Hearing Transcripts

1 Thursday, 28th August 2003
2 (10.30 am)
3 MR ANTHONY CHARLES LYNTON BLAIR (called)
4 Examined by MR DINGEMANS
5 LORD HUTTON: Good morning ladies and gentlemen. Good
6 morning Prime Minister.
7 A. Good morning my Lord.
8 MR DINGEMANS: I do not think we need an introduction. May
9 I start with the dossiers? We have heard that a dossier
10 was being produced in February 2002 which related to
11 four countries, one of which was Iraq. Could you
12 explain the background to that?
13 A. After September 11th there was a renewed sense of
14 urgency on the question of rogue states and weapons of
15 mass destruction and the link with terrorism, and there
16 was some thought given to trying to bring all that
17 together, identifying the countries that were
18 a particular source of concern to us, one of which was
19 Iraq.
20 Q. We have heard that the dossier was then pursued against
21 Iraq alone in about February/March time. Why was the
22 decision made to concentrate on Iraq alone?
23 A. Again, as I say in my witness statement, I think given
24 history Iraq was a special case. It was in breach of
25 United Nations resolutions. It had a history of using

1
1 weapons of mass destruction against its own people. So
2 there was a sense that Iraq as it were fitted a special
3 category.
4 Q. We know that the dossier got at least in its earlier
5 stages to a final state in early March time but was not
6 published.
7 A. Hmm.
8 Q. What was the reason for that?
9 A. We had a draft, but this thing was already beginning to
10 build as a very major story. Frankly we were months
11 away from deciding our strategy on this issue. I took
12 the view in the end, and discussed it with the
13 Foreign Secretary, and we both agreed that it would
14 inflame the situation too much in order to publish it at
15 this stage.
16 Q. We have also heard that on 3rd September you do announce
17 that dossier is going to be published.
18 A. Yes.
19 Q. What changed?
20 A. What changed was really two things which came together.
21 First of all, there was a tremendous amount of
22 information and evidence coming across my desk as to the
23 weapons of mass destruction and the programmes
24 associated with it that Saddam had. There was also
25 a renewed sense of urgency, again, in the way that this

2
1 was being publicly debated. I recall throughout the
2 August break last year literally every day there were
3 stories appearing saying we were about to go and invade
4 Iraq. Military action had been decided upon.
5 President Bush and I had a telephone call towards
6 the end of that break and we decided: look, we really
7 had to confront this issue, devise our strategy and get
8 on with it and I took the view, in the end, and said
9 this at the press conference I gave in my constituency
10 on 3rd September, that we really had to disclose what we
11 knew or as much as we could of what we knew. That was
12 because there was an enormous clamour. Here we were
13 saying: this is a big problem, we have to deal with it.
14 Why did we say it was a big problem? Because of the
15 intelligence. And people were naturally saying: produce
16 that intelligence then.
17 Q. What was the aim of the dossier?
18 A. The aim of the dossier was to disclose the reason for
19 our concern and the reason why we believed this issue
20 had to be confronted.
21 Q. We have heard evidence that after your announcement on
22 3rd September, there was a meeting in Downing Street
23 chaired by Alastair Campbell on 5th September, where the
24 presentational sides of the dossier were discussed, and
25 after that meeting an e-mail was exchanged. Can I take

3
1 you to that? That is CAB/11/17.
2 A. That is going to come up here, is it?
3 Q. I hope so. What you can see is about 13.50 -- we
4 understand the meeting was about noon -- Mr Powell
5 e-mailed Mr Campbell:
6 "What did you decide on dossiers?"
7 "Re dossier, substantial rewrite, with JS
8 [John Scarlett] and Julian Miller in charge, which JS
9 will take to US next Friday, and be in shape Monday
10 thereafter. Structure as per TB's discussion.
11 Agreement that there has to be real intelligence
12 material in their presentation as such."
13 Had you at this stage discussed the structure of the
14 dossier with Mr Campbell?
15 A. I think I had discussed it in outline at least, that it
16 was important that it dealt with Iraq and the question
17 of weapons of mass destruction. We would obviously have
18 to deal with the main elements of that because that
19 after all was our case.
20 Q. And had you been aware of the proposed role that
21 Mr Campbell was going to take in assisting with the
22 presentation?
23 A. Well, I was in no doubt that he would assist with the
24 presentation. I cannot recall exactly when but
25 certainly around that time. However, I also knew that

4
1 it had to be a document that was owned by the Joint
2 Intelligence Committee and the Chairman, John Scarlett.
3 That was obviously important because we could not
4 produce this as evidence that came from anything other
5 than an objective source.
6 Q. We have heard that there was a draft of the dossier
7 produced on 10th September, and we have seen that.
8 I will not take you to that, if that is all right. What
9 was the first draft of the dossier that you actually
10 saw?
11 A. As I say in my statement I believe I saw the
12 10th September draft and I commented on drafts of the
13 16th and 19th and I made certain comments on that. But
14 obviously in the end, of course, it all had to be
15 produced and done through the process of the JIC.
16 Q. We have also seen some JIC assessments, redacted JIC
17 assessments of 5th and 9th September which deal with the
18 45 minute issue. When did you see those?
19 A. I have seen the JIC assessment on 9th September but
20 other than that, I do not think I made a comment on the
21 45 minutes in respect of the dossier.
22 Q. But you may have seen it as it went through in the draft
23 of the 10th September?
24 A. Yes, I suppose that -- if it was in the 10th September
25 draft I would have seen it.

5
1 Q. Can I take you to an e-mail dated 11th September which
2 is CAB/23/15? This was an e-mail that Mr Scarlett
3 produced. What this says is:
4 "We have now received comments back from No. 10 on
5 the first draft of the dossier. Unsurprisingly they
6 have further questions and areas they would like
7 expanded."
8 Then the main comments are set out.
9 A. Hmm, hmm.
10 Q. They liked, for example, a specific personality.
11 "Is there any intelligence that Iraq has actively
12 sought to employ foreign experts ..."
13 And 3 and 4, similar detailed comments. Then this
14 is said at the bottom:
15 "I appreciate everyone, us included, has been around
16 at least some of these buoys before, particularly item
17 4. But No. 10 through the Chairman want the document to
18 be as strong as possible within the bounds of available
19 intelligence. This is therefore a last(!) call for any
20 items of intelligence that agencies think can and should
21 be included."
22 Were you aware that this process was going on?
23 A. Yes, of course, and it was important that it made the
24 best case that we could make subject, obviously, to it
25 being owned by the Joint Intelligence Committee and that

6
1 the items of intelligence should be those that the
2 agencies thought could and should be included. So if
3 you like it was a process in which they were in charge
4 of this, correctly, because it was so important to make
5 sure that no-one could question the intelligence that
6 was in it as coming from the genuine intelligence
7 agencies, but obviously I mean I had to present this to
8 Parliament. I was going to make a statement.
9 Parliament was going to be recalled. We were concerned
10 to make sure that we could produce, within the bounds of
11 what was right and proper, the best case.
12 LORD HUTTON: So you would agree, Prime Minister, that the
13 wording that "No. 10 through the Chairman want the
14 document to be as strong as possible within the bounds
15 of available intelligence" is a fair way of putting your
16 view and the view of your staff in No. 10?
17 A. Provided that is clearly understood as meaning that it
18 is only if the intelligence agencies thought both that
19 the actual intelligence should be included and that
20 there was not improper weight being given to any aspect
21 of that intelligence. In other words, given that the
22 process was that they had to decide what it was we could
23 properly say, then obviously we wanted to -- we had to
24 make this case because this was the case that we
25 believed in and this was the evidence that we had,

7
1 because all of this stuff was obviously stuff that had
2 come across my desk.
3 LORD HUTTON: And that is conveyed by the words "as strong
4 as possible within the bounds of available
5 intelligence"?
6 A. Yes, and also the last sentence I draw attention to.
7 I did not see this e-mail at the time, but you know any
8 items --
9 LORD HUTTON: Quite. The last sentence:
10 "This is therefore a last(!) call for any items of
11 intelligence that agencies think can and should be
12 included."
13 A. Yes, exactly.
14 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
15 MR DINGEMANS: We have heard that the foreword was produced.
16 We have looked at the dossiers, we have seen the
17 dossiers, your signature appears with that. Can you
18 help us on how the foreword was produced?
19 A. Again, as I say in my witness statement, the foreword
20 would be -- the normal practice here is I would have
21 told Alastair Campbell what are the items I think that
22 are important, specific points that should be in it, on
23 the basis of the drafts produced, and the foreword was
24 expressed obviously to be my foreword. I should say at
25 this point that probably my statement was the thing

8
1 I was concentrating most upon.
2 Q. We will come to your statement, if I may. CAB/11/38 is
3 the first document we see with the foreword. It is from
4 Felicity Hatfield, who Mr Campbell told us worked for
5 him, to Alison Blackshaw, with a draft of the dossier.
6 That followed conversations. We can just see the Word
7 document which says -- it is very small writing -- but
8 "AC -- TB Foreword -- DO."
9 If we go to CAB/11/39 you will probably recognise
10 the dossier foreword by TB?
11 A. Hmm, hmm.
12 Q. That appears to be the first draft we can see. That
13 followed the discussions you had with Mr Campbell?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. There is a slight variation on that at CAB/11/49. We
16 can see another draft, a revised dossier foreword.
17 I imagine there were various discussions about the
18 dossier, is that right?
19 A. There were discussions going on about the dossier.
20 I mean, as I say, it was more the facts in the dossier
21 and the statement that were the key items. There could
22 well have been discussions as drafts of the foreword
23 were circulating around.
24 Q. Also on 17th September Mr Powell sends an e-mail, which
25 is at CAB/11/53, to Alastair Campbell and David Manning.

