Hearing Transcripts

1 Thursday, 14th August 2003
2 (10.30 am)
3 DR BRYAN WELLS (called)
4 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
5 LORD HUTTON: Good morning.
6 MR DINGEMANS: Dr Wells, can you give his Lordship your full
7 name.
8 A. My name is Dr Bryan Harry Wells. I should say for the
9 avoidance of confusion I spell my first name with a Y,
10 not an I.
11 Q. What is your occupation?
12 A. I am Director of Counter Proliferation and Arms Control
13 at the Ministry of Defence, formerly the director of
14 Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat in the
15 Ministry of Defence. I am also the United Kingdom's
16 Commissioner to the United Nations Monitoring,
17 Verification and Inspection Commission, UNMOVIC. That
18 is not a Government appointment, that appointment is in
19 the gift of the United Nations Secretary General.
20 Q. If there were to be any conflicts between Her Majesty's
21 Government and the United Nations, how do you resolve
22 that in your employment?
23 A. In my advice that I give to the executive chairman of
24 UNMOVIC I am speaking in a personal capacity. That is
25 understood by the executive chairman, until recently

1
1 Dr Hans Blix, now Dimitri Perricos and it is understood
2 by my colleagues in UK Government.
3 Q. Dr Kelly himself had a United Nations role as well, did
4 he not?
5 A. Dr Kelly's role in relation to me was as special adviser
6 to me as UNMOVIC commissioner; and in that role he
7 advised me on the organisation of UNMOVIC, its plans for
8 operations and its actual operations in Iraq.
9 Q. And how long have you been at the Ministry of Defence?
10 A. I joined the Ministry of Defence in September 1988.
11 Q. What were you doing before that?
12 A. I was a post-doctorate research scientist at Oxford
13 University.
14 Q. Not in Government?
15 A. Not in Government, sir.
16 Q. How long were you Dr Kelly's line manager?
17 A. Since August of last year.
18 Q. And did you get to know him well over the period of
19 time?
20 A. I believe we did. We travelled to New York on many
21 occasions for UNMOVIC commissioners meetings and we
22 would obviously meet in the margins of that. We also
23 had meetings obviously in London as well.
24 Q. Right. And his particular speciality, I think we have
25 heard, was in biological and chemical weapons. Was that

2
1 the only part of your job or did you have other duties
2 as well?
3 A. My duties covered the full range of counter
4 proliferation and arms control agendas. That includes
5 all of the nonproliferation treaties, nuclear as well as
6 chemical and biological, and also the export control
7 regimes.
8 Q. Who was David Kelly's reporting officer?
9 A. David Kelly's reports were written by Dr Richard Scott,
10 director of DSTL.
11 Q. Although you were his line manager, he was reported on
12 by someone else?
13 A. That is correct. That is because Dr Kelly had a range
14 of contacts across Whitehall within the Ministry of
15 Defence and also within the Foreign and Commonwealth
16 Office.
17 Q. So he was managed by someone or reported on by someone
18 who had no direct contact with him; is that right?
19 A. I believe that the director of DSTL maintained contact
20 with Dr Kelly. I can also say that the director spoke
21 to me at regular intervals.
22 Q. You may have seen some of the documents that I referred
23 to on Monday, which related to complaints Dr Kelly had
24 made to DSTL; and I asked Mr Hatfield about that and he
25 said I would have to speak with you or DSTL. Do you

3
1 mind if I speak with you about that?
2 A. Please do.
3 Q. Can I take you to MoD/3/140?
4 This is a letter dated 17th April 2000 from Dr Kelly
5 to Paul Taylor. Effectively the gist of this letter is
6 that he was complaining, at the bottom of the page:
7 "Pay and reward for my work has been a problem ever
8 since."
9 That was ever since his move from UNMOVIC. Were you
10 aware of any of those problems?
11 A. I note that that letter is dated 2000, before I took
12 over responsibilities. I have to say, in all the time
13 that I knew David since August of last year, he did not
14 raise any concerns with me.
15 Q. Right. Would you have been the person he would have
16 raised the concerns with?
17 A. I would not have been surprised, if he had concerns, if
18 he would have spoken to me.
19 Q. Right. Can I take you to MoD/3/47? Again it is
20 a letter, to be fair, that predates your appointment.
21 Obviously you are the person now with responsibility.
22 This is from Dr Kelly to Stephen Dettmar, human
23 resources manager at DSTL, 14th September 2001:
24 "You know I have been unhappy with my management by
25 DERA, now Dstl, for some time. I have finally decided

4
1 to write formally to Ms Hilary Brown ..."
2 Do you know whether his complaints were ever
3 resolved?
4 A. I do not. It was only after the tragic events that
5 I became aware of this correspondence.
6 Q. The latest note that I can find is MoD/3/39; and this is
7 to Dr Scott. It is from David Kelly again.
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. You see the date of this?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. This is 17th March 2003.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. First of all, were you aware that David Kelly had
14 written this letter before his death?
15 A. I was not.
16 Q. And you were not aware of any unhappiness that he had
17 about terms and conditions?
18 A. He did not communicate any unhappiness to me.
19 Q. He was obviously dealing with DSTL for that, and he has
20 obviously had a meeting with Richard Scott because he
21 says:
22 "Dear Richard,
23 "I appreciated the opportunity to talk to you last
24 Thursday.
25 "In the course of our meeting you stated that you

5
1 considered I should have received a 6 per cent pay rise
2 in October 2002 as a consequence of my promotion to
3 level 9 on 18th February 2002."
4 And he talks about that. There is writing at the
5 bottom of the page. Do you know whose writing that is?
6 A. I do not.
7 Q. And at the bottom it seems to say something like:
8 "Please note 8 to 9 ..." which I imagine is level 8
9 to level 9 DSTL?
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. "... was not in October 2002 but previously (2001). Can
12 you please check he has been treated in accordance with
13 the rules."
14 Have you been able to make any enquiry since
15 Dr Kelly's death to ascertain whether or not he had been
16 treated in accordance with the rules?
17 A. No I have not. As I say, I was not aware of this
18 correspondence until last week.
19 Q. And so if one is to pursue that, I infer from your
20 answer that I really have to deal with DSTL on that?
21 A. I believe so, sir.
22 Q. Right. When was your first meeting with Dr Kelly?
23 A. My first meeting was August 9th of last year. That was
24 an introductory call, immediately before Dr Kelly went
25 on leave and in the first week of my taking up the post.

6
1 Q. So a general discussion with Dr Kelly?
2 A. It was about half an hour.
3 Q. Right. You had a meeting on 5th September with him?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And at that meeting you went to DIS. Can you just help
6 us with what DIS means?
7 A. That is the Defence Intelligence Service.
8 Q. And what took place at that meeting?
9 A. The DIS had arranged for me, given that I was new in the
10 post, a presentation on their assessments on Iraqi
11 weapons of mass destruction.
12 Q. Right. So I mean their assessment on Iraqi weapons of
13 mass destruction must have been fairly relevant to the
14 issue of the dossier, which we know took place on
15 24th September 2002.
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Do you know whether there was any discussion of the
18 dossier at that meeting?
19 A. I cannot recall any discussion.
20 Q. What was Dr Kelly's relationship with the personnel at
21 the DIS who were at the meeting? Did he know them well?
22 A. Yes, he did. He knew many of them well. He had been
23 colleagues with some of them for many years and he
24 visited them on a regular basis.
25 Q. Right. DIS is obviously an intelligence service.

7
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. And Dr Kelly was not, but from that meeting, and no
3 doubt from your other knowledge, would this be a fair
4 characterisation: that Dr Kelly had strong links with
5 members of the DIS?
6 A. Yes. I would -- whether one says strong is a judgment,
7 but links.
8 Q. You choose your word.
9 A. I would say he had regular links.
10 Q. Right. Was there any evidence of unhappiness or
11 discussions at that time about any of the claims that
12 were to be made in the dossier, that you were aware of?
13 LORD HUTTON: Just tell me again if you would, please, what
14 date was this, this meeting that you had with DIS?
15 A. My Lord, it was 5th September.
16 LORD HUTTON: 5th September. Yes.
17 MR DINGEMANS: We know the dossier has been issued on the
18 24th.
19 A. Yes.
20 LORD HUTTON: I beg your pardon, I interrupted you. Just
21 put the question again. Was Dr Wells aware of any --
22 MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware of any unhappiness at that
23 meeting amongst members of the DIS?
24 A. To the best of my recollection this was not discussed.
25 Q. You were not discussing the dossier?

8
1 A. No, it was a straight presentation on DIS assessment of
2 the situation on Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.
3 Q. Was a 45 minute claim mentioned in that presentation?
4 A. To the best of my recollection it was not; but I have to
5 say that I was a few weeks in post and if it was, I am
6 not sure that I would have picked up any significance of
7 it.
8 Q. Right. It was effectively to brief you because you were
9 new to the post?
10 A. Exactly.
11 Q. And to bring you up to speed as quickly as possible?
12 A. That is a very fair characterisation, sir.
13 Q. I think on 6th September you met with Dr Kelly,
14 Hans Blix; is that right?
15 A. That is right. Dr Blix was in London on other business
16 but, as was quite often the case, if he was in London he
17 would arrange to meet UK officials and sometimes
18 ministers.
19 Q. And after that initial interaction with Dr Kelly and
20 indeed UNMOVIC contacts, what else did you have to do
21 with Dr Kelly to the close of that year, the close of
22 2002?
23 A. I would characterise two things. The first was
24 throughout the autumn there was a lot of work in the
25 United Nations about a new Security Council resolution

9
1 giving UNMOVIC new powers in relation to inspections in
2 Iraq. That was eventually passed as Security Council
3 Resolution 1441 in November of that year. So we were
4 expecting that UNMOVIC would deploy into Iraq quite
5 soon, and in fact it deployed at the end of November.
6 We were doing -- we, sorry, UK Government were doing
7 a lot of work to consider what we could do as
8 governments to give UNMOVIC the best support we could.
9 Q. Right?
10 A. And David, given his knowledge of UNMOVIC, assisted in
11 that process.
12 The second issue was that we had an UNMOVIC
13 commissioners meeting at the end of November. That was
14 a commissioners meeting under Security Council
15 Resolution 1284, it happened every quarter. So we knew
16 it was coming. But because it was at the end of
17 November, a few days after UNMOVIC had first deployed
18 into Iraq, it had very special significance for the
19 commissioners.
20 Q. And what was your relationship with David Kelly on these
21 matters? He had obviously had a great deal of
22 experience of United Nations inspections.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. And you had taken up the post I think you say in August?
25 A. David acted as my fount of knowledge on UNMOVIC.

10
1 Myself, and I think it is fair to say a number of
2 colleagues, did not really know the structure of
3 UNMOVIC, how it operated, how it was proposing to
4 operate in Iraq until quite late in the autumn when we
5 suddenly realised it was going to deploy into Iraq.
6 David was an official in the Ministry of Defence who
7 had that sort of knowledge; and so he was very important
8 in briefing up the chain, as it were, on that.
9 Q. After the UNMOVIC inspections had taken place, and
10 indeed after the war in Iraq, were there any other
11 involvements with Dr Kelly and inspections or proposed
12 inspections?
13 A. Yes. After the withdrawal of UNMOVIC from Iraq and the
14 subsequent military actions, the coalition forces
15 started to think about how it would undertake the
16 identification and subsequent destruction of any weapons
17 of mass destruction or supporting material that it found
18 in Iraq; and as a result of this the Iraq Survey Group
19 was established. This was April/May of this year.
20 Again the United Kingdom, having been a coalition
21 partner, wanted to play a full role in this, and we drew
22 on David's experience as a weapons inspector in
23 formulating our thinking on how to assist in this; in
24 particular, in relation to David's role to me, I was
25 asked as part of the United Kingdom's efforts to recruit

11
1 a cadre of inspectors who could deploy to Iraq. Most of
2 these people, not all but most, were former UNSCOM
3 inspectors who would therefore have had experience of
4 undertaking inspections in Iraq.
5 David, of course, was vital there in knowing who the
6 individuals were, what their specialisms were, what
7 their capabilities were. So he was the person who could
8 give us the contacts of people who might, in principle,
9 be interested in doing this work.
10 Q. How much time was Dr Kelly spending in London itself and
11 how much time was travelling, if you had to put
12 a percentage on it?
13 A. I would say about 50 per cent of his time was in London.
14 He did work quite a lot at home as well, as well as
15 travelling.
16 Q. And the other 50 per cent was travelling and working at
17 home then?
18 A. That is correct.
19 Q. And when he worked in London was his office next to
20 yours, another building?
21 A. He had an office close to my own, which he shared with
22 two other people. I know he had, also, an office in the
23 DIS although I do not know the details of that.
24 Q. So he had an office in your building. Are you able to
25 tell us where that is geographically?

