Hearing Transcripts

1 Wednesday, 27th August 2003
2 (10.30 am)
3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
4 Yes, Mr Dingemans.
5 MR DINGEMANS: My Lord, the Secretary of State for Defence.
6 LORD HUTTON: Thank you.
7 MR GEOFF HOON (called)
8 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
9 MR DINGEMANS: Could you tell his Lordship your full name.
10 A. I am Geoffrey William Hoon.
11 Q. And you are Secretary of State for Defence?
12 A. Yes, I am.
13 Q. When were you appointed Secretary of State for Defence?
14 A. In October 1999.
15 Q. Did you have any involvement in the drafting of the
16 dossier that was published by the Government on
17 24th September 2002?
18 A. I saw two drafts of the dossier in the week beginning
19 16th September 2002, relatively late stage in the
20 process of the drafting, and I did not offer any
21 comments or suggest any changes to it.
22 Q. Were you aware of the Defence Intelligence Staff
23 involvement with the drafting of the dossier?
24 A. I knew that there would have been from within the
25 Ministry of Defence participation by the DIS in the

1
1 preparation, but I was not aware of what specific
2 contribution they had made.
3 Q. Were you aware of any unhappiness expressed by members
4 of the DIS with the dossier, either before or after
5 publication?
6 A. Not at the time, not before publication. Very much
7 later, preparation for evidence that I gave to the ISC,
8 I was aware that two officials had expressed some
9 concern about certain language used in the dossier.
10 I think it is important that I emphasise that this was
11 of a linguistic kind. The debate was whether particular
12 intelligence "indicated" or "suggested" or "showed"
13 a particular conclusion. So it was a very technical
14 discussion by individuals in DIS; perhaps, not
15 surprisingly, very expert people trying to ensure that
16 the language was absolutely precise.
17 Q. If I show you MoD/4/6, is this the memo to which I think
18 you have just referred to? It is a memo dated
19 18th July 2003. It should come up on your screen:
20 "The ISC is likely to probe the Secretary of State
21 and the former CDI [Chief of Defence Intelligence] about
22 the process through which the members of the DIS can
23 express concerns..."
24 Is that the document to which you were referring?
25 A. Yes, it is. It is part of the preparation I received

2
1 for giving evidence to the ISC in July.
2 Q. At MoD/4/9 we see the concerns reported to you, I think,
3 as part of the annex to the briefing note; is that
4 right? (Pause). Do you recognise that?
5 A. I do not specifically recognise it, but it appears to
6 refer to the general issue that I have just set out,
7 yes.
8 Q. And you had no other involvement with the dossier
9 itself?
10 A. No.
11 Q. Can I then turn to a lunch that we have heard from
12 Ms Watts that Dr Kelly reported having with you in
13 about April time. Did you, in fact, have lunch with
14 Dr Kelly at any time?
15 A. No, I did not. It is my practice from time to time to
16 eat in the Old War Office Building canteen. That was
17 particularly the case in the course of the conflict
18 because I was there long periods of the time and
19 throughout weekends. When I am there, I routinely talk
20 to members of the armed forces but also obviously to
21 officials.
22 On this particular occasion I had lunch with
23 a private secretary from my private office. At the end
24 of lunch we were approached by an official, I did not
25 know who it was. We talked about Iraq. We discussed

3
1 the Government policy, which the official said he
2 strongly supported; and it was not a formal occasion in
3 any sense at all. It was the kind of conversation that
4 I had routinely with people in the Ministry of Defence.
5 I did not know that it was Dr Kelly at the time.
6 I only realised that it was Dr Kelly when, after his
7 death, I visited his wife and daughters and one of the
8 daughters reminded me of this meeting and this occasion.
9 And I immediately realised, of course, that it was
10 Dr Kelly.
11 Q. He is said to have said to Ms Watts that you remarked
12 that there was a "mosaic of evidence" being built up.
13 Does that ring any bells?
14 A. I do not recall using the specific word "mosaic"
15 although I clearly could have done because I think that
16 is consistent with the way in which I have described the
17 intelligence picture as far as Iraq under Saddam Hussein
18 was concerned.
19 I have been in this position for almost four years.
20 Before that I was briefly in the Foreign Office, with,
21 for a period of time, responsibility for the
22 Middle East. Therefore I have been seeing intelligence
23 material in relation to Iraq now for well over
24 four years. And it is my view of that intelligence that
25 it is cumulative, that it builds up to a picture.

4
1 Intelligence tends not to be in the form of a large
2 volume of material submitted at any one time. It is
3 a series of individual sometimes pieces of information
4 that build up into a picture. So actually "mosaic" is
5 quite a good word to describe the picture that
6 I perceived about Iraq's position in relation to weapons
7 of mass destruction.
8 Q. That appears to have been April. On 29th May
9 Mr Gilligan made his broadcast on the Today Programme.
10 What was your reaction to that broadcast?
11 A. Well, he had made what I considered to be a very serious
12 charge against the Government, essentially that the
13 Government was lying to Parliament and to the British
14 people. And I took particular exception to that charge
15 because of my responsibility for decisions affecting the
16 lives of British servicemen and servicewomen. I was
17 also concerned that essentially the way in which this
18 material was presented by the BBC meant that it was
19 impossible for the public or Parliament to evaluate the
20 standing, the knowledge, the experience, the background
21 of Andrew Gilligan's anonymous source.
22 Normally when assessing evidence it is possible to
23 look at the source of the evidence to make a judgment as
24 to whether that person has knowledge or experience
25 sufficient to bring forward that particular piece of

5
1 information. By relying on an anonymous source that
2 opportunity was denied to the public and denied to
3 Parliament.
4 Q. Does that mean when the source was identified it became
5 particularly important to identify what his
6 qualifications were?
7 A. Certainly that is part of the normal process by which
8 evidence is evaluated, whether in court or in human
9 relations.
10 Q. We have been told about investigations that were carried
11 out after the broadcast on 29th May. Were you aware of
12 any of these investigations?
13 A. No, I was not.
14 Q. We know that Mr Gilligan gave evidence to the Foreign
15 Affairs Committee on 19th June. Did you note his
16 evidence and reflect on that at all?
17 A. Certainly it seemed to reflect the material that he had
18 broadcast and the material that he had set out in an
19 article in The Mail on Sunday. There was a particular
20 emphasis, in the evidence that he gave to the Foreign
21 Affairs Committee as against what he broadcast and
22 wrote, on the source. He referred, in the Foreign
23 Affairs Committee, continually to the fact that this is
24 what his source had told him, rather than necessarily
25 asserting that it was true.

6
1 Later I did look again at the transcript because on
2 the assumption that Mr Gilligan was telling the truth to
3 the Committee, I was trying to see whether he gave any
4 clear indication about the nature of the source and who
5 that source might be.
6 Q. You say later you looked again at the transcript. When
7 was that, that you looked again?
8 A. It was once Dr Kelly had come forward, because my
9 concern throughout was to try to identify whether or not
10 Dr Kelly was, in fact, Andrew Gilligan's single source.
11 Q. Were you aware whether or not notice had been given to
12 the Ministry of Defence about the proposed broadcast?
13 A. I believe very strongly that notice was not given; and
14 it was one aspect of my concern about the way in which
15 this material had been published by Mr Gilligan and the
16 Today Programme that no proper opportunity was given to
17 the Ministry of Defence to respond to it.
18 LORD HUTTON: Was that to respond after the report had been
19 broadcast or before it was broadcast?
20 A. The concern, obviously, came after the broadcast because
21 Mr Gilligan, and I think subsequently John Humphrys on
22 the Today Programme, stated strongly that this had been
23 checked with the Ministry of Defence, the implication
24 being that the Ministry of Defence had had the
25 opportunity of responding to the allegations made by

7
1 Andrew Gilligan, and that was not the case.
2 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
3 A. And a record of contacts by journalists to the Ministry
4 of Defence press office is kept. That did not show that
5 Andrew Gilligan had informed the MoD press office at all
6 of the nature of the broadcast that he was going to make
7 on that Thursday morning; and that no effort, therefore,
8 was made by Andrew Gilligan to apprise us of the nature
9 of the broadcast.
10 LORD HUTTON: As regards apprising you of the nature of the
11 broadcast, did you feel that the MoD should have been
12 given notice of it before the report was broadcast, so
13 it had the opportunity to point out to the BBC that the
14 criticism was unfounded, or that your opportunity to
15 reply should be in the Today Programme after the report
16 had been broadcast?
17 A. I personally believe that it would have given much
18 better balance to the story that was broadcast if we had
19 had the opportunity, at the time, to respond; so that --
20 LORD HUTTON: "At the time"; you mean before it was
21 broadcast?
22 A. Before it was broadcast. But then it would have
23 appeared, presumably, in the broadcast to the effect
24 that the Ministry of Defence did not accept the
25 allegations made by Andrew Gilligan and the Today

8
1 Programme.
2 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
3 MR DINGEMANS: We know on 28th June that Mr Bradshaw goes on
4 to the Today Programme. This is CAB/1/378. He speaks
5 with Mr Humphrys about whether or not notice is given.
6 We have seen this in the past. I think you have seen at
7 least extracts of the broadcasts.
8 A. I actually heard the broadcast at the time.
9 Q. You heard the broadcast. He follows it up with a letter
10 at CAB/1/389. That is responded to; you can see his
11 letter to Mr Sambrook which is dated 28th June, after
12 his interview. Were you party to any of this
13 letter-writing at this stage?
14 A. I was not party to that particular letter but, from
15 memory, I believe that Mr Sambrook responded and in his
16 response stated that there had been contact with the
17 Ministry of Defence press office alerting the Ministry
18 of Defence press office to -- as a result of that,
19 I then wrote to Richard Sambrook indicating that this
20 was not true and that I hoped that he and the BBC would
21 correct that fact.
22 Q. We see at CAB/1/390 Mr Sambrook's letter of 29th June
23 suggesting that there had been contact, and you can see
24 that coming up on the screen.
25 A. Yes, I have seen that.

9
1 Q. Mr Bradshaw writes a follow up letter. But you write
2 a letter at CAB/1/403.
3 A. I think 2nd July.
4 Q. Yes. And in terms of the dispute with the BBC, we have
5 seen that effectively Mr Campbell has written on
6 26th June and he has got a response on 27th June which
7 he considered did not address the issues. He goes on to
8 Channel 4 on 27th June and strongly reaffirms that.
9 On 28th June Mr Bradshaw takes up, as it were,
10 a slightly different tack in relation to the absence of
11 notice; and you join in with that after Mr Sambrook's
12 reply of 30th June that we have just looked at.
13 Was this part of a letter-writing campaign or
14 anything that was being orchestrated against the BBC at
15 this stage?
16 A. It was certainly not orchestrated. I joined in because
17 I felt that Richard Sambrook was stating something that
18 I knew, from the records kept in the Ministry of
19 Defence, was wrong.
20 Q. Did you have any discussions with Mr Campbell about your
21 proposed letter-writing?
22 A. I spoke to him, I think it was immediately after the
23 interview involving Ben Bradshaw, I think on a Saturday
24 morning, essentially to make the point that I am just
25 making to you now, that there was a record in the

10
1 Ministry of Defence press office. That record did not
2 appear to bear out what John Humphrys had been saying.
3 Q. I think there was further correspondence with
4 Mr Sambrook. We see his reply to you at CAB/1/401.
5 A. 3rd July?
6 Q. Yes. And we can see a fairly short letter saying:
7 clearly your version of what happened differs from ours.
8 I take that seriously and will look again. I think you
9 write on 4th July at CAB/1/408, is that right?
10 A. I have a letter dated 3rd July. So I wrote almost
11 immediately in response.
12 Q. Right. Effectively picking up those points.
13 A. If I may say that my concern, essentially, here was
14 twofold. One, that I did not believe that
15 Andrew Gilligan was necessarily reliably informing the
16 world about what had happened in relation to his
17 contacts with the Ministry of Defence press office.
18 I was also concerned that he was not necessarily
19 reliably informing his manager, Richard Sambrook, as to
20 what had taken place.
21 Q. And you wanted to bring that to Mr Sambrook's attention?
22 A. I did.
23 Q. On 3rd July, whilst this correspondence is being
24 exchanged, did you hear anything relating to Dr Kelly?
25 A. It was on the evening of the -- the late afternoon, in

11
1 the first place, on 3rd July that I was told that an
2 official had come forward. I apologise for my
3 hesitation but I did not hear anything in relation to
4 Dr Kelly at that stage because no-one at that stage gave
5 me a name or told me the identity of the official who
6 had come forward. I was simply told, by my principal
7 private secretary, that --
8 Q. That is Sir Kevin Tebbit, is it?
9 A. My principal private secretary is Peter Watkins. This
10 was my private office informing me that someone had come
11 forward, that the Permanent Secretary would like to have
12 a conversation with me, that is Sir Kevin Tebbit; and
13 suggesting that we should meet later that day. In fact,
14 we eventually met in the evening of 3rd July, where
15 I was told in a little more detail, but still not given
16 the name, that an official had indicated that he had had
17 contact with Andrew Gilligan during what I might say was
18 the relevant time period before the broadcast.
19 Q. Were you told anything about a letter that the official
20 had written?
21 A. I was told that he had set out, in some detail, that he
22 had had this meeting with Andrew Gilligan. There were
23 various details put to me, but I -- the significant
24 thing was that although he had recognised some of the
25 things that Andrew Gilligan subsequently broadcast as

12
1 being attributable to him and to his conversation, he
2 did not believe that he was Andrew Gilligan's single
3 source because there were other things in the broadcast
4 that he did not recognise as having said to
5 Andrew Gilligan in the course of that meeting.
6 Q. Did you have any initial reaction to this information?
7 A. I think my first -- my very first reaction was that this
8 was something that could well lead to disciplinary
9 proceedings, as far as the official was concerned. The
10 Ministry of Defence, in the period -- for some time, has
11 had something of a reputation for unauthorised briefing
12 and leaking to journalists; and it did appear that this
13 was perhaps an opportunity to demonstrate that
14 unauthorised contacts with journalists would be looked
15 at seriously.
16 Q. Can I just there take you to a reference which is
17 5th June 2003, MoD/1/17? This is a memorandum from
18 Martin Howard who the Deputy Chief of Defence
19 Intelligence. He says, in paragraph 2, that the
20 Ministry of Defence had a reputation as a "leaky"
21 department.
22 Over the page at MoD/1/18, towards the bottom, he
23 said this:
24 "I repeat, that I have no reason to think that
25 anyone in the DIS is responsible for the leak to

