that we are in that the - I do not know if - I saw an interview Tom Mangold did after Dr Kelly's death where he said Dr Kelly understood this. Maybe he did understand it but maybe he did not understand the ramifications of it, that it was going to happen.

[19 August, page 154, line 2]

A …. I felt, in some of those discussions that we were having, during that period, that there was an element of unreality about them; that any second there could have been a phone call.

Indeed, it seems that the report of Mr Rufford - the reporter Mr Rufford from the Sunday Times was already on to this. It was going to happen. I think what we - again, I say with the benefit of hindsight what we did not do was actually just acknowledge that and I think maybe more time could then have been taken with Dr Kelly to sit down and say: look, this is virtually inevitable, it is going to have to happen and therefore let us work out exactly all the steps that then have to be taken.

As I say, it is easy in a sense to - and I do not want to feel that I am criticising others in this, because I understand how these strategies can get drawn up in very difficult, fast moving situations. But I think that would have been a better approach.

[19 August, page 163, line 9]

Q. We then come on to the 8th July. The Prime Minister is prepared, in the morning, for the Liaison Committee. I think we have heard from Mr Powell about that yesterday. Then at 11.30am he returns from the Liaison Committee and there is a discussion about whether or not Dr Kelly's name should be made public. Were you party to that discussion?

A. I was party to parts of that discussion.

[19 August, page 165, line 12]

LORD HUTTON: Mr Campbell, in a sense I think you have already given detailed answers to a number of matters relating to Dr Kelly's name being released, but appreciating that, I would just like to ask you another general question: suppose at this discussion on 8th July someone had said: let us just hold on for a minute, this is a civil servant who has given very distinguished service to his country, he has admittedly been indiscreet in speaking to a journalist as he has, but if we release his name we are going to subject him to very considerable strain. Is that right that we should do this? Can we not simply batten down the hatches? And there is a risk of a leak but perhaps it will not come out, or if the names are put to us we just say: we do not respond to questions about civil servants. I know you have in a sense already responded to that question, but I wondered if you could give a general answer, a general summary as to what the response would have been if that question had been raised?

A. I think you could have done that, but I think it would still have ended with all the media pressure - media and other pressure that you refer to, because I think it would have come out, because these things do. And again, I mean, I am slightly - I have given up reading newspapers in recent weeks but I have a slight concern that things I have said already will be taken as critical of others. I regret that if that is the case. I do want to say in all those discussions I was privy to Kevin Tebbit in particular was absolutely solicitous. He did not make the point in exactly the way that you put it -

LORD HUTTON: No, I appreciate that.

A. - but he was constantly emphasising: this is an employee. Yes, he has clearly done something that he should not have done, but we are his employer and have a duty of care to him.

The other observation I would make from those discussions, again this clearly is a hindsight point, but the impression I got - I did not know Dr Kelly, but the impression I got was of, and the way that he was being described was actually of a very strong, resolute character, clearly of deep conviction and who had been in many difficult, stressful circumstances, and I just do not think it crossed anybody's mind that it might take the turn that it did.

[19 August, page 167, line 15]

LORD HUTTON: But a cover-up in what sense? What would have been covered up?

A. What would have been covered up would be the fact - bear in mind - and this is why it was so difficult to draft that press release that was finally released, because there were so many of these competing factors. Part of the discussion that I recall, involving Sir Kevin Tebbit, Sir David Omand, the Prime Minister and others, was Sir Kevin clearly not being 100 per cent sure about whether - what Dr Kelly had actually said, about what he might say if he was called before a Select Committee.

So I do not think people should imagine that we were sitting there thinking: well, Dr Kelly, up before the Select Committee, it is unadulterated, unalloyed good news for the Government. It was not necessarily going to be so because Kevin Tebbit had reported he did have concerns about some aspects of the Government's position.

LORD HUTTON: So the concern was that if his name was not given by the Government but it was later revealed, it might transpire that Dr Kelly had views which were quite or strongly critical of the Government?

A. That is right; and that is why the Government did not want to put him before public scrutiny. And I think if, for example, on that Saturday that I was talking to the Prime Minister and Jonathan Powell and the Defence Secretary about the issue, if one of the Sunday papers, on that Saturday, had discovered this development then I can guarantee you the headlines the next day would have been "Government cover-up on eve of FAC report".

[20 August, page 58, line 23]

Q. Did you at this stage [7 July 2003] have any view about whether or not Dr Kelly's name should be made public?

A. I started from the premise that it was inevitable that his name would become public at some stage. He had implied as much in his own letter.

Q. We have seen the passages where he says someone at RUSI - you think it may be Chatham House -

A. Yes.

Q. - may have known him, and also that he thought that some suspicion might fall on him.

A. Yes.

Q. Is there not a difference between those two passages and actually giving the name out to the press?

A. There is indeed, but there are many other elements in between the two points. As I say, the comment from a member of staff who did not know about this beforehand, having read The Times on Saturday, saying: they have all but named him, was also very significant. I have learnt subsequently actually, I did not know at the time, that knowledge that Dr Kelly had had meetings with Andrew Gilligan were becoming discussed at cocktail parties that officials in the Ministry of Defence were having. I only learnt that subsequently but it gives, I think, a flavour of the sort of environment.

[20 August, page 72, line 1]

LORD HUTTON: ….. can you just elaborate a little more on the point: why, if the Government were aware that there was an official who had not been directly concerned in drawing up the intelligence part of the dossier, if they knew there was such an official, why would the Government feel obliged to put his views into the public arena?

A. The 45 minutes comment he would make, I think, was not a central point here. The central point was that if we were certain that Dr Kelly provided the explanation for a story which had a fundamental influence on public confidence and trust in the Government's policies, then there was a strong case, one might almost say a duty, to bring that information forward.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. So it was because he was the source of the story, not just that he was an official who may have held views that differed from the Government's views?