12
1 A. Yes, it is in the Metropole Building in Northumberland
2 Avenue.
3 Q. Then he had an office in the DIS building?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. Did he have an office in the Foreign and Commonwealth
6 office?
7 A. I do not believe he did, although he obviously went over
8 and saw Foreign Office colleagues usually when he was in
9 London.
10 Q. When he was in London, we have about 50 per cent of his
11 time was in London, how much time was he next door to
12 you or nearly next door to you and how much time was in
13 other offices?
14 A. I would say it was about evenly split between the three.
15 Q. It appears that Dr Kelly went to Kuwait on about
16 19th May. Do you know that?
17 A. Yes I do.
18 Q. It also appears that there was some confusion with his
19 visa and he was taken off the plane and deported the
20 next day. Do you know the circumstances in which that
21 came to happen?
22 A. I hope I can shed some light on this. I was not
23 directly involved myself. I was in Washington at the
24 time on totally unrelated business but I did speak to
25 Dr Kelly afterwards.

13
1 What I understand happened is the following: on
2 16th May, the Friday, I had a meeting with Brigadier
3 John Deverell who had recently been appointed as the
4 Chief of Staff to the Iraq Survey Group and he was also
5 the most senior UK officer who would be deploying to
6 Iraq. I saw Brigadier Deverell along with David. David
7 was very keen to go to Iraq to get a better
8 understanding of what sort of role inspectors would have
9 when they were out there. This was important because we
10 were still in discussions with potential recruits. If
11 we could not really tell them what they were going to do
12 then clearly we could only go so far in our discussions.
13 Brigadier Deverell said he was happy for David to be
14 part of his team who were going out I think on Sunday
15 the 18th as part of a familiarisation visit. So we are
16 talking of a very short time to arrange things.
17 Q. Yes.
18 A. My understanding is that David had assumed that the
19 military team running Brigadier Deverell's programme
20 would arrange the entry for him; and the military team,
21 knowing that David was a civilian and therefore did not
22 have military identification, would arrange his own
23 visa.
24 Q. For whatever reason his visa was not arranged and he was
25 deported back to the United Kingdom?

14
1 A. My understanding is that he landed first in Qatar and
2 then flew on with Brigadier Deverell to Kuwait prior to
3 going on to Iraq. At Kuwait it was found he did not
4 have the right or the necessary papers for entry. He
5 was given hotel accommodation and then returned to the
6 United Kingdom at the earliest opportunity.
7 Q. You say you discussed this with him after the event.
8 What was his reaction to that?
9 A. I would say two things. The first was a degree of
10 embarrassment that this had happened; and a degree of
11 frustration that he really wanted to learn how the Iraq
12 Survey Group was working, that was denied him. I think
13 he also expressed a degree of unease at what had
14 happened as well. I think he found it disturbing that
15 he had been taken to a hotel and then put on a plane
16 back.
17 Q. Did it lead to any expressions of dissatisfaction with
18 the Ministry of Defence as an employer or anything?
19 A. No, it did not.
20 Q. What did you know of Dr Kelly's contacts with the press?
21 We have heard from Mr Hatfield about his permitted
22 contacts and we have seen evidence of a whole range of
23 permitted contacts, and we have also seen his appraisal
24 form. Have you seen that appraisal form?
25 A. I have seen his most recent appraisal form, yes.

15
1 Q. Which deals with media contacts being part of his
2 duties?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Do you know whether he sought authority for contacts
5 through the Ministry of Defence or through the Foreign
6 and Commonwealth Office?
7 A. At our introductory meeting he explained the
8 arrangements for dealing with the press and that these
9 would be through the Foreign Office. He would gain
10 authorisation to do that. He did say that on certain
11 topics, I think on smallpox and anthrax, he would go
12 through the Ministry of Defence press office.
13 Q. Right.
14 A. If there was a major briefing he would inform me that
15 this was happening and that it had been cleared. And
16 this was presented to me as an arrangement of long
17 standing.
18 Q. And did he mention any briefings that he might give on
19 behalf of the United Nations, in which case there would
20 be no UK Government authorisation?
21 A. I do not recall that he did so.
22 Q. When were you first aware of any press briefings that
23 become relevant to the Inquiry?
24 A. I believe the first one that I recall discussing with
25 colleagues was the Observer article on 15th June.

16
1 Q. Yes.
2 A. I saw that article -- this was concerning the mobile
3 biological weapons facilities that had been discovered
4 by the Iraq Survey Group.
5 Q. Did you know whether or not Dr Kelly had a view on those
6 laboratories?
7 A. Yes, I do. He did discuss it with me; and he was of the
8 view that these were not biological weapons facilities.
9 Q. And that followed -- had Dr Kelly actually got to Iraq?
10 A. Yes. Sorry, I should have said that he did manage to
11 get to Iraq between the 5th and 10th June to do the
12 reconnaissance visit that had been earlier planned and
13 in part of that he did see the mobile facilities.
14 Q. He had formed a view, right or wrong, about the mobile
15 laboratories?
16 A. That is correct.
17 Q. And he shared that view with you?
18 A. He did.
19 Q. And then what drew your attention to the article in the
20 Observer? First of all, what did the article say, or
21 the gist of it?
22 A. To the best of my recollection, the Observer article
23 quoted a UK source who had seen the facilities -- now,
24 that is a very few number of people -- and to the best
25 of my recollection it said that that source believed

17
1 that the mobile facilities were not for biological
2 weapons but for hydrogen production. I recall David
3 expressing that view to me.
4 Q. Did you receive any --
5 LORD HUTTON: Do you know, was that the view of other
6 members of the United Kingdom Survey Group or were there
7 differences of opinion?
8 A. My Lord, there were differences of opinion. I did not
9 have any discussions with any of the other members who
10 had seen the facilities.
11 LORD HUTTON: I see. But there were differences of opinion
12 within the British team as far as you know?
13 A. There was a spectrum of opinions, my Lord, yes.
14 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.
15 MR DINGEMANS: Were you contacted about the Observer
16 article?
17 A. The following morning at about 10 o'clock I believe
18 Martin Howard rang me about the article.
19 Q. So if the article was published on Sunday 15th June,
20 that must be Monday 16th?
21 A. That was the 16th.
22 Q. He rings you at 10 o'clock. What did he say?
23 A. First of all he asked me if I had seen the article and
24 I confirmed that I had. Martin was of the view that
25 David must be a candidate for being the source and he

18
1 wanted to discuss that with David.
2 Q. Was Mr Howard aware of Dr Kelly's views on the mobile
3 laboratories then?
4 A. I could not say for certain.
5 Q. Do not worry, we will ask him.
6 LORD HUTTON: Just before we proceed, Dr Wells, may I ask
7 you: if you could see the letter which Dr Kelly wrote to
8 you on 30th June 2003, which is MoD/1/19, and at the
9 third page of that letter, you see the passage there in
10 the paragraph beginning "I should explain ...", then
11 there is a sentence about six or seven lines down:
12 "Over the next ten years I undertook at the request
13 of MOD, FCO, CBD Porton Down, and the especially the UN
14 press office and UNSCOM/UNMOVIC press officer both
15 attributable interviews and occasionally unattributable
16 briefings. All such interactions were cleared by the
17 appropriate authority. As my contact details became
18 known it became inevitable that direct approaches were
19 made and I used my discretion as [to] whether I provided
20 information."
21 Had you been aware that that had been Dr Kelly's
22 practice?
23 A. My Lord, I was personally not aware that he would have
24 used discretion rather than reporting straight to the
25 appropriate press office.

19
1 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Well, have you any comment on the point
2 he makes that as his contact details, in other words
3 presumably his home and mobile telephone numbers became
4 known, it became inevitable that direct approaches were
5 made, "and I used my discretion"? Do you have any
6 opinion on that as to whether that is an understandable
7 approach in practice?
8 A. My Lord, it would depend on the nature of the approach
9 that was made. If it was, for example, to check some
10 details of a briefing that had already been authorised,
11 then in the interests of swift reporting one can
12 understand it. If it was a request for an entirely new
13 briefing, then I would have expected that appropriate
14 clearance from the press office would have been sought.
15 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much.
16 MR DINGEMANS: Can I just, in that respect, take you to
17 a document, CAB/1/115? This is a memo dated
18 21st July 2003 from Patrick Lamb of the Foreign Office
19 and towards the bottom of that page can I just ask you
20 to comment on his analysis that the system which he had
21 set up, which had been set up relating to press contact,
22 "... ultimately relied on self discipline and judgment
23 on all sides, worked well and provided the media with
24 expert background briefing", which suggested that in
25 some respects Dr Kelly was left to make the decision on

20
1 his own; was that your understanding at the time?
2 A. I think that is a fair reflection of my understanding of
3 how the system worked.
4 Q. Turning back to the Observer article, you are contacted
5 I think you tell us at about 10 o'clock by Mr Howard.
6 What do you do as a result of that?
7 A. I explain to Mr Howard that David is currently in
8 New York but I would contact him to ask him to phone
9 Mr Howard to discuss the issue of the Observer article.
10 Q. Did you manage to make contact with Dr Kelly?
11 A. I made contact at around 1500 London time.
12 Q. What did you do, ask him to call Martin Howard?
13 A. I said to David that Mr Howard wanted to discuss the
14 Observer article. I recall that David said that he was
15 not the source of that.
16 Q. Right.
17 A. And I said that I would want him personally to convey
18 that to Mr Howard.
19 Q. What was your next contact with Mr Howard about press?
20 A. My next contact was the Thursday, the 19th June. We had
21 had a meeting that Mr Howard chaired on UK support to
22 the Iraq Survey Group. And after that meeting,
23 Mr Howard asked Tim Dowse of the Foreign Office and
24 myself to --
25 Q. Can you tell everyone what Tim Dowse's role is?

21
1 A. I apologise. He is the head of counter proliferation
2 department in the Foreign Office. He is basically my
3 Foreign Office opposite number.
4 Q. So you have a meeting with Mr Dowse and Mr Howard?
5 A. That is right. Mr Howard says he wishes to have an
6 interview with Dr Kelly to discuss recent contacts with
7 the press. This is against the background of the
8 Observer article but also it had -- I was told, for the
9 first time, that Dr Kelly had told Foreign Office
10 colleagues that he had spoken to Mr Gilligan.
11 Q. So you are told on the 19th June?
12 A. 19th.
13 Q. That Dr Kelly had spoken to Andrew Gilligan?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And who told you that from the Foreign Office, Mr Dowse?
16 A. Mr Howard told me that at the meeting that we had.
17 Q. He told you that at the meeting. And what was the
18 outcome of the meeting?
19 A. We agreed that the three of us should ask David to come
20 in for an interview at the earliest appropriate time, to
21 find out what he had spoken to Mr Gilligan about, what
22 he had said, but also, given that this contact appeared
23 not to be authorised, to remind him not to speak to the
24 press without proper authorisation.
25 Q. Right. And did the meeting on 24th June take place?

22
1 A. It did not.
2 Q. And why was that?
3 A. At that time I did not know -- I did not know at the
4 time, but there was, in addition to inquiries underway
5 about what I might call the 45 minute allegations, there
6 was a parallel investigation involving the police about
7 the leaking of a top secret document. David --
8 Q. Was that the document that Mr Gilligan referred to about
9 the absence of links or a reported absence of links
10 between Saddam Hussein and Osama Bin Laden?
11 A. I do not have full details but I believe it was.
12 Q. That Mr Gilligan I think had published in February 2003?
13 A. I do not have the details of that.
14 Q. So you were telling us why the meeting on 24th June did
15 not go ahead?
16 A. At that time David was being considered as part of that
17 inquiry and the view was taken I was not party to this
18 decision -- the view was taken that an interview with
19 David about his links with the press might prejudice
20 that other inquiry.
21 Q. Did a time come when that other inquiry excluded
22 Dr Kelly?
23 A. I believe it did, sir, but I do not have the details of
24 that.
25 Q. You were not involved with that?