13
1 Mr Gilligan. But if it turns out that this is the case
2 and the individual is identified, the strongest possible
3 action will be taken."
4 Which I think you say accords with your initial
5 thought?
6 A. That was certainly my very first thought, because over
7 some time there had been warnings to -- I will not just
8 say officials, because this extended obviously as well
9 to members of the armed forces. It was not simply
10 a question of officials being warned, it was a concern
11 generally about security, not least in times of
12 conflict, that information should be held securely
13 within the department.
14 Q. Your other reaction?
15 A. Immediately, perhaps almost at the same time, I was also
16 concerned at the Foreign Affairs Committee hearings
17 because my assumption was that any disciplinary process
18 will take some considerable time to complete. On that
19 Thursday, as far as I was aware, the Foreign Affairs
20 Committee was still meeting, still hearing, as part of
21 their investigation into the decision to take military
22 action in Iraq, a significant part of which was
23 concerned with the Andrew Gilligan broadcast and the
24 role that he had played and Alastair Campbell had
25 played. So I was very concerned, at that stage, that if

14
1 an official had come forward who had relevant evidence
2 to that inquiry, that that would be something that we
3 would have to make known, quite quickly, to the Foreign
4 Affairs Committee.
5 Q. I appreciate the Foreign Affairs Committee is not
6 a Select Committee that reports on your department, the
7 Ministry of Defence.
8 A. No.
9 Q. But we have seen in their final report that they were
10 critical that the Government was cooperating with the
11 Intelligence and Security Committee and not really
12 cooperating with them; and they made a number of points.
13 For example, they had asked for drafts of the dossier
14 and not been given them. Were you party to any
15 decisions about the cooperation or absence of
16 cooperation with the Foreign Affairs Committee as it was
17 progressing?
18 A. No, I was not, although I was obviously aware of the
19 debates taking place. They concerned, for example,
20 access to intelligence material. The Foreign Affairs
21 Committee felt very strongly that they should see the
22 relevant intelligence background as part of the decision
23 to take military action. There was also a considerable
24 discussion about whether, in fact, Alastair Campbell
25 should give evidence to the Committee. As you say, it

15
1 is not strictly my responsibility, but I would not
2 necessarily accept that there was any lack of
3 cooperation on the part of the Government.
4 Alastair Campbell subsequently did give evidence to
5 the Foreign Affairs Committee and indeed, as
6 I understand it, the Foreign Secretary found a way of
7 making available to the Committee significant parts of
8 the intelligence background. So actually there was, in
9 practice, cooperation with the Committee, although
10 I think it is fair to say that most Select Committees
11 most of the time will suggest that they are not
12 receiving the kind of cooperation from the Government
13 that they would ideally like.
14 Q. Did you decide, when you were talking to
15 Sir Kevin Tebbit, what to do in relation to Dr Kelly,
16 about interviews or anything else?
17 A. Well, I did not decide because it has always been my
18 practice, in the Ministry of Defence, to ensure that
19 appropriate responsibilities are dealt with by
20 appropriate people. When I first arrived in the
21 Ministry of Defence I think it was the then Chief of
22 Defence Staff described the leadership of the Ministry
23 of Defence as a three legged stool. He had
24 responsibility for military matters; the Permanent
25 Secretary had responsibility for personnel matters,

16
1 Civil Service; and I was responsible for political
2 leadership of the department. Therefore, as far as any
3 personnel issues were concerned, the responsibility was
4 clearly that of the Permanent Secretary.
5 Q. Was anything said about interviews with Dr Kelly though,
6 in your discussions?
7 A. The Permanent Secretary summarised the position
8 consistently, I believe, with the thoughts that I have
9 just set out to you in terms of my initial reaction,
10 which was that either there could be a disciplinary
11 process affecting the official or there could be what he
12 described as a management process, reflecting the fact
13 that the official had come forward, was apparently
14 cooperating, and could, he believed at that stage,
15 correct the public record, that is the material that
16 Andrew Gilligan had broadcast. That was his analysis of
17 the issue. That analysis I accepted because he was
18 responsible for those personnel questions.
19 LORD HUTTON: Was correcting the public record a personnel
20 matter?
21 A. As far as Sir Kevin was concerned, it was important to
22 the Ministry of Defence and indeed to the Government as
23 a whole that the public record should be corrected.
24 I think he viewed that as a management issue, as far as
25 dealing with the official was concerned.

17
1 MR DINGEMANS: After the --
2 LORD HUTTON: What did you understand by the public record
3 being corrected, Secretary of State?
4 A. I think it is important that I do not get ahead of my
5 knowledge at this stage, my Lord.
6 LORD HUTTON: Leave it to a later stage if you prefer.
7 A. I think I can say this: at the time --
8 LORD HUTTON: I just want to know what was in your thoughts
9 at the time.
10 A. At the time we were obviously concerned about the
11 broadcast that Andrew Gilligan had made. It appeared
12 possible, but I can go no further than that and I would
13 not put it any more strongly, that this particular
14 official, at that time, would have had something
15 relevant to say about the content of the broadcast and
16 how Andrew Gilligan came about the material that he
17 relied on for making the broadcast. But at that stage,
18 I was told that the official did not believe that he was
19 Andrew Gilligan's single source or primary source, and
20 the issue, therefore, was his exact status in relation
21 to the material that Andrew Gilligan had relied on.
22 MR DINGEMANS: Did you speak to anyone that evening, after
23 your conversation with Sir Kevin Tebbit?
24 A. I had a brief conversation that evening with
25 Jonathan Powell simply to alert him and the

18
1 Prime Minister to the fact that this official had come
2 forward.
3 Q. Why were you speaking to Mr Powell at that stage?
4 A. It seemed to me a matter of significance for the
5 Government that an official who might have something
6 relevant to say had come forward. It would be standard
7 practice on an issue of that significance for me, and
8 I am sure for other Secretaries of State, to inform the
9 Prime Minister.
10 Q. The 4th July we know is a Friday. Where are you on that
11 day?
12 A. I was in my constituency.
13 Q. Did you have any discussions relating to Dr Kelly, as we
14 now know him to be, on that day? You at that stage know
15 him to be an official.
16 A. I think it is important that I just fill in the
17 background. On the Thursday evening Kevin Tebbit had
18 made clear to me that there would have to be an
19 interview conducted by the personnel director,
20 Richard Hatfield. I think my only involvement in the
21 process is I was asked by Kevin whether that interview
22 should take place on the Friday or the following Monday.
23 Because of my concern about the Foreign Affairs
24 Committee I suggested that it was better that that
25 interview should take place sooner rather than later.

19
1 It therefore took place on the Friday.
2 The further conversation I had on the Friday was
3 about the results of that interview conducted by
4 Richard Hatfield.
5 Q. Well, who gave you the results of the interview?
6 A. Kevin Tebbit called me to say that the --
7 Q. On the telephone?
8 A. Yes, called me to say that the interview had taken place
9 but that it was inconclusive as to whether or not the
10 official -- and I think it was in that conversation that
11 I first learned of his name, so perhaps it would be
12 sensible if I described him from now on as Dr Kelly.
13 I was told, for the first time, his identity. But I was
14 told that the interview had not established whether or
15 not he was, in fact, Andrew Gilligan's primary source.
16 Q. Do you remember what time of day this conversation took
17 place?
18 A. I am almost sure that it would have been towards the
19 evening. I have checked my diary for that day. I had
20 a very full programme of engagements in the
21 constituency, including constituency surgery which again
22 is done by appointment. So there was not a lot of free
23 time in my diary that day. So I assume it would have
24 been some time in the early evening.
25 Q. Did you have any discussions with Mr Campbell on that

20
1 day?
2 A. To the best of my recollection, the first time that
3 I spoke to Alastair Campbell about this was on the
4 Saturday morning; but I -- that is really largely
5 because of the busy nature of a full constituency day.
6 I do not believe I had a conversation with Alastair on
7 the Friday evening, I think it was the Saturday morning.
8 Q. Friday evening or Saturday morning. What was the nature
9 of your conversation with him?
10 A. Well, the reason that I believe that it was Saturday
11 morning was that there was an article in The Times on
12 Saturday morning by Tom Baldwin which I saw in the press
13 cuttings faxed to me that morning, which seemed to
14 indicate some very detailed knowledge on the part of
15 Tom Baldwin about the identity of Andrew Gilligan's
16 single source. Because it was a media issue, and
17 therefore something for which Alastair is responsible,
18 I called him to say that I had seen this article and
19 felt that it was of some significance.
20 I also spoke to Kevin Tebbit, who had also seen the
21 article and who had also quite independently thought it
22 was significant. Alastair, of course, had seen the
23 article and told me that, as far as he was concerned,
24 Tom Baldwin had got the material in the piece from an
25 editorial lunch attended by Richard Sambrook at the

21
1 offices of The Times.
2 Q. Did you speak to Mr Campbell about your initial
3 reactions on hearing the news of Dr Kelly coming
4 forward?
5 A. Yes, I did. I described to him the process that I have
6 set out to you now, which is what my initial reaction
7 was, the importance of security of information in the
8 Ministry of Defence and the possibility of there being
9 disciplinary proceedings, but also I emphasised to him
10 my concern about any suggestion that the Government
11 should be covering up the fact of a potential witness
12 coming forward, in the light of the continuing, as
13 I felt at the time, Foreign Affairs Committee
14 deliberations. So I went through precisely the process
15 that I have gone through today of describing to him both
16 my initial reaction and then my thoughts about the
17 relevance of this to the Foreign Affairs Committee.
18 Q. I think Mr Campbell's recollection was that the
19 conversation was on the Friday. He also mentioned that
20 after you had spoken about your initial instincts in
21 relation to disciplinary proceedings, you mentioned the
22 words "plea bargain". Do you recollect mentioning that
23 to Mr Campbell?
24 A. I do not remember using that particular phrase to him,
25 but I can see that as a shorthand account of what I had

22
1 described to him it would have summarised, in a sense,
2 the alternatives available to the personnel director in
3 the Ministry of Defence in dealing with Dr Kelly. But
4 I would want to emphasise that it was never the case
5 that Richard Hatfield or anyone else in the Ministry of
6 Defence offered any kind of an arrangement or deal to
7 Dr Kelly. I have subsequently read the accounts that
8 Richard Hatfield has set out of the interviews he
9 conducted with Dr Kelly. There was no mention of any
10 kind of a deal or plea bargain. It was simply perhaps
11 Alastair's summary of the material that I had set out to
12 him; and the material I had set out was entirely
13 retrospective. It was not in any way suggesting how the
14 matter would be taken forward.
15 Q. What had you said to Mr Campbell that could be written
16 down in shorthand as a plea bargain?
17 A. I had taken him through, in precisely the way I have
18 done today, my initial reaction, which was this was
19 potentially a serious disciplinary issue. But equally
20 my second thought, which was that this potential witness
21 might have something to say relevant to the Foreign
22 Affairs Committee hearing and that we would have to take
23 care to avoid any suggestion that we might be seen to be
24 covering up the fact of this witness, given the
25 importance of the issue to the Foreign Affairs

23
1 Committee.
2 LORD HUTTON: But Secretary of State, a plea bargain, as
3 I understand it, usually means that a person charged
4 with some sort of offence agrees to plead guilty on the
5 understanding that he will not receive a very severe
6 sentence.
7 A. That is also my understanding, my Lord.
8 LORD HUTTON: Yes. But do you think you might have used
9 this term or do you think it is a term which Mr Campbell
10 attributed to the sense of what you were saying to him?
11 A. Well, I do not recall using the phrase.
12 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
13 A. I can see that in the description that I gave of the
14 process that had taken place up until then, that that
15 might be a shorthand account, because normally
16 disciplinary proceedings would follow from an
17 investigation where the authorities inside the Ministry
18 of Defence, as a result of their efforts, had identified
19 a particular individual who might have broken the rules.
20 In contrast, this particular individual had come
21 forward. He had written quite a detailed letter, had
22 volunteered information, was apparently cooperating.
23 So, in a sense, my Lord, without it being in any way
24 a formalised arrangement, and I would want to emphasise
25 this was not in any way acted upon by Richard Hatfield

24
1 or anyone else, that that might have been seen to be of
2 that kind by Alastair in the course of his summarising
3 our conversation.
4 MR DINGEMANS: Did you suggest to Mr Campbell that Dr Kelly
5 had said that the intelligence went in late, or the
6 45 minute claim had gone in late? Do you recollect that
7 as any part of your conversation?
8 A. I do not remember that specific point being made; but
9 I certainly indicated to him that Dr Kelly had said that
10 some of the material used by Andrew Gilligan he
11 recognised and was clearly from him in the course of the
12 conversations that he had had, but some of the material
13 was not. And it may well have been that that particular
14 aspect of it was part of the material that he
15 recognised.
16 Q. At this stage, had you seen Dr Kelly's letter which we
17 can see at MoD/1/19?
18 A. I had seen it. I --
19 Q. When had you seen it?
20 A. I had seen it the previous evening, because I think it
21 was following my conversation with Kevin Tebbit, when he
22 reported the results of the initial interview with
23 Richard Hatfield, I was concerned to know more about the
24 background of the official coming forward. Therefore
25 I asked for that to be sent to my office. It was sent

25
1 to my constituency office. I do not have a secure line
2 there, so my private office topped and tailed the letter
3 to ensure that it was not identifiable.
4 Q. So you see that on the Friday at your constituency?
5 A. Yes, Friday evening.
6 Q. Did you see any notes of the interview on that day?
7 A. No, I did not.
8 Q. But you were told about that by the Permanent Secretary?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. And what level of detail did Sir Kevin Tebbit go into
11 about the interview?
12 A. I think the point I have made already, which was that as
13 a result of the interview Richard Hatfield, the
14 personnel director, had concluded that Dr Kelly was not
15 the single source, was not the primary source that
16 Andrew Gilligan had relied on, and that, therefore, it
17 would not be possible at that stage for Kevin Tebbit to
18 seek to correct the public record -- I think that was
19 the phrase that he used -- on the basis of Dr Kelly
20 having come forward.
21 LORD HUTTON: What did you understand by Sir Kevin Tebbit
22 correcting the public record? I mean, if Mr Hatfield
23 had concluded that Dr Kelly was the single source, how
24 did you understand that Sir Kevin Tebbit would correct
25 the public record?