A. Absolutely. I think it was almost a unique and unprecedented case, my Lord. Here was a single anonymous source, we had learnt from Mr Gilligan, who was responsible for a judgment which had a major effect on the confidence in the Government and on the intelligence process. If we find that there is a single identified source who says, effectively, "It was I, but I did not say those things, they are" as Dr Kelly put it "a considerable embellishment on what I said", then that would be the only way of clarifying reliably the public record. It would have been no good for the Government to say: we have an anonymous source who we think might be the same one that said something different. The authenticity would have depended on the individual being named.

[20 August, page 74, line 7]

MR DINGEMANS: So would the Government be accused of a cover up if Dr Kelly does not believe he is the source, and you may agree or disagree with him, and he has uncomfortable views on some aspects of the 45 minutes claim? Where is the cover up in that?

A. I think the cover up is: here we are, sitting on information of great relevance to the Foreign Affairs Committee, and indeed the Intelligence and Security Committee, which arrives in a letter dated 30th June and here we already are, 7th July, the Foreign Affairs Committee have reported without any knowledge of this. This was a critical adjunct to Andrew Gilligan's testimony, which was the main reason for the Foreign Affairs Committee's hearing and process. We had said nothing about it. Here we were, a week later. It did look as it we were withholding information of great public interest.

[20 August, page 83, line 4]

Q. Can I also take you to the defensive Q and A material which is at MoD/1/62, which I think was prepared for the reaction to the press release, which I think we have been told went out at about quarter to 6 on Tuesday, 8th July. Were you aware of this defensive Q and A material?

A. Yes, I was aware of it.

Q. Were you party to any of the drafting of this defensive Q and A material?

A. No, I did not draft any of it. I did glance through it.

Q. Do you know whether or not Dr Kelly was aware, if this was all a voluntary process, of the defensive Q and A material?

A. No I do not think he would have - I am sure he did not see the Q and A.

Q. He did not see the Q and A?

A. I am pretty sure he did not.

Q. Perhaps you can tell me if this is right or wrong: if you go through the Q and A material, we have been told if they ask these questions, they get these answers; this is to prepare all the press officers so they are giving the same answers. That is right, is it not?

A. (Pause). Yes- well, I assume so. I mean, I did not spend time myself in going through the detailed Q and A. I regarded that as the normal backgrounding that is given on these sorts of issues. I spent more time over the actual statement itself.

Q. I understand that. But now that you have had a chance to look at the Q and A material.

[Part of the Q and A material was then read out by counsel.]

…it does seem, reading this, and certainly I think we are likely to hear this from journalists, that once you got these clues, if they can be so described, it is not going to be very difficult to identify Dr Kelly?

A. These were not intended to be clues.

[20 August, page 85, line 22]

A … So my own view was always that it would be preferable for Dr Kelly to come forward with a clear statement. We had not reached that stage on the Tuesday evening, because the discussions with Dr Kelly had still been concentrating on the discrepancies between his account and Andrew Gilligan's. Nevertheless, it was felt, not just in the Ministry of Defence but very strongly in No.10 and in the Cabinet Office, that it was necessary for a statement to be made, that the information could not be held on to. I was not, myself, present during all the discussions on the Tuesday because I was in Portsmouth handing out awards for bravery for people who had managed to save the "Nottingham" from sinking, so it was an event that I could not really cancel. But I was aware of the discussions that were going on at No.10 and the Cabinet Office and there was a very strong feeling that we needed to come forward with the information. If -

MR DINGEMANS: Who did you understand that strong feeling to come from?

A. Well, it was a collective view of Sir David Omand, John Scarlett, the Prime Minister. It was one which I did not disagree with at all, but I was not there. And, as you recall, the first idea was that this should be sent in the form of a letter to the Intelligence and Security Committee for them to look at, and also that it should be put to the BBC in the context of: we are not asking you to say whether this is the source but only to say if it is not, so that we could be clear on our ground. As it happened, Ann Taylor decided she did not wish to receive this unless it was preceded by a public statement.

Q. Is that the reason that the impetus came for the public statement?

A. I think that was the reason, so that when I returned from Portsmouth it was quite clear that the view in Whitehall, which we shared in the Ministry of Defence, we did not dissent, was that we should indeed issue a public statement, and the sense was that that needed to be done more or less then on that date, the Tuesday or so. So we needed to issue a statement before we had got to a stage really where we could name Dr Kelly, because the last conversation we had had with him had not actually got to that point.

Q. He had not yet said: okay, give my name out?

A. He had not been asked that question.

Q. And so when the defence Q and A material is deployed and the material not intended to be clues is used as clues by journalists, and the journalists then come back with the right name, and the name is given out, was Dr Kelly, at this stage, voluntarily cooperating with the process?

A. I think again this is not the context that I would put it in. We needed to come up with the statement that was sufficiently informative to justify its existence. That is to say, it had to explain that the individual who had come forward had a status which was different from that alleged by Mr Gilligan and also that his views were not exactly the same as those claimed by Mr Gilligan on this critical issue of Government interference on the dossier, in order to justify the statement and the intention of it being discussed further in the Intelligence and Security Committee.

The need for a question and answer brief in the first instance was no more than that we had always expected that Dr Kelly's name would come out, at any moment, throughout this process from the receipt of his letter onwards, growing over time. So there was always a need to anticipate the prospect that journalists would say, anyone would say: you know, we know it is Kelly. And we could not deny that it was Dr Kelly if that circumstance arose. We could not deny it partly because this is not an issue on which to play games, it was an issue of vast public importance, and partly because it would have been wrong for other members of the Ministry of Defence to come under suspicion and media scrutiny, which indeed did happen.

I mean, this was not an abstract concern. This was a real point. We had journalists tapping on the windows of an individual's house trying to attract the attention of their children in order to talk to their father, who happened to be a member of the Ministry of Defence. Nothing to do with this issue at all. But the idea that we could not allow others to come under that sort of scrutiny was real. It was not an abstract point. And therefore we had to be prepared to say: no, it is not X or it is not Y.