23
1 A. I was not involved.
2 Q. I will ask Mr Howard about that. Will he know?
3 A. I believe he will sir.
4 Q. I can always ask him, anyway.
5 So you do come to have an interview with Dr Kelly?
6 A. No. The meeting that was fixed for the 24th was
7 postponed sine die. Mr Howard did not give a reason for
8 that. I quite simply relayed the message to David that
9 the meeting had been postponed. I did not know the
10 reason for the postponement so I could not tell Dr Kelly
11 the reason.
12 Q. And you then receive a letter dated 30th June 2003. Can
13 I take you to that? That is MoD/1/19.
14 When did you receive this letter?
15 A. I received it late afternoon on 1st July, the Tuesday.
16 Q. Had Dr Kelly told you it was coming?
17 A. He rang me mid to late afternoon on Monday 30th June to
18 say that he had written me a letter.
19 Q. Did he tell you what the letter was about?
20 A. He said that it was about his dealings with
21 Andrew Gilligan. His attention had been brought to
22 Mr Gilligan's evidence before the FAC and he had spent
23 the weekend searching his mind about whether he might
24 have been the source of Mr Gilligan's quotes.
25 Q. Did he say to you anything on the telephone about

24
1 whether he thought he had been the source?
2 A. I do not believe he did.
3 Q. Right. You then get the letter; and we can see the
4 letter. Can I take you through that briefly? He talks
5 about controversy raging over Andrew Gilligan's claims,
6 he talks about his involvement in writing the three
7 dossiers. Then over the next page he introduces his
8 dealings with Andrew Gilligan. I have taken Mr Gilligan
9 through that, so I will not take you through that.
10 At the bottom of page 20:
11 "I most certainly have never attempted to undermine
12 Government policy in any way ..." and he says he was
13 sympathetic to the war because he recognised from
14 a decade's work the menace of Iraq. Page 21, he did not
15 consider he was the source "... until a friend in RUSI
16 said that I should look at the oral evidence ..."
17 Did you know who that person was in the Royal United
18 Services Institute?
19 A. I should say first of all it was not RUSI. David did
20 from time to time mis-attribute the colleague. She was
21 in Chatham House.
22 Q. Someone had pointed out the similarity and that is what
23 had prompted him to think about that?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. "I should explain my 'unusual' interaction with the

25
1 media", he talks about that. His Lordship has just
2 taken you to that passage so I will not go back to it.
3 The penultimate paragraph on page 21:
4 "I have never served as a designated spokesperson
5 for any organisation, never initiated the release of
6 information on behalf of any organisation and never
7 discussed a JIC report. I have never contacted any
8 journalist to claim that a newspaper report was correct
9 (or incorrect). I have never made a claim as to the
10 timing of when any part of the dossier was included.
11 I have never acted as a conduit to release or leak
12 information. I have never discussed classified
13 information with anyone other than those cleared so to
14 do. I do not feel 'deep unease' over the dossier
15 because it is completely coincident with my personal
16 views on Iraq's unconventional weapons capability."
17 Having investigated and indeed having heard all that
18 we have heard about Dr Kelly's contacts with the press,
19 did you form a view about whether or not there had been
20 any breach of the Official Secrets Act?
21 A. On the basis of what Dr Kelly said in this letter and on
22 the basis of the subsequent interview by
23 Richard Hatfield on the 4th July we came to the
24 conclusion that, on the face of this text, there had not
25 been a breach of the Official Secrets Act.

26
1 Q. And now that you have heard or perhaps seen transcripts
2 of the tape, and you have heard evidence from Mr Hewitt
3 about what he says was said and you have heard evidence
4 from Mr Gilligan about what he said was said and you
5 have seen Mr Gilligan's note, are you still of the same
6 view?
7 A. That is very difficult for me to answer. I have not,
8 I confess, seen all of the transcripts. I would really
9 have to look at those to come to a judgment.
10 Q. Right. What did you do about this letter of 30th June?
11 A. On 1st July in the morning, I had a meeting with
12 a member of the Ministry of Defence security set up at
13 their request; and this was the point at which I learnt
14 that there was a parallel inquiry into the leaking of
15 a top secret document; and that, at that stage, David
16 was being considered as part of that.
17 Q. Right.
18 A. I, in turn, said that David had told me that he had
19 written a letter to me outlining his dealings with
20 Mr Gilligan. We came to a common understanding that it
21 was possible that the letter that David had written
22 might have implications for the inquiry into the leaking
23 of the top secret document. Clearly we could not come
24 to that judgment until we saw what the letter said.
25 Q. Yes.

27
1 A. So we reached an agreement that as soon as the letter
2 arrived we would have a further meeting to look at what
3 the letter said, to decide on the handling. The letter
4 arrived, as I said, late on the afternoon of 1st July.
5 I held a meeting with the Ministry of Defence security
6 and subsequently with the police on the morning of
7 2nd July.
8 Q. Did you send the letter on to Mr Howard?
9 A. Yes, I did on the 2nd --
10 Q. Can we look at MoD/1/23? Can you tell everyone what
11 this is?
12 A. Yes. This is a covering minute that I wrote to
13 Mr Howard, formally forwarding a copy of Dr Kelly's
14 letter to me to him. We had come to the decision in my
15 discussions with Ministry of Defence security and the
16 police that the letter did not have immediate
17 implications for the leaking of a top secret document.
18 Consequently, the best person up the chain, if you like,
19 to receive this was Mr Howard given his responsibilities
20 for looking into the allegations of the 45 minutes
21 quote.
22 Q. You say at the end of that short paragraph:
23 "You may wish to pass a copy to the leak inquiry
24 personnel."
25 A. That is the personnel looking into the leaking of the

28
1 top secret document.
2 Q. From which subsequently Dr Kelly was excluded?
3 A. From which he was excluded.
4 Q. That is 2nd July. On 3rd July where were you?
5 A. I was on leave. I believe I was in London on private
6 business.
7 Q. Right. We know from various other documents that on
8 that evening Mr Hoon called Mr Powell. Do you know how
9 Mr Hoon came to be aware of the contents of the letter?
10 A. I do not know, sir.
11 Q. Did you interview Dr Kelly about the letter?
12 A. I did not. On 2nd July I had intended to interview
13 Dr Kelly at 1600 on 4th July.
14 Q. Which would have been a Friday, is that right?
15 A. That was a Friday.
16 Q. Right.
17 A. When I returned to office on Friday morning,
18 Martin Howard rang me a little bit before 10 o'clock to
19 ask me over to his office to discuss the letter.
20 Q. Right.
21 A. And, at that point, Mr Howard said that it had been
22 decided -- I am not sure if he said by whom, but it had
23 been decided that Mr Hatfield should conduct an
24 interview with Dr Kelly at as early an opportunity as
25 possible; and that I should have to organise that

29
1 meeting as quickly as I could.
2 Q. So it had been decided by someone else, not his line
3 manager, that Mr Hatfield would come in and interview?
4 A. That is correct.
5 Q. Were you given any explanation of this?
6 A. I believe -- I think Martin pointed to the seriousness
7 with which the letter was being taken.
8 Q. Was anything else said? Did he say anything else?
9 A. I cannot recall. It was a very short conversation,
10 because I knew that Mr Howard had another meeting at
11 10 o'clock; and so it was a very short meeting to ask me
12 to arrange the meeting between Dr Kelly and Mr Hatfield.
13 Q. Right. So you then arranged the interview.
14 A. That is correct.
15 Q. You had originally I think told us you were going to
16 interview him at 1600 hours. When did the interview
17 take place?
18 A. The interview took place at 11.30. It transpired
19 Dr Kelly was already in the Foreign Office that morning
20 on other business, so I could arrange that meeting
21 really quite quickly.
22 Q. Do you know what other business he was on?
23 A. I do not. It was quite routine for him to be in the
24 Foreign Office when he came up to London.
25 Q. I infer from your answer also quite routine for you not

30
1 necessarily to know what he was doing when he was on
2 Foreign Office business?
3 A. It would clearly be on matters of Iraq or on chemical
4 and biological weaponry but I would not have expected to
5 be told the details.
6 Q. So who was present at the interview on 4th July?
7 A. There were three of us: Mr Hatfield, myself and
8 Dr Kelly.
9 Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/24? Do you recognise this?
10 A. This is Mr Hatfield's notes of the meeting.
11 Q. Can I take you, briefly, through those? I know you have
12 also made some notes and I will take you through those.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. The interview begins at 11.30 and appears to end at
15 about 1.15.
16 A. That is my recollection.
17 Q. And there was no break in between?
18 A. There was no break.
19 Q. How did Mr Hatfield begin the interview? If you look at
20 paragraph 1, that might help you.
21 A. The meeting was not a formal meeting in the sense that
22 it was part of a process that might lead to a formal
23 disciplinary action, and Mr Hatfield made that clear at
24 the beginning, he said: this is informal, in the
25 technical sense; but nevertheless in other senses of the

31
1 word it was a formal meeting.
2 Mr Hatfield sat on one side of his table, Dr Kelly
3 sat on the other. I was sitting at one end. Dr Kelly
4 had water provided. During the meeting he was offered
5 coffee, but declined it.
6 Q. Right. And we can see from the next couple of
7 paragraphs that the objects in the interview were
8 explained. First of all, to form a view of whether
9 there was evidence to suggest a sufficiently serious
10 offence had been committed to warrant formal
11 disciplinary action. And second, to establish if his
12 meeting with Andrew Gilligan was likely to form the
13 basis of Mr Gilligan's evidence to the FAC which had
14 already taken place at this stage.
15 A. That is right. Mr Hatfield made it very clear that the
16 meeting was very much in two parts as you have
17 described, sir.
18 Q. Towards the bottom of that page Mr Hatfield said this,
19 after Dr Kelly had explained in terms very similar to
20 his letter of 30th June about his contacts with the
21 press; Mr Hatfield said this:
22 "I asked why he consulted the FCO press office
23 rather [than] the MoD. Dr Kelly said that his salary
24 was paid by the FCO."
25 Is that right?

32
1 A. That is a fair reflection -- that is a reflection of the
2 facts. His salary is -- the Ministry of Defence is
3 reimbursed for the costs of Dr Kelly's salary.
4 Q. So Dr Kelly was paid for by the Foreign and Commonwealth
5 Office, had you as a line manager in the Ministry of
6 Defence, had an office with the defence intelligence
7 staff and yet reported back to the DSTL; is that fair?
8 A. Yes, he had a number of contacts throughout Government,
9 yes.
10 Q. Right. Mr Hatfield said when Dr Kelly had said that:
11 "I said that was irrelevant -- he was seconded to
12 MoD" and appeared to suggest that all press contacts
13 should go through MoD press office; is that right?
14 A. That is what Mr Hatfield said.
15 Q. Did you, at that stage, say: well, hang on Mr Hatfield,
16 I had a chat with Dr Kelly about this back on
17 9th August?
18 A. No, I did not. I was taking notes in this meeting.
19 Q. Right. But you were able to speak?
20 A. I was able to speak.
21 Q. But did not?
22 A. But did not.
23 Q. "I asked [as in Mr Hatfield asked] who had given him
24 authority to exercise his own judgment about contacts
25 with journalists on defence related business, since this

33
1 was contrary to standing departmental instructions.
2 Dr Kelly said that he had never read those instructions,
3 nor sought to discover what guidance existed ..."
4 Then he talked about how he regarded his discussions
5 as a continuation of his role as UN expert. We see that
6 at the bottom of the page.
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Then over the page we can see that Dr Kelly was asked to
9 summarise his contacts with Andrew Gilligan. I have
10 taken Mr Gilligan through relevant passages of this so
11 if it is all right, I will not take you through those.
12 At the bottom of page 25:
13 "At this point I asked Dr Kelly whether he was
14 confident that he had accurately reflected the meeting
15 with Gilligan and whether there was anything he had
16 omitted about this other meeting. I stressed that
17 whatever the actual significance of anything he had said
18 to Gilligan, their meeting could turn out to be very
19 important in relation to the public dispute between the
20 Government and the BBC about Gilligan's claims. It
21 might become necessary to consider a public statement
22 based on his account. Gilligan's reputation was at
23 stake and he would be bound to challenge any
24 inaccuracies -- and I reminded Dr Kelly of the
25 possibility that he might have been tape-recorded.