9
1 It does not appear as it were to get e-mailed to you.
2 A. Hmm.
3 Q. And he says he has three comments:
4 "I think it is worth explicitly stating what the
5 Prime Minister keeps saying, this is the advice to him
6 from the JIC."
7 Then:
8 "We need to do more to back up the assertions ..."
9 And:
10 "In the penultimate para you need to make it clear
11 Saddam could not attack us at the moment. The thesis is
12 he would be a threat to the UK in the future if we do
13 not check him."
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. Did those comments get reflected in the dossier?
16 A. I think so, yes; but I think the most important thing
17 was I was very careful in my statement to make it clear
18 what we were and were not saying. I think it is just
19 important to emphasise this point. The purpose of the
20 dossier was to respond to the call to disclose the
21 intelligence that we knew but at that stage the strategy
22 was not to use the dossier as the immediate reason for
23 going to conflict, but as the reason why we had to
24 return to the issue of Saddam and weapons of mass
25 destruction preferably, as I said later, through the

10
1 United Nations.
2 Q. On 17th September, there is also a memo that Mr Campbell
3 sent to Mr Scarlett. It is CAB/11/66. You can see in
4 the first paragraph he says:
5 "Please find below a number of drafting points. As
6 I was writing this, the Prime Minister had a read of the
7 draft you gave me this morning, and he too made a number
8 of points. He has also read my draft foreword, which
9 I enclose (he will want another look at it before
10 finally signing it off but I'd appreciate your views at
11 this stage)."
12 A. Hmm, hmm.
13 Q. Then a number of comments are made. Over the page, at
14 67, we can see if you scroll down:
15 "'Vivid and horrifying', re human rights, doesn't
16 fit ..." and effectively should go.
17 A. Hmm, hmm.
18 Q. Item 9:
19 "... 'might' reads very weakly."
20 Item 10:
21 "... 'may' is weaker than in the summary."
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Were you aware these type of comments were being passed
24 by Mr Campbell to Mr Scarlett?
25 A. I cannot say I was aware of each and every specific

11
1 comment but I was certainly aware of the fact, as I say,
2 because this was going to be a publicly presented
3 document, that he would be making comments upon it all
4 subject, of course, to the fact that it had to be in the
5 end the work of the JIC.
6 Q. And in fact, if we go to CAB/11/70, we can see
7 Mr Scarlett's response, which is dated 18th September,
8 and he thanks Mr Campbell for the minute. He talks
9 about the reordering of chapter 3 and he makes some
10 specific comments. At paragraph 6 he turns to the
11 detailed comments:
12 "... we have been able to amend the text in most
13 cases as you proposed. Taking your points in sequence:
14 "1. We have strengthened language on current
15 concerns and plans, including in the executive summary.
16 The summary also brings out the point on sanctions and
17 containment, as you proposed."
18 A. Hmm, hmm.
19 Q. He says at the bottom:
20 "... the intelligence supports only 'may have'" for
21 item 2.
22 If we go over the page to 71, you can see 6, he
23 says:
24 "'Vivid and horrifying' has been dropped."
25 A. Hmm, hmm.

12
1 Q. 9 he says he cannot improve on "might", but on 10 he
2 says that the language you queried on the old page 17
3 has been tightened.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. Were you aware of these type of responses from
6 Mr Scarlett?
7 A. No, I was not aware of the absolute detail of it; but on
8 the other hand, I mean, having read it, it seems to me
9 a perfectly right way of proceeding. In other words,
10 there are certain things that we are asking if they can
11 improve on this or improve on that and they say: well,
12 we can or we cannot. I think the important thing
13 I would say is that once the decision had been taken
14 that, as it were, John Scarlett and the JIC should
15 actually own this document, it should be their document,
16 then I think everything that was done was subject to
17 that.
18 Obviously it was vitally important when we got to
19 Parliament and produced this document that I was able to
20 stand up absolutely clearly and say: look, this is the
21 work of the joint intelligence agencies, they stand
22 behind the intelligence that is here.
23 Q. You said I think that your main preoccupation at this
24 time was preparing your statement for Parliament?
25 A. Yes.

13
1 Q. Was Parliament, in fact, recalled to look at the
2 dossier?
3 A. Yes. We recalled Parliament on 24th September.
4 Q. Is there anything from your statement to Parliament that
5 you wanted to emphasise?
6 A. I think the only thing, as I do in my witness statement
7 to you, is just to emphasise the fact that I make it
8 clear what I perceived the threat to be. I said, if
9 I could read this very briefly:
10 "'Why now?' people ask. I agree I cannot say that
11 this month or next, even this year or next, that he will
12 use his weapons. But I can say that if the
13 international community having made the call for his
14 disarmament, now, at this moment, at the point of
15 decision, shrugs its shoulders and walks away, he will
16 draw the conclusion dictators faced with a weakening
17 will always draw. That the international community will
18 talk but not act ..."
19 Then I go on to say:
20 "If we take this course, he will carry on, his
21 efforts will intensify, his confidence grow and at some
22 point, in a future not too distant, the threat will turn
23 into reality. The threat therefore is not imagined.
24 The history of Sadaam and WMD is not American or British
25 propaganda. The history and the present threat are

14
1 real."
2 Q. And that was the process by which the dossier was
3 produced, as far as you had any involvement in it?
4 A. Yes, that is right.
5 Q. Were you aware at the time about any unhappiness amongst
6 members of the Intelligence Services with the process by
7 which the dossier was being produced?
8 A. Absolutely not, no.
9 Q. We have now seen some e-mails that had been sent around.
10 An example, just so that you can see it, is at MoD/4/11,
11 which is a letter dated 8th July 2003, so after the
12 event, but it relates to a complaint or a matter that
13 was raised.
14 He is writing to the Deputy Chief of Defence
15 Intelligence. The name has been redacted. He says, in
16 the second paragraph:
17 "Your records will show that as an ADI NBC ST, and
18 probably the most senior and experienced intelligence
19 community official working on 'WMD', I was so concerned
20 about the manner in which intelligence assessments for
21 which I had some responsibility were being presented in
22 the dossier of 24 September 2002, that I was moved to
23 write formally to your predecessor, Tony Cragg,
24 recording and explaining my reservations."
25 Had any of those complaints as it were worked their

15
1 way up as far as the JIC or to you?
2 A. No, they did not. I mean, I should say that this was
3 a -- the question of whether we produced intelligence,
4 though, was a very, very difficult question.
5 I mean, on the one hand it is not normal for you to
6 do this. I mean, intelligence, as I say in my witness
7 statement, is intelligence and it has to be handled with
8 care. On the other hand, the clamour for us to produce
9 the reasons why -- here was I saying this is the
10 situation with Saddam and weapons of mass destruction we
11 have to deal with. The clamour for us to produce the
12 evidence for this was obviously very, very strong.
13 So, in a sense, the 24th September dossier was an
14 unusual -- the whole business was unusual, but it was in
15 response to an unusual set of circumstances. We were
16 saying this issue had to be returned to by the
17 international community and dealt with. Why were we
18 saying this? Because of the intelligence. Not
19 unnaturally, people said: well, give us the intelligence
20 insofar as you can.
21 Q. There are various other e-mails but I will not take you
22 to those.
23 One other criticism that has been made, again after
24 the event, is at FAC/3/34. This is in the report from
25 the Foreign Affairs Committee. It is at paragraph 100.

