Hearing Transcripts

1 Monday, 22nd September 2003
2 (10.15 am)
3 LORD HUTTON: Good morning, ladies and gentlemen.
4 Mr Lloyd-Jones.
5 MR GEOFFREY WILLIAM HOON (called)
6 Examined by MR LLOYD-JONES
7 MR LLOYD-JONES: Is your full name Geoffrey Hoon, Secretary
8 of State?
9 A. It is Geoffrey William Hoon.
10 Q. Are you the Member of Parliament for Ashfield and
11 Secretary of State for Defence?
12 A. I am, yes.
13 Q. Have you previously given evidence in this Inquiry?
14 A. Yes, I have.
15 Q. On 8th July your Department issued a press statement
16 dealing with an individual working in the Ministry of
17 Defence who came forward to volunteer he had met
18 Mr Gilligan on 22nd May. Did you see that statement
19 before it was issued?
20 A. Yes, I did.
21 Q. Did you approve of its contents?
22 A. Yes, I did.
23 Q. Did you authorise the publication of that press
24 statement?
25 A. Yes, I did.

1
1 Q. Why did you consider, at that time, that it was right to
2 publish that press statement?
3 A. Well, I had been concerned for some days by then that an
4 official having come forward who had something relevant
5 to say about the subject of two Parliamentary inquiries,
6 at that stage we had still not identified that fact.
7 I first became aware of it on the previous Thursday, but
8 in fact Dr Kelly had first communicated his contact with
9 Andrew Gilligan as long ago as Monday 30th June.
10 Therefore, I was increasingly concerned about the amount
11 of time that was passing without us acknowledging the
12 fact that an official had come forward.
13 In addition, officials were due to give evidence the
14 following day, the 9th, to the ISC; and therefore,
15 again, there was some concern that if they had been
16 asked questions about this matter they needed to be
17 clear as to the position that the Government was taking.
18 Above all else, because of both pressures, I was
19 concerned that we should not be accused of covering up
20 the fact that an official had come forward.
21 Q. With the benefit of hindsight, do you still consider
22 that it was the right thing to do?
23 A. Yes, I do, because once an official had come forward,
24 once he had made known the fact that he had had an
25 unauthorised contact with Andrew Gilligan, then we had

2
1 to deal with it. We did not have the option of doing
2 nothing. We had to resolve this matter and use our best
3 judgment to deal with the situation.
4 Q. The Inquiry has heard that in the early evening of
5 9th July the MoD press office confirmed to a journalist
6 the identity of the person who had come forward,
7 Dr Kelly. Were you aware, on 9th July, that the MoD
8 press office was adopting an approach under which it was
9 proposing to confirm the identity of the individual if
10 the correct name was put?
11 A. Yes, I was. I had had a conversation earlier that day
12 with Sir Kevin Tebbit, the Permanent Secretary, in which
13 he had set out to me the concerns that he had as far as
14 the press office were concerned, in particular that
15 individual press officers should not be seen to be lying
16 to journalists, and that it was better that they should,
17 if the right name was put to them, acknowledge the fact.
18 He was also very concerned that there was a risk to
19 other members of staff, other officials, and he did not
20 want anything said by the press office to lead
21 journalists in the direction of the wrong official.
22 Q. It has been suggested in certain quarters that your
23 previous evidence to this Inquiry in relation to this
24 matter may have been inaccurate, so perhaps we should
25 take a moment to look at that.

3
1 You gave oral evidence to the Inquiry on
2 27th August. Prior to that, had you provided to
3 the Inquiry a written statement?
4 A. Yes, I had.
5 Q. Do you have a copy of that statement?
6 A. Yes, I do.
7 Q. When did you write that statement?
8 A. It was shortly before my previous appearance. I was
9 required to submit it 24 hours in advance.
10 Q. Could I ask you, please, to read aloud paragraphs 25, 26
11 and 27 of that statement?
12 A. Paragraph 25 begins:
13 "On the morning of Wednesday 9th July,
14 Jonathan Powell suggested that I should write again to
15 Mr Davies but this time with Dr Kelly's name.
16 I discussed this view with the MoD's Director of News,
17 Pam Teare, and other officials. An alternative approach
18 would have been to dispute Mr Davies' point about source
19 protection and repeat the offer in my previous letter.
20 I concluded, however, that we were more likely to obtain
21 a sensible response if we gave the name to the BBC so
22 that the Governors and senior management could establish
23 whether they had been told the truth by Mr Gilligan. My
24 office contacted Mr Davies' secretary in advance to
25 ensure that the letter was sent directly to a fax in his

4
1 own office and that the BBC understood that this letter
2 would not be released to the press. Copies sent to the
3 very limited number of Whitehall recipients were marked
4 accordingly.
5 "26. During the course of Wednesday 9th July the
6 Permanent Secretary told me how the Ministry of Defence
7 press office would deal with press enquiries trying to
8 identify the official referred to in the Ministry of
9 Defence statement. The decision to confirm the name of
10 Dr Kelly if it was put to the MoD directly was to avoid
11 any suggestion that we were in any way misleading
12 journalists. We did not want anyone to claim that we
13 had been less than straightforward in our dealing with
14 them, not least in the light of the FAC's conclusion
15 that Andrew Gilligan's alleged contact should be
16 thoroughly investigated.
17 "27. I did not brief Dr Kelly's name to any
18 journalists, neither was I aware of any strategy to do
19 so. The defensive question and answer material prepared
20 to help the MoD press office respond to possible press
21 enquiries was not put to me for approval and I did not
22 see it at the time."
23 Q. Thank you. Are those the paragraphs of your statement
24 which relate to the events of Wednesday 9th July?
25 A. Yes, they are.

5
1 Q. You refer there to a conversation with Sir Kevin. Do
2 you recall when during 9th July that conversation took
3 place?
4 A. To the best of my recollection it took place immediately
5 before the press meeting that has been referred to.
6 Sir Kevin, quite frequently -- his office is close to
7 mine -- will come in first thing in the morning, put his
8 head around the door and if he wants to raise matters
9 with me, he will do so. He is -- these are not in the
10 nature of formal meetings but if there are matters he
11 wants to clear with me, to check with me, then it is
12 a very regular practice. It happens, I would say, more
13 often than not on the days when we are both in the
14 office together.
15 Q. Can we have on the screen the transcript for
16 27th August, at page 73?
17 LORD HUTTON: Has Mr Hoon a copy?
18 A. I have it, my Lord.
19 LORD HUTTON: I think if you read out any particular passage
20 you want to put to Mr Hoon.
21 MR LLOYD-JONES: I am sorry, I was not aware it was not
22 scanned in.
23 LORD HUTTON: Of course. That is quite understandable.
24 MR LLOYD-JONES: Could I read the passage then Secretary of
25 State?

6
1 LORD HUTTON: Read it as fully as you wish so that everyone
2 can understand the context.
3 MR LLOYD-JONES: Thank you, I will do that. At page 73 we
4 find my Lord putting this -- one should perhaps go back
5 to line 6:
6 "Lord Hutton: Just going back to the question and
7 answer material. I appreciate you say you did not see
8 this material --
9 "Answer: No, my Lord.
10 "Lord Hutton: -- but Ms Pam Teare said that one of
11 the factors that influenced I think her and others in
12 preparing this material was that the press might suggest
13 the names of other MoD officials or persons from the
14 Government as being the source and the view was taken
15 that it would be unfair if that were not denied in case
16 suspicion fell on the wrong people. I appreciate you
17 say you were not concerned with that aspect but what is
18 your view on that, Secretary of State?"
19 The answer which was given was:
20 "Answer: Well, I was aware of certainly
21 Sir Kevin Tebbit raised that with me. He was very
22 concerned that other officials might come under
23 investigation by journalists; and indeed I think it is
24 right that one did find a journalist in his garden
25 approaching his children."

7
1 You go on to make the point it would be wrong to ask
2 press officers to deceive journalists and that would not
3 be appropriate.
4 That conversation with Sir Kevin, Secretary of
5 State, does that refer to the same conversation to which
6 you have just referred or to a different conversation?
7 A. I am fairly confident that it took place immediately
8 before the press meeting.
9 Q. So that passage in your evidence, in the first phase,
10 refers to the same meeting, does it?
11 A. Yes.
12 Q. What did Sir Kevin say on that occasion?
13 A. In the meeting -- essentially he was setting out
14 something that had been previously agreed, that is the
15 night before, as I have understood the evidence, that in
16 the Q and A was a reference to the fact that if
17 a journalist approached the press office with the right
18 name, then that name would be confirmed by press
19 officers; and so essentially what Kevin was doing that
20 morning was just checking with me essentially that
21 I agreed to that approach.
22 Q. Did you approve of that course?
23 A. Yes, I did. We equally had a brief discussion about the
24 options that were available. Clearly, there were three.
25 The press officer could either have told a flat lie to

8
1 journalists, which would not have been appropriate; they
2 could have confirmed it, as we agreed they should; or
3 they could have obfuscated, they could have said: no
4 comment.
5 It was certainly my very strong view, and I think it
6 has been confirmed by journalists who have given
7 evidence to the Inquiry, that no comment was tantamount
8 to admitting the name in question was the right name.
9 Therefore it seemed to Sir Kevin, it was his view and it
10 was certainly my view, that this was the best and most
11 straightforward way of dealing with journalists who had
12 identified correctly the name of the person who had come
13 forward.
14 Q. Did you see any reason to change the approach which had
15 been adopted?
16 A. No, I did not.
17 Q. Did you say so to Sir Kevin?
18 A. I agreed with Sir Kevin. I confirmed the approach that
19 had been previously outlined.
20 Q. Were you the shown the Q and A brief at that time?
21 A. No, I was not.
22 Q. Did you have any other conversations that day with
23 Sir Kevin on the subject of the approach that was being
24 followed by the press office?
25 A. There might have been further conversation with Kevin.