34
1 Dr Kelly said that he understood this but stood by his
2 account."
3 Why did you understand that it might become
4 necessary to make a public statement?
5 A. (Pause). I was not part of any discussions on the issue
6 of a public statement. That was the first that I had
7 heard of it.
8 Q. And did it surprise you?
9 A. I did not take a view one way or the other on that.
10 Q. You are a civil servant of some experience, you have
11 told us, and you have told us when you joined the
12 Ministry of Defence and your current position.
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. Is it unusual for civil servants to be named in the way
15 that Dr Kelly was named?
16 A. That is a very difficult question for me to answer. My
17 experience is that it probably is but we were not
18 dealing with normal circumstances.
19 Q. So when Mr Hatfield said to Dr Kelly: you might be
20 named, you told us before you did not make any comment
21 when Mr Hatfield had put a comment to Dr Kelly; did you
22 make any comment at this stage?
23 A. I did not.
24 Q. And what did Dr Kelly do?
25 A. He acknowledged that. He did not, to my recollection,

35
1 express any -- he certainly expressed in words no
2 discomfort with that, and I do not recall any body
3 language that expressed discomfort.
4 Q. Having said that it might be necessary to make a public
5 statement, Mr Hatfield then says he was prepared to
6 accept the account in good faith and pointed out
7 breaches of departmental instructions in relation to the
8 contact. And that, I suppose, took the form or replaced
9 the meeting that you were proposing to have on
10 24th June, pointing out the instructions?
11 A. That is correct.
12 Q. And Mr Hatfield identified that he said that his contact
13 with Gilligan was particularly ill-judged. This is
14 halfway through that paragraph. And Mr Hatfield said
15 towards the end of that paragraph:
16 "I would, however, write to him shortly to record my
17 displeasure at his conduct. I went on to instruct him
18 to familiarise himself with departmental guidance about
19 dealings with the media, to report all contacts to his
20 line manager and never to agree to an interview without
21 explicit authority. Finally, I warned Dr Kelly that any
22 further breaches would be almost certain to lead to
23 disciplinary action and the possibility of disciplinary
24 action could of course be re-opened if further facts
25 came to light that called his account and assurances

36
1 into question."
2 How was Dr Kelly when this sort of version of the
3 riot act was being read out to him?
4 A. Dr Kelly was composed throughout. It is not
5 a comfortable experience for anyone to receive that sort
6 of message from the personnel director of the
7 organisation; and he looked -- he was somewhat
8 uncomfortable, but I believe he was expecting the sorts
9 of words that Mr Hatfield would have said.
10 I should also say that Mr Hatfield set this out in
11 a very measured tone. He did not raise his voice; and
12 he wanted to make absolutely clear that Dr Kelly
13 understood the points that he was making.
14 Q. Mr Hatfield then went on in the note to say this, just
15 below halfway down that page:
16 "The second part of the interview was devoted to
17 a more detailed comparison of Dr Kelly's interview with
18 Gilligan's FAC appearance. I will summarise my
19 conclusions - my detailed analysis is appended ..."
20 It is very difficult to reconcile the two accounts,
21 that is the gist of his matter.
22 Over the page, at page 27, he said this at the end:
23 "If both Gilligan's and Kelly's accounts are
24 essentially truthful, perhaps the most likely
25 supposition is that Kelly appeared to provide broad

37
1 collateral for Gilligan's 'single source' claims about
2 the dossier, although not for the specific allegations
3 about political interference."
4 Then a further reference to Mr Gilligan's evidence
5 to the FAC. At the end of this meeting, did you think
6 that Dr Kelly was the source of Mr Gilligan's story?
7 A. I did not, sir.
8 Q. Did Mr Hatfield think that Dr Kelly was the source of
9 Mr Gilligan's story?
10 A. I do not believe he did. My recollection is that that
11 final paragraph, which you have just quoted, is
12 a summary of Mr Hatfield's views.
13 Q. Can I then take you to MoD/1/30? Can you just tell us
14 all what this document is?
15 A. Yes. I said earlier that Mr Hatfield conducted the
16 interview with Dr Kelly in two parts. The first was in
17 relation to disciplinary or management action in
18 relation to his contacts with Mr Gilligan; and the
19 second was to compare Dr Kelly's account of his meeting
20 with Mr Gilligan, on the one hand, with Mr Gilligan's
21 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee of his meeting
22 with the source on the other, to see where there were
23 areas of overlap and where there were areas of
24 divergence.
25 Q. And this document, if one continues through it, is an

38
1 analysis of the various questions that were asked,
2 question 511, 559, looking at Mr Gilligan's evidence and
3 getting Dr Kelly's views; is that right?
4 A. That is right. The meeting, at this stage, was
5 essentially conducted by Mr Hatfield reading
6 Mr Gilligan's answers to the various questions and then
7 either asking Dr Kelly to comment or noting that
8 Dr Kelly had already commented, in the earlier part of
9 the interview.
10 Q. Can I ask you to look at MoD/1/32, paragraph 17 of your
11 note where you record that "Hatfield summed up."
12 Perhaps you can just read for us what the gist of his
13 summing-up was.
14 A. "There appeared to be consistencies between parts of
15 Gilligan's testimony to the Foreign Affairs Committee,
16 and what Kelly says that he said to Gilligan. In
17 particular, the meeting was set up at Gilligan's
18 initiative, and Kelly had acknowledged that the
19 statement that it was 30 per cent likely that there was
20 a CW programme in the six months before the conflict was
21 consistent with his views. But there were significant
22 discrepancies. In particular, Kelly denied having any
23 knowledge of the '45 minutes claim' until after the
24 Dossier was published, and denied having any knowledge
25 of the process by which that assessment was included; he

39
1 also denied giving any opinion that the evidence that
2 uranium had been sought from Niger was based on
3 unreliable information. In addition, Kelly was not of
4 the view that Iraq had not been able to weaponise
5 chemical and biological weapons."
6 Q. Then he deals with some minor discrepancies. Over the
7 page, about three lines down, can you just read from
8 "Hatfield said ..."
9 A. "Hatfield said that overall, his judgment was that if
10 there were a single source of Gilligan's information,
11 then it was not Kelly. Kelly's words may have been part
12 of the background to Gilligan's stories, but on the
13 basis of what he had testified, he was satisfied that
14 Kelly was not the source of the most significant
15 allegations."
16 Q. After that interview had finished, where did Dr Kelly
17 go, do you know?
18 A. Mr Hatfield's office is close to Holborn and I walked
19 with Dr Kelly back to my office in Metropole Building,
20 that takes about 25 minutes.
21 Q. Right.
22 A. I then asked him into my office, after 10 minutes or so;
23 and I said that he must obviously reflect and take on
24 board what Mr Hatfield had said, we must await the
25 letter that Mr Hatfield said he would write and that

40
1 I would help him take through further any actions that
2 were necessary at that point.
3 Our discussions then turned to the forthcoming
4 training that Dr Kelly and other weapons inspectors were
5 going to receive on Monday at RAF Honnington. I was
6 going to deliver a short introductory speech there and
7 we discussed the sort of things I might say.
8 Q. Did you discuss with Sir Kevin Tebbit, the permanent
9 undersecretary at the Ministry of Defence, the contents
10 of the interview you had had with Dr Kelly?
11 A. I did not.
12 Q. Because on 4th July 2003 Sir Kevin Tebbit is writing to
13 Sir David Omand. Can we look at MoD/1/34? This is
14 a letter sent saying:
15 "Dear David,
16 "An official in the MoD has volunteered that he had
17 a discussion with Andrew Gilligan on 22 May, one week
18 before Gilligan's allegation about the interference in
19 the production of the September dossier and the
20 '45 minute story'."
21 He then goes on to give some reference to who that
22 is without identifying Dr Kelly by name; and summarises,
23 over the page, at 35, the interview. But at the top of
24 this he says this:
25 "My immediate reaction was that this must be the

41
1 'single source' to whom Gilligan referred to in his
2 testimony ... Certainly, his comments to Gilligan could
3 have been incorporated into Gilligan's 29 May story.
4 However, closer examination, following today's interview
5 suggests that this would not necessarily be a reliable
6 conclusion."
7 Then he sets out a number of possibilities, and says
8 over the page, at page 36, that the letter is being
9 copied to Andrew Turnbull, David Manning, Michael Jay,
10 Eliza Manningham-Buller and John Scarlett.
11 Were you aware that the interview was being referred
12 up, if I can put it that way, in this manner, at the
13 time?
14 A. I know that Mr Hatfield wished to prepare some material
15 for Sir Kevin, but apart from that I was not aware of
16 further details; and I know that because Mr Hatfield
17 asked me to prepare a few paragraphs that he might use
18 as part of that.
19 Q. And you were unaware, at this time, of any contact
20 between Mr Hoon and Mr Powell?
21 A. I was not aware of that.
22 Q. 5th and 6th July, which we have now got to, Saturday and
23 Sunday, what are you doing then?
24 A. Saturday I am at home.
25 Q. Right.

42
1 A. And on Sunday I travel up in the afternoon to
2 East Anglia so that I can deliver an introductory talk
3 to a group of weapons inspectors who are shortly to
4 deploy to Iraq.
5 Q. You travel to East Anglia; whereabouts in East Anglia?
6 A. I was staying with my parents.
7 Q. Where were you going to be on the Monday?
8 A. RAF Honnington which is close to Bury St Edmunds.
9 Q. Did you see or speak to Dr Kelly over the weekend?
10 A. I do not believe I did.
11 Q. The meeting on 4th July appears to have finished on the
12 basis that you are going get a letter telling you off
13 and that appeared to be the end of it, at that stage; is
14 that right?
15 A. Yes, that was my reading.
16 Q. If you read the text, that appears to be what was
17 suggested; and that is why I have asked you to read the
18 summing-up.
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. What happened in relation to Dr Kelly on the morning --
21 Monday morning is 7th July, is it?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. You are at RAF Honnington and you are going to give
24 a pep talk to the inspectors; is that right?
25 A. That is right. I arrived at RAF Honnington between 8.30

43
1 and 9.00.
2 Q. Was Dr Kelly there?
3 A. Yes, he was.
4 Q. Already there?
5 A. He was already there. He had stayed in Bury St Edmunds
6 overnight and had travelled with his inspector
7 colleagues to RAF Honnington. There were five or six of
8 them, I cannot remember the exact number, of which
9 Dr Kelly was one. I delivered a 15-minute introductory
10 talk, essentially thanking them for agreeing to be part
11 of this team and wishing them all the best for their
12 deployment. There was a short question and answer
13 session after that.
14 Q. That was becoming part of a team and the team was the
15 Iraq Survey Group; is that right?
16 A. Yes, the team was the Iraq Survey Group.
17 Q. Then they were going to be trained for two days; is that
18 right?
19 A. That is right. To the best of my recollection, it was
20 essentially health and safety training for deployment
21 into Iraq.
22 Q. Did Dr Kelly complete his training without interruption?
23 A. No, he did not. I left RAF Honnington I believe
24 somewhere between 9.30 and 9.45. I was in fact
25 returning home as I was ostensibly on leave that day.

44
1 While I was travelling home Richard Hatfield called me,
2 I cannot remember the time exactly, but during the
3 morning.
4 Q. On a mobile?
5 A. On my mobile, to say that he had been asked to conduct
6 a further interview with Dr Kelly and needed to do that
7 as quickly as possible. Mr Hatfield did know that
8 Dr Kelly was at RAF Honnington and so he realised there
9 would be something of a time delay before that meeting
10 could be set up.
11 Q. Did you say to him why does he have to have a second
12 interview, or why is there a second interview, or you
13 just acted?
14 A. I acted. I needed to be cautious on what I said on
15 a mobile line.
16 Q. Right. So did you call RAF Honnington and ask Dr Kelly
17 to come down, or drive back?
18 A. I carried on travelling. I spoke to David and asked him
19 to arrange the quickest method back to London, which
20 I think was car to Cambridge and then the rail down.
21 David was fairly confident that he could make a meeting
22 in London at 4 o'clock and that is what we ultimately
23 arranged.
24 Q. So that interfered with his day's training?
25 A. It did.