16
1 What they say is this:
2 "We conclude that the language used in the September
3 dossier was in places more assertive than that
4 traditionally used in intelligence documents. We
5 believe that there is much value in retaining the
6 measured and even cautious tones which have been the
7 hallmark of intelligence assessments and we recommend
8 that this approach be retained."
9 Do you agree with that comment?
10 A. I think that we described the intelligence in a way that
11 was perfectly justified and I would simply make this
12 point: although obviously people look back now on the
13 September dossier in a quite different way, if I make
14 these two points: the first is that the dossier, at the
15 time, was not received as being particularly incautious
16 in tone. On the contrary, a lot of people said that it
17 was done in a fairly prosaic way. So the commentary at
18 the time was not actually that it seemed to be, you
19 know, advancing the case in an adventurous way, if I can
20 put it like that, at all. The commentary was rather to
21 the opposite effect.
22 Secondly, the 45 minute claim, as I think I say in
23 my witness statement, just a point to make, I mentioned
24 it in the foreword, I mention it in my statement.
25 I think after then I do not think I mention it again in

17
1 Parliament. Indeed, on the 18th March debate, which was
2 the crucial debate, where Parliament decided that it was
3 going to opt for conflict, I do not think it came up at
4 all, and I think there is a sense in which it is
5 important to recognise that the September dossier was
6 not making the case for war, it was making the case for
7 the issue to be dealt with; and our preferred
8 alternative was indeed to deal with it through the
9 United Nations route.
10 Q. Now, one of the points that was made by some of the
11 witnesses from the BBC was, in fact, that the Government
12 had not relied on the 45 minutes claim after it had
13 featured in the dossier.
14 A. Hmm.
15 Q. And they perceived that may be because the Government
16 had doubts about whether or not it should have been put
17 in there in the first place. Is that right?
18 A. No, that is absolutely wrong. There was absolutely no
19 reason for us to doubt that intelligence at all. Can
20 I just emphasise again, the whole purpose of having the
21 JIC own this document was in order to provide the
22 absolute clarity and certainty -- whatever discussions
23 were going on as to how you presented it -- that in the
24 end they were perfectly happy with this. And I think it
25 was -- it was certainly part of our conversation in the

18
1 early December period that for very, very obvious
2 reasons it was essential that anything that we said in
3 the course of my statement or in the dossier we could
4 hand on heart say: this is the assessment of the Joint
5 Intelligence Committee.
6 Q. If I can move away from the dossier now with one final
7 question: were you aware at all of Dr Kelly's
8 involvement in any historic or current drafting of the
9 dossier?
10 A. No, I was not.
11 Q. We have seen correspondence between Mr Campbell and
12 Mr Sambrook relating to complaints about BBC coverage.
13 They go back, some of the documents we have seen, to the
14 war in Afghanistan and then the war in Iraq.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Was there a feeling in Downing Street that the
17 Government was not being properly represented by the BBC
18 at this stage?
19 A. There was a feeling, but I do not doubt we are not the
20 first Government to be in such a situation, that there
21 were parts of the BBC that were not covering it in as
22 objective a way as we thought, but that happens --
23 I think it happened throughout the business in
24 Afghanistan too. I should imagine we are not the first
25 Government and will not be the last Government to have

19
1 such concerns.
2 Q. Were you aware of Mr Campbell's letters of complaint and
3 the apparent absence of success, so far as getting any
4 major corrections were concerned?
5 A. Yes, I was aware he had made complaints about certain of
6 the stories. It was not from all parts of the BBC,
7 incidentally, at all. But there were complaints about
8 certain stories.
9 Q. We have seen the letters which are specific to certain
10 programmes.
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. Can I turn, now, to the 29th May Today broadcast. Where
13 were you at the time?
14 A. I was in Basra with the British troops when I was told
15 about the claim, I think shortly after it was made.
16 Q. And what was your reaction to that?
17 A. Well, it was an extraordinary allegation to make and an
18 extremely serious one.
19 Q. What did you do to --
20 LORD HUTTON: What were you told of the allegation
21 Prime Minister? How was it reported to you?
22 A. It was reported to me -- I cannot actually recall
23 whether I got an actual written transcript of what was
24 said, but I think I even may have, but the things that
25 absolutely stood out and were extraordinary, in my view,

20
1 were (1) that this 45 minutes claim had been inserted
2 into the dossier at the behest of No. 10 Downing Street;
3 (2) that it was done by us I think the words were
4 "probably knowing it was wrong"; and (3) that we had
5 done it contrary to the wishes of the Intelligence
6 Services.
7 I think that then the report went on to say: and
8 that this information had been supplied by someone who
9 was in charge of the process of drawing up the dossier.
10 So, obviously it was an extremely serious allegation.
11 MR DINGEMANS: What steps were taken to correct the record?
12 A. Well, we issued a strong denial, which did not really go
13 anywhere.
14 Q. Can I take you to some speeches that you made at the
15 time? It is CAB/1/158. These are some extracts that
16 have been prepared. I think after you were in Kuwait
17 and in Iraq, you then went to Poland; is that right?
18 A. Yes, absolutely. Yes.
19 Q. And you can see what you say at the top:
20 "... the idea that we authorised or made our
21 intelligence agencies invent some piece of evidence is
22 completely absurd ..."
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. Was that the main charge to which you were responding at
25 the time?

21
1 A. Yes, I mean, look, this was an absolutely fundamental
2 charge. It is one thing to say: we disagree with the
3 Government, you should not have gone to war. People can
4 have a disagreement about that. This was an allegation
5 that we had behaved in a way that were it true -- as
6 I say in my statement, tested in this way, had the
7 allegation been true, it would have merited my
8 resignation. It was not a small allegation, it was
9 absolutely fundamental. The next day in Poland
10 I thought we might have been able to deal with it on day
11 one just by saying: look, this is completely untrue.
12 Day two, when we were in Poland, I then asked --
13 I cannot remember exactly who and how it all came about,
14 but I said: look, you have to check this out. What is
15 more, you have to check it out with John Scarlett and
16 the JIC people that we can say definitively and
17 emphatically this is not the case. The dossier was the
18 work of the JIC and they were entirely happy with it.
19 I then made that emphasis at the press conference;
20 and I hoped then that the strength of denial might put
21 it to rest, but it did not. What really I think from
22 that moment on made the thing extremely difficult was
23 there was then a Mail on Sunday article by Mr Gilligan
24 that then named Alastair Campbell as the person who had
25 done this effectively. I cannot remember -- there was

22
1 some huge great headline.
2 Q. We have seen the article.
3 A. Yes. What that then did was -- you already have this
4 extraordinarily serious allegation which, if it were
5 true, would mean we had behaved in the most disgraceful
6 way and I would have to resign as Prime Minister. Then
7 what you had was a very specific allegation, and putting
8 Alastair Campbell into this.
9 Now, if I can say this with all sort of due
10 deference to the media and everyone, I mean the
11 insertion of Alastair's name was -- once you then put
12 that into the pot along with everything else, you have
13 something that is no longer a small item. There is the
14 person who is a BBC correspondent saying specifically
15 that his source for this someone in charge of drawing up
16 the dossier had named Alastair Campbell as the person
17 who put it in.
18 The combination of those things, both the original
19 report and then the Sunday newspaper follow-up, to be
20 frank, ever since then that has been the issue. I mean,
21 we are three months on and it is still the issue.
22 Q. You considered, I think we have heard from Mr Campbell,
23 putting this to the Intelligence and Security Committee,
24 in a way of dealing with the issue; is that right?
25 A. Well, what happened then was we were then in a complete

23
1 and full storm. I do not make any criticism at all of
2 the opposition parties, everybody, but by the time we
3 got to Monday in the Parliament, it was more or less
4 a given that this is what had happened, that
5 Alastair Campbell had actually produced the
6 intelligence, not the Joint Intelligence Committee.
7 Well, unsurprisingly that was a pretty big issue.
8 There was a raging storm going on. And it was clear,
9 because there were a lot of calls for inquiries, there
10 was going to have to be some sort of inquiry into it.
11 I thought that the Intelligence and Security Committee
12 were the right people to deal with this. I thought they
13 were the best people to deal with it. I thought they
14 would deal with it in a sensible way, and I also thought
15 this is within a fairly narrow compass of fact. We
16 either did this thing or we did not do this thing. So,
17 if they were able to look at it, and make a decision,
18 then that would be the best way of dealing with it.
19 Q. Now, in fact while on CAB/1/158, if we scroll down to
20 the bottom of that page, we can see comments that you
21 made to Parliament on 4th June, extracts from Hansard,
22 again denying in vigorous terms the story.
23 A. Hmm.
24 Q. Going over the page to 159, and I think it is the second
25 paragraph, it says this:

24
1 "Rather than having allegations made by anonymous
2 sources that are completely untrue, is not it better
3 that people with evidence should present it to the
4 Intelligence and Security Committee and allow that
5 Committee to make a judgment?"
6 A. Hmm.
7 Q. That is what you were hoping to do as at 4th June; is
8 that right?
9 A. Yes, and I thought they were the best people --
10 I thought all the way through they were the best people
11 to do this. I agreed I would publish their report, so
12 there was no question of suppressing their judgment on
13 it. They meet in private. They are pretty discreet.
14 Contrary to what some people say, I appoint the people
15 but after consultation with the opposition leaders in
16 respect of their people serving on it. And they are
17 senior Parliamentarians with a lot of experience.
18 I thought they would be the best people to deal with it.
19 I did not, I confess, right at the very beginning think
20 that the FAC were the right people to deal with it.
21 Q. At about this time the FAC are announcing they are going
22 to hold their inquiry. What was your attitude to that?
23 A. My attitude to it was that I did not think that was the
24 best thing. I thought, for the reasons I have given,
25 that the Intelligence and Security Committee -- however,