26
1 A. Well, I think that is a --
2 LORD HUTTON: Again, perhaps this is coming ahead to a point
3 you will deal with later.
4 A. We were all concerned, but not only the politicians,
5 my Lord, but also senior officials, including
6 Kevin Tebbit, about the allegations that Andrew Gilligan
7 had made, because they went to the heart of the
8 Government's credibility and trust.
9 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
10 A. Therefore Sir Kevin was equally concerned to ensure that
11 if there was relevant evidence supplied by an official
12 who had had a relevant contact with Andrew Gilligan,
13 that he could then use that material to demonstrate
14 actually that what Andrew Gilligan had asserted in his
15 broadcast was not, in fact, true.
16 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
17 MR DINGEMANS: Were you aware, as far as Mr Hatfield was
18 concerned, who is the personnel director, that the
19 disciplinary side of proceedings had been concluded on
20 that Friday evening?
21 A. I do not think that was made known to me on the Friday
22 evening. I learned subsequently that that was the case;
23 but certainly I had understood -- I know
24 Richard Hatfield very well, he was formerly the policy
25 director in the Ministry of Defence and I had regular

27
1 contact with him when he was in that position. He is an
2 extremely capable and effective civil servant and I knew
3 he would have gone through the material thoroughly and
4 fairly with Dr Kelly.
5 Q. We can see at MoD/1/26, which is part way through notes
6 of the meeting on 4th July, and it is the first main
7 paragraph, Mr Hatfield says he is prepared to accept his
8 account in good faith. On the basis of his letter he
9 breached departmental instructions.
10 He says later down that paragraph:
11 "This was a potentially very serious matter.
12 Nevertheless, I accepted his assurance that there had
13 been no malicious intent and there appeared no reason to
14 believe that classified material had been revealed. On
15 that basis, I judged that it would not be appropriate to
16 initiate formal disciplinary proceedings. I would,
17 however, write to him shortly to record my displeasure
18 at his conduct."
19 In fact we know he wrote on 9th July. When did you
20 become aware that had been the outcome of the
21 disciplinary side of the process?
22 A. I am not sure I could give you a precise date. To the
23 best of my recollection, there was some delay between
24 the decision that Richard Hatfield took and actually
25 seeing Dr Kelly to communicate that fact to him. But

28
1 I was certainly aware, probably second-hand, either from
2 my private office or from Sir Kevin, that some sort of
3 process was to be gone through with Dr Kelly arising out
4 of the interview. As I have indicated previously, these
5 were essentially personnel matters, they were not
6 matters necessarily that concern the Secretary of State.
7 Q. We also know that there was a draft press statement,
8 prepared by the Ministry of Defence that night, and
9 draft Q and A material, also prepared that night. If we
10 look at CAB/21/3, we can see at the top:
11 "Produced on 4.7.03."
12 A. Yes, I have the document in front of me.
13 Q. That was produced on the Friday evening when you were in
14 the constituency. Were you any part of this Q and A
15 material and were you consulted about it?
16 A. No, I was not. I would not expect to be consulted about
17 that kind of material. It would be prepared in the
18 press office for the guidance of individual press
19 officers, particularly those coming on duty, to ensure
20 that they had access to appropriate material should
21 these questions arise. But this was entirely material
22 that was contingent upon their being asked these
23 questions by journalists contacting the press office.
24 Q. In fact no-one contacted the press office so, as we
25 understand it, it was not deployed.

29
1 Were you aware that at this stage there had been
2 concern that Dr Kelly was the source of The Observer
3 article on mobile trailers and whether or not they were
4 related to chemical and biological weapons?
5 A. I was not aware of that at that stage, no.
6 Q. And were you aware of Dr Kelly's involvement, if any, in
7 the dossier?
8 A. Only because of the reference in the letter that he
9 originally sent to the Ministry of Defence. There was
10 a reference to his part in the dossier in his letter
11 informing the Ministry of Defence that --
12 Q. We can see the relevant extracts at MoD/1/19:
13 "As you know I have been involved in writing three
14 'dossiers'..."
15 If one scrolls down the page he says:
16 "My contributions to the latter [that is the UK
17 Government's dossier] were in part 2 (History of UN
18 Inspections) and part 1 chapter 2 (Iraq's programmes
19 1971-1998) at the behest of the FCO and I was not
20 involved in the intelligence component in any way nor in
21 the process of the dossier's compilation. I have not
22 acknowledged to anyone outside FCO my contribution ...
23 I am not a member of the intelligence community although
24 I interact with that community and I am essentially, as
25 an inspector, a consumer of intelligence not

30
1 a generator..."
2 So that is what you knew at this stage?
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. You think that the conversation you had with Mr Campbell
5 was on the Saturday. Did you have any other
6 conversations with anyone else that day?
7 A. I am sure that there would have been some discussion
8 with my principal private secretary. But that is the
9 only conversation that I can recall was strictly
10 relevant, as far as these issues were concerned.
11 Q. Did you have a view at that stage about whether or not
12 it was desirable that Dr Kelly's name should be made
13 public?
14 A. I was concerned at that stage that we did not have
15 enough information to be able to be sure that Dr Kelly
16 was the single source of Andrew Gilligan's material.
17 And in those circumstances, and indeed throughout the
18 history of this matter, because I was not sure that that
19 was the case, I did not believe that it was appropriate
20 to make his name public.
21 Q. Were you aware that throughout, whether rightly or
22 wrongly, Dr Kelly was contending that he was not the
23 single source?
24 A. That he was not?
25 Q. Yes.

31
1 A. Yes, I was aware of that and I have said so already to
2 the Inquiry. I was aware of that because of the letter
3 that he wrote to the Ministry of Defence and, indeed,
4 because of the interview that he had conducted with
5 Richard Hatfield. That was a significant factor in the
6 material that Kevin Tebbit told me about following the
7 interview.
8 Q. Did you learn of any proposed meeting at the BBC over
9 this weekend?
10 A. Yes, I did. I think it was widely broadcast that there
11 was to be a meeting of the BBC governors on the Sunday
12 evening to consider these issues.
13 Q. What was your reaction to that meeting?
14 A. I think my concern, and I certainly discussed this with
15 Alastair Campbell on the Sunday, which would have been
16 the 6th, was that Andrew Gilligan may not have been
17 reliably informing senior management in the BBC of the
18 nature of his source. That particularly came out of an
19 interview that Richard Sambrook did with the Today
20 Programme somewhat earlier, where he had indicated that
21 the source was an intelligence source; and that did not
22 appear to fit with Dr Kelly's position, although
23 I recognised, and we had a good deal of discussion about
24 this -- that is Alastair Campbell and I on the Sunday --
25 that there were at least two possible explanations of

32
1 that. 1) that Andrew Gilligan had misrepresented the
2 nature of his source to his management and that they
3 were not therefore in a position to properly assess the
4 material that he had provided to them; or, and this
5 remained my concern throughout, that there was in fact
6 another primary source, that there was another person
7 who had provided more significant information to
8 Andrew Gilligan.
9 Q. Did you, on the Sunday, discuss with Mr Campbell the
10 desirability of bringing out Dr Kelly into the open?
11 A. Not as far as his name was concerned, because I remained
12 very concerned that that would have been unfair to
13 Dr Kelly at that stage, because I was not sure that he
14 was Andrew Gilligan's single source.
15 What I discussed with Alastair -- we spent a lot of
16 time discussing it, I am afraid rather fruitlessly in
17 many ways -- was how we could find a way of encouraging
18 the BBC to accept that it was in both our interests to
19 identify Andrew Gilligan's source. It seemed to me that
20 there was at least the possibility that Andrew Gilligan
21 was being less than frank with Richard Sambrook and
22 others about the nature of his source and that,
23 therefore, there was an interest both in the Ministry of
24 Defence and in the BBC of identifying who that was.
25 Q. Did you have any discussions with the Prime Minister

33
1 over the weekend about this?
2 A. I certainly had a conversation with Jonathan Powell.
3 I do not believe that I spoke directly to the
4 Prime Minister on the Sunday, no.
5 Q. And what was the nature of your conversation with
6 Mr Powell?
7 A. Well, again, it followed on from the kinds of
8 conversations that I had been having with
9 Alastair Campbell. I am pretty sure that Alastair was
10 also having them with Jonathan and probably with the
11 Prime Minister, although I have no specific evidence of
12 that. Simply that we were all concerned that someone
13 had come forward, that they might have relevant evidence
14 to give about the nature of Andrew Gilligan's contacts,
15 but that because we were not confident that he was the
16 single source that Andrew Gilligan had relied on, that
17 we could not confidently take the matter forward unless
18 we had some process whereby the BBC were willing to
19 confirm the identity of that source.
20 I think it is fair to say that Jonathan was fairly
21 sceptical about the willingness of the BBC to do that,
22 and that we discussed various ways in which, in
23 a confidential manner, senior BBC management might be
24 willing to do that, simply because I thought that it
25 might be in their interest to know whether or not, in

34
1 fact, Andrew Gilligan was reliably informing them of all
2 the relevant information about his source.
3 Q. Was this the genesis of the letters that we know you
4 wrote on the 8th and 9th or 9th and 10th?
5 A. There were a good deal of discussions in the days that
6 followed about the best way of trying to give this
7 information to the BBC or encourage the BBC to identify
8 Andrew Gilligan's source. In the end, this was the one
9 approach that was adopted. But other approaches were
10 considered as well.
11 Q. Because, I mean, logically if Dr Kelly goes before
12 anyone and he is protesting he is not the single source,
13 whether or not very clever people like Sir David Omand
14 think differently, unless the BBC have confirmed he is
15 the single source, people like the Foreign Affairs
16 Committee are likely to conclude as Mr Hatfield did,
17 namely he has nothing to do with it.
18 A. And that was exactly my view as well, because I think it
19 was extremely important, in fairness to Dr Kelly, not to
20 expose him as the single source without being sure that
21 that was true; and I was not sure that that was true.
22 And the Prime Minister was not sure that it was true.
23 Eventually on that Sunday afternoon I had a message,
24 it came from two sources, one from my private secretary
25 and one directly from Jonathan Powell, that the

35
1 Prime Minister felt there was insufficient information
2 to be able to confidently take forward any suggestion
3 that Dr Kelly was the single source and that therefore
4 we should not pursue the matter further that day, that
5 is before the meeting of the BBC governors.
6 Q. I appreciate we are running ahead of ourselves a wee
7 bit.
8 LORD HUTTON: Before we proceed, may I just ask, Secretary
9 of State: with regard to your plan vis a vis the BBC,
10 suppose you had given in confidence to the BBC or to the
11 Government Dr Kelly's name and that the BBC had then
12 confirmed that: yes, he was Mr Gilligan's source. What
13 was your thinking after that? What did you think might
14 happen or that you might bring about?
15 A. I think, at that stage, my Lord, it would have been
16 fairer for there to have been the correction of the
17 public record that Sir Kevin and I and others were
18 concerned about. If, at that stage, Dr Kelly was
19 acknowledged as being the single source that
20 Andrew Gilligan had relied on, then there is then the
21 possibility of the kind of evaluation -- public
22 evaluation of his evidence that I referred to at the
23 outset, that people could then look at what he was
24 saying in the light of his knowledge, background and
25 experience and make a judgment as to whether what he was

36
1 saying was true. But of course it would also --
2 LORD HUTTON: Sorry, on the basis it would then be
3 established he was not an intelligence source.
4 A. I was about to make a related point, my Lord, which is
5 that at that point he could indicate what he had and had
6 not said to Andrew Gilligan, so the public, Parliament,
7 we would all have been in a position to know whether
8 Andrew Gilligan had or had not exaggerated the material
9 that he had been provided with by Dr Kelly.
10 LORD HUTTON: Yes. But that would have involved Dr Kelly
11 coming forward into the public domain and stating what
12 he had said and what he had not said to Mr Gilligan?
13 A. As I had understood it, that point had been made to him
14 by Richard Hatfield in the interview on the Friday
15 afternoon.
16 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
17 A. I was not aware that Dr Kelly necessarily had any
18 concerns about his identity remaining secret. Indeed,
19 as I had understood it, he had been warned by
20 Richard Hatfield that it was most likely that his name
21 would come out. Indeed, as far as I was concerned, the
22 fact that he had come forward was based upon material
23 that a colleague of his had identified as being so close
24 to Dr Kelly's known views as to be only capable of
25 having come from Dr Kelly. And of course, that material

37
1 was material that Andrew Gilligan repeated before the
2 Foreign Affairs Committee. So I did not see that there
3 was -- it would have been surprising if Dr Kelly's name
4 came out; but at the same time, because I was not sure
5 that Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's single source, I did
6 nothing to take that forward because it would have been
7 unfair to Dr Kelly.
8 I might say, it would have also made the Ministry of
9 Defence and the Government look rather foolish if we had
10 indicated that Dr Kelly was the single source, for the
11 BBC to say: well, actually he was not. That was
12 a concern that I had over that weekend.
13 MR DINGEMANS: Going forward, as it were, almost to the end
14 of the story, before Dr Kelly's death were you ever sure
15 that Dr Kelly was the single source?
16 A. Not before his death.
17 Q. But we also know that Dr Kelly's name did come out.
18 A. Yes, it did.
19 Q. So, I understood you to be saying that at that stage you
20 were still concerned with ensuring, out of fairness to
21 Dr Kelly, his name did not come out before you were sure
22 he was the single source.
23 A. That is absolutely right. Indeed, I had a conversation
24 with my private secretary on the day that the BBC made
25 their announcement, still questioning whether in fact --

38
1 because I had been told they were going to make an
2 announcement but I did not know the nature of it at the
3 time. I still was not sure on -- when was it? --
4 Sunday, about the 20th I should imagine, when they made
5 their announcement, I still was not sure at that stage,
6 before they made their announcement, that Dr Kelly was
7 their single source.
8 Q. I rushed ahead of myself a bit. Shall we go back to the
9 Sunday? Does that cover all you wanted to say about the
10 discussions on the Sunday?
11 A. Just forgive me a second. (Pause). Yes.
12 Q. Coming on then to the Monday. We have heard about
13 a meeting which took place in No. 10 and the fact that
14 you were not there but Sir Kevin Tebbit was there. Did
15 you have any discussions with Sir Kevin Tebbit before he
16 went?
17 A. He came into my office before going across to the
18 meeting in Downing Street. I think the one thing that
19 he told me at that stage was that it had been agreed
20 with the Cabinet Office and Downing Street over the
21 weekend that Dr Kelly would be interviewed again.
22 Q. It had been agreed by?
23 A. Well, I think in conversation with Sir David Omand on
24 behalf of the Cabinet Office and Downing Street.
25 Q. Right. And Sir Kevin Tebbit had agreed that?