9
1 I attended with him a service to commemorate the
2 conclusion of the Korean War. To the best of my
3 recollection we might have discussed it once more. But
4 it was only in the nature of, in effect, confirming the
5 decision we had previously agreed on.
6 Q. On that occasion were you shown the Q and A brief?
7 A. No, I was not.
8 Q. Did you speak with anyone else during that day,
9 9th July, about the approach that was being followed by
10 the press office at this time?
11 A. Well, I have referred already to the press briefing
12 meeting. That is a regular meeting that occurs in my
13 office first thing in the morning. I have checked my
14 diary for that day; it was scheduled to last from 9
15 until 9.15. I had another meeting that day at 9.15.
16 Towards the end of that meeting there was a further
17 very brief discussion of the practice that Pam Teare,
18 who was present at the meeting, was recommending for the
19 press office, which was that -- consistent with what
20 I had previously agreed with Sir Kevin -- if
21 a journalist came forward with the right name then it
22 would be confirmed by the press office. There was
23 a discussion about the rationale for that; I suspect
24 largely for the benefit of my special adviser,
25 Richard Taylor, who had only learned about the fact that

10
1 someone had come forward the previous evening when he
2 had watched the news. So there was some discussion,
3 really, about the underlying rationale, confirming what
4 had previously been decided.
5 Q. Could you tell us who was present at the meeting?
6 A. I was, Pam Teare, Richard Taylor, my principal private
7 secretary.
8 Q. Were you shown the Q and A brief on that occasion?
9 A. No, I was not.
10 Q. How long did the discussion of the approach taken by the
11 press office last?
12 A. It could only have been a matter of minutes. Normally
13 we would look at the extract of press cuttings that is
14 delivered each day around the Ministry of Defence to see
15 whether there were any issues that we had to deal with.
16 We had a much longer discussion, as I previously
17 indicated, about whether, in fact, to incorporate
18 Dr Kelly's name in a further letter to Mr Davies.
19 I would say that the discussion of the rationale
20 underlying the approach of the press office probably
21 took a couple of minutes at the end of the meeting.
22 I can recall that everyone was anxious to finish the
23 meeting because I had another meeting scheduled for
24 9.15. It is the kind of occasion on which private
25 secretaries put their head around the door to indicate

11
1 that you should be moving things along.
2 Q. Did you agree with the approach that was being taken by
3 the press office?
4 A. Yes, I did.
5 Q. Now, in your oral evidence -- again I am afraid we
6 cannot see it on the screen, but it is page 100 to 101
7 of your evidence on 27th August. Perhaps I can take the
8 same course and read that, just to put this in context.
9 You were asked by my learned friend Mr Dingemans
10 about evidence that Mr Taylor, your special adviser, had
11 confirmed the name of Dr Kelly to journalists. You said
12 that you were not specifically aware of that at the time
13 but that you had learned that had happened, you had
14 learned since that that had happened. You were asked
15 what was your view of that. You said:
16 "Well, I assume that that was consistent with the
17 question and answer process that had been agreed within
18 the department. I do not think it occurred in any
19 earlier timeframe."
20 Then Mr Dingemans asked you:
21 "The question and answers material that your special
22 adviser knows about but you did not?"
23 This is the passage I want to ask you about.
24 A. Hmm, hmm.
25 Q. Your answer:

12
1 "I did not see the question and answer, but I was
2 obviously aware of the advice that I had received that
3 if the right name was given to an MoD press officer they
4 should confirm it. I am not suggesting -- I am not
5 suggesting, for a moment, that I was not aware of that;
6 and obviously my special adviser would have been aware
7 of it as well."
8 Was that answer correct?
9 A. Yes, it was.
10 Q. Why did you consider, at the time, that it was right for
11 the Ministry of Defence to confirm the name of the
12 person who had come forward if it was put?
13 A. Because otherwise having considered the two other
14 options that seemed to be available, neither of the
15 other two options I regarded as being satisfactory. One
16 was to lie; the other would undoubtedly have involved
17 considerable difficulties for press officers trying to
18 maintain a no comment policy, a no comment policy which
19 I know from experience of dealing with journalists they
20 would simply have regarded as some sort of confirmation.
21 I think, my Lord, it was Mr Blitz who said just that in
22 his evidence to the Inquiry.
23 Q. With the benefit of hindsight do you still consider that
24 it was the right thing to do?
25 A. Yes, I do.

13
1 Q. Could I ask you now to cast your mind back to the
2 previous day, the 8th July.
3 On 8th July, the day that the press statement was
4 released, had you formed any view as to the likelihood
5 of Dr Kelly's name being discovered by the press had the
6 Ministry of Defence not issued the press statement?
7 A. Yes. As I think I gave evidence on the last occasion,
8 my Lord, it was a consistent view of all of those who
9 had to deal with this problem that sooner rather than
10 later Dr Kelly's name would emerge. Right from the
11 beginning when Dr Kelly in his letter indicated why he
12 had come forward, he said that it was because
13 a colleague had identified his words in the version that
14 Andrew Gilligan gave to the Foreign Affairs Committee,
15 that those words were so distinctive, so associated with
16 Dr Kelly, that she mentioned it to him. And given that
17 if one person could identify Dr Kelly's views in the
18 mouth of Andrew Gilligan, then it would hardly be
19 surprising if others did the same. And the way in which
20 these things worked, I think everyone assumed that
21 sooner rather than later Dr Kelly's name would emerge.
22 Q. Were you told anything by your officials as to whether
23 Dr Kelly had been given any warning or advice as to the
24 likelihood of his identity becoming public?
25 A. Certainly on the Friday, in the course of the first

14
1 interview with Richard Hatfield I had understood --
2 I had been told that Richard Hatfield had made it very
3 clear that it was very likely that his name would emerge
4 and that Dr Kelly -- I think the word used -- had
5 accepted that.
6 Q. Was anything reported to you about the press office
7 contacts with Dr Kelly?
8 A. On the Friday, I know from the evidence that they would
9 have prepared routinely a question and answer brief to
10 deal with the possibility that the name might emerge
11 over the weekend. I certainly recall having discussions
12 over the weekend about what we would do if a Sunday
13 newspaper, for example, discovered that Dr Kelly had
14 come forward.
15 Q. My question was directed rather to whether anything had
16 been reported to you about contacts made by the press
17 office with Dr Kelly to advise him?
18 A. Well, that happened on the Tuesday, on 8th July, that as
19 the press statement was being drafted and prepared the
20 press office contacted Dr Kelly, I think it was
21 Kate Wilson, to warn him of the likelihood that he would
22 be approached by members of the press and that he should
23 take appropriate action. I think she suggested to him
24 that it might be sensible for a short period for him to
25 find somewhere else to live in order to avoid unwelcome

15
1 attention from the press.
2 Q. Did you ask any of your officials to report to you on
3 Dr Kelly's welfare?
4 A. Yes, I did. I regularly asked my private secretary to
5 ensure that someone was in contact with Dr Kelly. He
6 reported to me that Bryan Wells, who was formally
7 Dr Kelly's line manager -- but I was very -- I was given
8 a very clear impression that the two men got on well
9 together and Bryan Wells was taking a personal interest
10 in Dr Kelly's welfare; even to the extent, I am not
11 quite sure when I was told this but I was well aware
12 that Mr Wells had cancelled a trip to the United States
13 in order to remain in the United Kingdom precisely to
14 fulfil that function.
15 I felt that there was, in my case, a balance to be
16 struck in taking an interest in Dr Kelly's welfare but
17 at the same time not interfering in what was a personnel
18 process. I did not want anyone to suggest there was
19 political interference in the decisions and the
20 approaches being taken by those responsible for
21 individual personnel matters.
22 Q. Turning, then, to another matter, Secretary of State.
23 On 10th July you received a letter from
24 Mr Donald Anderson stating that the FAC wished Dr Kelly
25 to give evidence. We know that in due course you took

16
1 a decision that Dr Kelly should give evidence both to
2 the FAC and the ISC. Do you recall the matters in
3 respect of which Mr Anderson wanted Dr Kelly to give
4 evidence?
5 A. Essentially as I would have expected. Mr Anderson was
6 concerned about the fact that the Committee had
7 previously heard evidence from both Mr Campbell and
8 Mr Gilligan and they were concerned about what light
9 potentially Dr Kelly might throw on that. So the letter
10 from Donald Anderson was couched in those terms. It was
11 in the context of their previous findings and
12 deliberations.
13 Q. Yes. Could we have on the screen, please, MoD/1/73?
14 This is the letter of 10th July from Mr Anderson to you.
15 If we could scroll down, please. We see there:
16 "You will wish to know that the Clerk is writing to
17 Dr Kelly today, inviting him to appear before the
18 Committee to give oral evidence in public on Tuesday
19 15 July, on questions directly relevant to the
20 Committee's report published earlier this week, arising
21 from the MoD statement of 9 July."
22 Could we have on the screen, please, MoD/1/82.
23 Again, if we scroll down to the final paragraph of
24 the first page we see this:
25 "Although the FAC has now completed its own inquiry,

17
1 I can understand why you also wish to see Dr Kelly.
2 I am prepared to agree to this on the clear
3 understanding that Dr Kelly will be questioned only on
4 those matters which are directly relevant to the
5 evidence that you were given by Andrew Gilligan, and not
6 on the wider issue of Iraqi WMD and the preparation of
7 the dossier. Dr Kelly was not involved in the process
8 of drawing up the intelligence parts of the dossier."
9 Secretary of State, why did you make that
10 stipulation limiting the scope of evidence?
11 A. In a sense it begins from the original letter from
12 Mr Anderson, which indicated that he wanted to ask
13 Dr Kelly questions arising out of the report that the
14 FAC had concluded.
15 I think a second factor was that obviously the issue
16 for Dr Kelly and the Committee was what had taken place
17 between Dr Kelly and Andrew Gilligan. He was the only
18 person in a position to give evidence of that kind; and
19 it seemed right, consistent with what Donald Anderson
20 had asked me, that that limitation should be there.
21 I also had in mind, because it was contained in the
22 original evidence -- sorry, in the original submission
23 from Sir Kevin Tebbit, I had in mind that it was likely,
24 at that stage, that Dr Kelly would be giving evidence to
25 two different Committees on the same day; and therefore

18
1 limiting the amount of time picked up, in a sense, the
2 point that Kevin Tebbit had made that I should have
3 regard to the man, that is, that he should not be
4 subject to two back-to-back inquiries that were of the
5 usual length. The usual length, in my experience of an
6 appearance before a Parliamentary Committee, is in the
7 order of 2 and a half hours. It would not seem to me to
8 be right to subject someone to two back-to-back two and
9 a half hour sessions.
10 Q. What was Mr Anderson's reply?
11 A. Well, what he said in his reply was:
12 "I share your clear understanding of the scope and
13 duration of the questioning."
14 Indeed, having looked at this letter since, he could
15 have said: I reluctantly accept, or: I am bound by your
16 request. What he actually said was that he shared my
17 view. I took that to mean that he agreed entirely with
18 the approach that I had taken.
19 MR LLOYD-JONES: Secretary of State, thank you very much.
20 LORD HUTTON: Thank you, Mr Lloyd-Jones.
21 Mr Gompertz.
22 Cross-examination by MR GOMPERTZ
23 Q. Secretary of State, apart from the Walter Mitty slur for
24 which Mr Tom Kelly has made an unreserved apology, is
25 there anything at all which you feel that the Government