Therefore, to the extent there was a strategy, it was simply that. The question and answers were guidance for backgrounding, but there was no intention of, as it were, volunteering the name or playing games with the press trying to help them get the name. They certainly worked hard enough to find it. In a way, I fear, the statement we made showed the futility really of trying to make a statement based on an anonymous source. If the name is not there, the press is not that interested. They spent huge efforts trying to find out who it was.

[20 August, page 97, line 1]

Q. On 14th July I think you have a conversation with Mr Howard about whether Dr Kelly felt under stress. Do you -

A. Yes. I can remember - I mean, it was not prompted by anything other than a general concern that Dr Kelly should be coping and so I asked Mr Howard to make sure that he was okay.

[20 August, page 97, line 20]

Q. Is there anything else that you know of the circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly's death that you can assist his Lordship with?

A. I do not think there is. I have thought long and hard about this issue. As you can imagine, as Permanent Secretary I have felt deep sense of responsibility, not of culpability but of responsibility in this area, since he was a member of my staff and my staff were talking to him. So his death came as a terrible shock. I have thought long and hard about the approach that was taken, whether it was reasonable to ensure that Dr Kelly came forward to tell his story. I still believe that to have been the right course of action. I believe that was correct on a number of grounds. Firstly, on grounds of proportionality. I mean, this was not a minor issue. This was a major issue, in terms of Government reputation and in terms of the integrity of the whole way in which we handle intelligence. And in those circumstances one has to weigh that against individual considerations.

The second issue was the problem of having a single anonymous source, and then an individual comes forward who we have reason to believe is that source, or at least provides the explanation for what Andrew Gilligan reported. In other words, these are very special circumstances. So correcting the public record could only be achieved by that single anonymous source being named as the individual who can provide the explanation.

The third issue that I have thought about concerns accountability. I mean normally, as the Permanent Secretary, or indeed Ministers such as Geoff Hoon, if officials in our departments are carrying out our business, implementing Government policy, sometimes controversially, sometimes disagreeing, sometimes issues arising in the press, we still take responsibility for their actions and do not expect to put them in front of committees. I appear regularly in the Public Accounts Committee to answer for the actions of my officials, whether they are helpful or unhelpful, and I accept that responsibility because they are doing their job. This was a case where an individual had caused a great deal to happen, operating, as it were, outside his official responsibilities; and the only way, in a sense, that he could deal with that was under his own responsibility. So there was a different sense of accountability here. The attendance at Parliamentary Committees was something that Ministers had to decide. The issues were always bound to come out anyway and that was always underlying this point, that we expected the name to emerge at any stage throughout the process, and the concerns that despite your points that the Government would be criticised heavily for not bringing it forward, the problems of other members of the department coming under suspicion if we were not prepared to confirm that it was Dr Kelly once a public statement had been made.

But all these issues have gone round in my head, but I am satisfied that we did the right things, balancing very difficult issues.

[20 August, page 193, line 14]

Q. We know that during the course of the 9th July his name is obtained by various journalists. Were you party to that process at all?

A. No. I was asked questions at the Lobby and I tried - I felt uncomfortable doing the Lobbies that day because I think I was trying to juggle a number of different pressures, if you like. I was trying to juggle the need to try to protect Dr Kelly's name for as long as possible, though, again, I was aware that Dr Kelly had accepted that his name would become public.

Q. Who had told you that?

A. Kevin Tebbit. I had heard at one of the meetings.

Q. He had said that?

A. He had said that.

Q. Yes.

A. I accepted that as a realistic assessment of my own judgment as to what might happen. So I was trying to protect Dr Kelly's identity. But I was also trying to clarify the apparent discrepancies between the MoD statement and the BBC's response to it. And I was also being asked questions by journalists as well. So I was trying to juggle, if you like, a number of different pressures.

[26 August, page 167, line 5]

LORD HUTTON: I have asked at least one other witness, Sir David, as to the reason why these very senior officials, including yourself, all assembled to discuss this report with Sir Kevin Tebbit. I mean, it does seem a galaxy gathering to discuss this matter, if I may so put it. Do you have any comment on that?

A. I think the explanation lies in the front pages of the newspapers, that this was an issue which had dominated political debate in the country for a considerable time and showed no signs of diminishing. It was a matter of intense interest and concern to the Prime Minister, in view of the nature of the allegations which were being made. It was a matter of concern to me, because it was directly challenging the integrity of a process for which I was responsible.

[26 August, page 182, line 22]

Q. Did you express any views about the FAC or not, at that stage?

A. Yes, we discussed what should be done. I made clear my view, which was that there was now sufficient probability that he was the single source to warrant our informing the Parliamentary Committees; and that, in particular, the Intelligence and Security Committee needed to know they were about to take evidence from senior witnesses on these very matters, and we could not be in a false position of appearing before a Committee and not admitting to the fact that we now believed that it was likely we had an explanation for the stories that had appeared.

Q. What was said about the Foreign Affairs Committee?

A. As far as I can recall the logic of the discussion, we first considered the position of the Intelligence and Security Committee and agreed that we had to inform them. And certainly I made it clear that if I was giving evidence I would certainly have to admit to this knowledge; and that it would be very difficult, indeed, unthinkable, to inform one Committee, the Intelligence and Security Committee, and not inform the Foreign Affairs Committee, which is a Select Committee of Parliament, who had only just completed a report which touched on these matters; so that if we informed one we would have to inform the other. The logic then went on to debate: if we inform the Foreign Affairs Committee, is that tantamount to making the matter public? And we concluded that it was.

Q. Had not the Foreign Secretary given evidence in private to the Foreign Affairs Committee?

A. Yes, he had.

Q. The Foreign Affairs Committee had reported, had they not?

A. They had.

Q. And you were, as a Government, cooperating with the Intelligence and Security Committee in giving them drafts of the dossier, and you were less than cooperative to the Foreign Affairs Committee, you were not giving them any drafts of the dossier. Why did you need to tell them anything?