25
1 it is not up to me to say what the FAC look into. You
2 know, as I say in my witness statement, I worried right
3 at the very beginning that when a Select Committee is
4 looking at an issue that is such a huge and hot
5 political issue in a sense, that the danger always is
6 that it splits down party lines, that the whole thing
7 becomes difficult.
8 I thought that the best way of dealing with it, as
9 I say, was through the ISC. I made that clear. But on
10 the other hand, you know, the argument, to be fair to
11 those people who were opposed to that, they said: look,
12 the FAC is a Select Committee. The ISC reports to you
13 as Prime Minister, so the FAC are the right people to
14 look at this. Well, it is an argument.
15 Q. We can see what the FAC thought at FAC/3/10. This is in
16 their report that is published on 7th July. And at
17 paragraph 6 they said that they were strongly of the
18 view that they were entitled to a greater degree of
19 cooperation from the Government on access to witnesses
20 and intelligence materials, and they talk about the
21 correspondence in relation to Mr Campbell and the fact
22 that he then appeared and "we asked for direct access to
23 the JIC assessments".
24 A. Hmm, hmm.
25 Q. "That was refused, although some extracts were read to

26
1 us in private session. We are confident that our
2 inquiry would have been enhanced if our requests had
3 been met."
4 Then they do balance it at the bottom of the
5 paragraph by saying:
6 "Yet it is fair to state that within the
7 Government's self-imposed restraints the
8 Foreign Secretary sought to be forthcoming ... in
9 private session ..."
10 They note the differences between their inquiry and
11 the ISC in paragraph 7, I think making the points that
12 you have just made:
13 "... the Prime Minister has repeatedly said in the
14 House that he will cooperate fully with a parallel
15 inquiry by the statutory Intelligence and Security
16 Committee. This is hardly surprising, since the
17 Committee was appointed by and reports to him, and it
18 meets entirely in private. The Foreign Affairs
19 Committee, on the other hand, was appointed by and
20 reports to the House of Commons ... We believe that our
21 inquiry is the more credible of the two ..."
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Were those views you shared?
24 A. Well, I did, not unsurprisingly. I mean, what I thought
25 was, yes, fine, the ISC it is true meets in private and

27
1 reports to me, but I had agreed I would publish their
2 report. So that point as it were was taken care of.
3 And although they are appointed by me, as I say, the
4 people on them who are from different political parties
5 are appointed after consultation with me. They are
6 senior Parliamentarians, they are experienced people,
7 all of them, and they had shown quite clearly, for
8 example over the report they did on the Bali bombing,
9 they were perfectly prepared to be independent. I had
10 no doubt at all they would get to the truth of this.
11 In relation to the previous paragraph, in a sense
12 that does accurately reflect the fact that I was not
13 keen on the FAC doing this. I was worried about the
14 precedent of No. 10 officials appearing, which is why
15 originally I said that I did not think Alastair should
16 appear. I think there was concern as well from the
17 intelligence people about how much we would say. But in
18 the end I mean Alastair did appear and the
19 Foreign Secretary actually read them out the JIC
20 assessment of the 9th September about the 45 minute
21 point.
22 Q. At this time, and this is all early June, when you were
23 saying the ISC is going to report --
24 A. Hmm, hmm.
25 Q. -- Mr Campbell is writing various private letters to the

28
1 BBC and getting various private responses. Were you
2 aware of those letters being exchanged?
3 A. I was aware he was in correspondence with the BBC.
4 I was not aware of the details of it, but I was aware of
5 the fact that he was still trying to get the story
6 withdrawn.
7 Q. Then on 12th June we have heard that there was a lunch
8 with the BBC.
9 A. Hmm.
10 Q. Do you recall that?
11 A. I do.
12 Q. And was anything said in relation to this criticism that
13 had been made, as you perceived it, of the Government in
14 relation to the intelligence assessments?
15 A. It was a lunch that really was about trying to make sure
16 we all got back on terms with each other. So it was not
17 done in an aggressive way, I may say. But obviously we
18 discussed Iraq and the issues to do with Iraq.
19 Curiously, we never got into the should they apologise,
20 should we apologise part of it. It was somewhat
21 overshadowed by the fact that that day we had
22 a reshuffle, so it was necessarily somewhat truncated,
23 I think.
24 Q. And so the issue of the report, Mr Gilligan's report,
25 was it ever expressly raised?

29
1 A. No, I think the general issue to do with Iraq was
2 raised, but this had obviously already been raised in
3 correspondence; and I think my purpose in the lunch, in
4 a sense, was more to do with a discussion with them that
5 allowed us to be on terms with each other.
6 Q. In the hope that the dispute might go away or ...?
7 A. All the way through we hoped the dispute might go away.
8 But the only way it was going to go away was if they
9 said clearly and unequivocally that the original story
10 was wrong and it was pretty obvious by then that they
11 were not going to.
12 Q. That is 12th June. We can then go on to 19th June when
13 Mr Gilligan gives evidence to the Foreign Affairs
14 Committee. Were you aware of the fact that he was
15 giving evidence or had given evidence to the Foreign
16 Affairs Committee?
17 A. Yes, I mean I would have been aware that he was giving
18 evidence.
19 Q. He was asked by the Foreign Affairs Committee at
20 FAC/2/145 -- it is question 461, which is at the bottom
21 of the page, if I can take you to that. Mr Pope asked
22 this:
23 "Just on the issue of the 45 minutes, I want to be
24 very clear about what your source is alleging. Is your
25 source alleging that the 45 minutes did not exist in the

30
1 assessment that was inserted by Alastair Campbell?"
2 Mr Gilligan says:
3 "I will quote his words again. He said, 'It was
4 real information. It was the information of a single
5 source.' My source did not believe it was reliable. He
6 believed that that single source had made a mistake,
7 that he had confused the deployment time for
8 a conventional missile with the deployment time for a
9 CBW missile. He did not believe that any missiles had
10 been armed with CBW that would therefore be able to be
11 fireable at 45 minutes' notice. He believed that claim
12 was unreliable."
13 A. Hmm, hmm.
14 Q. And at FAC/2/148, towards the bottom, Mr Gilligan, in
15 answer to Mr Illsley, said this:
16 "It was not a claim that was in any way made up or
17 fabricated by Downing Street. Another one of the
18 reasons why this story took on the life that it did was
19 that Downing Street denied a number of things which had
20 never been alleged. They denied, among other things,
21 that material had been fabricated. Nobody ever alleged
22 that material had been fabricated."
23 A. Hmm.
24 Q. Was that your understanding of the dispute?
25 A. Well, it certainly is not my understanding that that is

31
1 an accurate assessment of what was being alleged. Look,
2 what was being alleged -- and this is the reason why the
3 issue was such a big issue -- if what had been said was,
4 well, somebody within the system doubts this 45 minute
5 claim but nonetheless the 45 minute claim was put in
6 there by the Joint Intelligence Committee and so on,
7 I doubt it would have been a very big issue. But the
8 original allegation, never really withdrawn in clear and
9 unequivocal terms, was this had been put in by
10 Downing Street against the wishes of the security
11 people.
12 LORD HUTTON: Perhaps we should look at BBC/1/4 which
13 contains the start of the Today Programme.
14 MR DINGEMANS: This is the broadcast that was made, the
15 early morning broadcast. If you look at the second
16 paragraph --
17 A. Hmm.
18 Q. -- Mr Gilligan, it is about line 4, says this:
19 "... and what we've been told by one of the senior
20 officials in charge of drawing up that dossier was that,
21 actually the Government probably erm, knew that that
22 45 minute figure was wrong, even before it decided to
23 put it in."
24 Then towards the bottom:
25 "... Downing Street, our source says, ordered a week

32
1 before publication, ordered it to be sexed up, to be
2 made more exciting and ordered more facts to be er, to
3 be discovered."
4 A. Yes. Well, I mean, you know, look, any person listening
5 to that would think that we had done something improper,
6 not that we just got our facts mixed up. I mean in my
7 submission, I think that anybody who listened to that --
8 this was the purpose of it. The whole thing since then
9 has been not did the Government make the wrong decision,
10 but did the Government dupe us, did the Government in
11 a sense defraud people over it? That has been the
12 central charge. My view, just to state it frankly, all
13 the way through, has been that the only thing that was
14 going to remove that was -- whatever agreement or
15 disagreement you had over whether the story should ever
16 have been run in the first place, the only thing that
17 was going to remove that was a clear and unequivocal
18 statement that the original story was wrong.
19 Q. Mr Campbell gave evidence on 25th June. I have taken
20 you to Mr Gilligan's evidence, he is 19th June.
21 Mr Campbell gives evidence on 25th June. At FAC/2/284,
22 in answer to Mr Pope, Mr Campbell said this:
23 "Well, it is true that when the BBC representative
24 came to the Committee last week [which was 19th June] he
25 claimed that all he had ever alleged was that we had