19
1 or the Ministry of Defence have done wrong in relation
2 to the matters with which this Inquiry is concerned?
3 A. Having followed your cross-examination carefully, over
4 several days, I can see that there may be judgments
5 about the precise timing of particular decisions, the
6 precise point at which those decisions had an effect,
7 which are within what I would describe as the reasonable
8 range of judgments that people can take when confronted
9 with these situations. But if you mean were any of
10 those outside those reasonable range of judgments, so
11 far out as to be wrong, then I would say not.
12 Q. So no systemic failure by the MoD or anything of that
13 kind?
14 A. No, I do not believe so.
15 Q. Merely errors of judgment made by individuals in
16 relation to minor matters?
17 A. In fact I did not say errors of judgment, no. In fact,
18 I was at pains to avoid saying that. I said in any
19 given situation when people exercise their judgment
20 there are reasonable judgments they can take. They may
21 not necessarily always take the same judgment. That
22 does not mean because they differ that they are errors.
23 Q. So no errors, in effect?
24 A. What I am saying is that there are -- there is the
25 possibility that different people, with the benefit of

20
1 hindsight, might have judged that the decisions could
2 have been taken slightly differently. What I would be
3 at pains to emphasise is I do not believe this would
4 have had any material effect.
5 Q. Your stance when you gave evidence on 27th August was
6 that it would have been quite wrong to make Dr Kelly's
7 name public, wholly inappropriate to do so, until you
8 were sure that he was the single source of Mr Gilligan's
9 material.
10 A. I believe, and I still believe, that it would have been
11 wrong to volunteer his name without having that
12 confidence.
13 Q. You made that point, I think I am right in saying, on
14 a review of your evidence on the previous occasion, no
15 fewer than eight times.
16 A. Well, that does not surprise me. I have not counted
17 them but it was something that was firmly in my mind.
18 Q. And you never were sure that he was Mr Gilligan's single
19 source until after his death, were you?
20 A. I said that on the last occasion.
21 Q. Yes. Would you like, then, to look at TVP/3/238 which
22 will come up on your screen, which is the text of an
23 interview which you had with Mr Peter Sissons after
24 Dr Kelly had died.
25 A. Yes.

21
1 Q. Do you want to find the paper copy?
2 A. Yes, please, if I may. Yes, I have it. Thank you.
3 Q. What you said in answer to Mr Sissons' allegation that
4 your Department and you personally outed Dr Kelly as the
5 probable mole was that that was simply not right, as
6 evidence from the Department will show you followed very
7 carefully established MoD procedures and that certainly,
8 as far as you personally were concerned, "We protected
9 his anonymity".
10 Is that right?
11 A. That is what I said, certainly.
12 Q. Was what you said to Mr Sissons correct?
13 A. Yes.
14 Q. You, personally, named Dr Kelly in a letter to the BBC,
15 did you not?
16 A. In a private letter to the Chairman of the Governors,
17 yes.
18 Q. Yes. Do you want to look at that, or not?
19 A. I am fairly familiar with it.
20 Q. It is MoD/1/71.
21 A. Yes. Yes.
22 Q. Was that protecting Dr Kelly's anonymity, Mr Hoon?
23 A. I think writing a letter in confidence to the Chairman
24 of the BBC, having taken some trouble to ensure that it
25 was only seen by Mr Davies, is protecting his anonymity,

22
1 yes.
2 Q. Whose idea was it that you should embark on this
3 strategy with the BBC?
4 A. There had been some considerable discussions, over
5 a number of days, about the best way to identify whether
6 or not, first of all, Dr Kelly was Andrew Gilligan's
7 primary source, and whether the BBC would acknowledge
8 that fact.
9 Q. Yes. Whose idea was it that this strategy should be
10 implemented?
11 A. Well, I think we had had a number of discussions. I had
12 certainly had them over the weekend with
13 Alastair Campbell. I had discussed it, again, with him
14 on the Monday evening. Although I was not present at
15 the meeting on Tuesday that took place in the Cabinet
16 Office, I assume that it was discussed there as well
17 because on the Wednesday morning, as I have just given
18 evidence, I had a message from Jonathan Powell, which
19 I took to be on behalf of the Prime Minister, saying
20 that it was now appropriate, as far as they were
21 concerned, that I could privately mention to
22 Gavyn Davies that the person who had come forward was,
23 in fact, Dr Kelly.
24 Q. I am not concerned with the dispute between the
25 Government and the BBC, although it may be that others

23
1 will be. All I want to ask you is the question that
2 I have already put: do you consider that this tactic was
3 protecting Dr Kelly's anonymity?
4 A. I could see no reason why, in a confidential letter sent
5 to the Chairman of the BBC, that this would result in
6 Dr Kelly's name being widely known. Indeed, having
7 looked at the evidence, I do not think it did.
8 Q. Can we go back, please, to TVP/3/238, the interview with
9 Mr Sissons? You see, you were asked this question, were
10 you not, by Mr Sissons about halfway down the page:
11 "Whose idea was it to name him in the letter to the
12 BBC which was subsequently leaked?"
13 You answered:
14 "As I say there was a careful procedure within the
15 MoD, the procedures of the MoD were scrupulously
16 followed. And it was, at an appropriate stage, judged
17 that given the prospect of the name of Dr Kelly being
18 revealed in any event, that it was better to invite the
19 BBC to comment, rather than to allow there to be the
20 kind of chase by the media that we've seen all too often
21 in these kinds of circumstances. Again, these are
22 matters for the inquiry."
23 The first question I ask you about that is: what are
24 these careful procedures of the MoD which were
25 scrupulously followed?

24
1 A. Well, there were personnel procedures. As I indicated
2 to the Inquiry before, it was my judgment that those
3 were best left in the hands of those responsible,
4 ultimately the Permanent Secretary. He delegated the
5 responsibility of interviewing Dr Kelly to the personnel
6 director, Richard Hatfield.
7 I have read his evidence. It confirms it is
8 consistent with what I was told at the time. He looked
9 at this matter, first of all, on the basis of whether or
10 not there was a disciplinary issue. Having decided that
11 there was not, he then conducted a further interview
12 with Dr Kelly. As I understand it, that is consistent
13 with Ministry of Defence personnel procedures.
14 Q. There are no procedures for naming civil servants, are
15 there?
16 A. I did not name Dr Kelly other than in a private letter
17 to --
18 Q. That is not the question I asked you, Mr Hoon. I am
19 very sorry to interrupt you.
20 There are no procedures for naming civil servants,
21 are there?
22 A. Well, I think that is not the fairest way of putting
23 this issue. The issue is whether the procedures were
24 followed. The procedures, as I have indicated, were
25 followed. Since I did not name Dr Kelly other than in

25
1 relation to the letter that I wrote privately to
2 Gavyn Davies, I am not sure where your question takes
3 us.
4 Q. Well, let us see. What I suggest to you is that there
5 was a deliberate Government strategy to leak Dr Kelly's
6 name into the public arena without appearing to do so,
7 by a combination of the press statement, the question
8 and answer material, the Prime Minister's official
9 spokesman press briefing and other leaks which appear to
10 have taken place to the press. That is what I suggest.
11 A. Well, you have put that point to a number of witnesses;
12 they have all denied it; and I deny it.
13 Q. His name was leaked, was it not?
14 A. Not by me.
15 Q. No?
16 A. No.
17 Q. Because, let us just finish with this document on
18 TVP/3 --
19 A. I apologise for interrupting you. But the suggestion
20 you are making is there is some evidence that I leaked
21 it. Perhaps you would indicate where it is so that
22 I can comment on it.
23 Q. We will come to that in just a moment.
24 What I am going to ask you next is this, Mr Hoon.
25 You say about two-thirds of the way down that document:

26
1 "I'm not aware that his name was leaked. It was
2 certainly not leaked by me, and I assure ['you' it must
3 be] that we made great efforts to ensure Dr Kelly's
4 anonymity."
5 A. That is right, yes.
6 Q. What efforts did you make or did the MoD make to ensure
7 Dr Kelly's anonymity?
8 A. Well, first of all, the knowledge of his name was
9 limited to a very small number of people within the
10 Ministry of Defence. I gave evidence on the last
11 occasion that I was not told of his name until the
12 Friday evening in a conversation with the Permanent
13 Secretary. I did not tell my own special adviser until
14 Wednesday 9th July. He learned about it from a news
15 bulletin the previous evening. My principal private
16 secretary did not tell other members of the office of
17 what had occurred.
18 My office removed all identifying details from the
19 copy of Dr Kelly's letter faxed to my constituency
20 office on Friday 4th July because I did not have
21 a secure line in my constituency office.
22 Before we sent the private letter to Gavyn Davies we
23 assured there was a fax line immediately available to
24 him, again to ensure the letter did not fall into other
25 hands.

27
1 The press statement did not contain details about
2 the name of Dr Kelly. Despite efforts by a number of
3 journalists to require the press office to identify him
4 by name, that was resisted.
5 A whole series of steps were taken to protect
6 Dr Kelly's anonymity.
7 Q. Would you like to look at the press statement which was
8 issued? MoD/1/67, please.
9 A. Could you give me the date, it assists me in finding
10 the --
11 Q. It was issued on 8th July at 5.45 pm.
12 A. Thank you. Yes. I have it there, yes.
13 Q. First of all, there is the obvious point in line 1, it
14 was stated that the person was an individual working in
15 the MoD; right?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Then if you go to the third paragraph:
18 "The individual is an expert on WMD who has advised
19 Ministers on WMD and whose contribution to the dossier
20 of September 2002 was to contribute towards drafts of
21 historical accounts of UN inspections."
22 That is a pretty limited class of persons, is it
23 not?
24 A. It is obviously a limited class. Whether it is "pretty
25 limited" I think depends on how much information you

28
1 have at the time about Dr Kelly. It seems to me clear
2 that those journalists who had had contact with Dr Kelly
3 would have thought that this was referring to him.
4 Those journalists who had not had contact with Dr Kelly,
5 I doubt this would have assisted them.
6 Q. This was a press statement, was it not?
7 A. Yes, it was.
8 Q. So journalists were going to receive it, obviously. And
9 they were going to follow the leads given in it, were
10 they not?
11 A. I have no doubt that journalists throughout this period
12 were trying to identify who was the source of
13 Andrew Gilligan when he had his conversations, yes.
14 Q. In your desire to protect Dr Kelly's anonymity at all
15 times, did you consider that this press statement might
16 alert journalists?
17 A. I did not consider that it would alert journalists in
18 the sense you are suggesting. It certainly inevitably
19 meant that their interest in this matter would be
20 heightened, yes.
21 Q. I mean, for example, we have evidence from
22 Mr Norton-Taylor of the Guardian. He said that it
23 whetted his appetite, which I have no doubt is
24 substantial.
25 Did that occur to you?