45
1 Q. Did you see him later on that day?
2 A. I saw him -- I was present at the interview at 1600 --
3 Q. Right.
4 A. -- with Mr Hatfield and also Mr Howard. After that
5 interview Dr Kelly returned to Bury St Edmunds, stayed
6 the night there. RAF Honnington I understand were able
7 to reconfigure the second day's training for David so
8 that he did not miss out on any of the essential items.
9 Q. So he still managed to complete his training but what
10 was his attitude on the Monday night or Monday
11 afternoon?
12 A. (Pause). I cannot recall exactly, but he did not appear
13 anything other than composed.
14 Q. Right. You then have the meeting. Who was at the
15 meeting?
16 A. There were four people at the meeting. This took place
17 in Mr Hatfield's office again. The participants were
18 Mr Hatfield, Mr Howard and Dr Kelly, and I took notes.
19 Q. So the person who has joined is Mr Howard?
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. Although you did not speak on the mobile about why this
22 second meeting had been called for the understandable
23 reason you have given, no doubt when you were with
24 Mr Hatfield you could have had that opportunity. Did
25 you take it and ask why there was now a second

46
1 interview?
2 A. The choreography was that David and I, as I recall, met
3 in my office first and then went up to Mr Hatfield's
4 office and we then went in together for the meeting. So
5 there was not the opportunity for me to speak to
6 Mr Hatfield.
7 Q. So you did not. Did anyone ever tell you why there was
8 this second interview?
9 A. It was explained at the meeting itself.
10 Q. Can we turn to the notes of the meeting?
11 LORD HUTTON: I wonder whether this might be a convenient
12 moment to give the stenographers a five minute break.
13 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, yes.
14 (11.40 am)
15 (Short Break)
16 (11.45 am)
17 MR DINGEMANS: I was asking you about the meeting on
18 7th July, MoD/1/46, if I may. Mr Hatfield appears to be
19 in the chair again and the notes reflect his role.
20 A. That is correct.
21 Q. He started by saying he wanted to cover two issues:
22 "The first was to follow up the discrepancies
23 between Gilligan's account of the meeting with his
24 source and Kelly's account of his meeting with
25 Gilligan."

47
1 Had you not done that on 4th July?
2 A. Yes we had. Richard explained that the Ministry wanted
3 to be clear on certain areas of what Dr Kelly had said
4 on the 4th; and that reflects the issues that were
5 covered later.
6 Q. And that was the reason he wanted to be clear about it.
7 Did he explain why he wanted to be clear about it?
8 A. He explained, to the best of my recollection, that it
9 was possible that the account, the Ministry of Defence
10 account would -- or Dr Kelly's account would -- I am
11 sorry, might have to become known to the Foreign Affairs
12 Committee and might become known more widely to the
13 public.
14 Q. Yes. Continuing on:
15 "The second issue was that MoD may wish to make
16 a public statement, and he wished to discuss that with
17 Kelly. The meeting was structured to follow ..."
18 a comparative analysis that Mr Hatfield had carried out.
19 So the first is to get more information about
20 discrepancies with Mr Gilligan's account; is that right?
21 A. That is correct.
22 Q. And, second, so the Ministry of Defence might make this
23 public statement?
24 A. That is right. The vast majority of the meeting was
25 concerned with the first of those two issues that you

48
1 have highlighted.
2 Q. And I know you did not say anything about a public
3 statement on 4th July. Did you on the 7th July?
4 A. No, I did not. David noted that without comment.
5 Q. Right. He noted it without comment. And how did he
6 look about it?
7 A. He was composed throughout this meeting.
8 Q. To continue through the document, he talks about his
9 contacts with journalists, and some of these I put to
10 Mr Gilligan, page 47, his involvement in the dossier,
11 the meeting with Mr Gilligan, continuing to page 48, and
12 the quotation specifically being put. At paragraph 10
13 on page 48 we come to the 45 minute claim.
14 Then we continue the interview, page 49, at
15 paragraph 11, the discussions on uranium imports:
16 "Kelly said that so far as he could recall it was
17 not discussed in depth." He would only have noted the
18 international observations.
19 Then, talking about Mr Campbell's role:
20 "Kelly replied that, as he had said in his letter of
21 30th June, Gilligan did raise the involvement of
22 Campbell and Kelly said that he was unable to comment."
23 Then the source for the 45 minutes claim at
24 paragraph 14. Then we continue to page 50, towards the
25 end of the interview, Dr Kelly's assessments of

49
1 a chemical warfare programme, Iraqi weapons of mass
2 destruction; and at paragraph 17 Mr Howard asked if
3 Dr Kelly was aware of anyone else who might have been
4 a source.
5 Then paragraph 18:
6 "Mr Howard asked if anybody from the BBC, and in
7 particular Mr Gilligan, had tried to contact Kelly since
8 the meeting on 22nd May. Kelly replied that Gilligan
9 had not tried to contact him. The only BBC person he
10 could recall having contacted him was Susan Watts,
11 a science editor."
12 Could you just tell me this: was the issue of the
13 Newsnight broadcast, which we know from other evidence
14 the broadcasts were on 2nd and 4th June --
15 A. Hmm.
16 Q. -- and this meeting is 7th July and the other meeting
17 was 4th July, was that ever raised with Dr Kelly?
18 A. Could I ask for clarification? The Newsnight broadcast
19 was by?
20 Q. Gavin Hewitt.
21 A. It was not.
22 Q. I am very sorry, Susan Watts. Gavin Hewitt did the
23 News at 10.
24 A. When Dr Kelly said that he had spoken to Susan Watts,
25 that was noted without comment and was not pursued

50
1 further.
2 Q. So it was simply not pursued?
3 A. It was not pursued.
4 Q. No-one asked: what about the broadcasts on 2nd and
5 4th June?
6 A. No, the focus of the meeting was on Dr Kelly's meetings
7 with Andrew Gilligan. It was not pursued at all.
8 Q. Nothing was asked that elicited anything about
9 Gavin Hewitt?
10 A. No, it was not.
11 Q. So at the end of the interview, paragraph 19, can you
12 just tell us how Mr Hatfield summed it up?
13 A. Yes.
14 "Mr Hatfield said that it was likely that the
15 department would need to make some public statement on
16 Kelly's involvement with Gilligan. He passed Kelly
17 a draft press release and Kelly confirmed that he was
18 content with its terms. Hatfield said that although
19 Kelly was not named in the press release his identity
20 may become known in due course. Kelly replied that he
21 acknowledged this: in his letter of 30th June he had
22 said that a friend at RUSI had alerted him to the
23 possibility of his being considered as Gilligan's
24 source."
25 Q. Right. Can I then take you to MoD/5/25? Can you tell

51
1 us what these are?
2 A. This is my contemporary notes of the meeting on
3 7th July.
4 Q. Right. Those run through to page 30. Do those notes --
5 I am afraid I have had difficulty in reading them in the
6 short time I have had them -- do those notes broadly
7 accord with Mr Hatfield's formal -- the formal minutes
8 we have seen typed up?
9 A. I am sorry, the formal meeting minutes that we have just
10 been looking at were typed by me on the basis of these
11 handwritten notes.
12 Q. So those accord?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. These were the source for the notes?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. So how did you understand things were going to progress?
17 A. Following that meeting, Richard said that he was content
18 for David to return to RAF Honnington to complete his
19 training.
20 LORD HUTTON: Was that when Dr Kelly was there or was that
21 after the meeting?
22 A. My Lord that was at the end of the meeting.
23 LORD HUTTON: I see. So he said that to Dr Kelly.
24 A. He said that to Dr Kelly. He also said that as we were
25 planning for Dr Kelly to deploy to Iraq later in the

52
1 week commencing 7th July or possibly the Monday
2 thereafter, he thought it was wise to postpone David's
3 deployment until matters had sorted themselves out. But
4 he was content to plan on the basis that David would be
5 deploying to Iraq.
6 MR DINGEMANS: What matters were going to sort themselves
7 out?
8 A. There was uncertainty about the timing of the release of
9 the press release, what may happen after that. And
10 Richard thought it prudent not to send David to Iraq
11 straightaway.
12 Q. Right. And was there any discussion about why it was
13 now necessary to have a press release?
14 A. I do not recall that there was. This part of the
15 meeting was really quite short. Mr Hatfield passed
16 Dr Kelly a copy of a draft press release. Dr Kelly read
17 it; and said he was content with it.
18 Q. Right. Did he say: why are you making this press
19 release?
20 A. No, he recognised -- he was perfectly content with it.
21 Q. And you were not part of the decision-making process
22 that led to the making of the press release?
23 A. I was not, sir.
24 Q. Can I just ask you: if someone had asked for a security
25 style interview, would you have characterised the

53
1 interview that took place as a security style interview?
2 A. No, I would not. The meeting was actually very friendly
3 in tone. We wanted to be sure of certain aspects of
4 David's account of his meeting with Mr Gilligan; and we
5 wanted to help him explain, to elicit the details of his
6 story.
7 Q. I do not know what a security style interview is but it
8 does not sound very nice. What does it mean to you?
9 A. I have to say I am not aware of that formal term.
10 Q. Can I take you to CAB/1/46?
11 A. Yes, of course.
12 Q. This is a note to Sir David Omand. It is dictated by
13 John Scarlett. Can you tell us all John Scarlett's
14 role?
15 A. He is chairman of the JIC, the Joint Intelligence
16 Committee.
17 Q. He says this:
18 "Andrew Gilligan and the MoD single source.
19 "I agree with Kevin Tebbit's letter of Saturday that
20 the finger points strongly at David Kelly as Gilligan's
21 source. I have been through the Gilligan/FAC transcript
22 again. I attach copies of two pages in particular which
23 seem to make it clear that Gilligan has only talked to
24 one person about the September dossier. If he could
25 have referred to any corroborating information he would

54
1 have done so. If this is true, Kelly is not telling the
2 whole story.
3 "Gilligan must have got the 45 minute single
4 intelligence report item from somewhere, presumably
5 Kelly. Conclusion: Kelly needs a proper security style
6 interview in which all these inconsistencies are
7 thrashed out."
8 That is where I had got the phrase "security style
9 interview". But that was not the nature of the
10 interview you had on the 7th?
11 A. This is the first time that I have seen this document.
12 I would emphasise that the meeting was conducted in
13 a friendly style. I do not believe David felt any
14 particular pressure at that meeting.
15 Q. Can I take you to another document, MoD/1/44. This is
16 a memo dated 8th July 2003, dictated by Dominic Wilson.
17 Who is he?
18 A. He is private secretary to Sir Kevin Tebbit, the
19 Permanent Secretary.
20 Q. You can see the date, 8th July 2003. He says, at
21 paragraph 2:
22 "What is now needed is a more intensive interview
23 with Kelly."
24 He identifies at the end of that paragraph:
25 "The core issue in this respect is whether it was

55
1 Kelly who alleged that the 45 minute intelligence was
2 inserted into the dossier against the wishes of the
3 intelligence community ..."
4 He says at paragraph 4 this, and you can see the
5 date of the memo, 8th July.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. "Against this background I understand that arrangements
8 have been made for the further interview to be carried
9 out by you and addresses ..." I imagine he means the
10 people at the top?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. "... at 1600 today."
13 Was a further interview ever carried out?
14 A. There was not. There was only two interviews, on
15 4th July and 7th July. This minute was, in fact,
16 conveyed orally to Mr Hatfield in advance of the meeting
17 on 7th July. The meeting on 7th July was indeed at 1600
18 but did not, on the face of this, actually get typed up
19 until the day after, so --
20 Q. So this is referring to the interview that took place on
21 the 7th, is it?
22 A. That is correct. There was no further interview.
23 Q. And after the interviews had been completed, did you
24 believe that Dr Kelly was the source of Mr Gilligan's
25 story?