33
1 'given it undue prominence'. I am afraid that is not
2 true. What he said last week was not true. It was
3 a complete backtrack on what he had broadcast and
4 written about in the Mail on Sunday, The Spectator and
5 elsewhere. Now the reason why I feel so strongly that
6 we, the Government, from the Prime Minister down deserve
7 an apology about this story is it has been absolutely
8 clear not just by me - you can put me to one side..."
9 and he talks about himself, saying that:
10 "'This story is not true' and if the BBC defence
11 correspondent on the basis of a single anonymous source
12 continues to say that is true, then I think something
13 has gone very wrong with BBC journalism."
14 A. Hmm, hmm.
15 Q. Mr Campbell has obviously picked up on the fact that
16 Mr Gilligan, whatever he originally broadcast -- and you
17 have been shown what he originally broadcast and you
18 accurately set out what had been relayed to you in
19 relation to that broadcast.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. But by 19th June, when he was reading out what his
22 source says, he is effectively putting a slightly lesser
23 charge?
24 A. That is correct. There is no doubt that they, as it
25 were, shifted to saying: look, we are not attacking your

34
1 integrity, we just simply say this is what was told to
2 us, and so on. But the real problem was that the
3 original allegation had been made, it had then been, as
4 I say, backed up and really had booster rockets put on
5 it by the Mail on Sunday article and nothing -- so far
6 as people were looking at this and taking it in, they
7 were not taking in the intricacies of was this about
8 your integrity or not. The fact is that the entire
9 original allegation was an attack on our integrity.
10 I want to make this point because it is important.
11 I do not mean that in a sense I was being unduly
12 sensitive about this. I think in my walk of life you
13 get attacks the entire time. That is part of the
14 business and you should not complain about it normally.
15 Indeed, if you did, you would spend your entire time
16 complaining. This was an attack that went to the heart
17 of not just the office of Prime Minister but also the
18 way our Intelligence Services operated. It went in
19 a sense to the credibility, I felt, of the country,
20 never mind the Prime Minister. It was a very, very
21 serious charge.
22 It is correct that in the weeks that followed that
23 charge was somehow -- the ground was slightly shifted
24 but nobody from the outside would have really understood
25 that as happening. I think most of the reports normally

35
1 said the BBC sticks by its story, is basically what was
2 said.
3 Q. Another possible way perhaps of demonstrating what had
4 actually happened would have been to show the dossiers,
5 indeed or the draft dossiers. That is what the FAC
6 asked for. Can I take you to FAC/2/287? It is question
7 1019 towards the bottom of the page. Mr Chidgey says:
8 "You appreciate how important this issue is. The
9 accusation has been made that this document was
10 adjusted, altered, sexed up - whatever - for a
11 particular political purpose" which you have identified
12 as the thrust of the complaint.
13 A. Hmm.
14 Q. "You said, and it is on record elsewhere, that his
15 process took many months to evolve. I think it would be
16 helpful if, perhaps not today but shortly afterwards,
17 you could let the Committee have information on the
18 suggestions that were made by you and your team as this
19 document evolved ... drafts were continuing ... It
20 would be very helpful if it was possible for us to have
21 copies of those earlier drafts so that we could satisfy
22 ourselves that there were no attempts to change the
23 essence of the document in order to pursue a particular
24 political point."
25 We have seen now the drafts of the dossiers and we

36
1 have now seen the e-mails and the suggestions that were
2 made so that everyone is able to make their own
3 judgments in that respect.
4 A. Hmm.
5 Q. Was there any reason that the FAC were not shown the
6 dossiers?
7 A. I think, from recollection, it was -- and I think
8 someone indicated -- I had not seen this before
9 actually, but what Alastair Campbell says in reply to
10 this, I think it was the Joint Intelligence Committee
11 and John Scarlett took the view that that was not
12 a right thing to do. I think their worry all the way
13 through was that, you know, there was a limit to what
14 should be shown to the FAC.
15 Q. On 25th June, Mr Campbell also made allegations that the
16 story from the BBC was a lie, I have taken you to part
17 of the passage.
18 A. Excuse me, can I just say something? I think it is also
19 important -- I mean, I cannot speculate and should not
20 as to whether, had we given earlier drafts, it would
21 have made a difference. I do just point out we
22 obviously had said in the most plain and unequivocal
23 terms that this was the work of the Joint Intelligence
24 Committee and Jack Straw had actually read them out, the
25 JIC assessment, in private on the 9th September. Once

37
1 you have the JIC assessment read out on 9th September,
2 it is pretty obvious that the claim is not our claim but
3 their claim.
4 Q. I have taken you to those parts where the FAC said that
5 they had those read out in private.
6 A. Hmm.
7 Q. Mr Campbell also made what the BBC perceived to be wider
8 attacks on their journalism. He described the story as
9 a lie and he described the BBC in less than flattering
10 terms.
11 Was this an escalation of the dispute between No. 10
12 and the BBC that you were aware of?
13 A. No, I do not think it was -- I mean, it was important,
14 frankly, for reasons that I say in my witness statement,
15 that we made it clear we were not attacking the BBC's
16 independence. But in the end the essence of this, all
17 the way through, was really an original story. But by
18 the time you got to this point, I think it was largely
19 self generating, this, because you see if it had been
20 withdrawn quickly then I think the issue would have
21 dampened down. But by the time you have got to this
22 stage, you have the FAC doing its report and you had
23 a huge row going on in Parliament. Virtually every
24 Prime Minister's Question Time I was being asked about
25 the issues to do with trust and the document and so on.

38
1 Q. What was your perception about how the dispute could
2 end, as it were, at this stage?
3 A. I was of the view that the only thing that would really
4 help in this situation was, as I say, whatever argument
5 we had about whether the story should ever have been
6 run, that there was something clear and unequivocal
7 stated by the BBC that the story was wrong. I did not
8 think it terribly likely we were going to get such
9 a statement by that stage and also, to be blunt about
10 it, I thought we had to move on.
11 Q. In fact before the FAC report there are two further
12 items of correspondence. Mr Campbell wrote a letter of
13 26th June. That is at CAB/1/352. He publicised that
14 letter. You have no doubt seen it, so if I may I will
15 not take you through that.
16 A. Hmm.
17 Q. And that asked for an immediate response, and a response
18 came back on 27th June which was at CAB/1/355, from
19 Mr Sambrook, effectively reasserting all the
20 allegations.
21 If I can take you to CAB/1/360, this was in answer
22 to specific questions that Mr Campbell had posed:
23 "Does the BBC still stand by the allegation it made
24 on 29th May that No. 10 added in the 45 minute claim to
25 the dossier?

39
1 "The allegation was not made by the BBC but by our
2 source - a senior official involved in the compilation
3 of the dossier - and the BBC stands by the reporting of
4 it."
5 There is a distinction drawn between the BBC and the
6 source. Was that a distinction that you recognised?
7 A. Well, obviously when you say recognised -- I recognise
8 those are two different things to say: this is what our
9 source says; this is what we say. I go back to the
10 original point that I made. Withstanding the force of
11 the original allegation, the only thing that was going
12 to diminish that force was a clear statement. What we
13 got into was a distinction that you would pick up, if
14 you were in the details of this, between what the source
15 says and what the BBC say. But if you were simply
16 observing this, you would still be struck by the force
17 of the original allegation.
18 That was really the point that I was trying to make
19 then and throughout, that unless there was something
20 very clear and unequivocal about the original story
21 being wrong then frankly the force of the allegation
22 remained, and it indeed did remain; actually in some
23 ways it still does remain.
24 LORD HUTTON: I think a possible indication from
25 Mr Sambrook's statement is that there is a difference

40
1 between the BBC directly making an allegation that
2 someone or the Government has acted improperly and the
3 BBC reporting someone else's view that a person or the
4 Government has acted improperly. Do you have any
5 comment on that, Prime Minister?
6 A. I think if you are to make that distinction then in your
7 reporting of it on 29th May you make it a very clear
8 thing. I think if one goes back to that and if one
9 takes the newspaper article on the Sunday, I think you
10 would be hard put to say: somebody said this thing but
11 we stand back from it. It was not coming across like
12 that. I honestly believe it was not meant to come
13 across like that.
14 MR DINGEMANS: Mr Campbell has told us that Mr Sambrook's
15 reply was read to him I think while he was at Wimbledon
16 and he was extremely irritated by it. He went to
17 Channel 4. He was invited to Channel 4 and made an
18 appearance that day. Did you know that that was
19 proposed?
20 A. Yes. He phoned me shortly before and asked for my
21 permission to do it and I gave my permission for him to
22 do it.
23 Q. Do you think that had any effect on the escalation of
24 the dispute?
25 A. To be frank, I think it was pretty much there already,