A. (Pause). The answer to that, I think, you have already had this morning from a member of the Committee and indeed from the Chairman of the Committee. For us to have deliberately withheld this information from a Select Committee, when it was relevant to a report they had just produced, whilst making it available to another Committee of Parliamentarians would have been, in my view, improper.

Q. Was any thought given to notifying the Foreign Affairs Committee in private?

A. Yes.

Q. I mean, like Mr Straw's evidence.

A. The evidence may have been given in private, but the fact that he was giving it certainly was not. That was very publicly known. And we thought it just inconceivable that we could inform the Chairman and the Chairman would not feel obliged to inform the Committee; and once we had told the Foreign Affairs Committee in full, that was tantamount to making the matter public.

[27 August, page 11, line 19]

Q. Were you told anything about a letter that the official had written?

A. I was told that he had set out, in some detail, that he had had this meeting with Andrew Gilligan. There were various details put to me, but I - the significant thing was that although he had recognised some of the things that Andrew Gilligan subsequently broadcast as being attributable to him and to his conversation, he did not believe that he was Andrew Gilligan's single source because there were other things in the broadcast that he did not recognise as having said to Andrew Gilligan in the course of that meeting.

Q. Did you have any initial reaction to this information?

A. I think my first - my very first reaction was that this was something that could well lead to disciplinary proceedings, as far as the official was concerned. The Ministry of Defence, in the period - for some time, has had something of a reputation for unauthorised briefing and leaking to journalists; and it did appear that this was perhaps an opportunity to demonstrate that unauthorised contacts with journalists would be looked at seriously.

Q. Can I just there take you to a reference which is 5th June 2003, MoD/1/17? This is a memorandum from Martin Howard who the Deputy Chief of Defence Intelligence. He says, in paragraph 2, that the Ministry of Defence had a reputation as a "leaky" department.

Over the page at MoD/1/18, towards the bottom, he said this: "I repeat, that I have no reason to think that anyone in the DIS is responsible for the leak to Mr Gilligan. But if it turns out that this is the case and the individual is identified, the strongest possible action will be taken." Which I think you say accords with your initial thought?

A. That was certainly my very first thought, because over some time there had been warnings to - I will not just say officials, because this extended obviously as well to members of the armed forces. It was not simply a question of officials being warned, it was a concern generally about security, not least in times of conflict, that information should be held securely within the department.

Q. Your other reaction?

A. Immediately, perhaps almost at the same time, I was also concerned at the Foreign Affairs Committee hearings because my assumption was that any disciplinary process will take some considerable time to complete. On that Thursday, as far as I was aware, the Foreign Affairs Committee was still meeting, still hearing, as part of their investigation into the decision to take military action in Iraq, a significant part of which was concerned with the Andrew Gilligan broadcast and the role that he had played and Alastair Campbell had played. So I was very concerned, at that stage, that if an official had come forward who had relevant evidence to that inquiry, that that would be something that we would have to make known, quite quickly, to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

[27 August, page 15, line 14]

Q. Did you decide, when you were talking to Sir Kevin Tebbit, what to do in relation to Dr Kelly, about interviews or anything else?

A. Well, I did not decide because it has always been my practice, in the Ministry of Defence, to ensure that appropriate responsibilities are dealt with by appropriate people. When I first arrived in the Ministry of Defence I think it was the then Chief of Defence Staff described the leadership of the Ministry of Defence as a three legged stool. He had responsibility for military matters; the Permanent Secretary had responsibility for personnel matters, Civil Service; and I was responsible for political leadership of the department. Therefore, as far as any personnel issues were concerned, the responsibility was clearly that of the Permanent Secretary.

Q. Was anything said about interviews with Dr Kelly though, in your discussions?

A. The Permanent Secretary summarised the position consistently, I believe, with the thoughts that I have just set out to you in terms of my initial reaction, which was that either there could be a disciplinary process affecting the official or there could be what he described as a management process, reflecting the fact that the official had come forward, was apparently cooperating, and could, he believed at that stage, correct the public record, that is the material that Andrew Gilligan had broadcast. That was his analysis of the issue. That analysis I accepted because he was responsible for those personnel questions.

LORD HUTTON: Was correcting the public record a personnel matter?

A. As far as Sir Kevin was concerned, it was important to the Ministry of Defence and indeed to the Government as a whole that the public record should be corrected. I think he viewed that as a management issue, as far as dealing with the official was concerned.

[27 August, page 21, line 2]

Q. Did you speak to Mr Campbell about your initial reactions on hearing the news of Dr Kelly coming forward?

A. Yes, I did. I described to him the process that I have set out to you now, which is what my initial reaction was, the importance of security of information in the Ministry of Defence and the possibility of there being disciplinary proceedings, but also I emphasised to him my concern about any suggestion that the Government should be covering up the fact of a potential witness coming forward, in the light of the continuing, as I felt at the time, Foreign Affairs Committee deliberations. So I went through precisely the process that I have gone through today of describing to him both my initial reaction and then my thoughts about the relevance of this to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

Q. I think Mr Campbell's recollection was that the conversation was on the Friday. He also mentioned that after you had spoken about your initial instincts in relation to disciplinary proceedings, you mentioned the words "plea bargain". Do you recollect mentioning that to Mr Campbell?

A. I do not remember using that particular phrase to him, but I can see that as a shorthand account of what I had described to him it would have summarised, in a sense, the alternatives available to the personnel director in the Ministry of Defence in dealing with Dr Kelly. But I would want to emphasise that it was never the case that Richard Hatfield or anyone else in the Ministry of Defence offered any kind of an arrangement or deal to Dr Kelly. I have subsequently read the accounts that Richard Hatfield has set out of the interviews he conducted with Dr Kelly. There was no mention of any kind of deal or plea bargain. It was simply perhaps Alastair's summary of the material that I had set out to him; and the material I had set out was entirely retrospective. It was not in any way suggesting how the matter would be taken forward.