56
1 A. I continued to maintain that there were parallels in
2 some areas of Mr Gilligan's story, that matched what
3 Dr Kelly had told us; but there remained significant
4 discrepancies; and, in my view, those discrepancies
5 remained sufficiently significant for, if there was
6 a single source, it was still -- it was not Dr Kelly.
7 LORD HUTTON: You say you continued to maintain that, was
8 that in discussion with Mr Hatfield? It is just your
9 use of the word "maintain", or do you mean by that that
10 it remained your view?
11 A. My Lord, it was my view on the 4th July following the
12 first interview and it remained my view after the
13 interview on the 7th July.
14 LORD HUTTON: It was your use of the word "maintain".
15 I thought that might convey that you had stated to other
16 people --
17 A. I am sorry, my Lord, I did not convey that.
18 LORD HUTTON: It is just "remained"?
19 A. Yes.
20 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.
21 MR DINGEMANS: Do you know, for example, whether Mr Howard
22 was of the same view?
23 A. I do not know that.
24 Q. A press release was made by the Ministry of Defence on
25 this day. Can I take you to FAC/1/24:

57
1 "Full MoD statement on Gilligan meeting.
2 "An individual working in the MoD has come forward
3 to volunteer that he met Andrew Gilligan of the BBC on
4 May 22.
5 "it was an unauthorised meeting ..." et cetera.
6 It goes through various points that appear to have
7 been extracted from Dr Kelly in the interview, that we
8 have now looked at. What were your own feelings about
9 the issue of the press statement?
10 A. My thoughts were with David. David was comfortable with
11 the notion of a press statement. He did not express
12 unease; and my thoughts were really for what was the
13 best for David.
14 Q. Those were your primary thoughts, with Dr Kelly. But
15 what were your thoughts about issuing a press statement?
16 It seems to have been unprecedented, is that right?
17 A. I could not say whether there was a precedent. As
18 I said earlier, sir, it is not normal, but equally we
19 were not dealing with normal circumstances.
20 Q. Can I take you to a document, MoD/1/62? These are
21 questions and answers. These were also drafted within
22 the Ministry of Defence; and they have been called
23 "Defensive Q and A". Were you aware that these were
24 being drafted?
25 A. I do not believe I was. I certainly did not have a part

58
1 in drafting them.
2 Q. And you were not consulted then about those?
3 A. I was not consulted.
4 Q. Right. In which case I will come back to those with
5 those who may be able to help.
6 That is the 7th July. You have got to the end of
7 the day. He has been interviewed and he has gone back
8 to RAF Honnington. What is happening now?
9 A. On 8th July I do not recall having any dealings with
10 Dr Kelly or indeed the issues relating to Dr Kelly at
11 all. On 9th July, I know that I had a few telephone
12 conversations with Dr Kelly throughout the day.
13 Q. Where was he then?
14 A. He was at home.
15 Q. And were you given any documents to hand to him?
16 A. Mr Hatfield's letter to Dr Kelly is dated 9th July.
17 I believe I received it on the 10th.
18 Q. Can I take you to that?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. That is MoD/1/69. Let us just orientate ourselves.
21 Monday is the 7th, Tuesday is the 8th when the press
22 statement is made. So Wednesday is the 9th July?
23 A. Correct.
24 Q. Mr Hatfield is writing this letter to Dr Kelly. You get
25 it, you think, on Thursday 10th?

59
1 A. I believe that is correct.
2 Q. Can I just take you briefly through the letter:
3 "I interviewed you with your line manager ..." about
4 the contacts with Andrew Gilligan. "I explained that
5 your letter had serious implications ..." about
6 unauthorised contact.
7 He refers to the interview. At paragraph 3:
8 "As I made clear, these are serious breaches of
9 standard departmental procedure and you were unable to
10 give me any satisfactory explanation for your behaviour.
11 Your contact with Gilligan was particularly ill-judged.
12 Your discussion with him in May has also had awkward
13 consequences for both yourself and the department which
14 could easily have been avoided. I accept your assurance
15 that these consequences were unforeseen and unintended
16 and in particular that as you state in your letter you
17 did not make any allegations or accusations about the
18 preparation of the September 2002 dossier. I also
19 concluded on the basis of your account that you had not
20 divulged any classified or otherwise privileged
21 information. On this basis, I have concluded that
22 although your behaviour fell well short of the standard
23 that I would expect from a civil servant of your
24 standing and experience, it would not be appropriate to
25 initiate formal disciplinary proceedings. You should,

60
1 however, understand that any further breach of
2 departmental guidelines in dealing with the media would
3 almost certainly result in disciplinary action, with
4 potentially serious consequences."
5 Then he talks about paragraph 4, being aware.
6 Then paragraph 5:
7 "I should also remind you that the possibility of
8 disciplinary action could be reopened if any facts were
9 to come to light which appeared to call into question
10 the account and assurances that you gave to me."
11 Now, when did you hand that letter to Dr Kelly?
12 A. I handed it to him the next time I saw him, which was
13 Monday 14th July.
14 Q. So where was Dr Kelly on 9th July?
15 A. Dr Kelly was initially at home and then received
16 indications that the press were about to come to his
17 home and so he left.
18 Q. Who did he receive those indications from?
19 A. I do not know the precise sequencing because I believe
20 he was contacted both by the press and also our press
21 office. My involvement was that Dr Kelly rang me,
22 I believe during the afternoon of the 9th, to say that
23 Nick Rufford of the Sunday Times had appeared at his
24 front door.
25 Q. Can you time that for us?

61
1 A. I have tried very hard to do that. I know that I took
2 a call from Dr Kelly at just before 15.30 on 9th July.
3 To the very best of my recollection that was when he
4 told me but you will understand that I cannot be
5 certain.
6 Q. So the best you can do is it was about 3.30 in the
7 afternoon?
8 A. Yes. I may be wrong but that is the very best of my
9 recollection.
10 Q. He leaves his house as you understand it and where does
11 he go?
12 A. He did not tell me that evening. He rang me at about
13 a quarter to 9 when I was at home. He said quite simply
14 that he was going to the West Country. The following
15 morning he informed me he had stayed in
16 Weston-Super-Mare.
17 Q. That is 10th July. On 9th July, on the Wednesday, he
18 has gone from his house, after a warning from the press
19 office and perhaps a member of the press.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. He spent Wednesday night at Weston-Super-Mare. What
22 happened to him on the Thursday?
23 A. On the Thursday morning he tells me he is travelling
24 down to Cornwall.
25 Q. Did you speak to him at all? Thursday is now the 10th,

62
1 is that right?
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did you talk to him at all?
4 A. We kept in contact Thursday and Friday, to the best of
5 my recollection. My interest really was to ensure that
6 he was okay, and that he was not experiencing discomfort
7 by the press interest.
8 Q. Did you discuss with him at any time appearances before
9 Parliamentary Committees?
10 A. Yes, I did. I received a call from the private
11 secretary to Sir Kevin Tebbit.
12 Q. That is Dominic Wilson, is it?
13 A. That is Dominic Wilson.
14 Q. When?
15 A. I believe it was Thursday afternoon.
16 Q. And what did he say?
17 A. He said that the emerging view that would be put to
18 ministers was that Dr Kelly should appear before the
19 Intelligence and Security Committee.
20 Q. Now, that meets in private, does it?
21 A. That meets in private, but not before the Foreign
22 Affairs Committee.
23 Q. So that is an emerging view from whom?
24 A. I only assume that it is an emerging view from senior
25 officials. I based that on the fact that it came from

63
1 Dominic Wilson but I do not know, sir.
2 Q. Why was he going to go before any committee? Did you
3 understand that? Did anyone tell you that?
4 A. (Pause). I am searching through my memory. I believe
5 I was told that he may have to go before Committees but
6 I was not party to those decisions.
7 Q. You were not party to the decision. Did anyone say: he
8 has to go to the Committees for reason (a) or (b)?
9 A. Because the Intelligence and Security Committee were
10 continuing their investigation into the conflict in
11 Iraq, and there was interest from the Foreign Affairs
12 Committee in its report, which recommended that the
13 Government follow up Mr Gilligan's contacts.
14 Q. Right. Can I just ask you about that? The Foreign
15 Affairs Committee reported that they were concerned
16 about the number of leaks that had been made by or
17 appear to have been made from Ministry of Defence
18 sources and asked that these be followed up. Did you
19 understand that to mean that everyone should then end up
20 in front of the Foreign Affairs Committee who had been
21 followed up as a source?
22 A. I did not give that consideration, sir.
23 Q. You were not part of that particular --
24 A. I was not party to that.
25 Q. Can I take you to a memo dated 10th July at MoD/1/75?

64
1 Who is this addressed to?
2 A. That is addressed to the Secretary of State, Mr Hoon.
3 Q. And if we look at page 76, who is it from?
4 A. That is from Sir Kevin Tebbit, Permanent Secretary.
5 Q. Going back to 75, he says this:
6 "There have been requests to you for Dr Kelly to
7 appear before both the FAC and the ISC (on the same day,
8 15th July)."
9 I think you say you had become aware of that?
10 A. Yes, I think I had.
11 Q. "2. We had already offered him to the ISC and I
12 recommend that you agree to that request, although to
13 avoid setting a precedent, you should stress that you
14 only are content for such a relatively junior official
15 to appear given the exceptional nature of the evidence
16 that Dr Kelly could offer".
17 Do you know what the exceptional nature of the
18 evidence that Dr Kelly could offer was?
19 A. I was not party to this minute.
20 Q. "As regards the FAC, however, I recommend that you
21 resist, on grounds that the FAC inquiry is completed
22 (their report finalised on 3 July, before we had been
23 able to talk to Kelly ourselves) and that a separate
24 session to question Kelly would attach disproportionate
25 importance to him in relation to the subject of their

65
1 inquiry as a whole. The ISC, on the other hand, are
2 only just beginning their work and are better placed to
3 ensure that Kelly's views are placed in the proper
4 context (he is, after all, not the Government's
5 principal adviser on the subject, nor even a senior
6 one)."
7 Is that analysis a fair analysis of Dr Kelly's role
8 in biological weapons?
9 A. I believe that Dr Kelly's role was adviser to me on Iraq
10 issues.
11 Q. Right.
12 A. Could I please just correct, I said I was not party to
13 this minute. I meant that I did not have a part in
14 drafting it. But I see that I was copied it.
15 Q. You were sent it, which is why I am asking you about it.
16 I had understood you in that context.
17 "A further benefit of an ISC hearing is that they
18 can more easily handle national security dimensions ...
19 "3. A further reason for avoiding two hearing, back
20 to back, is to show some regard for the man himself. He
21 has come forward voluntarily, is not used to being
22 thrust into the public eye, and is not on trial. It
23 does not seem unreasonable to ask the FAC to show
24 restraint and accept the ISC hearing as being sufficient
25 for their purposes ..."

66
1 At paragraph 4:
2 "It will, of course, be important to ensure that
3 views that Kelly may express are not necessarily taken
4 to represent HMG's policy ..."
5 They say that that can be dealt with.
6 At page 76:
7 "This line may not be sustainable in strict
8 institutional terms: the FAC reports to Parliament,
9 whereas the ISC, although drawn from Parliament, report
10 formally to the Prime Minister ...
11 "... I think it is worth a try at least. The
12 individual himself is, I understand, prepared to appear
13 before both bodies."
14 Can we turn then to MoD/1/77. What is this
15 document? If you look at the bottom of the page you can
16 see the name Geoffrey Adams.
17 A. This is a private secretary note from, I believe,
18 Mr Hoon's private secretary --
19 Q. Can we look at 78? That may help you.
20 A. Yes, that is from Mr Hoon's private secretary to the
21 private secretary of the Secretary of State of Foreign
22 and Commonwealth Affairs.
23 Q. In paragraph 1 it records oral and written requests from
24 the ISC and FAC.
25 A. Yes.