41
1 the dispute. One point I would just like to emphasise
2 throughout is that for us the dispute was in a sense not
3 what was important. What was important was the
4 correction of the story.
5 Q. Now Mr Campbell also issued a statement, at CAB/1/367,
6 that day where he makes plain his views about
7 Mr Sambrook's reply --
8 A. Hmm.
9 Q. -- where he says, in paragraph 2, that:
10 "It confirms our central charge that they do not
11 have a shred of evidence to justify their lie, broadcast
12 many times on many BBC outlets, that we deliberately
13 exaggerated and abused British intelligence and so
14 misled Parliament and public."
15 So he goes on to describe in certain language
16 Mr Sambrook's reply.
17 A. Hmm.
18 Q. It also appears at about this time that there is
19 a letter being written, 29th June, to the effect that
20 there is no point in corresponding any further, we will
21 wait until the FAC report.
22 A. Hmm.
23 Q. Were you part of that decision-making process?
24 A. I cannot recall exactly but I think I was saying to
25 Alastair at the time: look, they are not going to

42
1 withdraw their story, you will just have to wait and see
2 what the FAC say. And I think I was making the point
3 too, I recall, that it was important to distinguish --
4 because I did understand this from the BBC's point of
5 view -- it was important to distinguish between their
6 independence and the story.
7 Q. Going on to the FAC report, if I can just complete with
8 that before I turn to Dr Kelly's name coming to your
9 attention. The FAC actually reported on the morning of
10 7th July. Did you have any further attempts to try to
11 resolve the matter with the BBC?
12 A. As I say in my witness statement, on the morning of the
13 7th July I had an entirely private conversation with
14 Gavyn Davies, the Chairman of the BBC, at my request, to
15 see if there was some way we could find a way through
16 this; and it was a perfectly amicable discussion but we
17 were not able to come to an agreement.
18 I mean essentially we were both agreed it was
19 important to try to calm things down, and what I was
20 saying to him -- I was not exactly clear what the FAC
21 report was going to say but there were newspaper reports
22 about what it might say. I said: look, is not the
23 simple way through this, whatever we think about your
24 original broadcast and the allegations, is not the best
25 way through for you to say: well, we stand by our right

43
1 to have broadcast the story but we accept the story was
2 wrong, and we say we accept that as a retraction and we
3 can debate about whether it was right or wrong that the
4 story should ever have been run, but nonetheless the BBC
5 have now clearly retracted the original story?
6 He explained that he felt he could not do that, that
7 he could not actually retract the original story, that
8 would compromise the BBC's independence, although he
9 said again very clearly: look, we made it clear in our
10 statement -- they put out a statement the night before.
11 He said: look, if you look at that statement, it makes
12 it plain we are not attacking your integrity.
13 I made the points about that that I have made, which
14 are: you may not say it attacks my integrity but
15 actually that is what the story is about, and therefore,
16 unless the story is clearly withdrawn, then the attack
17 on my integrity remains. We could not come to an
18 agreement on that.
19 Q. Mr Davies, who is going to give evidence later, I have
20 seen some notes he has made in relation to that. One
21 thing he suggests is he said there was no basis on which
22 he could apologise because the source had not been
23 disproved. Do you recollect that in your conversation?
24 A. Well, I think what happened was that he made some
25 comment of that nature and I then said to him, and said,

44
1 you know, in confidence actually over the last few days,
2 we do have reason to believe there may be -- we do not
3 know at the moment -- someone who has come forward as
4 a source. It looks like from what he is going to say
5 that he does not back up Mr Gilligan's story, but we
6 cannot be sure of that. I think Gavyn said something
7 like: but this is corroborated by another report from
8 Susan Watts on Newsnight. I had never heard of this
9 report so I did not make any comment on that. Anyway,
10 that was really very much at the end of the
11 conversation. At the end of the conversation we tried
12 to agree -- we said let us to try to deal with this the
13 best we can but obviously it is a difficult situation.
14 Q. I think his perception -- he is likely to give evidence
15 to the effect that he considered this as some first
16 steps to return relationships to normal. Was that
17 a fair analysis?
18 A. I think all the way through we were anxious to get
19 things back on a normal footing and indeed the lunch on
20 12th June was a part of a desire to do that. After all,
21 the BBC is the main broadcasting outlet. It is not
22 really very sensible for the Government to be in
23 a situation where we have a continuing dispute with the
24 BBC. But the trouble was, again I just simply cannot
25 emphasise this enough, that the whole of the political

45
1 debate was overshadowed by the story. So unless you
2 managed to get that issue dealt with then, you know, you
3 could do your very best to get back on a decent footing,
4 I think it is important we do that in any event, but
5 what we could not do was get round the fact that the
6 story still stayed.
7 Q. The FAC report was published and they rejected the
8 allegations that Mr Campbell had been responsible for
9 inserting the 45 minutes claim. Was that sufficient for
10 the Government's purposes?
11 A. No. The trouble with the FAC report, rather as I had
12 anticipated at the outset, was that it split on party
13 lines. Yes, it is true, you could say by a majority
14 they had cleared the Government, but I think the next
15 day the coverage frankly was in balance probably
16 negative, it was at best a muddied picture, and
17 certainly you would not have in any shape or form
18 thought the next day: well, that is the Government in
19 the clear.
20 Q. Mr Campbell has given evidence. He said that, I think
21 on 7th July, and this is when the FAC report has been
22 published, that he felt slightly dispirited. The BBC
23 refused to accept they were wrong. That was obviously
24 something he was very keen on and you have said you were
25 very keen on as well. He said it was just going away as

46
1 a media thing, or used words to that general effect.
2 Was that right, that the story was now dying, as it
3 were, or going to die?
4 A. It was obvious once the FAC had reported, it was
5 important if possible that it started to go away as
6 a story. One of the reasons -- I mean, I actually
7 helped -- on 7th July after the FAC I think ourselves
8 and the BBC both put out statements.
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. In Alastair's statement, which I actually looked over
11 and helped draft a part of it, we made it clear that
12 whatever argument we had about the source, the key thing
13 was the original story. They had refused to accept that
14 the story was wrong -- well, there it was. You know,
15 maybe it would have been possible to move on at that
16 point, I do not know.
17 Q. In fact, there were other developments. Can I take you,
18 now, back to 3rd July?
19 A. Hmm.
20 Q. When was the first time you heard that a possible source
21 for Mr Gilligan's story had come forward?
22 A. I was away on a visit in the North West on 3rd July and
23 I was telephoned by Jonathan Powell, my Chief of Staff.
24 Q. What did he say to you?
25 A. We had a conversation about a whole series of things we

47
1 were discussing but in the course of that conversation
2 he said that the Secretary of State for Defence had
3 informed him that an official in the Ministry had come
4 forward to say that he had spoken to Mr Gilligan and
5 that he might be the source.
6 Q. And what was your reaction to that?
7 A. Well, he said that the Ministry of Defence were still
8 seeking further information and clarity. I said we had
9 to proceed with caution. We needed proper information;
10 and I said to keep the information to ourselves at that
11 point.
12 Q. Right. Was there any reason that you said to keep the
13 information to yourselves at that point?
14 A. I thought it was important, until we knew what was
15 actually happening, that we did not enlarge the circle
16 of information about it.
17 Q. Were you given a name, at that time?
18 A. No, I do not recall being given a name at that time.
19 I cannot recall when I first heard the name. I mean, it
20 may have been in these telephone conversations. It may
21 not have been. I do not think it was on 3rd July, but
22 at some point obviously in the next few days I was given
23 the name.
24 Q. Then on 4th July, are you in London or not?
25 A. No, I was at Chequers on 4th July in the evening. It

48
1 was a Friday evening.
2 Q. Which is a Friday night.
3 A. Yes.
4 Q. Had you had any discussions about the possible source
5 during the day?
6 A. No, I had not; and I had a stack of other things that
7 were preoccupying me at the time.
8 Q. Can you perhaps, just so that we can all put your
9 evidence in context --
10 A. Well, there was the National Health Service. The
11 Foundation Trust issue was obviously going to be a big
12 question in the next week, and the vote was the next
13 week. We had problems in the House of Lords over the
14 Criminal Justice Bills, and also the situation in Iraq
15 on the ground.
16 Q. So you were dealing with those issues?
17 A. All I had had was a statement in the course of
18 a conversation on other things, that this might be
19 a development.
20 Q. 4th July, in the evening is this?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. You are at Chequers; and what happens?
23 A. Jonathan called me again and he said that Kevin Tebbit
24 would be providing a letter, I think later that day,
25 giving details of this possible source. He said that he

49
1 had actually had a discussion with David Manning and
2 David Omand and John Scarlett about the next steps and
3 there had been a discussion about whether the Chairman
4 of the Foreign Affairs Committee should immediately be
5 informed, since the report was about to be published on
6 the Monday, and suddenly here we were on the Friday with
7 this information.
8 Of course, the Intelligence and Security Committee
9 were about to start their hearings. I think they were
10 due to take John Scarlett maybe on the Wednesday.
11 I cannot recall that exactly. Anyway, they concluded
12 there was not enough information to make a decision and
13 I agreed and said we should await the details in the
14 letter.
15 Q. Did you have any conversations with Mr Campbell on this
16 day about the matter?
17 A. No, not on that Friday. No.
18 Q. Or with Mr Hoon, who I think also knew at this stage?
19 A. No.
20 LORD HUTTON: Prime Minister, I have asked other witnesses
21 why these very senior officials were all concerned with
22 this matter. There was a discussion, and Mr Powell
23 discussed with Sir David Manning, Sir David Omand and
24 Mr John Scarlett. Why were so many senior officials
25 concerned with this?