Q. What had you said to Mr Campbell that could be written down in shorthand as a plea bargain?

A. I had taken him through, in precisely the way I have done today, my initial reaction, which was this was potentially a serious disciplinary issue. But equally my second thought, which was that this potential witness might have something to say relevant to the Foreign Affairs Committee hearing and that we would have to take care to avoid any suggestion that we might be seen to be covering up the fact of this witness, given the importance of the issue to the Foreign Affairs Committee.

LORD HUTTON: But Secretary of State, a plea bargain, as I understand it, usually means that a person charged with some sort of offence agrees to plead guilty on the understanding that he will not receive a very severe sentence.

A. That is also my understanding, my Lord.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. But do you think you might have used this term or do you think it is a term which Mr Campbell attributed to the sense of what you were saying to him?

A. Well, I do not recall using the phrase.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. I can see that in the description that I gave of the process that had taken place up until then, that that might be a shorthand account, because normally disciplinary proceedings would follow from an investigation where the authorities inside the Ministry of Defence, as a result of their efforts, had identified a particular individual who might have broken the rules. In contrast, this particular individual had come forward. He had written quite a detailed letter, had volunteered information, was apparently cooperating. So, in a sense, my Lord, without it being in any way a formalised arrangement, and I would want to emphasise this was not in any way acted upon by Richard Hatfield or anyone else, that that might have been seen to be of that kind by Alastair in the course of his summarising our conversation.

[27 August, page 30, line 11]

Q. Did you have a view at that stage about whether or not it was desirable that Dr Kelly's name should be made public?

A. I was concerned at that stage that we did not have enough information to be able to be sure that Dr Kelly was the single source of Andrew Gilligan's material. And in those circumstances, and indeed throughout the history of this matter, because I was not sure that that was the case, I did not believe that it was appropriate to make his name public.

Q. Were you aware that throughout, whether rightly or wrongly, Dr Kelly was contending that he was not the single source?

A. That he was not?

Q. Yes.

A. Yes, I was aware of that and I have said so already to the Inquiry. I was aware of that because of the letter that he wrote to the Ministry of Defence and, indeed, because of the interview that he had conducted with Richard Hatfield. That was a significant factor in the material that Kevin Tebbit told me about following the interview.

[27 August, page 37, line 13]

MR DINGEMANS: Going forward, as it were, almost to the end of the story, before Dr Kelly's death were you ever sure that Dr Kelly was the single source?

A. Not before his death.

Q. But we also know that Dr Kelly's name did come out.

A. Yes, it did.

Q. So, I understood you to be saying that at that stage you were still concerned with ensuring, out of fairness to Dr Kelly, his name did not come out before you were sure he was the single source.

A. That is absolutely right. Indeed, I had a conversation with my private secretary on the day that the BBC made their announcement, still questioning whether in fact - because I had been told they were going to make an announcement but I did not know the nature of it at the time. I still was not sure on - when was it? - Sunday, about the 20th I should imagine, when they made their announcement, I still was not sure at that stage, before they made their announcement, that Dr Kelly was their single source.

[27 August, page 46, line 25]

Q. Who did you understand to be the lead department? Had it now become No.10 or was it still the Ministry of Defence?

A. Well, the Ministry of Defence was the lead department as far as dealing with Dr Kelly on a personnel basis, as far his position, as far as the department were concerned, then I was concerned that the Permanent Secretary should look at that matter as an employment concern issue, to look at it from a point of view ensuring that Dr Kelly was properly and fairly treated. Equally, there were clearly wider implications in what was happening as far as the Government as a whole were concerned. That is why the Cabinet Office and Downing Street were engaged.

[27 August, page 52, line 6]

Q ….. Do you know whether or not Dr Kelly was told about the draft Q and A material and the Q and A material as deployed?

A. I do not, no. But can I make clear that I did not see either of these documents. They were not submitted to my office. That would not be something that I would normally deal with.

[27 August, page 55, line 5]

Q … … it rather looks like at the Tuesday morning meeting there is no-one from the Ministry of Defence actually taking an active role in it; is that fair or unfair?

A. Well, I think as a matter of fact it must be fair, although, as I understood it, Kevin Tebbit did come back from Portsmouth before that meeting concluded. So I thought that he was present for at least part of the meeting and certainly was present in the course of drafting material following on from that meeting.

[27 August, page 65, line 25]

Q …. So your understanding was that this was part of a fall back after the first public letter to the ISC had been rejected, to get the BBC to confirm whether or not Dr Kelly was the source; is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. And as far as you understood, it was not intended that Dr Kelly's name should ever be made public until he had been confirmed as the source; is that right?

A. That was certainly my concern, yes. That we should only act when we were sure about his role.

Q. What is also distributed for deployment that day and the following day when queries come in about the press statement are the Q and A that was actually finalised. That is at MoD/1/62. If we look at the second -

LORD HUTTON: Just before we go on to that, is it your evidence, Secretary of State, that this MoD statement was issued solely for the purpose of trying to persuade the BBC to reveal its source or was there another reason behind it?

A. That was certainly part of it, but throughout I had been concerned, as I think I have indicated, my Lord, to the Inquiry already, that we were in possession of significant information about a potential witness relevant to Parliamentary proceedings, relevant to the public debate; and I, as each day went by, was increasingly concerned that we were not making this information known, certainly to the Foreign Affairs Committee but to the wider public.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. I was very conscious that we risked being accused of a cover-up. I remember having a conversation about what would happen if, say, a Sunday newspaper on the Sunday had got wind of the fact that someone had come forward in the Ministry of Defence. I am sure that they would have accused us of covering that fact up.