29
1 A. I have just answered your question. I recognise that
2 the issuing of a statement was likely to lead to
3 journalists wanting even more than they had previously
4 to identify Andrew Gilligan's source. But there is
5 clear evidence that journalists were already looking for
6 Andrew Gilligan's source. I accept that this was bound
7 to increase their enthusiasm for making that
8 identification.
9 Q. You also became aware, did you not, of what was said at
10 two press briefings by the Prime Minister's official
11 spokesman, Mr Tom Kelly, on 9th July?
12 A. I became aware afterwards, yes.
13 Q. Yes. I do not want to take up a lot of time looking at
14 the documents, but since you have looked at them, would
15 you agree with me that amongst other bits of information
16 given on that occasion was the fact that the person
17 concerned was a technical expert? I can give you the
18 reference if you --
19 A. I think I have it, actually -- I have a record of the
20 Lobby.
21 Q. Thank you. A technical expert; right? Try CAB/1/220,
22 if that helps you.
23 A. Well, in any event, I am absolutely clear that I had no
24 contact with anyone who was responsible for giving that
25 briefing before it took place.

30
1 Q. Yes. I am putting to you a rather wider point at the
2 moment, that the Government as a whole had decided on
3 a strategy which would leak Dr Kelly's name into the
4 public arena, with a view to him giving evidence before
5 the FAC. Now, is that a strategy that you recognise or
6 not?
7 A. No, it is not; and indeed I do not believe that there is
8 the slightest shred of evidence for that assertion.
9 Q. Let us go back to the briefing by Mr Kelly on 9th July.
10 He said the following things, did he not: that the
11 person concerned was a technical expert?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. That he worked for a variety of Government departments?
14 A. He actually said for a "number", but yes.
15 Q. Very well. That he was currently working for the
16 Ministry of Defence?
17 A. Yes.
18 Q. That his salary was paid by another department?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. That he was on secondment to the MoD?
21 A. (Pause). I cannot actually see that, but I will take
22 your word for it.
23 Q. Thank you. That the nature of his work meant that he
24 was more of a consultant than a secondee? (Pause). We
25 can go to the passages if you are doubtful about them,

31
1 but I am trying to save time. Do you follow?
2 A. I do follow.
3 Q. Are you happy with that or not?
4 A. I cannot see it at the moment, but I will take that from
5 you.
6 Q. Thank you. And that there were only a few people who
7 were paid a salary by this particular Department but
8 worked for other Departments?
9 A. Perhaps you could refer me to specifically that part of
10 it.
11 Q. Yes. If you look at --
12 LORD HUTTON: Can we have that on the screen? CAB/1/220.
13 MR GOMPERTZ: Certainly, my Lord. 220.
14 A. Could you give me the date of that?
15 Q. Yes, of course. It is 9th July.
16 A. The morning Lobby briefing?
17 Q. I am actually looking at the afternoon. There was
18 information given at the morning one as well.
19 A. Sorry, that is where my confusion arises.
20 Q. I am so sorry. Page 220. CAB/1/220, bottom of the
21 page. I will not go through it all again. If you could
22 just read the last three lines of 220; and then if we
23 can go over to 221, please, to the top of the page.
24 I think you will see that the matters that I have been
25 putting are all there?

32
1 A. Hmm. There are two Lobby briefings in the course of
2 each day and I was looking at the first one.
3 Q. I understand. Do you see the point that was troubling
4 you?
5 A. Yes, I do. Thank you.
6 Q. "... the PMOS said that providing this information [as
7 to who paid his salary] would make it easier to identify
8 him given the fact that there were only a few people who
9 were paid a salary by this particular Department but who
10 worked for other Departments."
11 Right?
12 A. Hmm.
13 Q. If you just go down the page on 221 --
14 A. Sorry, this is what was confusing me. This was
15 a question put to him. This was: "Asked why..."
16 Q. Yes. "Asked why we were --
17 A. Asked if he was paid by the FCO, the PMOS declined to
18 answer the question on the grounds that he did not want
19 to do anything which might identify who the person was.
20 Q. Can we read it:
21 "Asked why we were so reluctant to say which
22 department paid his salary, the PMOS said that providing
23 this information would make it easier to identify him
24 [then these words] given the fact that there were only
25 a few people who were paid a salary by this particular

33
1 Department but who worked for other Departments."
2 Quite right he did not identify which Department it
3 was which paid his salary, but there were only a few
4 people who were paid a salary by that Department but who
5 worked for other Departments. That is the point I am
6 making. Do you follow?
7 A. I do follow.
8 Q. Thank you. Would you now go down to the middle of the
9 next --
10 LORD HUTTON: Is there any point you want to make on that,
11 Secretary of State? You have in sense, I think, already
12 made a point.
13 A. I am somewhat puzzled as to why I am being asked
14 questions about what someone else said in relation to
15 a briefing I had no part in and which I could not
16 reasonably have anticipated was going to be given in
17 this way.
18 MR GOMPERTZ: For the reason I have already put to you, that
19 this was not just a strategy devised by the MoD, was it?
20 This was a Government strategy.
21 LORD HUTTON: Is your evidence, Secretary of State, that
22 whatever may have been the strategy in the minds of
23 other people, you were not aware of this strategy and
24 you were not aware that this information would be given
25 out at the Lobby briefing? Is that what you are saying?

34
1 A. That is exactly my position, my Lord.
2 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
3 A. Learned counsel is suggesting there was some sort of
4 a conspiracy right across Government for all these
5 people to be involved in giving out small parts of
6 information which he has concluded provided a picture.
7 But there is just no evidence of that, my Lord.
8 Certainly as far as I am concerned there was no such
9 conspiracy.
10 LORD HUTTON: I think Mr Gompertz is putting to you that
11 there was a conspiracy on the part of the Government as
12 a whole. You have said, as far as you were concerned,
13 you were not aware of that.
14 A. Yes.
15 LORD HUTTON: Do you want to add anything further on that
16 point that Mr Gompertz has put to you?
17 A. Not only was I not aware of it, I would be extremely
18 surprised, not only in the light of the evidence which
19 your Lordship has heard but also what I knew of what was
20 going on elsewhere in Government, if that is a possible
21 argument that any reasonable person could make.
22 MR GOMPERTZ: Well, thank you for that, Mr Hoon.
23 Are you suggesting that No. 10 is in the habit of
24 issuing press briefings concerning a particular
25 Department, in this case your Department, without any

35
1 consultation whatsoever?
2 A. That is a very difficult question to answer precisely.
3 I am sure that as and when issues arise -- bear in mind
4 that journalists who attend these Lobby briefings are
5 trying to catch out the briefers on a range of issues
6 and will ask all sorts of questions, some of which may
7 be anticipated given the news of the day, some of which
8 may not. So I think strictly the answer to your
9 question is that by and large it would not always be
10 possible for, on every occasion, the briefers to consult
11 with the Department. They would simply have no notice
12 of the questions that were coming up.
13 Q. In this particular instance this was the story of the
14 moment, was it not?
15 A. Yes, it was.
16 Q. Yes. So are you saying that what Mr Tom Kelly said on
17 this occasion was without your knowledge in any shape or
18 form?
19 A. It was without my knowledge in any shape or form, yes.
20 Q. Let me ask you about the Q and A material which you have
21 been asked about again this morning. What you are
22 saying, as I understand it, is that on 9th July you did
23 not actually see the Q and A material; have I understood
24 correctly?
25 A. That is absolutely right. I did not actually see it at

36
1 all.
2 Q. It was never passed to you so that you held it in your
3 hand or had it in front of you?
4 A. That is right.
5 Q. But that there was some discussion about some of the
6 content of it?
7 A. One aspect of what was in the Q and A document, yes.
8 Q. Yes. Do I understand that you have a copy of the
9 transcript of your previous evidence in front of you?
10 A. Yes, I do.
11 Q. Because you were asked about one passage and one passage
12 only where you dealt with the Q and A material on the
13 previous occasion. I would like to ask you about the
14 other two. Could you, please, turn to page 52 of the
15 internal numbering?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. You see at line 6 you are asked:
18 "Question: Do you know whether or not Dr Kelly was
19 told about the draft Q and A material and the Q and A
20 material as deployed?"
21 A. Hmm.
22 Q. You answer:
23 "Answer: I do not, no." Then you go on to
24 volunteer: "But can I make clear that I did not see
25 either of these documents." That so far is consistent

37
1 with what you have said this morning. Then you go on:
2 "They were not submitted to my office. That would not
3 be something that I would normally deal with."
4 What about, "They were not submitted to my office",
5 Mr Hoon? Was that the whole truth?
6 A. So far as I am aware, yes.
7 Q. But they were in your office, you have just told us this
8 morning.
9 A. I do not think I have actually, no.
10 Q. What, the Q and A material?
11 A. I do not think I have said that they were in my office.
12 Q. Well, they were discussed.
13 A. That is not the same thing.
14 Q. Oh, I see. Are you not aware of the evidence of
15 Ms Pam Teare?
16 A. Yes, I read her evidence very carefully.
17 Q. That she probably had a copy with her.
18 A. I think, with the greatest respect, that is a very bad
19 point. I cannot anticipate what Ms Teare had with her
20 at the time. I gave you the evidence to the best of my
21 knowledge and recollection. If I may say so, I thought
22 that you seriously misled Pam Teare as to the facts
23 before the Inquiry.
24 Q. I do not seem to be doing very well, Mr Hoon, in your
25 judgment.