50
1 A. I think it was really that this was -- I mean, this
2 whole issue was still the dominant issue. You had the
3 Foreign Affairs Select Committee report on the Monday
4 into really the nature of the allegation. Then suddenly
5 at the last minute comes forward somebody who might be
6 the source. And I think there was a real concern on the
7 part of everyone -- we were in a quandary, frankly,
8 right from the very beginning. The Foreign Affairs
9 Select Committee is about to report on the Monday, the
10 report is going to deal precisely with the
11 Andrew Gilligan allegations and here is somebody who
12 suddenly emerges as the person who may be the source of
13 those allegations.
14 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
15 A. I think the reason why people were involved at a senior
16 level in the Civil Service were first of all that it was
17 very important. Secondly, certainly as the matter
18 developed, I was very, very keen, indeed insistent, that
19 we did have the senior people involved because
20 I anticipated right from the very beginning that there
21 were going to be a lot of questions asked afterwards
22 about: when did you know? Why did you not tell the
23 Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee? How could
24 you let them make their report on Monday when you were
25 in possession of information plainly relevant to their

51
1 report? That was I think the explanation as to why
2 people at a senior level were involved.
3 LORD HUTTON: Again, I think having heard a considerable
4 amount of evidence the reason may be obvious, but why
5 was this a quandary? What was the quandary which you
6 were concerned had arisen?
7 A. The quandary really was this: we had never really wanted
8 the Foreign Affairs Committee to look into this; we
9 thought the ISC should do it. But they had and that is
10 their right to do so and they had conducted their
11 investigation. Suddenly, as I say, at the last minute
12 forward comes somebody who may be the source of the
13 allegation that was at the centre of the FAC report.
14 What did you do? Did you inform the Chairman of the
15 Foreign Affairs Committee immediately, which is one
16 possibility and which I have no doubt afterwards people
17 would have said to us we should have done. Did you try
18 and get greater clarity of whether this was indeed the
19 source or not? So how did you handle this?
20 The reason why I thought it was very, very important
21 to involve the senior officials is that the whole
22 allegation around the Foreign Affairs Committee report
23 and all the rest of it was about the propriety of the
24 Government. Here is an issue that also seems to reflect
25 on propriety and I am in receipt of that information.

52
1 So I thought it was essential not in a sense to pass the
2 responsibility to them -- in the end I have full
3 responsibility for the decisions that are taken -- but
4 in order to make absolutely sure that when at a later
5 point, as I thought there would be, not obviously in the
6 context which we are talking now, but people would say:
7 when did you know? What did you know? Who did you
8 tell? I would be able to say: we handled this by the
9 book, in the sense of with the advice of senior civil
10 servants. Not, as I say, in order to pass
11 responsibility to them, but in order to make sure that
12 this was not, as it were, the politicians driving the
13 system but us taking a consensus view as to what the
14 right way to proceed was.
15 MR DINGEMANS: That is the evening of the 4th July when you
16 were, as I think you were saying, dealing with other
17 issues. Did you have any conclusion to your
18 conversation that evening? Who was your conversation
19 with; Mr Powell?
20 A. Yes. He told me about the meeting they had had earlier
21 and that they said: look, there is not enough
22 information to make a decision. I agreed and said we
23 would await the details in the letter that was coming
24 over from Kevin Tebbit.
25 Q. Did you get that letter that evening?

53
1 A. Yes. I got that letter that was faxed to me, I think,
2 by David Omand and that then, you know, gave a certain
3 amount of evidence obviously as to what Dr Kelly had
4 said in the interview that he had had with the Ministry
5 of Defence.
6 Q. We can see it at MoD/1/34. It is a letter dated
7 4th July 2003 from Sir Kevin Tebbit to Sir David Omand.
8 This was the letter you got at Chequers?
9 A. (Pause). Yes. Absolutely.
10 Q. Having received the letter, did you feel able to make
11 any other decisions?
12 A. No. I mean, I think it was simply obvious, as
13 I discussed with Jonathan earlier, that they had to get
14 further information about it.
15 Q. The 6th and 7th July, where are you physically? Are you
16 in Downing Street? Which is the weekend.
17 A. On 5th and 6th July I think I am still at Chequers in
18 the country; and I think that is when I get a second
19 letter.
20 Q. Can I take you to MoD/1/41? What had happened on the
21 morning of 5th July, if this helps, is that Mr Baldwin
22 had written an article in The Times --
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. -- when some further information was given --
25 A. Yes.

54
1 Q. -- about the BBC's source.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. Did you read that article in The Times?
4 A. I cannot honestly recall whether I saw the article or
5 not.
6 Q. In fact, I think I have shown you the wrong letter. Can
7 I take you to MoD/1/38? This is the letter, 5th July,
8 which you can see refers to: "Today's Times carries an
9 article by Tom Baldwin ...".
10 A. I do not think I actually saw the article before I got
11 this but I think probably when I got this I went and had
12 a look at the article. I cannot recall absolutely.
13 Q. Did you, having received this letter, decide to take any
14 further action?
15 A. Well, I thought that what this letter indicated was
16 effectively two things: (1) it was more probable that
17 the particular individual was the source of the
18 allegation by Mr Gilligan; and (2) the fact that the
19 media were on to it. I think in that letter --
20 Q. If we scroll down the page you can see the terms of it.
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Then, over the page, Sir Kevin Tebbit -- if it helps
23 you, at the top of the next page he said:
24 "There remain many discrepancies ... We still
25 cannot exclude the possibility that the main source, or

55
1 other sources, are elsewhere. But it may be possible to
2 explain and reconcile at least some of the mismatches."
3 A. Hmm, hmm.
4 Q. He says:
5 "Records of the MoD's interview [that was one that
6 took place on the Friday] ... are still being
7 prepared... The Times story today, whether accurate or
8 not, will increase the likelihood that over the weekend
9 other journalists will indeed identify and name the
10 BBC's source as our official. (He is ... well known in
11 media/academic circles)."
12 A. Hmm.
13 Q. Sorry, does that help?
14 A. I mean, the two things that I took out of this were: (1)
15 that it was more probable he was indeed the source; and
16 (2), that this thing was already washing round the
17 media.
18 Q. Or may well be washing round other parts of the media,
19 as it were?
20 A. It was in The Times and, you know, I think that they
21 were -- I certainly took that as an indication that he
22 thought this was -- you know, that this thing could come
23 out at any point.
24 Q. Had you been told that the matter might come out at any
25 point at this stage?

56
1 A. I cannot recall, but I mean I think -- I would use my
2 own judgment about that, to be frank.
3 Q. Your own judgment was?
4 A. My own judgment was obviously there was a -- with an
5 issue with so much political focus on it as this, when
6 someone was being interviewed and reinterviewed and
7 presumably people were talking about it within the
8 system, then you have an article in The Times, I think
9 I would have thought there was a fair possibility it
10 would leak in any event.
11 Q. Who did you have your discussions with over that
12 weekend? I appreciate it may not be possible to
13 separate Saturday and Sunday.
14 A. Yes. I mean, my recollection is that on the Saturday
15 Alastair called me, because he wanted to put to me his
16 proposal that he write privately to the BBC Governors
17 setting out the case in advance of the BBC Governors'
18 adjudication, if you like. I agreed to that. But he
19 then also raised the issue of the source because he had
20 been told that by the Defence Secretary and his worry,
21 he thought the information was plainly relevant and were
22 we not going to be criticised for withholding it.
23 I said to him what was my firm view throughout, as
24 I was just saying to you a moment or two ago, that we
25 had to proceed in a way that Sir Kevin and David Omand