[27 August, page 69, line 22]

A ….. I did not see this Q and A and played no part in its preparation, so it is a little difficult for me to comment about any underlying purpose. But if you are suggesting that there was some deliberate effort here to identify Dr Kelly, I say that is absolutely wrong and certainly no effort by me or my office to do that. As I have emphasised throughout, my concern was to identify the facts, and the key fact was whether Dr Kelly was or was not Andrew Gilligan's single source.

LORD HUTTON: But you have also said that in your earlier discussions with Sir Kevin Tebbit he had said that the fact that Dr Kelly had come forward might enable the public record to be corrected. I think you had accepted that that was a consideration in your mind as well.

A. Yes, my Lord, but that was only on the basis that he was clearly Andrew Gilligan's single source.

LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. But we have heard that in the course of the week, and indeed over the preceding weekend, the feeling had been growing amongst some very senior officials that, in fact, Dr Kelly was the single source. Were you aware of that, and in the week beginning 7th July?

A. I cannot comment on - I think your Lordship is referring, probably, to David Omand's assumptions at that stage.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. I was not aware of David Omand's thinking. I was aware that Sir Kevin Tebbit, having on the Friday evening readily accepted the advice from Richard Hatfield about his assessment of Dr Kelly's position, thought again on the Saturday, particularly after seeing the article by Tom Baldwin in The Times; and I think as a result of that he wrote a further letter to David Omand indicating that he felt there was now more evidence pointing to the fact that Dr Kelly was the single source. So there was a change in his thinking. But again, I do not think I or anyone else at that stage was sure enough, certainly from my position, to name Dr Kelly, because I think that would have been unfair to Dr Kelly.

[27 August, page 75, line 2]

MR DINGEMANS: One other way of battening down the hatches would have not been to make a press statement. At this stage you do not know it is Dr Kelly, you are making the press statement as part of the fall back plan to try to get the BBC to confirm whether it is or not. If you make the press statement, for all the reasons you have given, the press are going to go into a detailed hunt for that person; why not just avoid making the press statement?

A. Because of the need to acknowledge the fact that someone had come forward. There are a number of factors relevant to that. It is not only the attitude of the Foreign Affairs Committee; it is the fact that at some stage, for example, Government would have to respond to the Foreign Affairs Committee's conclusions and inevitably the timing of our knowledge about a potential witness would have to be made known. And I do not think it is - I do not think you should underestimate the view that Parliament would take of a Government department deliberately withholding such information.

[27 August, page 78, line 25]

A … I am sure from the moment they became aware that someone had come forward that journalists would be making determined efforts to discover his name. It was something Dr Kelly was warned about on the Friday when he first spoke to Richard Hatfield. I think it is something most people involved in this would think inevitable, that at some stages journalists would identify him. In a sense it is surprising, given the reason he came forward in the first place, that he was not identified sooner.

Q. Can I take you to 10th July, when his name does become public. There is a letter of request -

LORD HUTTON: Just before we go on to that. You said, Secretary of State, that people had assumed it was inevitable that his name would become public. Now, against that background, I appreciate you have emphasised that on a number of occasions, is it a fair summary then to suggest that Dr Kelly's name became public because of questions put by the press, not because it was the wish of the Government that the name should become public, and you hoped that the name would not become public for as long as possible but nonetheless it was always accepted that it was inevitable that it would become public? Just amplify that or qualify that in any way. I appreciate I have sought to summarise what has been quite lengthy evidence on your part.

A. I had from the beginning recognised that there was a significant probability that his name would become public, not least because the reason why he wrote to the Ministry of Defence in the first place, as I understand it, was because his views were so distinctive on a particular aspect on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction that a colleague had identified his views, in effect, in the mouth of Andrew Gilligan giving evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. So those close to Dr Kelly recognised that he must have had some contact with Andrew Gilligan because Andrew Gilligan was repeating well known views that Dr Kelly held.

That, I am sure, was the reason why Richard Hatfield warned Dr Kelly, on the Friday afternoon in the first interview, that there was every prospect of his name becoming known. It was obviously something, as well, that had been taken into account in securing Dr Kelly's consent to the issuing of the press statement.

So at each stage there was a recognition that his name would become known. What I am resisting, certainly as far as I am concerned, is any suggestion that there was some sort of conspiracy, some sort of strategy, some sort of plan covertly to make his name known. That was not the case.

[27 August, page 100, line 6]

Q. Were you aware that there has been some evidence that Mr Taylor, who I think is your special adviser, is that right?

A. Yes.

Q. Had confirmed Dr Kelly's name to journalists?

A. Hmm.

Q. Were you aware of that?

A. I was not specifically aware at the time but I - excuse me. I have learned since that that happened, yes.

Q. And what is your view on that?

A. Well, I assume that that was consistent with the question and answer process that had been agreed within the department. I do not think it occurred in any earlier timeframe.

Q. The question and answers material that your special adviser knows about but you did not?

A. I did not see the question and answer, but I was obviously aware of the advice that I had received that if the right name was given to an MoD press officer they should confirm it. I am not suggesting - I am not suggesting, for a moment, that I was not aware of that; and obviously my special adviser would have been aware of it as well.

Q. Do you know whether Dr Kelly was told that that was a proposed approach?

A. He was certainly told and agreed to the fact that a press statement was to be issued because that had been done on the - at least on the Tuesday, the day before the events you are describing.

Q. But I have taken you to the first draft of the Q and A which says: can't tell you anything until we have spoken to Dr Kelly and I have taken you to the second draft which appears to have been deployed which changes. Was Dr Kelly told of the change as far as you know?

A. Not as far as I know.

[28 August, page 49, line 20]

LORD HUTTON: Prime Minister, I have asked other witnesses why these very senior officials were all concerned with this matter. There was a discussion, and Mr Powell discussed with Sir David Manning, Sir David Omand and Mr John Scarlett. Why were so many senior officials concerned with this?