38
1 A. You put to Pam Teare -- this is the point -- I think it
2 is important. You put to Pam Teare that there was
3 evidence in the Inquiry that there was a discussion
4 about the Q and A. In fact, I have not been able to
5 find any such evidence. I think you are probably
6 referring to what Mr Richard Taylor said.
7 Q. Yes, I was.
8 A. Well, Richard Taylor said categorically that there was
9 no such discussion.
10 Q. I do not think so but let us --
11 A. I can give you the quotation.
12 LORD HUTTON: I think we should look at the transcript of
13 Mr Taylor's evidence. Do you have a reference to the
14 part of his evidence, Mr Hoon, that you want to refer
15 to?
16 A. Well, it is at page 81 of Mr Taylor's evidence, my Lord.
17 He said:
18 "I would not call it a discussion of the Q and A
19 material."
20 LORD HUTTON: I think perhaps if you would like to read from
21 line 2 of 81. Do you have that before you, Mr Gompertz?
22 MR GOMPERTZ: I do my Lord, yes.
23 LORD HUTTON: If you would like to read from line 2 of 81,
24 Mr Hoon.
25 A. My Lord, I only have my notes. I do not have the

39
1 full --
2 LORD HUTTON: I think you should.
3 Do we have a spare copy of the transcript we could
4 put before Mr Hoon?
5 MR GOMPERTZ: I am sure we can provide one, my Lord. It may
6 just take a moment.
7 LORD HUTTON: Yes, certainly. (Pause).
8 MR GOMPERTZ: I am afraid we cannot help, I am sorry about
9 that.
10 LORD HUTTON: If I may burden you, Mr Gompertz, would you
11 like to read from line 2 of page 81, I think down to
12 page 82 to about line 3, or further if you wish.
13 MR GOMPERTZ: Certainly, my Lord. That is certainly one of
14 the passages in mind. Line 2 on page 81 Mr Taylor was
15 asked -- Mr Hoon now I think has a copy:
16 "Although you have not been party to any of the
17 discussions which led to the press statement --
18 A. Can you remind me which line you are at?
19 Q. Line 2, page 81:
20 "Although you have not been party to any of the
21 discussions which led to the press statement being
22 issued, or indeed the Q and A material, was anything
23 mentioned about the press statement at that morning
24 meeting?
25 "Answer: Not specifically about the press

40
1 statement.
2 "Question: Was anything mentioned about the Q and A
3 material?
4 "Answer: At the end of a discussion on how to
5 follow up the letter to Mr Davies there was a brief
6 discussion on what we should do if journalists were to
7 ring and put the name directly to the Department of who
8 the official was. I would not call it a discussion of
9 the Q and A material. There was a discussion of one of
10 the questions, which I have since learnt was in the
11 Q and A material.
12 "Question: Was there any discussion about the other
13 questions in the Q and A material?
14 "Answer: No, not --
15 "Question: Was he a member of UNSCOM et cetera?
16 "Answer: No, to the best of my recollection we only
17 discussed the rationale for what to do if the name was
18 put directly to the Department.
19 "Question: What was the debate or was there
20 a debate or you were all of one view?
21 "Answer: The Director of News outlined the approach
22 which had been agreed the previous evening for use by
23 the press office as the statement was published.
24 "Question: Who did she say had agreed that?
25 "Answer: She did not at the time say who had agreed

41
1 it. She was outlining material which she, as Director
2 of News, and her press office were using. I, at the
3 time, would have assumed it was written by her."
4 I think we can stop there. So Mr Taylor, I suggest,
5 is making it clear that there was some discussion of one
6 aspect of the Q and A material.
7 A. What you have put to Ms Teare that I was complaining
8 about, you put to her that we have some evidence to
9 suggest that the Secretary of State saw the Q and A
10 document. That was simply not right. There is no such
11 evidence.
12 Q. I think I asked her whether she could say whether you
13 did see it.
14 A. No, no, I am quoting you directly, Mr Gompertz.
15 LORD HUTTON: Mr Hoon, I will look at the transcript.
16 I have your point on this, yes.
17 A. But I think, Mr Gompertz, if I may explain: you are not
18 properly understanding the way in which a Q and A
19 document works. A Q and A document is prepared for the
20 use of press officers. It is not something that comes
21 to my office. It is based on decisions that are taken
22 by the Department as a whole as a guidance for press
23 officers when they are answering questions put to them
24 by journalists. If I may give you an example: at around
25 this time we were taking a decision on which particular

42
1 training aircraft should be purchased for the Royal Air
2 Force. Eventually a decision was taken on which
3 aircraft we would choose. That would have been, I am
4 sure -- I have never seen it, but I am sure that would
5 have been incorporated into a question and answer
6 document, but I would not have needed to see the answer
7 to the question which I am sure was likely to be the
8 first question: which training aircraft has the Ministry
9 of Defence decided to purchase? It would have then
10 given the answer. But I would not have needed to see
11 that because in fact it was simply reflecting decisions
12 previously taken by the Ministry of Defence, in exactly
13 the same way that I take it that this question and
14 answer document was reflecting the views taken in the
15 Department.
16 MR GOMPERTZ: Can I ask you now, then, to look at another
17 passage in your evidence on the previous occasion?
18 Page 69, line 17 is the question. Do you have that?
19 A. Yes, I have.
20 Q. I do not think I need read the question, in fact. But
21 at line 22 you say this:
22 "I did not see this Q and A and played no part in
23 its preparation, so it is a little difficult for me to
24 comment about any underlying purpose."
25 Is that an answer that you stand by?

43
1 A. Well, the Q and A had been prepared the night before.
2 Q. Yes. So you do stand --
3 A. Therefore I played no part in its preparation.
4 Q. Even though there was discussion about it the following
5 morning in your office?
6 A. I was asked by the Permanent Secretary whether
7 I confirmed the document that had been prepared the
8 night before, as far as one small aspect of it was
9 concerned, which was the decision to confirm Dr Kelly's
10 name if a journalist got it right, and I agreed to that.
11 But that was the only issue that was raised with me by
12 either the Permanent Secretary or indeed in the
13 subsequent press briefing meeting.
14 Q. So apart from those matters, you had no knowledge of the
15 Q and A material being prepared in your Department at
16 all?
17 A. Not until I saw the Q and A document much later, no.
18 Q. Did it occur to you that the material contained in the
19 Q and A document might lead to the identification of
20 Dr Kelly if the right questions were asked by
21 journalists?
22 A. Well, with the benefit of hindsight I can see that the
23 answers to some of those questions might have assisted
24 journalists in that process, yes.
25 Q. But you did not, at the time, think to look through the

44
1 document in its entirety in order to continue your
2 avowed intention of protecting Dr Kelly's identity at
3 all times?
4 A. Well, I have made clear on more than one occasion that
5 this is a routine process entered into for the benefit
6 of press officers answering questions put to them by
7 journalists. It has never been my practice to go
8 through the Q and As which I am sure are routinely
9 prepared in relation to a whole range of subjects in the
10 Ministry of Defence.
11 Q. Can I turn to another topic? I believe that you had
12 a telephone conversation with Mr Alastair Campbell on
13 the morning of Saturday 5th July.
14 A. Yes, I did.
15 Q. You told us about that, I think, on the previous
16 occasion, as indeed Mr Campbell has given evidence about
17 it.
18 Can you tell us who called who, please?
19 A. I am confident that I called him.
20 Q. Yes. For what purpose?
21 A. I had seen a story in that morning's Times, written by
22 Tom Baldwin, which seemed to indicate some greater
23 knowledge of the identity of Andrew Gilligan's primary
24 source than, for example, I had been able to glean from
25 any evidence that Andrew Gilligan had given before the

45
1 Foreign Affairs Committee. So it seemed to me that
2 Tom Baldwin had some information that was not readily
3 available otherwise.
4 Q. Somehow Mr Campbell came to write in his diary the two
5 words "plea bargain".
6 A. Hmm.
7 Q. How did that come about?
8 A. Well, I cannot strictly answer that question but, as
9 I indicated on the last occasion, we had a conversation
10 about the process that I think I have already described
11 to the Inquiry today; a process whereby initially there
12 was a consideration of whether or not there were any
13 disciplinary questions that Dr Kelly might face,
14 followed by a recognition that having come forward
15 voluntarily, apparently cooperating, that the matter
16 could be dealt with in a different light. And I believe
17 what I told the Inquiry on the last occasion, and I
18 stand by, is that that description might have led
19 Mr Campbell to see this in terms of, journalistic
20 shorthand, a plea bargain.
21 Q. What Mr Campbell wrote in his diary, as I understand it,
22 is this:
23 "GH said his initial instinct was to throw the book
24 at him but in fact there was a case for trying to get
25 some kind of plea bargain."

46
1 Do you recognise that statement?
2 A. Well, I have seen those words.
3 Q. Well, do you recognise those words as words spoken by
4 you during this telephone conversation?
5 A. No, I do not. I indicated to the Inquiry on the last
6 occasion that I recognised them as journalistic
7 shorthand for rather a long explanation that I had given
8 to Alastair about what had, by then, taken place.
9 Q. You know perfectly well the meaning of the expression
10 "plea bargain", do you not? Lord Hutton took you
11 through it last time, did he not?
12 A. He did.
13 Q. And you know it anyway having practised at the bar
14 yourself.
15 A. I am well aware of it.
16 Q. Yes. How could that expression, on your account of
17 matters, have any relevance to what you were discussing
18 with Mr Campbell?
19 A. As I indicated on the last occasion, Dr Kelly was coming
20 forward, he volunteered, he appeared to be cooperating.
21 That -- perhaps you would be best putting these matters
22 to Mr Campbell, but that is an aspect, at any rate, of
23 what happens where there is a plea bargain, someone
24 cooperates with the authorities.
25 Q. What you are talking about, someone coming forward,

47
1 cooperating and so on, that is mitigation, is it not?
2 There is no element of a bargain there.
3 A. No, there is not; and I was at great pains to emphasise
4 that there was no bargain; and indeed when you put that
5 I think to Mr Hatfield, he said there was no bargain.
6 Nothing followed from this conversation at all. There
7 is no evidence at all anywhere that anyone entered into
8 any kind of a bargain with Dr Kelly.
9 Q. The fact that he had come forward and said voluntarily
10 what he had in his letter and then in the interview of
11 4th July, those were matters in the past, were they not,
12 when you were speaking to Mr Campbell?
13 A. Well, to the best of my recollection, on the Saturday
14 morning I was describing to him -- I was relaying to him
15 second-hand conversations because I was describing to
16 him what I had been told by the Permanent Secretary.
17 Q. How could there be, I quote, "a case for trying to get
18 some kind of plea bargain" in the future?
19 A. Sorry, I do not follow that.
20 Q. How could it be that you were saying that there was
21 a case for trying to get some kind of plea bargain?
22 A. I was not.
23 Q. Did you say anything that might have led Mr Campbell to
24 write down words of that kind?
25 A. Well, I think I have explained my understanding of this