39
1 A. Yes.
2 Q. So what were you told on the Monday morning by
3 Sir Kevin?
4 A. Well, simply that. There was some discussion about the
5 fact that Dr Kelly had already set off for
6 RAF Honnington to attend a course, I think in
7 preparation for his going back to Iraq, and therefore
8 there was discussion about how he could be returned in
9 order to be further interviewed.
10 I also discussed with him the same point that we
11 have just gone through: the possibility of approaching
12 the BBC privately to see whether they would be willing
13 to confirm the identity of Andrew Gilligan's single
14 source as part of this management process affecting both
15 institutions.
16 Q. And what was his view about that?
17 A. Well, I think it was part of the general discussions
18 that were taking place. I assumed he would have fed
19 that into the discussion that then took place in
20 Downing Street subsequently about what action to take.
21 Q. Sir Kevin goes off to Downing Street then?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. We know that the FAC report is published. Did you look
24 at it on that day?
25 A. Yes, I did. I certainly -- I do not think I looked at

40
1 the entirety of the report. I certainly looked at the
2 conclusions and recommendations. I mean, this was
3 a high profile report. It was directly concerned with
4 issues that I had obviously been very much involved
5 with, the decision to take military action in Iraq. So
6 its conclusions were of great interest to me.
7 Q. Can I take you to FAC/3/7, which is part way through the
8 conclusions part of the FAC report. Scrolling down we
9 can see there is a paragraph 26. Did you see that
10 conclusion at the time?
11 A. Yes, I did.
12 Q. Did that have any influence on your thinking?
13 A. Well, I think it simply emphasised the concern that
14 I had had since the Thursday, since I had been told that
15 an official had come forward. My concern on the
16 Thursday, as I have indicated already, is that we should
17 not be seen to be covering up the fact that this man had
18 come forward. Here was the Foreign Affairs Committee
19 actually emphasising the importance to them of
20 a thorough investigation into Andrew Gilligan's alleged
21 contact. So it rather heightened my anxiety that we
22 should not be holding back the information that someone
23 had come forward.
24 Q. Did you look at the relevant part of the report? It
25 says paragraph 154 there. In fact, that is

41
1 a typographical error and it is paragraph 152. If we
2 look at FAC/3/48 you can see paragraphs 150, 151 and 152
3 of the report. Did you look at that that morning?
4 A. I am not sure that I looked at it that morning but
5 I certainly did look at it later.
6 Q. What they say:
7 "Mr Gilligan [tells us he has lots of] ... contacts,
8 both official and unofficial."
9 They say: we are quite concerned about that. And at
10 the end of paragraph 152:
11 "We accept the need for the agencies on occasion to
12 brief the press within very strict guidelines ... [but]
13 we recommend [the] ... alleged contacts be thoroughly
14 investigated."
15 Did you read that as suggesting that anyone you
16 found had leaked a document should be hauled off before
17 the FAC?
18 A. No, I did not. But I equally recognised that the FAC
19 might have an interest in taking evidence from anyone
20 who had been in contact with Andrew Gilligan, as a way
21 of assessing the reliability of Andrew Gilligan's
22 evidence to them and indeed as a way of assessing the
23 nature of the dispute that had arisen between the
24 Government and the BBC.
25 Q. We know there was a draft press statement prepared on

42
1 7th July. That is MoD/17/2. This is something Ms Teare
2 provided after her evidence because she had referred to
3 some drafts. At the moment in the draft it says:
4 "In its Report published yesterday, the House of
5 Commons Foreign Affairs Committee recommended that
6 Andrew Gilligan's alleged contacts be thoroughly
7 investigated.
8 "In this context it may be relevant that an
9 individual working in the MoD has come forward to
10 volunteer..."
11 That press statement we know was not put out in that
12 format. Did you influence, at this stage, the draft
13 press statement because it appears to be reflecting your
14 thinking at the time?
15 A. Well, I did not see the drafts. Whether any comments
16 that I made influenced it, I do not know. It is
17 a rather difficult question for me to answer in terms of
18 whether I influenced it. I think it was well known,
19 certainly I had made this concern known to the Permanent
20 Secretary that I was anxious about the Foreign Affairs
21 Committee report and conclusion. So I may have
22 influenced the way in which that work was carried on;
23 but I certainly did not see the draft press releases in
24 preparation.
25 Q. We know that Sir David Omand has written a note after

43
1 the event, it is 21st July, in which he refers to the
2 importance of Dr Kelly cooperating with the process. We
3 also know that on 7th July, it is MoD/1/44, there is
4 a memo here which is dated 8th July but we have heard
5 that it was in fact produced on 7th July because it
6 referred to the interview that is going to take place.
7 What it says at paragraph 2 is:
8 "What is now needed now is a more intensive
9 interview with Kelly."
10 In fact it was produced on the morning, we were
11 told, of 7th July.
12 A. Hmm, hmm.
13 Q. Over the page at MoD/1/45, paragraph 5:
14 "In all this PUS [Sir Kevin Tebbit] remains
15 concerned to ensure that Dr Kelly's rights are
16 respected -- it is important to understand he is
17 cooperating voluntarily."
18 There is the different angle, that in the event that
19 it becomes evident that he may have divulged classified
20 or privileged information, proceedings would need to be
21 stopped to avoid prejudicing any case.
22 Were you aware at this stage that Dr Kelly's
23 involvement was all to be voluntary?
24 A. I certainly had understood from the beginning that
25 Dr Kelly had come forward, he had volunteered the fact

44
1 he had had a contact with Andrew Gilligan, that he was
2 cooperating. Certainly I think that is important in
3 terms of the sequence of events that took place.
4 Q. We have also seen, at CAB/1/46, a memo that Mr Scarlett
5 had dictated on the morning, where he had agreed with
6 Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter of Saturday, that is written
7 after Mr Baldwin's article, that:
8 "... the finger points strongly at David Kelly ..."
9 He had been through the transcript, he attached
10 copies of that, which make it clear that:
11 "Gilligan has only talked to one person about the
12 September dossier. If he could have referred to any
13 corroborating information he would have done so. If
14 this is true, Kelly is not telling the whole story."
15 A. Hmm.
16 Q. Were you aware of any doubts being expressed about
17 whether Dr Kelly had told the whole story, at this
18 stage?
19 A. I recognised, in the range of possibilities, that that
20 was one of them. But I was not -- I had not seen this
21 particular document. In fact, I think this is probably
22 the first time that I have seen it. I was not aware
23 that those doubts were being expressed elsewhere in
24 Government; but I recognise in the series of options of
25 facts that that was one of them.

45
1 Q. We know that at the meeting that Sir Kevin Tebbit
2 attended it was decided to give Dr Kelly a second
3 interview.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. We also know that that took place in the afternoon of
6 the 7th July, the Monday.
7 A. Hmm.
8 Q. Were you made aware that the second interview was taking
9 place?
10 A. Yes. Yes. It was something that Kevin had mentioned to
11 me on the morning in the meeting before he went across
12 to Downing Street.
13 Q. And did anyone report to you the outcome of the second
14 interview?
15 A. I cannot recall formally that happening, but I certainly
16 was aware that that second interview had not taken the
17 issue much further forward, the issue being whether or
18 not Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's single source.
19 Q. No. I mean, I think we have heard that Mr Scarlett
20 thought, as a result of his memo and the further
21 information, and Mr Howard thought, that he was
22 definitely the single source, but it does not
23 necessarily seem that Mr Hatfield had changed his view.
24 A. No.
25 Q. You were aware of a range of views on that?

46
1 A. I was aware of Richard Hatfield's view. I was not aware
2 that there were other views elsewhere. I thought I made
3 that clear earlier.
4 Q. Right. We can see that the Ministry of Defence are
5 still preparing some press statements. But these are
6 now being at least altered or improved by
7 Downing Street. If I take you to CAB/1/50 we can see
8 some of the drafting that is going on on Ministry of
9 Defence press statements. It appears that this was
10 happening on about 7th July. In fact, if you look at
11 the top left-hand corner you can see the fax date.
12 Were you aware that Downing Street was involved in
13 helping the Ministry of Defence with their press
14 statements?
15 A. I was not directly aware of that, but it would not be
16 a particular surprise given the involvement of
17 Downing Street and the Cabinet Office in these events.
18 These were events that affected the Government as
19 a whole, and therefore I would have expected there to be
20 a great deal of contact between the Ministry of Defence
21 and other parts of Government involved; in this case,
22 the Cabinet Office and Downing Street, which was
23 obviously why I called Jonathan Powell on the Thursday
24 and why Kevin Tebbit wrote to David Omand on the Friday.
25 Q. Who did you understand to be the lead department? Had

47
1 it now become No. 10 or was it still the Ministry of
2 Defence?
3 A. Well, the Ministry of Defence was the lead department as
4 far as dealing with Dr Kelly on a personnel basis, as
5 far his position, as far as the department were
6 concerned, then I was concerned that the Permanent
7 Secretary should look at that matter as an employment
8 concern issue, to look at it from a point of view of
9 ensuring that Dr Kelly was properly and fairly treated.
10 Equally, there were clearly wider implications in what
11 was happening as far as the Government as a whole were
12 concerned. That is why the Cabinet Office and
13 Downing Street were engaged.
14 Q. Did you have any conversations with Mr Campbell that
15 evening?
16 A. Yes, I did. There was a further conversation, in
17 a sense, following on from our discussions --
18 inconclusive discussions the day before about --
19 Q. Did you go and see him? Was it on the telephone?
20 A. I think it was on the telephone.
21 Q. Where were you --
22 LORD HUTTON: I think before we proceed into the details of
23 this it is a convenient time to give the stenographers
24 a break. I will rise for five minutes.
25 (11.45 am)

48
1 (Short Break)
2 (11.50 am)
3 MR DINGEMANS: We were on Monday 7th July, and you were
4 about to tell me about your telephone conversation,
5 I think you said it was, with Mr Campbell. Where were
6 you when you made the call?
7 A. As far as I am aware I was in the Ministry of Defence.
8 Q. And where is Mr Campbell?
9 A. I assume in Downing Street, but I could not give
10 evidence to that fact.
11 Q. Right. What was said in this conversation?
12 A. Well, it really was following on the conversation that
13 we had had the previous day about how to try to find
14 a way to persuade the BBC to acknowledge
15 Andrew Gilligan's single source. We discussed various
16 possibilities. I think it was on that occasion that he
17 put forward a further possibility of briefing
18 a newspaper that someone had come forward as a means of
19 putting further pressure on the BBC to acknowledge that;
20 but I had -- I was pretty doubtful about that, and
21 I think I pointed out to him that actually it still left
22 open the possibility that the BBC would simply deny it,
23 would simply say that this person was not their source;
24 and we would be no further forward.
25 LORD HUTTON: But why, if you are thinking of putting

49
1 pressure on the BBC, why brief a newspaper as opposed to
2 issuing a statement directly?
3 A. Well, my Lord, I was not thinking of briefing
4 a newspaper; and indeed I did not agree to that
5 approach. Although Alastair put it forward, I think it
6 is fair to him to say that he did not brief a newspaper
7 either. It is simply part of the discussions that were
8 taking place. It was one suggestion that he had made.
9 It was not something that I agreed to or indeed did
10 anything about.
11 LORD HUTTON: No.
12 MR DINGEMANS: Did you recall the conversation, at any time,
13 being switched on to a speaker phone?
14 A. Not at my end of the conversation, no.
15 Q. No. But when you are talking to someone and you are
16 switching on to a speaker phone, sometimes you hear it
17 sounds different, does it not?
18 A. I was not aware of that.
19 Q. You were not aware of Godric Smith joining the
20 conversation at all or listening into the conversation
21 at all?
22 A. (Pause). No.
23 Q. Did Mr Campbell mention any particular newspaper?
24 A. (Pause). Not to the best of my recollection, no.
25 Q. At this stage, did you understand whether or not

50
1 Dr Kelly was happy for his name to be given to any
2 newspaper or press statement?
3 A. That, at that stage, obviously had not been discussed
4 with Dr Kelly; and part of my concern, as well, as
5 I have indicated, certainly throughout the weekend, was
6 that whatever action we took we should be sure about the
7 factual basis; and since I was not sure on the Monday
8 evening any more than I had been over the previous
9 weekend, then I would have been uncomfortable about
10 briefing a newspaper because I did not judge that it
11 would have taken us any further forward.
12 Q. On the morning of 8th July Mr Baldwin has told us in
13 a Q and A column in The Times newspaper he had said
14 this: conversations with Downing Street say he is not
15 a member of the Intelligence Services but more likely to
16 be a weapons of mass destruction specialist at the
17 Foreign Office. He said that that was a variety of
18 conversations with sources in different Government
19 departments. For perfectly understandable reasons he
20 has not helped us any further with who those people
21 were. Do you know anything about those conversations
22 with Mr Baldwin?
23 A. No, I do not; and they certainly did not involve me.
24 Q. We have seen the defensive Q and A material that was
25 actually deployed. Can I take you to some draft Q and A

51
1 material which we have received --
2 A. Sorry, I apologise for interrupting you but when you say
3 they have actually been deployed, I am not sure it is
4 right to say they were deployed. At that stage there
5 was no reason for them to be used.
6 Q. Sorry, deployed on 8th July, 9th July.
7 A. Sorry.
8 Q. What was actually used. We have now been provided with
9 further drafts. Going to the morning of 8th July, if we
10 go to CAB/21/5, this is some Q and A material which is
11 said to have been sent to the Permanent Undersecretary
12 office at 8.07 on Tuesday, 8th July subject to
13 discussion and approval.
14 If you can look down to the fifth question:
15 "Is it X (ie the correct name)?
16 "If the correct name is put to us from a number of
17 callers, we will need to tell the individual we are
18 going to confirm his name before doing [I imagine that
19 is a typo for 'so']."
20 The actual Q and A material put out later that day
21 and used on 9th July has a rather different look to it.
22 If you look at MoD/1/62, you can see:
23 "Who is the official?"
24 At the top:
25 "We wouldn't normally volunteer a name.