A. I think it was really that this was - I mean, this whole issue was still the dominant issue. You had the Foreign Affairs Select Committee report on the Monday into really the nature of the allegation. Then suddenly at the last minute comes forward somebody who might be the source. And I think there was a real concern on the part of everyone - we were in a quandary, frankly, right from the very beginning. The Foreign Affairs Select Committee is about to report on the Monday, the report is going to deal precisely with the Andrew Gilligan allegations and here is somebody who suddenly emerges as the person who may be the source of those allegations.

LORD HUTTON: Yes.

A. I think the reason why people were involved at a senior level in the Civil Service were first of all that it was very important. Secondly, certainly as the matter developed, I was very, very keen, indeed insistent, that we did have the senior people involved because I anticipated right from the very beginning that there were going to be a lot of questions asked afterwards about: when did you know? Why did you not tell the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee? How could you let them make their report on Monday when you were in possession of information plainly relevant to their report? That was I think the explanation as to why people at a senior level were involved.

LORD HUTTON: Again, I think having heard a considerable amount of evidence the reason may be obvious, but why was this a quandary? What was the quandary which you were concerned had arisen?

A. The quandary really was this: we had never really wanted the Foreign Affairs Committee to look into this; we thought the ISC should do it. But they had and that is their right to do so and they had conducted their investigation. Suddenly, as I say, at the last minute forward comes somebody who may be the source of the allegation that was at the centre of the FAC report. What did you do? Did you inform the Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee immediately, which is one possibility and which I have no doubt afterwards people would have said to us we should have done. Did you try and get greater clarity of whether this was indeed the source or not? So how did you handle this? The reason why I thought it was very, very important to involve the senior officials is that the whole allegation around the Foreign Affairs Committee report and all the rest of it was about the propriety of the Government. Here is an issue that also seems to reflect on propriety and I am in receipt of that information.

So I thought it was essential not in a sense to pass the responsibility to them - in the end I have full responsibility for the decisions that are taken - but in order to make absolutely sure that when at a later point, as I thought there would be, not obviously in the context which we are talking now, but people would say: when did you know? What did you know? Who did you tell? I would be able to say: we handled this by the book, in the sense of with the advice of senior civil servants. Not, as I say, in order to pass responsibility to them, but in order to make sure that this was not, as it were, the politicians driving the system but us taking a consensus view as to what the right way to proceed was.

The Times story today, whether accurate or not, will increase the likelihood that over the weekend other journalists will indeed identify and name the BBC's source as our official. (He is as I indicated in my earlier letter well known in media/academic circles.)

[28 August, page 55, line 7]

A. I mean, the two things that I took out of this were: (1) that it was more probable he was indeed the source; and (2), that this thing was already washing round the media.

Q. Or may well be washing round other parts of the media, as it were?

A. It was in The Times and, you know, I think that they were - I certainly took that as an indication that he thought this was - you know, that this thing could come out at any point.

Q. Had you been told that the matter might come out at any point at this stage?

A. I cannot recall, but I mean I think - I would use my own judgment about that, to be frank.

Q. Your own judgment was?

A. My own judgment was obviously there was a - with an issue with so much political focus on it as this, when someone was being interviewed and reinterviewed and presumably people were talking about it within the system, then you have an article in The Times, I think I would have thought there was a fair possibility it would leak in any event.

[28 August, page 61, line 6]

Q. So you had understood, at this stage, that any public involvement of Dr Kelly was to be on the basis of his cooperation?

A. Yes. I mean, I think what was - look, right at the very outset, as I say, part of this difficulty was he had come forward. We were in receipt of this information. You know, the question was: what do we now do with that information, in particular in relation to the FAC, which was a concern; and I cannot recall exactly when I was told this, but I think there was certainly - it was said that he realised that he might end up having to give evidence.

Q. He realised he might end up giving evidence?

A. Yes.

Q. Do you recall who said that to you?

A. I do not but certainly by the time we got to 7th July, I mean the basis of the meeting was that he had already realised his name would in all likelihood come out.

Q. You have mentioned your concerns that the Government might be accused of a cover-up in relation to the FAC. Were you, at this stage, keen that the FAC reopen their inquiry or did you have any view on that?

A. No, I mean - look, if I had really wanted the FAC to do it, I think I could perfectly properly have put that information before the FAC actually on the Saturday or Sunday. I really was not sure what the right way to handle this issue was, but I knew that what we could not do was be in a situation where we were accused of misleading the FAC and that the reason why I thought it was so important to involve the senior officials, as I was saying to his Lordship just a moment or two ago, was in order to make it - you know, to make sure that we were operating in a way that they were content with, and therefore if at a later time people say: why on earth did you not give this information immediately to the FAC over the weekend, I could say: there were discussions going on. It was being handled by the MoD. This was the advice given to us by officials. Not as I say to put off responsibility. Responsibility is mine in the end. I take the decisions as Prime Minister. But in order to be able to say we had played it by the book.

[28 August, page 65, line 8]

Q. The outcome of that meeting was, I think, to conclude what had already been provisionally decided, that he should have a second interview. Do you recall that?

A. Yes. I mean, I think, as I recollect it, it was already the fact that he was going to be reinterviewed and I thought: well, that at least takes care of this for the moment. So, it is only after the reinterview you then reach the point when you really have to take a decision. But throughout Monday I should say that I mean the two things that seemed to us very, very clear, there was some surprise we expressed to each other on the Monday morning that it had not already leaked, and I think were was no doubt in anyone's mind that if on reinterview it was clear that he was in all probability the source then we were going to have to disclose that.

[28 August, page 71, line 22]

Q. So in the light of those considerations, who decided to do what?

A. Well, we decided that the - how do we then proceed? We cannot conceal this information. What is the best way of proceeding? And I mean it was a discussion about it and I think the consensus was that the best thing was that David Omand should write to the Chairman of the ISC, copy it to the FAC for courtesy and then make public the fact that the source had come forward.