57
1 were entirely content with, that we had to make sure
2 that the MoD's internal -- because there were obviously
3 personnel procedures that had to be gone through. And
4 again, just to say, and I am sure I said it to him in
5 the course of this conversation: Look, this is
6 a difficult situation. It is difficult to know exactly
7 how to proceed and what the right thing to do is, so,
8 you know, for goodness sake let us do it in a very
9 careful way.
10 Q. Were you aware, at this stage, that Mr Hatfield, who was
11 the personnel director of the Ministry of Defence, had
12 effectively interviewed Dr Kelly on the Friday
13 afternoon?
14 A. I cannot recall whether anyone mentioned that there had
15 been an interview. I do not think I had -- I think
16 I got more information actually once I had spoken on the
17 Sunday morning to David Omand.
18 Q. Right.
19 A. I did that because I wanted to check his view out on
20 this, because I mean I was worried about -- as I say,
21 right at the very outset I was worried about this
22 business with the FAC and should we tell them. I spoke
23 to him about it and he said he thought we needed further
24 information. That was his view. That was the
25 Foreign Secretary's view. I said: fine, although

58
1 I think we both agreed we had to be ready to move if
2 this news leaked. I think at that point he gave me some
3 more information about interviews that had taken place
4 but I cannot recall the exact detail of that.
5 Q. Did you know that at this stage there was no question of
6 the Official Secrets Act being invoked?
7 A. I cannot recall exactly when, but I think during the
8 course of that weekend, and if not certainly pretty
9 early on the Monday, I said: what is going to happen
10 here? And it was explained to me that this was not an
11 Official Secrets Act point.
12 Q. Not an Official Secrets Act point. As far as the
13 disciplinary side of matters goes, the unauthorised
14 contacts with the press, on Friday afternoon we can see
15 from the minutes of the meeting Dr Kelly had been
16 effectively told off and he was told he was going to get
17 a letter recording Mr Hatfield's unhappiness with the
18 situation, which would have brought the disciplinary
19 side of matters to an end. Were you told about the
20 disciplinary side of matters as well?
21 A. I think I was at some point. I just cannot remember
22 exactly when. But I certainly knew by into the meeting
23 of the 7th that their view was that it was not an
24 Official Secrets Act matter, it was a disciplinary
25 matter. There was going to be some disciplinary action

59
1 taken but not of a fundamentally serious nature.
2 Q. At MoD/1/41 there is a letter that Sir David Omand
3 starts to write on 5th July.
4 LORD HUTTON: I think at that point we will give the
5 stenographers a break for five minutes.
6 (11.45 am)
7 (Short Break)
8 (11.50 am)
9 MR DINGEMANS: Prime Minister, we were on MoD/1/41 which is
10 a letter that Sir David Omand starts on 5th July but
11 actually sends on 6th July. If we can scroll down a wee
12 bit, it relates to the receipt of the letter et cetera
13 and in the second paragraph says this:
14 "The Prime Minister asked for a deeper analysis of
15 what the official has actually said, read against the
16 account Gilligan himself ..." put in.
17 Do you recall that discussion with Sir David Omand?
18 A. Yes, I think what I was saying throughout was: look, we
19 need to get a -- we need to know, insofar as we can
20 know. Therefore it is important we have as much
21 information as possible. I think at some point, I am
22 not again precisely sure of which conversation this was
23 in, I was told that there was going to be a follow-up
24 interview.
25 Q. Right, by Sir David Omand?

60
1 A. I think it was David that told me that, yes, but
2 I cannot be absolutely sure. I suppose it could have
3 been Jonathan but I think it was David.
4 Q. Can I take you to a document, CAB/11/6? To tell you
5 what this is, this is part way through a document
6 produced by Sir David Omand dated 21st July 2003.
7 A. 21st July.
8 Q. It is after the event and relates to the events at the
9 time.
10 A. Yes.
11 Q. He is talking about the meeting on 7th July --
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. -- but referring also to what he had said over the
14 weekend. If you look at the bottom of the first
15 paragraph on that page, he says that:
16 "He reiterated that Dr Kelly had come forward of his
17 own volition, and that as far as MoD was concerned there
18 was no question of any offence having been committed
19 under the Official Secrets Act. Dr Kelly's continued
20 cooperation was therefore essential. The Prime Minister
21 made it clear that MoD should continue to handle the
22 case properly, and should follow whatever internal
23 procedures were normal in such cases."
24 It is slightly difficult from the note to see
25 whether that bit related to the weekend or the

61
1 discussion on 7th July.
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. But does that assist in your recollection?
4 A. Yes. I mean that is very much consistent with what
5 I was saying at the time.
6 Q. So you had understood, at this stage, that any public
7 involvement of Dr Kelly was to be on the basis of his
8 cooperation?
9 A. Yes. I mean, I think what was -- look, right at the
10 very outset, as I say, part of this difficulty was he
11 had come forward. We were in receipt of this
12 information. You know, the question was: what do we now
13 do with that information, in particular in relation to
14 the FAC, which was a concern; and I cannot recall
15 exactly when I was told this, but I think there was
16 certainly -- it was said that he realised that he might
17 end up having to give evidence.
18 Q. He realised he might end up giving evidence?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. Do you recall who said that to you?
21 A. I do not but certainly by the time we got to 7th July,
22 I mean the basis of the meeting was that he had already
23 realised his name would in all likelihood come out.
24 Q. You have mentioned your concerns that the Government
25 might be accused of a cover-up in relation to the FAC.

62
1 Were you, at this stage, keen that the FAC reopen their
2 inquiry or did you have any view on that?
3 A. No, I mean -- look, if I had really wanted the FAC to do
4 it, I think I could perfectly properly have put that
5 information before the FAC actually on the Saturday or
6 Sunday. I really was not sure what the right way to
7 handle this issue was, but I knew that what we could not
8 do was be in a situation where we were accused of
9 misleading the FAC and that the reason why I thought it
10 was so important to involve the senior officials, as
11 I was saying to his Lordship just a moment or two ago,
12 was in order to make it -- you know, to make sure that
13 we were operating in a way that they were content with,
14 and therefore if at a later time people say: why on
15 earth did you not give this information immediately to
16 the FAC over the weekend, I could say: there were
17 discussions going on. It was being handled by the MoD.
18 This was the advice given to us by officials.
19 Not as I say to put off responsibility.
20 Responsibility is mine in the end. I take the decisions
21 as Prime Minister. But in order to be able to say we
22 had played it by the book.
23 Q. On 7th July the FAC are going to report. I think you
24 had various other matters going on. Again, if you want
25 to give us the context of your day, is it possible just

63
1 to give an outline of the various other matters you were
2 considering?
3 A. Well, I refreshed my memory from my diary and in my
4 statement. I had a breakfast with an information
5 technology consultant. I had several meetings to deal
6 with the issue of school funding. I then had quite
7 a big speech on the criminal justice system in the
8 QE2 Centre at 12.15. There was also a meeting with the
9 head of the International Olympic Committee and then I
10 had interviews with European newspapers and a meeting of
11 Junior Ministers and a Government reception in the
12 evening.
13 It was a fairly busy time obviously. One of my
14 preoccupations through this too was that I had the
15 Liaison Committee on the Tuesday and Prime Minister's
16 Questions on the Wednesday, both of which obviously were
17 going to continue to be dominated by these allegations.
18 Q. You have a meeting, I think we have heard, to discuss
19 really the FAC report and the reaction to that. Was
20 Dr Kelly's name mentioned at all in that respect?
21 A. Yes, and at the end of it we agreed to discuss the issue
22 of what to do in respect of Dr Kelly; and I asked
23 David Omand and Kevin Tebbit to come over and, you know,
24 we discussed the issue. As I understood it, he was
25 going to be reinterviewed, then we would be in a better

64
1 position to know exactly what to do, but the very clear
2 view of all of us, right at the very outset, was that if
3 it became clear that in all probability he was the
4 source, the information could not remain undisclosed.
5 Q. Can I take you to CAB/1/46? This is a memo that
6 John Scarlett dictates on 7th July. It is addressed to
7 Sir David Omand, but it may reflect some of the views
8 that Mr Scarlett was giving at the meeting, where he
9 agrees with Sir Kevin Tebbit's second letter, that the
10 finger points strongly at David Kelly as the source and
11 he had been through the transcript, and he noted what
12 Mr Gilligan had said about only having one source.
13 A. Hmm, hmm.
14 Q. He says:
15 "If this is true, Kelly is not telling the whole
16 story.
17 "Gilligan must have got the 45 minute single
18 intelligence report item from somewhere, presumably
19 Kelly. Conclusion: Kelly needs a proper security-style
20 interview ..."
21 He has explained what he meant by that.
22 A. Hmm.
23 Q. Did you recall any discussion along these lines on
24 7th July?
25 A. I do not recall that. I mean obviously people were

65
1 concerned as to what really had taken place, I mean,
2 because you never can be sure. And one of the reasons
3 why right at the very outset I was dubious, let us say,
4 as to what would actually happen if Dr Kelly did give
5 evidence is that you can never tell what is going to be
6 said and what other views might be expressed and any of
7 the rest of it.
8 Q. The outcome of that meeting was, I think, to conclude
9 what had already been provisionally decided, that he
10 should have a second interview. Do you recall that?
11 A. Yes. I mean, I think, as I recollect it, it was a