52
1 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it..."
2 That is a reasonably substantial change. One is
3 saying: we need to go back to the individual and tell
4 him first. The other appears to be: well, we will tell
5 you.
6 Do you know whether or not Dr Kelly was told about
7 the draft Q and A material and the Q and A material as
8 deployed?
9 A. I do not, no. But can I make clear that I did not see
10 either of these documents. They were not submitted to
11 my office. That would not be something that I would
12 normally deal with.
13 Q. I will come back, if I may, to the Q and A material
14 because that comes later on on 8th July.
15 A. Can I just deal with a point about "put out" because
16 I think it is something that has been dealt with
17 previously in evidence before the Inquiry? These
18 questions and answers are prepared for the use of
19 individual press officers and, particularly in the
20 Ministry of Defence where there is a 24 hour process, it
21 may well be that an individual press officer comes on
22 duty without necessarily being aware of particular
23 issues. So these questions and answers are used by
24 individual press officers to answer specific questions
25 that are put to them by journalists. They are not "put

53
1 out" in any sense at all. They are simply sitting there
2 in the press office for use by those press officers
3 should these questions arise. But they are not
4 communicated generally to the world in any sense at all.
5 Q. No, but when they ring up and ask the right question:
6 "Did he play any part in drawing up the dossier?"
7 They are told:
8 "He was involved in providing historical details..."
9 A. The director of news would be responsible for drawing up
10 these documents to guide her staff, her press officers,
11 in the work they do in responding to questions from
12 journalists.
13 Q. We have heard about some meetings that took place in
14 Downing Street on 8th July, and in particular a meeting
15 at 11.45 am when it is decided that in the light of the
16 second interview his name ought to be supplied to the
17 Intelligence and Security Committee; and it is proposed
18 initially that that is going to be by way of a letter
19 that is going to be copied to the FAC, and because it is
20 going to be copied to the FAC it is going to be made
21 public.
22 As I understand from what you were saying, the
23 Ministry of Defence were going to be the lead department
24 on the personnel side of matters, and obviously putting
25 his name to the Intelligence and Security Committee part

54
1 relates to personnel; is that right?
2 A. Yes, that is right. Yes.
3 Q. We have also heard from Sir Kevin Tebbit that he was
4 handing out medals, I think, for HMS Nottingham and
5 saving her from sinking. We have also heard you were
6 not at that meeting at 11.45.
7 A. No.
8 Q. So how was the Ministry of Defence, as it were, dealing
9 with the personnel issues at that stage?
10 A. By then, because of the contacts, in particular with
11 David Omand, who also has personnel responsibilities for
12 the Cabinet Office, obviously these are discussions that
13 are taking place in Government and not simply involving
14 a particular department.
15 Q. But if we look, for example, at MoD/1/41, this is the
16 letter that Sir David Omand had written. It is
17 misdated, we now know this. It is written to
18 Sir Kevin Tebbit, in which he deals with what the
19 situation was over the weekend:
20 "The Prime Minister subsequently saw your letter ...
21 "The Prime Minister asked for a deeper analysis ...
22 "Your follow up letter has also been seen by the
23 Prime Minister ... The Prime Minister concluded that
24 notwithstanding the further circumstantial details in
25 your second letter he agreed with your recommendation...

55
1 "We agreed that you will circulate the detailed
2 account ..."
3 It was all being written, as we understood it, to
4 the Ministry of Defence because they were in charge of
5 the personnel side. But it rather looks like at the
6 Tuesday morning meeting there is no-one from the
7 Ministry of Defence actually taking an active role in
8 it; is that fair or unfair?
9 A. Well, I think as a matter of fact it must be fair,
10 although, as I understood it, Kevin Tebbit did come back
11 from Portsmouth before that meeting concluded. So
12 I thought that he was present for at least part of the
13 meeting and certainly was present in the course of
14 drafting material following on from that meeting.
15 Q. I think, in fact, as a matter of chronology, he was not
16 there at the first meeting which finishes at about 12.30
17 but arrives during the course of the second meeting
18 which started at 1.30. He arrived, I think we were
19 told, some time about 2 o'clock.
20 You had a meeting on 8th July with Mr Sambrook of
21 the BBC. Were you being told at all what was being
22 decided at the meeting at 11.45 in Downing Street?
23 A. Before I had the meeting with Richard Sambrook I was
24 certainly told that there was a proposal, I think from
25 David Omand, to contact the ISC and to use the ISC as

56
1 a means of perhaps persuading the BBC to reveal
2 privately their source and that, therefore, I should not
3 reveal the identity or the fact that Dr Kelly had come
4 forward. That was certainly a thought that I had had
5 before the meeting with Richard Sambrook.
6 I was very concerned that we had got into something
7 of a cul-de-sac with the BBC, that I needed to try and
8 find a way out of that cul-de-sac to take things
9 forward, and having a meeting with Richard Sambrook, who
10 I had written to on a number of occasions but never met,
11 seemed to me a possible way of moving things along, of
12 trying to improve relations with the BBC, particularly
13 as far as the Ministry of Defence was concerned, but
14 also to find a way in which if we could engage sensibly
15 in a proper discussion he might recognise he also had
16 a problem of a management kind, not being absolutely
17 sure he was getting all the right information from his
18 employees.
19 Q. You are rather warned off that because Sir David is
20 going to write to the ISC.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. But when Sir David is writing to the ISC, were you told
23 the letter was going to be copied to the FAC and made
24 public?
25 A. I was aware that there was a proposal to use the ISC for

57
1 the kind of process that I have just described, trying
2 to find a way of identifying the single source and
3 persuading the BBC to explain who that was. I was also
4 aware, quite soon afterwards, that Ann Taylor did not
5 want the ISC to be used in that way, I think
6 specifically because that would have involved the
7 publication of material. I think, because of the reason
8 you are giving, it would have had to have been copied to
9 the Foreign Affairs Committee and therefore that would
10 have compromised the confidential way in which the ISC
11 operates.
12 LORD HUTTON: May I ask you, Secretary of State, when you
13 say that you understood that the ISC was going to be
14 enlisted as a means of persuading the BBC to reveal the
15 identity of the source, did you understand that there
16 was any thought that the ISC would go rather beyond that
17 and would examine Dr Kelly for the purpose of coming to
18 the conclusion that Mr Gilligan's main criticism was
19 incorrect? In other words, that Dr Kelly would tell the
20 ISC that he had not made the report to Mr Gilligan which
21 Mr Gilligan then broadcast. That would be a more direct
22 way of dealing with the matter, would it not?
23 A. When you say, my Lord, they were enlisted; I knew and
24 I was aware this was a proposal.
25 LORD HUTTON: I am not so much concerned with the word

58
1 "enlisted" or "a proposal", but what was the purpose?
2 Was the purpose more than to hope that the ISC would put
3 pressure on the BBC or persuade the BBC, or was it that
4 the ISC themselves would come to the conclusion that
5 Mr Gilligan's report, in its main thrust, was incorrect?
6 A. I was not present at that meeting, but what I understood
7 to be the case was that given the confidential way in
8 which the ISC operates, that by giving the name of
9 Dr Kelly to the ISC on our side might encourage the BBC
10 to reveal their source on their side, so that, in
11 effect, Ann Taylor became the person who was in
12 a position to identify the matching individuals if
13 indeed that was the case.
14 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.
15 MR DINGEMANS: Did you not say, at this stage, to
16 Sir David Omand -- was it Sir David Omand you spoke to,
17 who told you not to mention to Mr Sambrook the
18 possibility of the source at this stage?
19 A. No, it was not. I think it was simply a message from
20 Jonathan Powell to my private office. So the
21 information would have been relayed to me by my private
22 office.
23 Q. Did you not say at this stage: well, hang on a minute,
24 Dr Kelly has not yet admitted he is the single source,
25 for the reasons you have given before we are not going

59
1 to put his name in the public; if we start publicising
2 the fact someone has come forward it is going to create
3 a dreadful scramble to find out who he is before we know
4 he is the single source?
5 A. In the process I have just described to you, I was not
6 proposing to publish the name. The issue was passing
7 the name, as I understood it, in confidence to the ISC;
8 but there was no decision at that stage about
9 publication, as far as I was aware.
10 Q. Passing it in confidence, but making it plain, by
11 publishing the letter, that a name had been passed?
12 A. Well, I was not party to these discussions. I think it
13 is important that I do not go beyond what my knowledge
14 at the time was. My knowledge at the time was that
15 there was a proposal to use the ISC for the kind of
16 purpose that I had previously described to the Inquiry,
17 as a way of giving the BBC some confidence that its
18 source would not be compromised, in a way that assisted
19 both the Government and the BBC in identifying that
20 source properly.
21 Q. We know you have the meeting with Mr Sambrook. That
22 takes place at about 1.30. I think that is right.
23 A. Yes, it is.
24 Q. Is that at the Ministry of Defence?
25 A. No, it took place in my office in the House of Commons.

60
1 Q. Right. If we turn to MoD/1/52, although this is dated
2 10th July it is a note of what was said at the meeting.
3 You can see the discussions in paragraph 2:
4 "Mr Hoon briefly rehearsed why we were sure that
5 Mr Gilligan had not forewarned..."
6 You raised concerns in paragraph 3 that you had been
7 denied an opportunity to answer the story. Mr Sambrook
8 is reported as saying that there is a general issue
9 about over-defensiveness on the Today Programme.
10 At paragraph 4 you say that you have read with
11 interest Tom Baldwin's article in Saturday's Times and
12 say it had been suggested that Mr Sambrook was the
13 source of the story. Mr Sambrook said he had
14 met Mr Baldwin but had not gone beyond previous
15 descriptions.
16 We have also seen notes that the BBC made of the
17 same meeting. Can I take you to BBC/6/781? These are
18 handwritten notes that were produced -- sorry, in fact
19 that is a bad reference. It is BBC/6/140. 781 is some
20 other numbering.
21 This is Tuesday, July 8th. These are notes I think
22 Mr Sambrook has told us about. Can I just ask you about
23 a passage at page 143 where we can see, if you go down
24 the page:
25 "You will have read reports in The Times by

61
1 Tom Baldwin suggesting Gilligan was in the 100 plus team
2 in Iraq."
3 I think your note is obviously slightly more cryptic
4 in relation to that, but deals with it.
5 Can I then take you to page 144 where you say this:
6 "My view of Mr Gilligan is he is essentially
7 a tabloid journalist."
8 You gave an example and:
9 "Said something to the effect that Gilligan
10 shouldn't be on Today."
11 Mr Sambrook is reported to have said:
12 "He is a particular sort of journalist and we are
13 thinking about the appropriate use of him."
14 And he explained he was taken on because of previous
15 perceptions about reporting.
16 Now, at this stage you were obviously aware of
17 Mr Campbell's views about the BBC and his general
18 unhappiness with this. Was this part of continuing the
19 dispute with the BBC, as it were, by way of private
20 meetings?
21 A. No, on the contrary. As I think I indicated earlier, it
22 was my effort to try to find a way out of a particular
23 difficulty that had arisen with the Today Programme
24 I think actually I had done an interview that morning
25 with the Today Programme and that was one of the reasons

62
1 why it was useful to have the meeting with Mr Sambrook
2 that day. And the difficulty was that I felt quite
3 strongly that since the Today Programme had asserted and
4 John Humphrys had said that Andrew Gilligan's story had
5 been checked with the Ministry of Defence beforehand,
6 that I should have the opportunity of at least refuting
7 that.
8 Therefore, when the Today Programme asked me on more
9 than one occasion to appear, I said: yes of course
10 I would appear but I felt it was only fair that I should
11 have the opportunity of at least indicating that the
12 Today Programme had not in fact, and Andrew Gilligan had
13 not in fact checked the story. The problem with that is
14 that the Today Programme would not allow me on on that
15 basis and withdrew the invitations for me to appear.
16 But I could see that that was not necessarily
17 a healthy state of affairs either for me, the Government
18 or for that matter for the BBC. There were many issues
19 on which I should appear on the Today Programme and do;
20 and I wanted to try and find a way out of that
21 particular -- I think I described it earlier as
22 a cul-de-sac, and that is why I wanted to talk to
23 Richard Sambrook about a more sensible basis on which we
24 could move things along both, I hope, in the interests
25 of the BBC and in the interests of the Government.