Q. Why was there a need to make public the fact that a source had come forward?

A. For two reasons really. I think, first of all, we were at any point concerned, as I said a moment or two ago - I think we were quite surprised on the Monday it had not already come out, but we thought that it was likely to come out at any particular point. And, secondly, because once you had copied it to the FAC - I mean, I thought there was a remote possibility the FAC might decide not to interview him, but I rather thought that they would.

Q. And that was the reason that it was decided to publicise the ISC letter?

A. Well, that you had to at least - in respect of the fact that there was somebody who had come forward, my concern was to get that information not concealed but, as it were, out there so that no-one could say afterwards: look, this is something that you people were trying to cover up or conceal from a House of Commons Committee. And that was the view of the meeting. Again I say this in absolutely no sense to say this was the civil servants' decision rather than my decision. I take full responsibility for the decisions. I stand by them. I believe they were the right decisions. But the advice also of Sir David, in particular, who was, if you like, the key person for me, was that it would have been improper to have withheld this from the FAC.

[28 August, page 76, line 24]

Q …. Were you aware of any assistance with the drafting of this press statement being given by officials within No.10?

A. I think certainly it came to Jonathan and I may have scanned my eye over it myself, but I cannot absolutely recall that.

Q. And I think we have heard that there was a drafting session in Mr Smith's room because this was on his computer.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. And that press statement was issued at about 5.45 on 8th July, and there has been evidence that it was read over to Dr Kelly.

A. Hmm, hmm.

Q. Also deployed was what was called defensive Q and A material.

A. Hmm.

Q. Were you aware of the existence of the defensive Q and A material?

A. I was not, but I, you know, would have thought it perfectly natural that the MoD had to prepare to field inquiries. I assume they had been doing that for several days.

Q. Now, these questions and answers, it appears, assisted the journalists in identifying Dr Kelly. Do you know whether any view had been taken that that should happen?

A. No, I do not; but I have to say that I think that the basic view of this was - you see, we were quite clear the name was going to come out in one way or another, and as far as I am aware, I think someone said this at the meetings, Dr Kelly was aware of that too. I think it was decided to do this by way of a public statement, not mentioning the name, (a) because we were not entirely clear, (b) I think to give at least a little bit of time to us; but the important thing was that at least the fact that someone had come forward saying I am the source was no longer something we possessed. We had actually been open and said: this is the case. As I say, I did not see the MoD Q and A, but I think the basic view would have been not to, as it were, offer the name but on the other hand not to mislead people. I think there was also some concern frankly if you ended up with a great scrabble as to who was the name, you know, other people might be thought of as the name who were not.

[28 August, page 80, line 9]

LORD HUTTON: Now, do you think, perhaps looking at it in retrospect, that it might have been a more appropriate procedure if the source had simply been named in the statement?

A. I have obviously thought very carefully about whether there were alternative ways of dealing with this. One alternative was certainly to make an open statement and name him upfront. I think the reason for the hesitation there was: well, we could not be absolutely sure about this. I seem to recollect, but I cannot be sure who said this and exactly when it was said, that there was some issue as to whether Dr Kelly himself did not want to be named in what I think was called the first wave of media focus on it. But I mean the only thing I would say, my Lord, is that if we had named him in the statement, I mean - I do not think the outcome in terms of him appearing in front of the FAC or any of the rest of it would have been any different.

[28 August, page 83, line 12]

Q. Was there any discussion about the pressure that Dr Kelly might be exposed to when you were having these meetings on 8th July?

A. Obviously one of the things that was part of the conversation that we were having was what Dr Kelly did, what sort of a person was he, what experience did he have. I mean, all I can say is that there is nothing in the discussion that we had that would have alerted us to him being anything other than someone, you know, of a certain robustness who was used to dealing with the interchange between politics and the media. Having said that, incidentally, it is never, ever a pleasant thing; indeed it is a deeply unpleasant thing for someone to come suddenly into the media spotlight. Certainly we were aware of that. It is one of the reasons why the press statement I think it was said at the meeting should be agreed with Dr Kelly. But there was in my view no way of avoiding the fact that you could not keep this information private.

[28 August, page 94, line 12]

Q. Or another way of proceeding may have been having disclosed that this person has come forward, not to say anything more either about his status or about his name?

A. Yes. The only difficulty there I think is that people would have felt that if you got a great swirl around, well, who is the person, you know, and a whole lot of people being named and identified, then before you know where you are, they have the wrong person. Remember this was still very much in the context this is somebody - I think they somewhat shifted the way they described him but the original allegation was this was someone in charge of the process of drawing up the dossier. Not who had contributed to the dossier, in charge of it.

So I think there was some anxiety within the MoD, I think I was not particularly aware of this but there was some anxiety in the MoD that in the difficult circumstances what you could not do is have a whole lot of speculation going on about a lot of other people being the source.

[4 September, page 77, line 11]

A. The meeting started, as always, with looking at the press cuttings, and the key issue that morning, the broadcast media as well, was the MoD statement of the previous evening and the BBC's reply, both to the press statement and in a separate parallel process Mr Davies' reply to Mr Hoon's letter of 8th July.

[4 September, page 81, line 8]

Q. Was anything mentioned about the Q and A material?

A. At the end of a discussion on how to follow up the letter to Mr Davies there was a brief discussion on what we should do if journalists were to ring and put the name directly to the Department of who the official was. I would not call it a discussion of the Q and A material. There was a discussion of one of the questions, which I have since learnt was in the Q and A material.

Q. Was there any discussion about the other questions in the Q and A material?

A. No, not -

Q. Was he a member of the UNSCOM et cetera?

A. No, to the best of my recollection we only discussed the rationale for what to do if the name was put directly to the department.

[4 September, page 83, line 2]

Q. Have you found out since whether or not Ms Teare discussed this Q and A material with anyone?

A. I have only learnt through the course of the Inquiry that she discussed it with the Permanent Secretary's office, but not at the time.

Q. Not from what the Inquiry has heard, from our own research at the Ministry of Defence. No-one has told you, as it were?