48
1 exchange. I took Alastair Campbell through what had
2 occurred up until then. I explained that Dr Kelly --
3 I am not even sure, to be quite -- I am pretty confident
4 I did not actually say it was Dr Kelly, I said "the
5 official" or something of the kind. I have indicated
6 previously, as far as I am concerned that that was his
7 summary of the past. I do not understand that this was
8 anything that was to be acted on for the future.
9 Indeed, there is no evidence that anyone so acted.
10 Q. Did you think that Dr Kelly ought to give evidence in
11 front of the FAC?
12 A. When I received a request from the Chairman of the
13 Foreign Affairs Committee, I eventually concluded, with
14 the benefit of the advice that I had received, that,
15 yes, he should give evidence once his name was in the
16 public domain, yes.
17 Q. And if he gave evidence in front of the FAC contrary to
18 the account which Mr Gilligan had given, that would
19 assist the Government, would it not?
20 A. I think it would assist everyone. I think it would have
21 assisted --
22 Q. Never mind everyone, what about the Government?
23 A. I am including the Government in "everyone".
24 Q. Right.
25 A. The Government would have benefited; the BBC would have

49
1 benefited; and I think, most importantly, the public
2 would have benefited. And the point that I made right
3 at the outset of my original evidence was that the
4 difficulty with Andrew Gilligan's story was that we were
5 not in a position to assess the nature, quality, status
6 of his source. So that ultimately it was of benefit to
7 everyone that he should give evidence once he had been
8 identified.
9 Q. Was this a benefit which you were referring to in your
10 conversation with Mr Campbell, when you said there was
11 a case for trying to get some kind of plea bargain?
12 A. Perhaps I need to look at his diary in order to be sure
13 about what you are saying. I have summarised, I think
14 on more than one occasion, and I do not wish to try your
15 patience by repeating it, but these were
16 Alastair Campbell's words, they were not my words; and
17 the best I can do is to say that they were a summary of
18 the description of the process that by then I was aware
19 had taken place.
20 Q. Because, of course, Dr Kelly did give evidence before
21 both Committees.
22 A. Eventually, yes.
23 Q. With your encouragement?
24 A. With my agreement.
25 Q. Yes. In doing so, would this be right: that you

50
1 overruled the advice of Sir Kevin Tebbit that it was
2 unnecessary for Dr Kelly to give evidence to the FAC as
3 well as the ISC?
4 A. I think that is a very simplistic description of
5 a rather detailed process that took place. The advice
6 that came from Kevin Tebbit relating to both requests,
7 made by both Chairmen of both Committees, was, first of
8 all, that it might be possible, in Kevin's view, that
9 Dr Kelly should give evidence to the ISC in public.
10 That was his thought. But by the time that I had
11 received the advice, and by the time that I came to
12 consider the advice, that option had already been
13 withdrawn because it was judged inappropriate for the
14 Government to suggest that the ISC should meet in
15 public. In any event I doubted that the Chairman of the
16 ISC would agree to that, since one of the main purposes
17 of the ISC is to be able to hear matters in confidence.
18 So once that had been withdrawn, that meant, in
19 effect, that the only opportunity for Dr Kelly to give
20 evidence was either in a closed session with the ISC,
21 which I simply did not judge would be acceptable to my
22 Parliamentary colleagues, or that he should give
23 evidence to the Foreign Affairs Committee in public.
24 And given that the Foreign Affairs Committee had
25 made that request, and given that I recognised that this

51
1 would be a very significant Parliamentary and public row
2 if I refused it, it seemed to me right that I should
3 accept the request made to me by the Chairman of the
4 FAC.
5 Q. So the answer to the question is that you did overrule
6 Sir Kevin Tebbit's advice?
7 A. I would not put it that way. Civil servants give advice
8 to Ministers, it is not always accepted.
9 Q. Yes.
10 A. It is part of the process of taking decisions.
11 "Overrule" is -- perhaps it might be good for a headline
12 but it does not describe the process that takes place in
13 Government. No-one was suggesting Kevin Tebbit's advice
14 was definitive. I considered it and I decided to take
15 a different course.
16 Q. And the limitations which you suggested should be put
17 upon Dr Kelly's time before the Committee, and indeed
18 the material which he should be asked about, they were
19 for his benefit and not for any political reason; is
20 that what you are saying?
21 A. I am certainly saying that was at the forefront of my
22 mind, yes. Here is a man who has been asked to appear
23 before two Parliamentary Committees to give evidence.
24 It seemed to me right that that should be constrained to
25 the issues that the inquiries were concerned with.

52
1 Q. Would it increase or decrease the stress on Dr Kelly to
2 give evidence in public?
3 A. (Pause). I can, from experience -- I recognise that
4 giving evidence in public is always more demanding than
5 giving evidence in private.
6 Q. And with live television cover?
7 A. Well, that is a feature of modern Parliamentary
8 proceedings.
9 Q. Would it increase or decrease the stress?
10 A. Again, I can see that televising a Parliamentary
11 proceeding adds to the pressure.
12 Q. So why was it that you were at one stage, and I must
13 make it plain that this is not what was finally
14 requested, but at one stage you were considering
15 requesting that Dr Kelly should give his evidence in
16 public to both Committees?
17 A. Well, I was never, ever contemplating that; and
18 I think -- I have seen your questioning before to
19 previous witnesses on this subject; and again you are
20 looking at a draft, a draft that came up from the
21 Department, not anything that I ever prepared or acted
22 upon. In fact, it would be fairer if you recognised
23 that I changed that draft significantly.
24 Q. So let us just see what the position was. Could you
25 look at MoD/1 --

53
1 LORD HUTTON: Mr Gompertz, I am entirely in your hands.
2 I have to consider the stenographers. Would you like to
3 go on for a few minutes and finish this topic? It might
4 be better.
5 MR GOMPERTZ: I do not mind, my Lord. Whichever your
6 Lordship prefers.
7 LORD HUTTON: If it is not breaking in on a particular line,
8 I think perhaps we will rise for five minutes.
9 MR GOMPERTZ: Very well.
10 (11.32 am)
11 (Short Break)
12 (11.37 am)
13 LORD HUTTON: Yes, Mr Gompertz.
14 MR GOMPERTZ: Your Lordship.
15 Mr Hoon, can I just clarify what I was asking you
16 about? If we can have MoD/1/77 on the screen, please.
17 Do you have that?
18 A. Yes, I have.
19 Q. If you turn over to MoD/1/78, the second page of the
20 memorandum, enclosed with that document are drafts of
21 the letters, so Mr Watkins says, which the
22 Defence Secretary proposes to send to Donald Anderson
23 and Anne Taylor later today.
24 And he invites comments. From what you said just
25 before we had the adjournment, are you saying those

54
1 drafts were not produced at your instigation?
2 A. They would have been produced in the Department for my
3 consideration.
4 Q. But did you have any knowledge of what was going into
5 them?
6 A. I obviously saw the drafts after they came to me, before
7 I sent them to the persons they were addressed to; and
8 in that process I made significant changes to the drafts
9 in order to better reflect what I thought should occur.
10 Q. Yes, but what I want to be clear about is that the
11 material which was included in the drafts, are you
12 saying that that was inserted by Mr Watkins or somebody
13 else in your staff without your knowledge?
14 A. Well, drafts are routinely prepared elsewhere --
15 Q. Yes.
16 A. Sorry let me finish. Drafts are routinely prepared
17 elsewhere in the Department. They would come up to my
18 office. I would look at the drafts. If I accepted the
19 draft, I would sign it and send it off. If I wanted to
20 make changes, I would make changes; and that would be
21 the letter that I agreed to that was then sent. This
22 was precisely the process that occurred in relation to
23 these drafts. The drafts were prepared elsewhere in the
24 Ministry of Defence by officials. They were for me to
25 consider. I considered them. I judged that it was

55
1 necessary to make changes and I made changes; and those
2 are the letters that I sent.
3 Q. Yes. So the idea of the hearings taking place in public
4 you are saying was not yours?
5 A. The idea of the ISC hearing taking place in public was
6 not mine, no. I think it is clear from the evidence
7 that it was Sir Kevin Tebbit's, but it was not an idea
8 that was -- by the time that I came to send the letter
9 to Ann Taylor, who is the Chairman of the ISC, it was
10 not an option that was still in play; because by then my
11 office had received advice this was not an appropriate
12 course of action. In any event, even if I had not
13 received that advice I, from experience of the ISC,
14 doubted whether they would meet in public.
15 Q. Could I ask you to look at a letter which was sent?
16 MoD/1/82. This was sent to Mr Anderson. Do you have
17 that?
18 A. Yes, I have.
19 Q. In the paragraph nearest the bottom of the page you say:
20 "I am prepared to agree to this [him giving evidence
21 this is] on the clear understanding that Dr Kelly will
22 be questioned only on those matters which are directly
23 relevant to the evidence that you were given by
24 Andrew Gilligan, and not on the wider issue of Iraqi WMD
25 and the preparation of the dossier."

56
1 Then over the page at MoD/1/83 you make the point
2 about the ISC and wanting to limit the period of time
3 which Dr Kelly should appear before the Committees for.
4 A. Yes.
5 Q. The limitation of the subject matter, which I read out
6 to you, was that for Dr Kelly's benefit?
7 A. Well, if I may say so in the first place, if I could
8 refer you back to MoD/1/73 and the request that came in
9 from Donald Anderson. He said he was making the request
10 for Dr Kelly to appear on questions: directly relevant
11 to the Committee's report published earlier this week,
12 arising from the MoD statement of 9th July. Therefore
13 the qualification here entirely reflects the request
14 that I had received from Donald Anderson.
15 Q. Yes. So it was not for any political reason that you
16 wanted to limit the scope of Dr Kelly's evidence?
17 A. Well, I think I then went on -- if you compare it to the
18 original draft, this was something that I added.
19 I indicated:
20 "... Dr Kelly will have appeared earlier the same
21 day before the ISC [which was our understanding at the
22 time]. I hope that you will bear this in mind and not
23 detain him for longer than about the same period of time
24 indicated by the ISC. As he is not used to this degree
25 of public exposure, Dr Kelly has asked if he could be

57
1 accompanied by a colleague."
2 Again, something I added in out of concern for
3 Dr Kelly's welfare.
4 Q. Yes. The question I asked you was whether the
5 limitation of the subject matter of questioning was for
6 any political purpose?
7 A. It was to ensure that the questions put to Dr Kelly were
8 consistent with the requests that had been made by the
9 Chairman of the Committee, which is to pursue matters
10 relevant to their previously published report.
11 Q. Because were you fearful, at all, that Dr Kelly might
12 have some unpalatable views on some topics?
13 A. I knew from the outset, for example, that Dr Kelly had
14 some distinctive views about whether Saddam Hussein's
15 regime was still manufacturing weapons of mass
16 destruction. He judged there was only a 35 per cent
17 likelihood that was the case. That was a distinctive
18 view that had been recognised by a colleague, which
19 prompted him to come forward in the first place.
20 Yes, I was aware that his views were not entirely
21 consistent with those that, for example, had appeared in
22 the dossier that had been published in September.
23 Q. That was the reasoning why you wanted the questioning
24 limited to the topics which you set out in your letter,
25 was it not?