63
1 Q. That meeting takes place at 1.30. We know that in the
2 course of the afternoon there is, as I think you have
3 already mentioned, a reply back from the Clerk to the
4 Intelligence and Security Committee saying they are not
5 very happy with the idea that they should have a public
6 letter and apparently suggest a press statement. Were
7 you told about that proposal?
8 A. No.
9 Q. Did you know that before the Ministry of Defence made
10 the press statement on 8th July that it was proposing to
11 issue a press statement?
12 A. Well, I was certainly aware that -- as I think I have
13 indicated -- there were a number of discussions taking
14 place about the best way of trying to persuade the BBC
15 to reveal its source. This was one option which, on the
16 morning of Tuesday the 8th July, those engaged in the
17 meeting preferred. It was not successful because of the
18 reluctance of Ann Taylor to become involved in the
19 process. Therefore, in effect, the fall back was for me
20 to write to the BBC and to publicise the fact that an
21 official had come forward.
22 Q. That was a fall back, suggesting someone had at least
23 a plan or a strategy. Whose plan or strategy was it, as
24 far as you understood?
25 A. It was something that had been discussed. It was

64
1 something I had discussed as long before as the Sunday
2 with Alastair Campbell. It was --
3 Q. Whose decision was it to implement that fall back
4 position?
5 A. I think that came out of the meeting on the Tuesday in
6 the Cabinet Office involving David Omand and others.
7 I simply -- I was given a message to the effect that it
8 was now appropriate for me to write to the Chairman of
9 the governors. Given that this is something that I had
10 wanted to do for some time, you know, I was certainly
11 willing to do that.
12 Q. So the implementation of the fall back plan you had at
13 least envisaged on the Sunday is coming to you from
14 No. 10, as it were?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. You do write a letter on 8th July. Can I take you to
17 that? That is MoD/1/66. You are writing "Dear Gavyn",
18 that is to the Chairman of governors.
19 "I am writing to draw to your attention an MoD
20 statement which we will be issuing later today about
21 Andrew Gilligan's 'single source'. This is enclosed.
22 "You will see that we have not named the official
23 within the MoD who has come forward. We would, however,
24 be prepared to disclose his name to you in confidence,
25 on the basis that you would then immediately confirm or

65
1 deny that this is indeed Mr Gilligan's source, in the
2 interests of resolving what has become a management
3 problem for both our organisations."
4 I think you have already explained what you meant by
5 that.
6 A. Yes.
7 Q. "I am sure you will understand that this is not the same
8 as divulging a source ..."
9 That evening a press statement is actually issued.
10 We will find that at MoD/1/56. In fact, we have seen so
11 many drafts of the press statements et cetera, this is
12 our best guess as to what was actually issued.
13 A. If I may say so, you have seen more drafts than I have.
14 Q. We can see there that the individual has volunteered he
15 met with Mr Gilligan:
16 "The official has told us that he made no
17 allegations or accusations about the dossier ... this
18 discussion was not authorised ..."
19 And:
20 "There is no reason to suspect that a breach of
21 security is involved."
22 We have seen earlier drafts which have the ISC
23 references in. For understandable reasons they may have
24 gone out.
25 So your understanding was that this was part of

66
1 a fall back after the first public letter to the ISC had
2 been rejected, to get the BBC to confirm whether or not
3 Dr Kelly was the source; is that right?
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. And as far as you understood, it was not intended that
6 Dr Kelly's name should ever be made public until he had
7 been confirmed as the source; is that right?
8 A. That was certainly my concern, yes. That we should only
9 act when we were sure about his role.
10 Q. What is also distributed for deployment that day and the
11 following day when queries come in about the press
12 statement are the Q and A that was actually finalised.
13 That is at MoD/1/62. If we look at the second --
14 LORD HUTTON: Just before we go on to that, is it your
15 evidence, Secretary of State, that this MoD statement
16 was issued solely for the purpose of trying to persuade
17 the BBC to reveal its source or was there another reason
18 behind it?
19 A. That was certainly part of it, but throughout I had been
20 concerned, as I think I have indicated, my Lord, to
21 the Inquiry already, that we were in possession of
22 significant information about a potential witness
23 relevant to Parliamentary proceedings, relevant to the
24 public debate; and I, as each day went by, was
25 increasingly concerned that we were not making this

67
1 information known, certainly to the Foreign Affairs
2 Committee but to the wider public.
3 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
4 A. I was very conscious that we risked being accused of
5 a cover-up. I remember having a conversation about what
6 would happen if, say, a Sunday newspaper on the Sunday
7 had got wind of the fact that someone had come forward
8 in the Ministry of Defence. I am sure that they would
9 have accused us of covering that fact up.
10 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
11 MR DINGEMANS: Your letter of 8th July that we have seen at
12 MoD/1/66, did you actually come up, yourself, with the
13 wording or did anyone bring a draft of that letter to
14 you?
15 A. Well, the normal process will be for a draft to be
16 brought to me. I --
17 Q. Do you know who had compiled the draft?
18 A. No, I do not but it is a very short letter. It was
19 probably -- it could easily have been prepared in my
20 private office. It is not a very detailed thing. What
21 I would say is that I regularly interfere in the drafts
22 that are put before me and change the wording.
23 Q. The defensive Q and A material, you have told us how
24 that works, at MoD/1/62. I was looking, really, at the
25 second question down:

68
1 "What is his name and current post?"
2 You issue a press statement saying: an unidentified
3 official has come forward.
4 A. Hmm.
5 Q. The press department or press office are likely to be
6 rung up and asked who it is. Now, the name is something
7 any journalist is going to ask for, is it not? And this
8 is the proposed answer:
9 "We wouldn't normally volunteer a name.
10 "If the correct name is given, we can confirm it and
11 say that he is a senior advisor to the Proliferation and
12 Arms Control Secretariat."
13 A. If you forgive me, I do not think that is quite the
14 right way to present this material. This is a guidance
15 for press officers. They are not going to read those
16 words out in the way you just have. These are
17 instructions to a press officer how to deal with the
18 request. I would not expect them to read that out in
19 the way you have just done.
20 Q. We have heard evidence from journalists about what they
21 were told. Some of them did ask some questions. If we
22 go down the page:
23 "Is he in Iraq?"
24 We are talking about weapons of mass destruction and
25 someone who has a good understanding of that, so

69
1 a question that one can anticipate:
2 "No, though he visited Iraq recently ...
3 "Is he a member of the ISG?
4 "No."
5 LORD HUTTON: You are reading 62?
6 MR DINGEMANS: Towards the bottom, my Lord.
7 LORD HUTTON: Yes, I see. Thank you very much.
8 MR DINGEMANS: You can see effectively further up the page:
9 "Did the official play any part in drawing up the
10 dossier?
11 "He was involved in providing historical details of
12 UNSCOM's activities ..."
13 Effectively there are a number of pieces of
14 information which are going to assist any journalist to
15 identify Dr Kelly. Is that a fair analysis of this
16 defensive Q and A material?
17 A. I do not believe that this necessarily would have led to
18 the identification of Dr Kelly on the assumption that
19 a journalist went through each and every one of those
20 questions. It seems to me highly unlikely that they
21 would have done.
22 I did not see this Q and A and played no part in its
23 preparation, so it is a little difficult for me to
24 comment about any underlying purpose. But if you are
25 suggesting that there was some deliberate effort here to

70
1 identify Dr Kelly, I say that is absolutely wrong and
2 certainly no effort by me or my office to do that. As
3 I have emphasised throughout, my concern was to identify
4 the facts, and the key fact was whether Dr Kelly was or
5 was not Andrew Gilligan's single source.
6 LORD HUTTON: But you have also said that in your earlier
7 discussions with Sir Kevin Tebbit he had said that the
8 fact that Dr Kelly had come forward might enable the
9 public record to be corrected. I think you had accepted
10 that that was a consideration in your mind as well.
11 A. Yes, my Lord, but that was only on the basis that he was
12 clearly Andrew Gilligan's single source.
13 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes. But we have heard that in the
14 course of the week, and indeed over the preceding
15 weekend, the feeling had been growing amongst some very
16 senior officials that, in fact, Dr Kelly was the single
17 source. Were you aware of that, and in the week
18 beginning 7th July?
19 A. I cannot comment on -- I think your Lordship is
20 referring, probably, to David Omand's assumptions at
21 that stage.
22 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
23 A. I was not aware of David Omand's thinking. I was aware
24 that Sir Kevin Tebbit, having on the Friday evening
25 readily accepted the advice from Richard Hatfield about

71
1 his assessment of Dr Kelly's position, thought again on
2 the Saturday, particularly after seeing the article by
3 Tom Baldwin in The Times; and I think as a result of
4 that he wrote a further letter to David Omand indicating
5 that he felt there was now more evidence pointing to the
6 fact that Dr Kelly was the single source. So there was
7 a change in his thinking. But again, I do not think
8 I or anyone else at that stage was sure enough,
9 certainly from my position, to name Dr Kelly, because
10 I think that would have been unfair to Dr Kelly.
11 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
12 MR DINGEMANS: This is 8th July. The Q and A material
13 I think is deployed effectively on the 9th once the
14 press statement has been made. But Mr Baldwin writes an
15 article, he told us in his evidence, saying that there
16 was an adviser who was undertaking work with the
17 Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat, previously
18 a UN weapons inspector. That is published on 9th July.
19 So after the press statement has gone out but before, as
20 far as we know it, the Q and A material has been used by
21 the press office. He has told us that that came from
22 more than one source. Again, he has not told us, for
23 understandable reasons, who that is.
24 Do you know anything about that story in The Times?
25 A. No, I do not. It certainly did not come from me.

72
1 Q. That is the 8th July. Is there anything else that
2 occurred on 8th July, so far as you recollect?
3 A. Well, I think the only point perhaps we have not covered
4 is that fairly promptly Gavyn Davies rejected the
5 proposal I had made, on the grounds that it would
6 conflict with the journalistic principle of source
7 protection.
8 Q. I take you to the letter, we have seen it before, it is
9 MoD/1/68. This is in response to your letter of
10 8th July. You have had a meeting with Mr Sambrook. You
11 write your letter as a result of the fall back. Then
12 Mr Davies replies saying:
13 "I have to say that the offer in your letter seems
14 to be an attempt to force the BBC to reveal the name or
15 names of source(s) used by Andrew Gilligan on Today and
16 Susan Ms Watts on Newsnight."
17 And says he is not going to go down that route.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. Actually, in the light of what you have told us, that is
20 probably a fairly fair analysis. You were trying to get
21 the name of the source out.
22 A. I think I would make two qualifications to that. First
23 of all, we were not trying to force the BBC to do
24 anything. We were giving them an opportunity, if they
25 judged it appropriate, to reveal their source.

73
1 Secondly, we were not as such trying to get the name
2 out. We were trying to identify whether or not Dr Kelly
3 was the single source and to give the BBC the
4 opportunity of conceding that, if they thought it
5 appropriate. They did not, at that stage.
6 LORD HUTTON: Just going back to the question and answer
7 material. I appreciate you say that you did not see
8 this material --
9 A. No, my Lord.
10 LORD HUTTON: -- but Miss Pam Teare said that one of the
11 factors that influenced I think her and others in
12 preparing this material was that the press might suggest
13 the names of other MoD officials or persons from the
14 Government as being the source, and the view was taken
15 that it would be unfair if that were not denied in case
16 suspicion fell on the wrong people. I appreciate you
17 say you were not concerned with that aspect but what is
18 your view on that, Secretary of State?
19 A. Well, I was aware of certainly Sir Kevin Tebbit raised
20 that with me. He was very concerned that other
21 officials might come under investigation by journalists;
22 and indeed I think it is right that one did find
23 a journalist in his garden approaching his children.
24 So, it is clear that that did happen.
25 I think another aspect of this is the extent to

74
1 which -- and I have had these conversations with
2 Pam Teare over the period that she has been working in
3 the Ministry of Defence -- it is -- it would be wrong to
4 ask press officers to deceive journalists, and no-one
5 would suggest that is appropriate. It is also quite
6 difficult actually, in the face of very determined
7 efforts by journalists, for press officers to, I think
8 your Lordship has used the phrase, batten down the
9 hatches to try to obfuscate the position. It puts quite
10 often relatively junior civil servants under a great
11 deal of pressure from sometimes quite aggressive
12 journalists. She prefers, and the advice she gave, is
13 that where it is possible to do so press officers should
14 be straightforward in responding to requests for
15 information by journalists.
16 LORD HUTTON: But one way of battening down the hatches is
17 simply to say: we do not give the names of civil
18 servants. That is not obfuscating, is it?
19 A. Yes, my Lord, although that would not necessarily be
20 true. That would not be an absolute policy that has
21 always been followed. Civil servants routinely give
22 evidence to Select Committees. They are routinely
23 identified. Therefore, I think it would be quite hard
24 to maintain that as an article of policy. It simply is
25 not something that has been routinely the case.

75
1 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you.
2 MR DINGEMANS: One other way of battening down the hatches
3 would have not been to make a press statement. At this
4 stage you do not know it is Dr Kelly, you are making the
5 press statement as part of the fall back plan to try to
6 get the BBC to confirm whether it is or not. If you
7 make the press statement, for all the reasons you have
8 given, the press are going to go into a detailed hunt
9 for that person; why not just avoid making the press
10 statement?
11 A. Because of the need to acknowledge the fact that someone
12 had come forward. There are a number of factors
13 relevant to that. It is not only the attitude of the
14 Foreign Affairs Committee; it is the fact that at some
15 stage, for example, Government would have to respond to
16 the Foreign Affairs Committee's conclusions and
17 inevitably the timing of our knowledge about a potential
18 witness would have to be made known. And I do not think
19 it is -- I do not think you should underestimate the
20 view that Parliament would take of a Government
21 department deliberately withholding such information.
22 Q. Now, on 9th July, we know that there are various Lobby
23 briefings given -- we have heard evidence -- in the
24 afternoon. It is CAB/1/221. That further details were
25 given out about the person who had come forward. If we

76
1 look at the bottom of the page, you can see that the
2 Prime Minister's official spokesman is:
3 "Asked for his definition of a 'senior intelligence
4 source', the PMOS said that there was a difference
5 between someone who was a technical expert on machinery
6 and equipment and someone who had intelligence
7 information about what was happening ... The person in
8 question was a technician -- a technical expert -- not
9 an intelligence official ..."
10 At 221, at the top of the page, we are told the
11 salary is being paid for by another department.
12 We have heard from Mr Blitz of the Financial Times
13 that those were indicators that assisted him to locate
14 who Dr Kelly was. I think we have heard about the
15 searches that were undertaken in that respect. Were you
16 aware that this material was being distributed at the
17 Lobby briefings?
18 A. No, I was not. But I routinely read the Lobby briefing
19 when it becomes available after the event. But I was
20 not aware that this was going to be said at the time.
21 Q. Going back, if I may, to your correspondence with
22 Mr Davies. You, in fact, write a letter, which we can
23 see at MoD/1/71, on 9th July. You say:
24 "Thank you for your letter replying to mine of the
25 same day.