67
1 Q. We will come to the circumstances in which those
2 requests were made later on.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Perhaps you can just read the next paragraph?
5 A. "The Defence Secretary has given the request from the
6 Foreign Affairs Committee careful consideration. There
7 are reasons for resisting this request:
8 "The FAC have already completed their inquiry.
9 (Indeed, their report was finalised on 3rd July before
10 MoD officials had interviewed Dr Kelly themselves.)
11 "A separate session to question Dr Kelly would
12 attach disproportionate importance to him in relation to
13 the subject of the FAC's inquiry as a whole.
14 "The ISC is better placed than the FAC to handle the
15 national security dimensions should the question of
16 intelligence material arise.
17 "It is fairer on the man himself not to expect him
18 to appear before the two Parliamentary Committees within
19 the space of three hours."
20 Q. Then over the page perhaps you can read, for balance,
21 the next part?
22 A. "On the other hand:
23 "It is not unreasonable for the FAC to feel that
24 Dr Kelly's account may call into question the evidence
25 that they were given by Andrew Gilligan and that they

68
1 should therefore have an opportunity to see him
2 themselves. (It is conceivable that, having done so,
3 they may decide to recall Gilligan).
4 "Presentationally, it would be difficult to defend a
5 position in which the Government had objected to
6 Dr Kelly appearing before a Committee of the House which
7 takes evidence in public in favour of an appointed
8 Committee which meets in private. Although the ISC has
9 considered taking evidence in public before and might
10 decide to do so on this occasion, this could set an
11 unwelcome precedent for both the Committee itself and
12 for us."
13 Q. Then it goes on to say:
14 "The Defence Secretary has, therefore, concluded
15 that on balance we should agree to the FAC's request
16 and. Given that Dr Kelly is a relatively junior
17 official who played only a limited role in the
18 preparation of the dossier, we should invite
19 Donald Anderson to agree that the Committee will confine
20 its questioning to matters directly relevant to
21 Andrew Gilligan's evidence. I understand that No. 10
22 would be content with this approach."
23 Were you consulted on whether Dr Kelly should give
24 evidence before both Committees?
25 A. My role in this was to speak to Dr Kelly initially, as

69
1 I recall, on Thursday, to take his view on whether he
2 would be content to appear before the ISC and also the
3 FAC. I explained to him that it was likely that he
4 would have to appear before the FAC but, at that stage,
5 there had not been a final decision on the FAC.
6 David said that he would be content, in principle,
7 to appear before both. He was fairly easy about
8 appearing before the ISC. He expressed some concern
9 about the publicity that would be surrounding an open
10 interview before the FAC, but, as a Crown servant, he
11 recognised that if called there would be an imperative
12 for him to attend and on that basis --
13 LORD HUTTON: He used words to that effect, did he,
14 Dr Wells?
15 A. I believe he said: if I am asked, I will do it. That is
16 to the best of my recollection, my Lord.
17 MR DINGEMANS: You say he expressed some concern. This was
18 a telephone conversation, was it?
19 A. It was while he was still down in Cornwall.
20 Q. It must have been concern you did not see visually.
21 What words did he use to express his concern?
22 A. I believe he said something like: there will of course
23 be publicity associated with it.
24 Q. When were you told that he was going to give evidence in
25 front of both Committees?

70
1 A. I was told that on the morning of the 11th of July.
2 Q. Right.
3 A. It must have been 11.30 or so.
4 Q. That is the Friday, is it?
5 A. That is the Friday. I was told that by Dominic Wilson
6 and asked to convey that to Dr Kelly.
7 Q. What did Dr Kelly say when you told him that?
8 A. He repeated the issue of the publicity that would
9 surround the appearance before the FAC.
10 Q. What do you mean he repeated it?
11 A. He had mentioned he had some concerns when I spoke to
12 him on Thursday; and he said, again: there is of course
13 the issue of publicity.
14 Q. So that is Friday. Did you have any further contact
15 with him on Saturday or Sunday?
16 A. If I could just return to the Friday, if I may.
17 Q. Of course. Sorry.
18 A. When I discussed with David the fact that he would
19 appear before both Committees, I told him that although
20 I was due to be in the United States for the first three
21 days of the following week, I had in fact cancelled that
22 trip so that I could help him in his preparations before
23 the Committee.
24 Q. Right.
25 A. David said that he -- he expressed regret that I had to

71
1 do that, but nevertheless thanked me for it.
2 Q. He was happy?
3 A. Yes. On the Saturday I did not call David in Cornwall.
4 I expected, because of the amount of publicity that this
5 issue was generating, he might welcome a break from me.
6 Q. Yes.
7 A. I did call him on the morning of Sunday.
8 Q. And what did you say to him then?
9 A. I asked him how he was feeling. He said he was tired
10 but otherwise fine; and we then went on to discuss the
11 media coverage that was in the Sunday newspapers.
12 Between the two of us we had been expecting a surge of
13 press reporting on the Sunday. In the event, in respect
14 of what we might have been expecting, it was
15 comparatively limited. David agreed but expressed
16 I would say dismay at an article in the Sunday Times
17 that Nick Rufford had written.
18 Q. What did he say about that article?
19 A. That article had a number of sentences in quotation
20 marks, quoting Dr Kelly, and David denied to me that he
21 had indeed said those.
22 Q. Right.
23 A. I was clearly not party to what passed between David and
24 Mr Rufford and so was not in a position to pass comment
25 on that.

72
1 Q. So that is the Sunday. What happened on the Monday?
2 What happens on the Monday?
3 A. On the Monday I arrived in my office early. I had
4 a clear diary because I was due to be in Washington; and
5 I set about making arrangements for David when he came
6 back. We had previously agreed that David would arrive
7 in my office at about 11 o'clock --
8 Q. Right.
9 A. -- in the morning. One of the first things I did was to
10 make sure that David had available, at Ministry of
11 Defence expense, accommodation for him to stay for the
12 period in London and we made arrangements that he could
13 stay anonymously at MoD expense in a nearby hotel. In
14 the event David said he would prefer to stay with his
15 daughter in Oxford and that was fine by me, if he felt
16 happier. I also --
17 Q. At this stage he was not staying at his house because he
18 wanted to avoid the press; is that right?
19 A. That is correct. I also set about making sure that the
20 administrative arrangements for David's appearance
21 before the two Committees were properly sorted out. My
22 ultimate objective in all of this was to ensure that
23 when David came up to London, all he had to do was
24 concentrate on his appearance before the Committees,
25 that any administrative or other arrangements were being

73
1 taken care of by others.
2 Q. Right. When he turned up in London, did you have
3 a meeting with him?
4 A. He came into my office to announce that he had arrived
5 and this was around about 11 o'clock. I said that we
6 had also arranged a private office for him to be in if
7 he wanted to be quiet. He said in fact he was happy
8 with his usual accommodation.
9 Q. And how did he seem?
10 A. He was composed. He was composed. He was smiling. We
11 checked that he had lunch arrangements made; and I said
12 that I had also prepared a checklist of the areas that
13 I thought the Committees might wish to ask him and that
14 I would go through that with him at an appropriate point
15 once he was ready.
16 Q. Right. And did you do that?
17 A. In the event, I received a call from Martin Howard,
18 I cannot now remember the time of that, to say that he
19 had been asked by Sir Kevin Tebbit to talk David through
20 the likely lines of questioning from the two Committees
21 and to assure himself that David felt comfortable with
22 those.
23 Q. To talk through the likely lines of questioning?
24 A. Just our thoughts, what the Committee might raise with
25 David, but not to give him any departmental answers.

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1 Martin made very clear, as I did, that --
2 Q. We will come to the meeting. So you get this telephone
3 call from Mr Howard at whatever time?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Do you then have a meeting with Mr Howard and Dr Kelly?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. What time was that? In the afternoon or ...?
8 A. I believe it was the afternoon. Can I just check my
9 notes?
10 Q. Yes, of course.
11 A. I am sorry, my notes do not make that clear. I believe
12 it was the afternoon; and I can say that because I had
13 a very short meeting with David just before lunch to go
14 through my notes of what I thought the Committee would
15 raise.
16 Q. Your note you wanted to raise with him to reassure him?
17 A. What I thought the Committee would raise with him.
18 Q. Then you have another meeting at which Mr Howard
19 discusses it?
20 A. Which is a much fuller meeting, yes.
21 Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/85? Can you tell everyone what
22 this is?
23 A. Yes. This is my note of the meeting that Mr Howard
24 chaired with Dr Kelly, myself and Ms Smith, who is
25 a member of civilian personnel. This meeting took place

75
1 on 14th July to go through the lines of questioning.
2 Q. Can we just go through paragraph 1:
3 "Mr Howard started the meeting by saying that he
4 wanted to ensure that Dr Kelly understood the procedures
5 that the FAC and ISC were likely to follow during their
6 evidence sessions, and that he was comfortable with what
7 was required of him. There was no question of the MoD
8 seeking to impose departmental lines: Kelly was free to
9 tell his own story. Howard outlined the different bases
10 on which FAC and ISC were constituted, and their current
11 interests in Government's policy towards Iraq and WMD.
12 "Mr Howard then outlined the areas that the two
13 Committees might be free to question Kelly. These were:
14 "(a) his role in Government, and relationship with
15 the media;
16 "(b) his role in drawing up the Government's
17 September 2002 dossier;
18 "(c) his meeting with Gilligan ...;
19 "(d) (for the ISC) his access to intelligence in
20 general;
21 "(e) (for the ISC) his access to intelligence on the
22 '45 minute claim'.
23 "Mr Howard emphasised that the Committees'
24 questioning in these areas would be eliciting
25 essentially factual answers, and Dr Kelly should be free

76
1 to give his own story. Dr Kelly confirmed that he was
2 happy about this.
3 "Mr Howard then outlined other areas where the
4 Committees might probe, which were at the margins of
5 what the Defence Secretary had defined when agreeing
6 that the Committees could interview Kelly, but which
7 were nevertheless hard to refuse. These areas were:
8 "(a) what Kelly thought of Government policy on
9 Iraq...
10 "(b) whether Dr Kelly thought he was Gilligan's
11 source. Kelly asked if he could say: 'I don't believe
12 I am'; Howard replied that Kelly was free to decide how
13 to answer this to his own conscience: the Department was
14 not telling him what to say;
15 "(c) what disciplinary action was being taken
16 against Dr Kelly. Dr Kelly said that this was a matter
17 for MoD."
18 When going through these three specific areas, was
19 Dr Kelly being given any sort of express steer by the
20 Ministry of Defence?
21 A. No, he was not. As I recall it, Martin set out the area
22 that he thought the Committees might wish to probe; and
23 actually David came forward with the lines that
24 I recorded here.
25 Q. But this was another interview that Dr Kelly was not

77
1 expecting. He was expecting, as he did, to go through
2 with you the lines of enquiry, and Mr Howard comes back
3 on to the scene and he is then told about likely lines
4 of questioning. If you look, for example, at the bottom
5 of page 85, an area:
6 "What Dr Kelly thought of Government policy on Iraq.
7 Dr Kelly said that this was a matter for ministers."
8 He was not getting perhaps silent nods or something
9 when he came up with that answer?
10 A. I do not believe he was. It is very difficult to
11 recall.
12 Q. And disciplinary action over the page:
13 "This was a matter for MoD."
14 Was the issue of, well, if you had not been entirely
15 frank with us about all that has happened, you may be in
16 further difficulties, ever raised at this meeting?
17 A. This was not raised.
18 Q. When was the letter that did make that point, and
19 I think I have read it, from Mr Hatfield --
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. -- given to Dr Kelly?
22 A. That was given to him by me after this interview.
23 Q. Did you say anything to Dr Kelly when he was handed the
24 letter?
25 A. Yes, I did. I knew that Dr Kelly had the interviews

78
1 before the two Committees foremost in his mind.
2 I handed him the letter. I said that he was expecting
3 it and he confirmed that he was expecting it; and I said
4 that we would need to have a discussion about that
5 letter once he had completed his appearances before the
6 Committee. And he took the letter in a low key way. He
7 was not uncomposed about it.
8 Q. Did you refer to the conclusion of the letter?
9 A. I did not.
10 Q. Was he aware of the conclusion of the letter, which was
11 to the effect that if he was holding back on any
12 contacts he might be in greater trouble?
13 A. My recollection is that Richard had already told him
14 that at the meeting on 4th July.
15 Q. Right. At paragraph 4, page 86, MoD/1/86, Kelly is
16 asked what he might say about uranium imports:
17 "Mr Howard noted that Dr Kelly had already said that
18 in his meeting with Gilligan he had confined himself to
19 repeating to the IAEA observations on the matter.
20 Dr Kelly should feel free to repeat the same line if
21 that was his position."
22 That, I mean to the lay reader, suggests a certain
23 steer in relation to that answer; is that fair?
24 A. It is difficult for me to answer. I was faithfully
25 recording what I believe Mr Howard to have said.