58
1 A. On the contrary, the issue about the extent to which
2 Dr Kelly was free to speak his mind had been considered.
3 I have to say I did not know this at the time, but it
4 had been considered in the preparation that he was given
5 for his appearance before the Committee. And he was --
6 having read it, he was told that he would be free to
7 speak his mind.
8 Q. And Mr Anderson, on MoD/1/84, was pliant to your
9 request, was he not?
10 A. He said:
11 "I share your clear understanding of the scope and
12 duration of the questioning..."
13 Yes.
14 I have to say that chairmen of Select Committees do
15 not always agree to requests made by Secretaries of
16 State in these circumstances, nor would I necessarily
17 expect them to. But I think it was -- as I indicated to
18 the Inquiry earlier, the fact he used the words
19 "I share" I think indicated his entire acceptance that
20 I was asking for a proper definition of the areas on
21 which Dr Kelly should give evidence.
22 Q. Did you consider the Osmotherly rules before you agreed
23 to Dr Kelly giving evidence?
24 A. I am aware of those rules, yes; and I was aware at the
25 time.

59
1 Q. Did you consider them on this occasion?
2 A. I did not go through them in detail but I understand the
3 essential principle underlying them, yes.
4 Q. Did you, in particular, consider the principle
5 underlying rule 72 that evidence can be given in closed
6 session in certain circumstances?
7 A. Yes, of course, and that does happen in certain
8 circumstances.
9 Q. Why not advise that?
10 A. Because those circumstances normally relate to security
11 considerations. They normally turn upon evidence,
12 particularly as far as the Defence Select Committee is
13 concerned, where essentially we are briefing Members of
14 Parliament on matters that are sensitive on security
15 grounds.
16 Q. The Osmotherly rules are also concerned, are they not,
17 with a situation where a Select Committee might be
18 dealing with what, in effect, are matters of discipline?
19 A. I can certainly see that that is a possibility; but
20 I did not judge that these were matters of discipline,
21 at this stage.
22 Q. Did you know that the question of disciplinary
23 proceedings against Dr Kelly had been expressly left
24 open in Mr Hatfield's letter to him?
25 A. Well, I think that is pitching it rather high.

60
1 Essentially, the point was that if new information arose
2 it could be gone back to, but, I mean, that would be
3 a -- that would be the case in any disciplinary
4 proceedings. Essentially the disciplinary proceedings
5 had been brought to a close; and that was done actually
6 quite early on in these events, in the middle of the
7 hearing on 4th July.
8 Q. Can I go on to another topic? We have heard from
9 Mr Hatfield that he considered the support provided by
10 the MoD for Dr Kelly was "outstanding". Do you agree
11 with that?
12 A. I certainly think that every reasonable step was taken
13 to ensure that Dr Kelly was properly supported, yes.
14 Q. So you did not think it was necessary to get Dr Kelly's
15 consent before his name was released?
16 A. The Ministry of Defence did not release his name.
17 Q. Well, they did. In answer to a specific question in the
18 Q and A material his name was confirmed as being
19 correct.
20 A. Well, that is not quite the same as releasing it, is it?
21 Q. I do not want to argue semantics with you, Mr Hoon. But
22 did you consider that he should be told that this
23 strategy was going to be adopted?
24 A. Again, there was no strategy; but I was well aware that
25 Dr Kelly anticipated that his name would become public.

61
1 It was something that he had understood. It had been
2 explained to him on the Friday; it was something that,
3 as I understand it, was explained to him again on the
4 Monday. Indeed, on the Monday a draft press statement
5 was shown to him. On the Tuesday, a press statement was
6 read over to him, and I think Richard Hatfield's
7 evidence is "paragraph by paragraph". And he consented
8 to that detail paragraph by paragraph.
9 So there cannot be any doubt that on the Tuesday
10 evening Dr Kelly was well aware that there was every
11 likelihood of his name becoming public, which, in fact,
12 is what happened through the assiduous efforts of
13 journalists.
14 Q. Yes. What I asked you was whether you thought he ought
15 to be consulted to see whether he consented to his name
16 being given in response to questions put by journalists
17 following the Q and A material?
18 A. I think the key time for all of these events is the
19 point at which the press statement was issued. At that
20 point great efforts were made to ensure that Dr Kelly
21 was aware what was likely to follow, which was that his
22 name would be revealed publicly. As a result of the
23 efforts made by journalists, something that he accepted
24 on the Friday, he accepted again on the Monday and
25 something that he was specifically taken through on the

62
1 Tuesday afternoon; something which he himself
2 acknowledged would happen --
3 Q. Let me put the question the other way round then: did
4 anybody ever inform Dr Kelly that the Q and A technique
5 was going to be deployed?
6 A. No.
7 Q. Did you not think that that was desirable?
8 A. Not in the context of someone who had been entirely
9 accepting of the fact that his name would become public,
10 who had had it explained to him repeatedly that it was
11 highly likely that his name would become public, who was
12 taken through the press statement paragraph by
13 paragraph, who had advice from the press office of the
14 consequences, as happened, once journalists became aware
15 of his name; who himself acknowledged the fact that it
16 was likely his name would become public quite soon.
17 Q. You are aware, are you, that on 8th July Mr Hatfield
18 wrote to Sir Kevin Tebbit a memorandum in which he said
19 that he had told Dr Kelly:
20 "I said that I did not think that it would be
21 necessary to reveal his name or to go into detail beyond
22 indicating that the account given to us did not match
23 Gilligan's [FAC] account, at least initially."
24 If you want the reference, it is MoD/1/54, letter or
25 memoranda of 8th July.

63
1 A. I do not think I saw that at the time, but I have seen
2 it since.
3 Q. So that was, on the face of it, Dr Kelly's frame of mind
4 on that date, was it not? That it would not be
5 necessary to reveal his name. That is how it had been
6 left at the end of the interview on 7th July.
7 A. And that is consistent with the approach that the
8 Ministry of Defence took. The Ministry of Defence did
9 not reveal his name. They confirmed it once
10 a journalist had correctly identified it.
11 Q. But on that very day, 8th July, the Q and A material was
12 being drafted and the press statement was being issued,
13 with the inevitable consequence that he would be
14 identified.
15 A. Well, he was taken through the press statement
16 carefully; warnings were given by a press officer as to
17 the consequences; it was suggested that he should take
18 appropriate action; and he made it quite clear that he
19 was well aware that his name would come into the public
20 domain, in his words "quite soon". Those were words
21 that he used to Mrs Kelly, that she gave in her evidence
22 as they sat and watched what I take to be the 7 o'clock
23 Channel 4 bulletin. What she said was: I knew then he
24 was aware that his name would be in the public domain
25 quite soon. So he recognised that fact on the Tuesday

64
1 evening.
2 Q. Do you think there was any need to warn Dr Kelly that
3 publication of his name was about to take place?
4 A. Efforts were made to warn him both on the Tuesday
5 evening when the press statement was made and indeed on
6 the Wednesday evening after the name had been confirmed,
7 yes.
8 Q. So, Dr Kelly, we have heard, was in his garden when the
9 news came to him via Mr Rufford, the journalist, and
10 left very soon thereafter from his home in a great
11 hurry.
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Does that, to your mind, indicate that he had been well
14 prepared for an impending media storm?
15 A. Well, it indicates that the day before he had been
16 warned of what was likely to follow, which is that once
17 the press statement had been issued this would, I think
18 I used the word earlier, heighten journalists' interest
19 in it. It is also clear that he received a call at
20 around that time, around the time he was visited by
21 Nick Rufford, I assume indicating again that he should
22 have regard to his own position as far as the
23 journalists were concerned. So he was warned
24 categorically, as I understand it, both on the day
25 before when the press notice was issued and, indeed,

65
1 again after it had been confirmed.
2 Q. Yes. We have heard that there was no contact whatever
3 from your press office to Dr Kelly on the day that the
4 name was confirmed until he, Dr Kelly, telephoned the
5 press office at about 8 o'clock.
6 A. Hmm -- I do not think that is --
7 Q. Is that outstanding support?
8 A. I do not think your presumption is quite right, if you
9 will forgive me for saying so.
10 Q. You tell me why it is wrong then.
11 A. Because Mrs Kelly said in her evidence that: the MoD
12 press office had just rung to say we ought to leave the
13 house and quickly so we could not be followed by the
14 press. That call occurred, in my view, at around the
15 time or shortly after that Nick Rufford had visited,
16 quite a long time before Dr Kelly himself called
17 Kate Wilson.
18 Q. I do not want to debate the evidence with you.
19 A. It is the evidence of Mrs Kelly.
20 Q. Yes. And you have no doubt borne in mind the evidence
21 of Mrs Wilson about this matter.
22 A. Well, I think Mrs Wilson was referring to a different
23 call.
24 Q. I follow. So you think that the support given by the
25 MoD with regard to the way in which Dr Kelly was

66
1 informed and kept informed of what was happening was
2 first class, do you?
3 A. I believe that the right steps were taken, both by those
4 concerned with Dr Kelly's welfare, directly Mr Wells,
5 who as line manager had that responsibility, as well as
6 by the press office informing him at appropriate stages
7 of what was to take place.
8 Q. Yes.
9 One final matter: the drafts of the dossier. Could
10 they not have been used in the month of July to defeat
11 the suggestion made by Mr Gilligan in his broadcast?
12 A. And how would that have been achieved?
13 Q. By making them public, to show that the dossier had not
14 been embellished.
15 A. I am not at all sure that that makes sense, if you
16 forgive me for saying so.
17 Q. Well, do you mean you do not understand the question?
18 A. I understand the question, but I do not understand why
19 the question is being put because it does not seem to be
20 based on anything particularly sensible by way of
21 explanation.
22 Q. Let me try to put some sense into it for you then. If
23 the object of putting Dr Kelly's name in the public
24 domain was to defeat the suggestion that the dossier had
25 been embellished by way of his evidence before the FAC,