77
1 "This is not about the divulging of sources."
2 You give the name, in confidence, to Mr Davies of
3 Dr Kelly.
4 What is the purpose behind this correspondence?
5 A. Essentially to -- by then I had accepted that the BBC
6 were not going to volunteer the name of their source.
7 I thought it might assist them in assessing the
8 reliability of what Andrew Gilligan might have said to
9 them to indicate privately to Gavyn Davies the name of
10 the official who had come forward.
11 Q. Were you given any assistance in writing this letter?
12 (Pause). Any drafts?
13 A. Well, there would have been a draft. I cannot tell you
14 precisely where it came from, but again it is not a long
15 letter. There was certainly some discussion, because
16 I think the suggestion for naming Dr Kelly at this stage
17 to Gavyn Davies, I think it actually came from
18 Jonathan Powell. This was something that, in a sense,
19 was consistent with the approach that we had taken over
20 several days.
21 Q. Can I ask you to look at CAB/11/136? This is an e-mail
22 that comes from the Garden Rooms and it is to "dnews;
23 Defence Secretary". It is copied to Jonathan Powell.
24 We can see "Alastair's note of 9th July".
25 Going on to 137 we can see some similarities with

78
1 the letter you finally sent:
2 "Thank you for your letter replying to mine of X.
3 "I am not asking you to divulge your reporter's
4 source ..."
5 You appear to cut out quite a lot of this material.
6 You say:
7 "I can tell you that the person is named X X, and he
8 is employed as Y Y ..." et cetera.
9 A. I have not seen that before. I accept it does bear some
10 similarities. I think I accept there would almost
11 certainly have been some discussions between
12 Downing Street and the Ministry of Defence about what
13 should go in the letter. The letter that I sent was
14 simple and to the point. I did not see any purpose in
15 over-elaboration.
16 Q. Now, the most important thing that is happening on
17 9th July, apart from the Lobby briefings that I have
18 taken you to, are the further indications or information
19 that is being given out about Dr Kelly without
20 identifying his name, which is leading journalists down
21 the path of ultimately, as we know, identifying
22 Dr Kelly. Were you aware that that process was going
23 on?
24 A. It would not surprise me that journalists were trying to
25 identify him. I am sure from the moment they became

79
1 aware that someone had come forward that journalists
2 would be making determined efforts to discover his name.
3 It was something Dr Kelly was warned about on the Friday
4 when he first spoke to Richard Hatfield. It think it is
5 something most people involved in this would think
6 inevitable, that at some stages journalists would
7 identify him. In a sense it is surprising, given the
8 reason he came forward in the first place, that he was
9 not identified sooner.
10 Q. Can I take you to 10th July, when his name does become
11 public. There is a letter of request --
12 LORD HUTTON: Just before we go on to that. You said,
13 Secretary of State, that people had assumed it was
14 inevitable that his name would become public. Now,
15 against that background, I appreciate you have
16 emphasised that on a number of occasions, is it a fair
17 summary then to suggest that Dr Kelly's name became
18 public because of questions put by the press, not
19 because it was the wish of the Government that the name
20 should become public, and you hoped that the name would
21 not become public for as long as possible but
22 nonetheless it was always accepted that it was
23 inevitable that it would become public? Just amplify
24 that or qualify that in any way. I appreciate I have
25 sought to summarise what has been quite lengthy evidence

80
1 on your part.
2 A. I had from the beginning recognised that there was
3 a significant probability that his name would become
4 public, not least because the reason why he wrote to the
5 Ministry of Defence in the first place, as I understand
6 it, was because his views were so distinctive on
7 a particular aspect on Iraq's weapons of mass
8 destruction that a colleague had identified his views,
9 in effect, in the mouth of Andrew Gilligan giving
10 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. So those
11 close to Dr Kelly recognised that he must have had some
12 contact with Andrew Gilligan because Andrew Gilligan was
13 repeating well known views that Dr Kelly held.
14 That, I am sure, was the reason why Richard Hatfield
15 warned Dr Kelly, on the Friday afternoon in the first
16 interview, that there was every prospect of his name
17 becoming known. It was obviously something, as well,
18 that had been taken into account in securing Dr Kelly's
19 consent to the issuing of the press statement.
20 So at each stage there was a recognition that his
21 name would become known. What I am resisting, certainly
22 as far as I am concerned, is any suggestion that there
23 was some sort of conspiracy, some sort of strategy, some
24 sort of plan covertly to make his name known. That was
25 not the case.

81
1 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Yes, thank you.
2 MR DINGEMANS: You get the letter from Mr Anderson at
3 MoD/1/73 which is dated 10th July, asking for Dr Kelly
4 to appear before the FAC. I think you have seen that
5 letter. You get some advice from Sir Kevin Tebbit at
6 MoD/1/75. And noting that you have received two
7 requests before the FAC and the ISC:
8 "We had already offered him to the ISC and
9 I recommend that you agree to that ... although you
10 should stress that it is exceptional. As regards the
11 FAC, I recommend that you resist on the grounds that the
12 FAC inquiry is completed and that a separate session ...
13 would attach disproportionate importance ..."
14 A. I think it is also, for the sake of completeness, that
15 you refer to paragraphs 5 and 6.
16 Q. I have not finished with the letter. I was going to
17 give a fair summary.
18 A. My apologies.
19 Q. You can see the other points that he gives. In
20 paragraph 3: hearings back-to-back. 4: Kelly's views
21 may not represent Government policy. Then 5:
22 "This line may not be sustainable in strict
23 institutional terms: the FAC reports to Parliament,
24 whereas the ISC, although drawn from Parliament, report
25 formally to the Prime Minister. And I do not believe

82
1 that the ISC have taken testimony in public before."
2 But I think it worth a try at least."
3 You respond to that at 77, effectively in the letter
4 to Geoffrey Adams setting out your reasons. You --
5 A. I think it is -- this is a private secretary's letter.
6 Q. Sorry. But does that represent your reasoning?
7 A. Normally speaking it would represent; it would be my
8 private secretary's paraphrase of decisions that I had
9 taken, but I did not see or specifically approve this
10 letter nor would I generally do so.
11 Q. Let us look at the three reasons:
12 "There are reasons for resisting this request:
13 "The FAC have already completed their inquiry.
14 "A separate session ... disproportionate ..."
15 Sorry, four reasons:
16 "The ISC is better placed than the FAC ...
17 "... fairer on the man himself ..."
18 Over the page:
19 "It is not unreasonable for the FAC to feel that Dr
20 Kelly's account may call into question the evidence they
21 were given by Mr Gilligan ..."
22 "Presentationally, it would be difficult to defend
23 a position in which the Government had objected to
24 Dr Kelly appears before a Committee which takes evidence
25 in public in favour of an appointed Committee which

83
1 meets in private. Although the ISC has considered
2 taking evidence in public before and might decide to do
3 so on this occasion, this could set an unwelcome
4 precedent..."
5 You concluded on balance you should agree to the
6 FAC's request.
7 I suppose in the light of your last answer I should
8 check this: is that an accurate summary of your views?
9 A. It was certainly a summary of the decision I took. My
10 private secretary is at pains to point out that the word
11 "presentationally", which has attracted a great deal of
12 interest, was not used by me.
13 Q. Subject to that qualification, did that represent your
14 views?
15 A. Yes, it did. I was extremely concerned that the --
16 perhaps I should say this, first of all: by the time
17 that I took that decision, the option of a public
18 hearing by the ISC had disappeared.
19 Q. Right.
20 A. The --
21 Q. Why did you want the evidence in public in the ISC?
22 I had understood that a concern was to avoid misleading
23 Parliamentary Committees. If they normally sit in
24 private, why not let them sit in private?
25 A. Again, can I make clear, I had not made that suggestion.

84
1 I had not wanted a public session of the ISC. I had
2 never proposed that. That only comes in the advice to
3 me from Kevin Tebbit; and I did not accept that advice.
4 Q. I think we have heard from Mr Scarlett he was unhappy
5 about it, for reasons of setting a precedent.
6 A. That was actually the point I was about to make, that by
7 the time I came to take my decision I had heard that
8 John Scarlett had recommended quite strongly that this
9 idea of pursuing a public hearing by the ISC was not
10 appropriate. It was not something that the ISC should
11 consider, the Government should suggest. This was not
12 something that I had ever advocated and did not.
13 Q. Did you get any assistance from anyone else about this
14 decision to put Dr Kelly before both the ISC and the
15 FAC? Were you made aware of anyone else's views?
16 A. I was certainly aware that the Prime Minister took
17 essentially the same view that I did, that it would be
18 extraordinarily difficult to explain to Parliament and
19 to the Foreign Affairs Committee why we were refusing
20 permission for an official who clearly had something
21 relevant to say about their previous deliberations, why
22 we would refuse permission for him to appear before that
23 Select Committee.
24 Q. How had you been aware of the Prime Minister's views in
25 relation to that?

85
1 A. I had not spoken to him directly. I think that came in
2 a view from Jonathan Powell, but I probably would need
3 to check that. But certainly -- I mean, I accept that
4 ultimately this was my decision. I am not in any way
5 trying to avoid that. But it was a decision based on my
6 knowledge and experience of Parliament. I am a Member
7 of Parliament as well as Secretary of State for Defence.
8 I know what view members of Select Committees take. We
9 have already discussed today the fact that Select
10 Committees tend to the view that Government does not
11 cooperate to the extent that they would like. My
12 dealings are obviously routinely with the Defence Select
13 Committee. I regularly appear before the Defence Select
14 Committee.
15 I did not see any basis on which we could
16 sustainably refuse permission for Dr Kelly to give
17 evidence. If we had refused, I think that would have
18 led to a great campaign in the press. I think it would
19 have led to very determined efforts amongst
20 Parliamentary colleagues to persuade us to allow him to
21 give evidence. And my judgment was that at the end of
22 the day he would give evidence. Therefore, I did not
23 see any great purpose in resisting that invitation at
24 that stage, especially given, by then, there was no
25 alternative.

86
1 LORD HUTTON: May I just ask you this: if you go back to
2 Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter of 10th July at MoD/1/75, were
3 you suggesting, Secretary of State, that
4 Sir Kevin Tebbit had suggested there be a public hearing
5 for the ISC?
6 A. That was the nature of his advice, my Lord, but it was
7 not advice I accepted.
8 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Does that appear in that letter?
9 A. My apologies, my Lord, I did not understand that.
10 LORD HUTTON: That advice, that the appearance of Dr Kelly
11 before the ISC should be in public, is that referred to
12 in this letter of 10th July?
13 A. Well, the implication of his advice to me is that we
14 should suggest to the ISC that they hold their hearings
15 in public with a view to hearing from Dr Kelly.
16 MR DINGEMANS: Can I help you? If one looks at MoD/1/79
17 there is a draft letter that appears to be annexed to
18 that.
19 LORD HUTTON: That is the explanation. Thank you very much,
20 Mr Dingemans.
21 MR DINGEMANS: This was a draft letter that was annexed to
22 the memo, which suggests that:
23 "Given the public interest in this case I also
24 wonder whether you would consider taking evidence from
25 Dr Kelly in public..."

87
1 A. Drafts came up together with the advice from the
2 Permanent Secretary for me to reply to both Ann Taylor
3 and to Donald Anderson and the requests from both
4 Committees. But those were drafts from the department.
5 They were not sent out and I did not accept that advice.
6 I did not send out a letter in that form.
7 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
8 MR DINGEMANS: If we go to MoD/1/80 we can see the draft for
9 the FAC, which effectively is saying that you are not
10 going to go to the FAC. That was the draft that had
11 come up with the memo.
12 If we go on to --
13 LORD HUTTON: I want then to be quite clear. I am grateful
14 to Mr Dingemans for pointing out that letter. Although
15 it was not in Sir Kevin Tebbit's letter to you of
16 10th July, the suggestion to you from your department
17 was that you would suggest to the ISC that there be
18 a public hearing, but you rejected that particular
19 advice? You did not act on that advice?
20 A. I did not act on it, not least because, I think for the
21 sake of completeness, my Lord, by the time that I came
22 to take the decision that option, in effect, had been
23 withdrawn because of the advice from the Chairman of the
24 JIC.
25 LORD HUTTON: Yes. I see. Yes. Thank you very much.

88
1 MR DINGEMANS: We see at MoD/1/81 the letter you do send to
2 Ann Taylor. You say that he can come and give evidence,
3 et cetera. You stress the exceptional circumstances and
4 say that:
5 "Dr Kelly was not involved in the process of drawing
6 up the intelligence parts of the dossier."
7 Then to Mr Anderson you write to him saying that he
8 can come, and you say again at the bottom of 82:
9 "Dr Kelly was not involved in the process of drawing
10 up the intelligence parts of the dossier."
11 Over the page you say:
12 "... [he] will have appeared earlier the same day
13 before the ISC. I hope that you will bear this in mind
14 and not detain him for longer than about the same period
15 of time indicated by the ISC."
16 Which we know to be 45 minutes:
17 "As he is not used to this degree of public
18 exposure, Dr Kelly has asked if he could be accompanied
19 by a colleague."
20 If one goes back to 82, at the bottom of the page
21 you say that:
22 "[You are] prepared to agree to this on the clear
23 understanding that Dr Kelly will be questioned only on
24 those matters which are directly relevant to the
25 evidence that you were given by Andrew Gilligan, and not

89
1 on the wider issue of Iraqi WMD and the preparation of
2 the dossier."
3 A. Hmm.
4 Q. Why did you make those comments in the letter?
5 A. In the first place picking up the advice I had received
6 from Kevin Tebbit, it was unfortunate that originally,
7 at any rate, the proposal was that Dr Kelly would have
8 to give evidence to both Committees on the same day.
9 I recognised that that was not fair on him, if he was to
10 be subjected to very long evidence sessions before both
11 Committees. And part of the reason for the
12 qualification, which I added to the draft, if you
13 compare the original draft that came up to the letter
14 that was actually sent, I added a significant elements
15 out of concern for Dr Kelly's position. And that was to
16 ensure, as I indicated:
17 "Dr Kelly will have appeared [because that is what
18 I assumed was going to happen] earlier the same day
19 before the ISC. I hope that you will bear this in mind
20 and not detain him for longer than about the same period
21 of time indicated by the ISC [which was 45 minutes]. As
22 he is not used to this degree of public exposure,
23 Dr Kelly has asked if he could be accompanied by
24 a colleague."
25 It was a very conscious effort, on my part, to limit