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1 Q. Right. Then he is asked about contacts with
2 Susan Watts. Kelly says he had not spoken about the
3 September dossier. He was asked how he wanted to take
4 forward his wish to be accompanied. I will come back to
5 that, if I may.
6 There were some handwritten notes made of this
7 meeting. First of all, can I take you to TVP/2/36?
8 This is an extract from a document that was
9 recovered by Thames Valley Police. It appears to be in
10 Dr Kelly's handwriting. It is headed "DCDI", that is
11 a reference to Mr Howard?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. He was at the meeting?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. It says:
16 "Areas to be covered: Foreign Office Committee --
17 House [et cetera]."
18 ISC, he talks about that.
19 "Role and job.
20 "Relationship to MoD ...
21 "Dossier, IISS dossier.
22 "45 minute, did not see.
23 "Gilligan.
24 "Letter to Bryan."
25 Then there is this heading, it appears to be "Tricky

80
1 Areas".
2 A. Those were the areas that Mr Howard said that the
3 Committees might wish to probe but were at the margins
4 of what the Defence Secretary had said to the
5 Committees.
6 Q. Did Mr Howard, from your recollection, use the word
7 "tricky areas"?
8 A. (Pause). I honestly cannot remember. The notion was
9 that these were areas which were at the margin of what
10 the Defence Secretary would allow, rather than areas
11 which might be uncomfortable for the Government.
12 Q. But you can see here:
13 "Views on Iraqi WMD".
14 We know that whether they were right or wrong views,
15 Dr Kelly had certain views that were at odds with other
16 views held by other people, or other express views.
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. And "handling by Government". Then there is "matters
19 for ministers", then "Gilligan's source", "matter for
20 BBC".
21 Looking at the note, an inference one can draw is
22 here is a tricky area and here is a suggested line. Is
23 that how the meeting took place?
24 A. That was not how the meeting took place. As I said
25 before, Mr Howard outlined the areas which were at the

81
1 margins of what the Defence Secretary thought that the
2 Committees might ask about; and I recall, when Mr Howard
3 set out that area, actually Dr Kelly came back with
4 a response.
5 Q. We can see "disciplinary", "Niger" and "Susan Watts".
6 Was anything at this stage said about the Newsnight
7 broadcast?
8 A. It was not. I recall that Mr Howard asked about links
9 with Susan Watts. All my record has is that Dr Kelly
10 says he had not discussed the dossier.
11 Q. Can I take you to another document, MoD/7/3. This is
12 a document that has just come in. These are handwritten
13 notes made by Heather Smith. What was her role at the
14 meeting?
15 A. Her role was really to discuss the issues of if the
16 Committees raised disciplinary matters, how Dr Kelly
17 would feel comfortable about answering those.
18 Q. Can I take you to MoD/9/4 which is a continuation of the
19 same note. Going down the page, can you see just under
20 a box doodle, there appears to be this word, this is
21 difficult to read but having read the first one I would
22 think that says "tricky areas"; what would you say?
23 A. I would be bound to agree sir.
24 Q. That would rather suggest that the word "tricky areas"
25 was used at that meeting?

82
1 A. It does. I cannot recall that the word "tricky areas"
2 was used but I acknowledge it is in two records.
3 Q. This is very difficult to read, but you can see "what do
4 you think of Government case for war" appears to be the
5 second tricky area and you can see in the square
6 brackets "matter for ministers"; does that support the
7 proposition that Dr Kelly is being given a line to go
8 on?
9 A. My clear recollection here was that that was what
10 Dr Kelly said, that it was a matter for ministers.
11 Q. Can I take you, finally, to your notes, which again we
12 have just received and thank you very much for them. It
13 is MoD/5/31. At the top there is a reference to
14 Gavin Hewitt. Can you explain how that gets there?
15 A. Yes, I can. I took these notes as the date says at the
16 meeting on the 14th. Martin Howard asked me to do
17 a typed record of the meeting at that time, but because
18 of pressure of other events as the days went by, I did
19 not, in fact, have the opportunity to type these until
20 I was at my home on the evening of 22nd July, and it was
21 while I was typing those minutes up, when I got to the
22 passage dealing with what David had said about his
23 dealings with Susan Watts, that he had not discussed the
24 dossier, that I recalled that a few days earlier the BBC
25 had broadcast both Susan Watts and Gavin Hewitt as

83
1 having spoken to Dr Kelly.
2 In parallel I was drawing up a draft reply to the
3 Foreign Affairs Committee about David's links with
4 journalists; and remembering what the BBC had broadcast,
5 I had, to the best of my recollection, the fact that
6 David had not given us any record of his having spoken
7 to Gavin Hewitt. And I wanted to capture that thought
8 straightaway, in case it --
9 Q. That explains why Gavin Hewitt gets there. That means,
10 does it, that the typewritten document we had of the
11 14th July meeting which we saw at MoD/1/85, that was
12 produced on the 22nd July, after Dr Kelly's death?
13 A. That is correct.
14 Q. So these handwritten notes at MoD/5/31 are obviously
15 more contemporaneous with the meeting?
16 A. Correct.
17 Q. Because can we just scroll down the page again and stop
18 at about -- it is MM or something, or MH I rather
19 suspect; that is Martin Howard?
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. And there is something I cannot read but it looks like
22 "factual/straight" and being a betting man I would say
23 that the words underneath the words "factual/straight"
24 were "tricky areas"; is that right?
25 A. That is right. As I said earlier, to the best of my

84
1 recollection they were not. I believe now, clearly,
2 that was the case.
3 Q. You record this:
4 "Your own views give own personal" -- I cannot make
5 out the squiggle.
6 A. "Personal points."
7 Q. "(Margins of..."
8 A. "(Margins of legitimacy)."
9 That is in the sense of what was in the remit in
10 relation to what Dr Kelly could say -- I am sorry, what
11 the Committees could ask but which were nevertheless
12 hard to refuse.
13 Q. I see. We see a fuller note of that in a moment.
14 "What think of Government?"
15 We know that to be shorthand: what do you think of
16 Government policy? And then the colon: "matters for
17 Ministers", "are you Gilligan's source", "matter for
18 BBC", then there is this: "Can I say I don't know?"
19 A. No, it says: "Can I say I don't believe?" That is
20 recorded in my notes. Dr Kelly --
21 Q. Absolutely. That rather suggests that the "matter for
22 BBC" which precedes it was a line that was given to him.
23 Is that fair?
24 A. No, that is not fair, sir. Dr Kelly said: "That is
25 a matter for the BBC" and that he was reporting to us

85
1 what he had said; and he then said, "Can I say I don't
2 believe I am?" And Martin said that is for his
3 conscience.
4 Q. So who suggested: "Are you Gilligan's source: matter for
5 BBC", who said "matter for BBC"? He said that?
6 A. He said that.
7 Q. He said "matter for BBC", then he said: "By the way, can
8 I say I don't think I am".
9 A. That is my recollection of how the meeting went.
10 Q. Why do you record specifically, "Can I say I don't
11 believe"? Why do you not put after the colon, "Can
12 I say matter for BBC"?
13 A. Because David did not say, "Can I say matter for the
14 BBC?" He said, "Can I say I don't believe I am?" and
15 Martin did not say yes or no, he said it was a matter
16 for him.
17 Q. Your recollection is that there was no mention of
18 Newsnight?
19 A. That is my strong recollection, sir.
20 Q. Can I take you to MoD/5/32?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. The second entry down: "Contact with Susan W". I rather
23 suspect that to be Susan Watts.
24 A. Susan Watts, yes.
25 Q. Can you just read out so that we can get on the

86
1 transcript what it says afterwards?
2 A. My recollection is going, I apologise.
3 "Contact with Susan Watts (source of Newsnight)."
4 I am sorry, I could not recall that.
5 Q. Do you have a clear recollection of this meeting on
6 14th July?
7 A. I believe I do, sir.
8 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you what are the words after
9 "source of Newsnight"?
10 A. That says:
11 "DK [David Kelly] not spoke about dossier" and that
12 is reflected --
13 MR DINGEMANS: We see it in the transcript anyway of your
14 transcribed note.
15 Can I take you to 15th July? That is when Dr Kelly
16 goes to give evidence at the Foreign Affairs Committee.
17 Who is going with him? We have now seen the clip
18 regularly repeated with Dr Kelly walking in. Can you
19 tell us how he got there?
20 A. We were planning to travel by car from the Old War
21 Office to the Houses of Parliament. There was in
22 fact -- and Dr Kelly and another person who works for
23 me, Wing Commander John Clarke, left Metropole Building.
24 As we were walking out there was a security incident
25 which prevented us from getting to the Old War Office to

87
1 meet up with the car, so we started a rather circuitous
2 route to get to Parliament, but the security incident
3 was cleared quite quickly and we were able to link up
4 with the car and go with the chief press officer to
5 Parliament; and the car dropped us and we walked into
6 the Parliament building.
7 Q. Right. How did Dr Kelly take that disruption, as it
8 were, to the plans?
9 A. He seemed composed. I checked whether he was all right,
10 because it clearly could be a troublesome experience;
11 but he was composed throughout.
12 Q. And he then goes to give evidence and you had
13 understood, is that right, that he was going to give
14 evidence to the ISC in the morning and the FAC in the
15 afternoon?
16 A. Afternoon. That is correct. I received a phone call
17 from Mr Hoon's private office during the morning to say
18 that -- well I thought it had said that the FAC had been
19 cancelled.
20 Q. Right.
21 A. But in fact it was the ISC that had been cancelled. So
22 we actually went to the Cabinet Office understanding
23 there was a 12.30 evidence session, but came back when
24 it was clear there was not. Again I checked that David
25 was not perturbed by that.

88
1 Q. So you had the bomb scare, the cancelled Intelligence
2 and Security Committee meeting, then he goes to give
3 evidence at the Foreign Affairs Committee; and we have
4 all seen his evidence in relation to that so I will not
5 take you through that, if I may?
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. Who else was with you? You mentioned yourself, and?
8 A. This is -- sorry, to the FAC?
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. There were four other people. Myself, Wing Commander
11 John Clarke I have just mentioned, the chief press
12 officer and the parliamentary liaison clerk.
13 Q. Was it hot when he was giving evidence?
14 A. Fairly hot. But not so hot as certainly for me to feel
15 that I needed to take my jacket off, for example.
16 Q. We can see from the transcript of his evidence that the
17 fans were switched off at one stage; why was that?
18 A. There was difficulty in the Committee members hearing
19 what Dr Kelly had to say.
20 Q. Why was that?
21 A. He was speaking quite -- rather softly. That was what
22 he said. He acknowledged he had a soft voice.
23 Q. Did he seem under pressure to you?
24 A. (Pause). I think it is fair to say that any civil
25 servant who appears before a Select Committee recognises

89
1 that it is a pressurised event. He seemed, to me, to be
2 dealing extremely well with the questioning.
3 Q. And you were taking a note of his answers; is that
4 right?
5 A. I was.
6 Q. And was anyone else noting his answers?
7 A. I believe --
8 Q. From the Ministry?
9 A. I believe Wing Commander Clarke took notes but I cannot
10 say for certain.
11 Q. What was the point of taking these notes?
12 A. The intention was that I would be able to drop
13 colleagues a short note summarising the key points from
14 Dr Kelly's evidence, because the full transcript would
15 not be available quickly.
16 Q. For a short while. Why did everyone want to know what
17 Dr Kelly had said?
18 A. It was a public event. It was a matter of obvious
19 interest in Government; and it was the quickest way of
20 providing the key points to colleagues.
21 Q. After Dr Kelly had finished giving evidence, did you say
22 anything to him?
23 A. Yes, I did. I said, immediately afterwards, "Well
24 done"; and we returned back to my office, and I checked
25 that he was okay; and I again said I thought he had done

90
1 very well in responding to the questions.
2 Q. And what happened to him for the rest of that day?
3 A. He was quite keen to return home to his daughter in
4 Oxford; and I said that was fine. We did not have any
5 other business. I checked he was okay, I checked that
6 he was okay for coming back into London the following
7 day to give evidence to the ISC, which had been
8 rearranged for Wednesday afternoon, and we arranged that
9 he need not get in at 11 o'clock as he had done on
10 previous days but that he could co