90
1 the amount of time that he would have to spend before
2 two Committees.
3 Q. Were you aware that Dr Kelly had some views that might
4 be considered uncomfortable on the dossier and Iraqi
5 weapons of mass destruction?
6 A. We have discussed already his distinctive views on -- he
7 had an assessment -- I think this was the point that was
8 recognised by his colleague when Andrew Gilligan gave
9 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee. He had
10 a view that there was a 30 per cent chance that
11 Saddam Hussein's regime would have been producing
12 weapons of mass destruction at the time. That was
13 a very distinctive view. I was aware of that. I accept
14 that that could have been considered uncomfortable by
15 the Government, but can I emphasise that no effort was
16 made to prevent him from giving that evidence should he
17 have chosen to do so.
18 Q. No effort to prevent him giving it if he was asked about
19 it. But the letter appears to be at least a steer that
20 he should not be asked about it.
21 A. (Pause). The suggestion I made to the Select Committee
22 was designed to ensure that he was properly protected
23 against the prospect of a long, open ended appearance
24 before the hearing. He would not have been a witness
25 that would have given evidence to certainly either the

91
1 Defence Select Committee or the Foreign Affairs
2 Committee routinely about this aspect of the dossier.
3 They had previously had witnesses. They had not
4 objected to those witnesses. There did not seem any
5 useful purpose in allowing a long, open ended question
6 session with him at that stage.
7 Q. If one of the concerns, and you have told us one of the
8 concerns is to respect parliamentary sovereignty, to
9 cooperate with the Committee. Dr Kelly, as we know, had
10 strong views, you have told us about that. He had
11 distinctive views which did not always coincide with
12 Government's views. But he had views that impacted
13 directly on what the Foreign Affairs Committee had
14 considered, and that was the reason to go to war in
15 Iraq. Part of that related to his views on the dossier
16 and part of that related to his view on Iraqi weapons of
17 mass destruction. Surely he is going to say something
18 that one expects is likely to be helpful about
19 Mr Gilligan; why should he not be able to say other
20 matters which were less helpful?
21 A. I think it is important to understand the basis on which
22 officials give evidence to Select Committees. In most
23 cases, part relating to his own person position was
24 exceptional to this, but in most cases officials give
25 evidence on behalf of Ministers. The basic principle is

92
1 that Ministers give evidence to Select Committees but
2 they are entitled to invite officials to do so on their
3 behalf. Generally speaking, that means the most senior
4 officials in any given department will be giving
5 evidence of the policy decisions reached by the
6 department that the Select Committee is investigating.
7 To allow any member of any department to give
8 evidence before a Select Committee would risk inevitably
9 that particular official simply giving one person's view
10 of a policy developed in that department. I can
11 conceive of circumstances in which a Select Committee
12 might, for example, want to investigate whether the
13 policy had been developed properly and therefore they
14 might be interested in interviewing 100 officials in
15 order to check whether the Government's policy was
16 perhaps irrational and based only on one person's view.
17 But this was just one official who had particular views.
18 But his views were not characteristic of the policy that
19 the Government had developed or established, nor of the
20 senior officials who had reached the conclusions that
21 the Government had acted upon.
22 Q. Were you aware that he was to be given a briefing on
23 14th July? Can I take you to CAB/1/106? We have seen
24 notes of the briefings. I will not take you to all
25 those. But this is a document produced by Mr Smith

93
1 which says that:
2 "DCDI [we know to be Mr Howard] is to brief
3 David Kelly this afternoon for his appearances tomorrow
4 before the FAC and ISC, and will strongly recommend that
5 Kelly is not drawn on his assessment of the dossier (but
6 stick to what he told Gilligan)."
7 It does seem to mirror, in some respects, your views
8 as set out in the letter to Mr Anderson. Were you aware
9 of this briefing?
10 A. I was not specifically aware that he was to be briefed,
11 but it would not come as any great surprise to me that
12 he should be. Anyone from the Ministry of Defence going
13 to give evidence from the Select Committee, including
14 the Secretary of State for Defence, would expect to get
15 help in relation to the kind of material that the Select
16 Committee would be covering in its hearing; and I am
17 routinely briefed for my appearances before the Defence
18 Select Committee, as are other officials.
19 Q. Are you told in your briefings about "tricky areas"?
20 A. Certainly, yes.
21 Q. And was there any communication about the outcome of
22 Dr Kelly's briefing before he appeared on the 15th?
23 A. Sorry, could you ...
24 Q. Were you told of the outcome of his briefing? We know
25 the briefing took place on the 14th and he appears on

94
1 the 15th. Were you told about the outcome of the
2 briefing?
3 A. Not specifically. In preparing for today, I certainly
4 have seen the record that was prepared; and I have seen
5 the references to allowing Dr Kelly to freely express
6 his point of view.
7 Q. After Dr Kelly's appearance at the Foreign Affairs
8 Committee, the Ministry of Defence was written to by the
9 Foreign Affairs Committee who suggested that Dr Kelly
10 had been poorly treated. That is MoD/1/89. We have
11 seen the letter on a number of occasions.
12 A. Well, my apologies -- before we go on to that, can
13 I just make one further point, perhaps two in relation
14 to the position of the Foreign Affairs Committee?
15 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
16 A. Firstly, had the Foreign Affairs Committee been
17 uncomfortable with the suggestions that I made to them
18 it was perfectly open for the Chairman to come back and
19 say: I am sorry, we do not accept that qualification or
20 restriction; but, in fact, in his reply to me
21 Donald Anderson said:
22 "I share your clear understanding of the scope and
23 of the duration of the questioning."
24 So the Chairman of the Select Committee agreed
25 entirely with the points that I had made.

95
1 One other point in relation to the advice that
2 I received as far as the decision that I took to allow
3 Dr Kelly to give evidence. Ministers routinely make
4 judgments of this kind. It is my experience, where
5 I have not entirely accepted the advice that I have been
6 given by civil servants, that if those civil servants
7 are unhappy with the decision I have taken, they come
8 back and ask me to reconsider. They would put the
9 advice to me again on occasions. I have seen the same
10 advice in my box on more than one occasion where civil
11 servants have been unhappy with the decision I have
12 taken. That did not happen on this occasion. There was
13 no suggestion at all that the Permanent Secretary was
14 unhappy at all with the decision that I took.
15 LORD HUTTON: Mr Dingemans, are you going to be some time?
16 MR DINGEMANS: I have five more minutes of questions,
17 my Lord.
18 LORD HUTTON: Are the stenographers content to go on? Then
19 we will continue.
20 MR DINGEMANS: On 15th July Dr Kelly has given evidence.
21 MoD/1/89. The Foreign Affairs Committee --
22 LORD HUTTON: I should say, Secretary of State, do not feel
23 rushed to the slightest degree. I do not think you will
24 be, but anyway do not feel rushed at all.
25 A. I am grateful, my Lord.

96
1 MR DINGEMANS: The Committee deliberated and they say they
2 considered it unlikely that Dr Kelly was
3 Andrew Gilligan's prime source and:
4 "Colleagues have also asked me to pass on the view
5 that Dr Kelly has been poorly treated by the
6 Government."
7 A. Yes.
8 Q. Until the BBC actually confirmed Dr Kelly was their
9 source that was always a substantial risk, was it not?
10 A. It was.
11 Q. In fact, until the BBC after the event confirmed
12 Dr Kelly was the source nothing really was gained by
13 putting Dr Kelly before the Foreign Affairs Committee,
14 was there, in terms of the Government's argument with
15 the BBC and correcting the public record?
16 A. But that implies that it was somehow the Government's
17 desire to put him before the Foreign Affairs Committee.
18 The -- what happened was that the Foreign Affairs
19 Committee made a request that he should appear.
20 Q. You issue a press statement, MoD/1/90. I think you were
21 not in the country at the time, is that right, when that
22 comes in? But at the bottom of that press statement it
23 is said:
24 "We also note the FAC's view that Dr Kelly has been
25 'poorly treated' by the Government. We do not accept

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1 this. Dr Kelly came forward voluntarily with
2 information on a matter of public interest. He has been
3 properly treated in accordance with Departmental
4 procedures. He has expressed no complaint to us or the
5 FAC..."
6 A. Hmm.
7 Q. Did that reflect your views in relation to the matter?
8 A. Yes, it did. At the time I remember being rather
9 puzzled by the Foreign Affairs Committee's conclusion
10 that he had been poorly treated because it appeared to
11 me that actually in the way in which he had been
12 questioned, the way -- the opportunities that he had
13 been given, the help he had been provided with, that
14 actually he had been very well treated by the personnel
15 director and by those responsible for his welfare in the
16 department. A great deal of support had been afforded
17 to him. His line manager, Mr Wells, I know, had taken
18 a great deal of care and trouble to ensure he had the
19 necessary assistance.
20 I found that rather surprising; and perhaps the only
21 explanation that I more recently have been able to see
22 was in the evidence that Mr Anderson gave to this
23 Inquiry where he said that the reason for that, if
24 I have understood him correctly, was because they came
25 to the conclusion that he was not the single source and

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1 therefore felt that in a sense the department were
2 exposing Dr Kelly unfairly. I cannot see in any way
3 that Dr Kelly was poorly treated in the process inside
4 the Ministry of Defence.
5 Q. Now --
6 LORD HUTTON: I mean, did you take into account that
7 appearing even for 45 minutes before the FAC and also
8 before the ISC would, in itself, place pressure and
9 strain on Dr Kelly?
10 A. Yes, my Lord. That was the specific reason for limiting
11 the time, as far as the second hearing was concerned.
12 And of course, as it turned out the two Committees did
13 not meet on the same day, so he only actually gave
14 evidence before the Foreign Affairs Committee on
15 a single day and separately elsewhere. So that degree
16 of pressure was not present.
17 I think also it is important to emphasise that he
18 was given a great deal of advice and help in preparation
19 for his appearance. So I feel confident that all that
20 could be done for him in preparation was done.
21 MR DINGEMANS: We know after the FAC hearing he goes to the
22 ISC on 16th July and some Parliamentary Questions are
23 drafted. But as I understand it, you did not have any
24 direct involvement in the drafting of that.
25 A. No, I did not. Indeed, I did not see those drafts until

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1 I was looking on the Inquiry's website and -- because
2 they had not reached my office at the time of Dr Kelly's
3 death.
4 Q. We know that Dr Kelly's body was found on 18th July.
5 Can I take you to TVP/3/238, which is an interview
6 with Peter Sissons. He says this:
7 "The death was a great tragedy. Our thoughts of
8 course are with his wife, with his family and with his
9 friends and colleagues at the MoD, and obviously in the
10 wider scientific community, this is a very great
11 personal tragedy. He killed himself after your
12 department, indeed you personally outed him as the
13 probable mole."
14 You say this:
15 "I'm afraid that's simply not right, and as the
16 evidence that the department will give to the Inquiry
17 will show, we followed very carefully established MoD
18 procedures, and at all stages, certainly as far as
19 I personally was concerned, we protected his anonymity."
20 We have heard that in fact the department confirmed
21 his name to journalists. We have heard from you that
22 the department issued a press statement to the effect
23 that a man had come forward, all at a time when no-one
24 knew for sure that he was the single source. Do you
25 still hold by your answer that the Ministry of Defence

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1 followed established procedures and protected his
2 anonymity?
3 A. Yes, I do; and the only person that I named Dr Kelly to
4 was Gavyn Davies in a private letter that was not for
5 publication.
6 Q. Were you aware that there has been some evidence that
7 Mr Taylor, who I think is your special adviser, is that
8 right?
9 A. Yes.
10 Q. Had confirmed Dr Kelly's name to journalists?
11 A. Hmm.
12 Q. Were you aware of that?
13 A. I was not specifically aware at the time but I -- excuse
14 me. I have learned since that that happened, yes.
15 Q. And what is your view on that?
16 A. Well, I assume that that was consistent with the
17 question and answer process that had been agreed within
18 the department. I do not think it occurred in any
19 earlier timeframe.
20 Q. The question and answers material that your special
21 adviser knows about but you did not?
22 A. I did not see the question and answer, but I was
23 obviously aware of the advice that I had received that
24 if the right name was given to an MoD press officer they
25 should confirm it. I am not suggesting -- I am not

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1 suggesting, for a moment, that I was not aware of that;
2 and obviously my special adviser would have been aware
3 of it as well.
4 Q. Do you know whether Dr Kelly was told that that was
5 a proposed approach?
6 A. He was certainly told and agreed to the fact that
7 a press statement was to be issued because that had been
8 done on the -- at least on the Tuesday, the day before
9 the events that you are describing.
10 Q. But I have taken you to the first draft of the Q and A
11 which says: can't tell you anything until we have spoken
12 to Dr Kelly and I have taken you to the second draft
13 which appears to have been deployed which changes. Was
14 Dr Kelly told of the change as far as you know?
15 A. Not as far as I know.
16 Q. Are you aware of anything else relating to the
17 circumstances surrounding Dr Kelly's death that you can
18 assist his Lordship with?
19 A. (Pause). I am certainly aware that the FAC asked for
20 Dr Kelly to provide a list of all of the contacts that
21 he had had with journalists and that that was something
22 that he was working on in the period immediately before
23 his death, and certainly I know that people have
24 speculated about the impact of preparing that list on
25 his frame of mind at the time, but I cannot go further

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1 than that speculation.
2 Q. And is there anything else that you wish to say?
3 A. My Lord, if I may, I have expressed my condolences to
4 Mrs Kelly and her family privately. I would like with
5 your permission to take the opportunity of doing so
6 again publicly and at the same time thank Mrs Kelly for
7 her understanding. At each stage in these events I was
8 trying to establish above all the facts what was the
9 truth about Mr Gilligan's broadcast and his subsequent
10 article, what was said by Dr Kelly to Mr Gilligan and
11 was Dr Kelly in fact Mr Gilligan's single source. In
12 doing so I emphasised at all times the importance of
13 treating Dr Kelly absolutely fairly.
14 LORD HUTTON: Yes. Thank you very much Secretary of State.
15 A. Thank you my Lord.
16 LORD HUTTON: Well, I think Mr Dingemans it might be more
17 convenient to everyone if I sat at 2.15. That might
18 slightly cut down the afternoon but I think that is
19 preferable.
20 (1.15 pm)
21 (The short adjournment)
22
23
24
25

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