67
1 why not publish the earlier drafts?
2 A. Well, because there are a number of things in that
3 question that I disagree with. There was no objective
4 of putting Dr Kelly's name into the public domain. That
5 was not our objective. The question of the dossier and
6 Dr Kelly's involvement in that was set out by him in his
7 letter, which I read very carefully. A carefully
8 drafted letter, long, detailed, in which he indicated
9 his role in the preparation of the dossier, which
10 I think, to the best of my recollection, was to do with
11 the historical parts of the explanation of
12 Saddam Hussein's possession of weapons of mass
13 destruction.
14 It was a very clear account of his involvement. As
15 I say, I am puzzled as to why you think publishing
16 successive drafts would have helped the Government's
17 processes.
18 MR GOMPERTZ: Thank you very much indeed, Mr Hoon.
19 A. Thank you very much.
20 Cross-examination by MR CALDECOTT
21 MR CALDECOTT: One for your Lordship and one for Mr Hoon.
22 (Handed).
23 LORD HUTTON: Thank you very much.
24 MR CALDECOTT: Secretary of State, that file may not be
25 entirely complete but I think it has most of the

68
1 documents I shall be referring to in it.
2 A. Thank you.
3 Q. You would receive, would you not, final JIC assessments
4 as part of your ministerial briefing?
5 A. Yes -- when you say as part of my ministerial briefing,
6 I would receive them routinely.
7 Q. You receive them shortly after they become final?
8 A. I confess I never checked the dates, but I assume so,
9 yes.
10 Q. They have a very high security rating, do they not, JIC
11 assessments?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Am I right they are above top secret?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And they only have a code word, is that right?
16 A. Yes. Yes, I think this is public knowledge.
17 Q. You would have received and read, would you, the final
18 JIC assessment of 9th September?
19 A. Yes.
20 Q. I think your evidence is that you subsequently also
21 received and read two drafts of the dossier in the week
22 before publication.
23 A. Yes.
24 Q. I think that is the week of 16th September. I suggest
25 to you the drafts you probably received were those of

69
1 the 16th and the 19th.
2 A. That fits. I had been in the United States for all of
3 the previous week representing the Government at the
4 commemoration of the September 11th events at the
5 Pentagon.
6 Q. Can I ask you if any significant changes between those
7 two drafts ever registered with you?
8 A. No, it did not.
9 Q. Would I be right that nobody had made any attempt to
10 track the changes between those two drafts when you got
11 them?
12 A. No.
13 Q. As Secretary of State you would be well aware of the
14 important distinction between a judgment as to
15 a possibility and a judgment as to a certainty?
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. That is reflected in a known vocabulary of JIC
18 assessments, words like "shows" for certainties and
19 "indicates" for possibilities.
20 A. Yes.
21 Q. Can I move on to the broadcast by Mr Gilligan? We know
22 his first broadcast was 29th May. His article
23 identifying Mr Campbell was 1st June, in the Mail on
24 Sunday. We also know that the matter was raised at
25 Prime Minister's Question Time on 4th June.

70
1 Were you in Parliament on 4th June?
2 A. I cannot remember, I am sorry.
3 Q. Can I be candid about this: our researches tend to
4 suggest that you were in Parliament but we have seen
5 some film of Question Time which suggests you may not
6 have been in the chamber during the actual Question
7 Time. Does that help?
8 A. I am sorry it does not, because I might watch Question
9 Time in my office.
10 Q. Yes.
11 A. I am sorry, I do not wish to be unhelpful but I simply
12 do not know.
13 Q. I suspect everybody here knows it but most rooms in the
14 House of Commons have a screen showing what is going on.
15 A. As does my office in the Ministry of Defence.
16 Q. It would be right that Parliamentary Questions by the
17 Leader of the Opposition on this topic of high public
18 interest which also concerned your Department would have
19 been something you would have followed closely?
20 A. I would, but again I do not want to give you any -- make
21 any suggestion that because I would follow it closely
22 I was necessarily watching it, because I simply do not
23 recall what I was doing that particular day at that
24 time.
25 Q. After then or thereafter you would have been fully aware

71
1 of the Government stance on those questions concerning
2 Mr Gilligan's allegations of only a few days earlier?
3 A. I was, yes.
4 Q. Can I just remind you, please, it is CAB/1/238, as to
5 what the Prime Minister said in response to
6 Mr Duncan-Smith. It is the first page, I think, in
7 your bundle.
8 A. Thank you.
9 Q. It may be the second page. It is 238, the second page,
10 I want to refer to. At the top of the page you will see
11 a sentence starting:
12 "In particular..."
13 He there deals with the 6.07 broadcast and the
14 suggestion of insertion.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. Which we know is very vigorously challenged:
17 "... the claim that the readiness of Saddam to use
18 weapons within 45 minutes of an order to use them was a
19 point inserted in the dossier at the behest of No. 10 is
20 completely and totally untrue."
21 A. Hmm.
22 Q. I want to draw your attention to the next sentence,
23 which goes on to deal with something rather different:
24 "Furthermore, the allegation that the 45 minute
25 claim provoked disquiet among the intelligence

72
1 community, which disagreed with its inclusion in the
2 dossier -- I have discussed it, as I said, with the
3 Chairman of the Joint Intelligence Committee -- is also
4 completely and totally untrue. Instead of hearing from
5 one or many anonymous sources, I suggest that if people
6 have any evidence, they actually produce it."
7 A. Hmm.
8 Q. If you kindly, please, just go over the page to
9 a further statement by the Prime Minister at the top of
10 page, CAB/1/239:
11 "I have already said that we will produce all the
12 evidence for the Intelligence and Security Committee.
13 I really think that that is the sensible and right way
14 to proceed. It can then come to a considered judgment
15 and I will publish the report. I repeat that all the
16 allegations that have been made are completely without
17 any substance."
18 Do you agree with me, Mr Hoon, that if any evidence
19 subsequently emerged that there had been disquiet within
20 the intelligence community that the House of Commons
21 would have had to have been informed immediately?
22 A. Yes.
23 Q. Do you also agree that any members of the Intelligence
24 and Security Committee listening to that statement by
25 the Prime Minister would be confident that they would be

73
1 getting all evidence which might be relevant to those
2 issues?
3 A. Well, I would just emphasise the qualification which the
4 Prime Minister made at the outset where he said "which
5 disagreed with its inclusion in the dossier".
6 Q. Well, can we just read it again? I am not going to
7 debate it endlessly but going back to 238:
8 "Furthermore, the allegation that the 45 minute
9 claim provoked disquiet among the intelligence
10 community, which disagreed with its inclusion in the
11 dossier ... is also completely and totally untrue."
12 I suggest that anybody listening to that would
13 conclude (a) they did not agree with its inclusion and
14 (b) they expressed no disquiet about it.
15 A. I think that is a literal interpretation of those words,
16 yes.
17 Q. It is a fair interpretation, is it not? Because it is
18 important that the public, who effectively he is
19 addressing through Parliament here, it is important to
20 understand how they would interpret it?
21 A. Yes.
22 Q. Also, no doubt, you would have been interested in the
23 conclusions of the Foreign Affairs Committee when they
24 were published on 7th July.
25 A. Yes, I was. Yes.

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1 Q. And you will have read them?
2 A. I certainly read the conclusions on 7th July, yes.
3 Q. Can I, please, draw your attention to paragraph 86 of
4 that report at FAC/3/31. I think I am right in saying
5 these conclusions are all listed compendiously at the
6 end. We get it here in its individual section.
7 A. Yes, I have that.
8 Q. It is towards the end of that conclusion, in
9 paragraph 86 at the bottom of the page:
10 "We further conclude that, in the absence of
11 reliable evidence that intelligence personnel have
12 either complained about or sought to distance themselves
13 from the content of the dossier, allegations of
14 politically inspired meddling cannot credibly be
15 established."
16 A. Hmm.
17 Q. Do you see that?
18 A. Yes, I do.
19 Q. It is clear, is it not, therefore, that the Foreign
20 Affairs Committee were under the impression, at least,
21 that there was no reliable evidence of any such
22 distancing by the intelligence community from the
23 45 minute claim as it appeared in the dossier?
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. That was published on 7th July. Can we move forward

75
1 only 11 days, please, to a memo to you from Mr Howard,
2 DCDI, of 18th July. MoD/4/6.
3 A. It does not appear to have its accompanying --
4 Q. I am very sorry. Perhaps you better use the screen. If
5 it is not there, that s my mistake.
6 A. It is there. It only seems to be part of the document,
7 as I recall it, but I will --
8 Q. It has some three pages with some annexures. You do not
9 have the speaking note, I am not going to ask you about
10 that. It is just the main memo.
11 A. I have that here. I am simply indicating to you that it
12 is not the whole document.
13 Q. This is a briefing memo from Mr Howard, DCDI. You have
14 the opening page?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. We can see from paragraph 1 that he is addressing the
17 question of: how should we respond to the Intelligence
18 Security Committee if the issue of the procedure whereby
19 DIS members can complain about the misuse of
20 intelligence arises.
21 A. Hmm.
22 Q. But also the question of whether it was in fact used at
23 the time of the September dossier. So it is a double
24 question that he is addressing. I think I can take this
25 quite shortly. If one looks at paragraph 5 on MoD/4/7,

76
1 the next page, please --
2 A. Yes.
3 Q. -- about halfway into that paragraph:
4 "In the course of this debate [this is the debate
5 about the dossier] two individuals in DIST (one of whom
6 is still in post and one of whom has retired) raised in
7 writing some specific concerns about the precise wording
8 on issues relevant to their areas of expertise."
9 You will see two lines down:
10 "I attach copies of the relevant minutes."
11 In fact it is right to say that Mr Howard was
12 against your producing those minutes, was he not, to the
13 ISC, and he was against you telling the ISC who the
14 authors were?
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. But I am more interested in why you accepted that advice
17 than what the advice was. Did you read those minutes?
18 A. Yes, I did.
19 Q. Can we look, please, at the first one which is MoD/22/1?
20 You would have known that minute was from Dr Jones,
21 branch head of the Science and Technological Directorate
22 at DIS.
23 A. When you say I would have known, I saw the name at the
24 foot of the page. I did not know Dr Jones.
25 Q. Do you see on MoD/22/2 there is a redaction. That would

77
1 have his title, would it not, as well as his name?
2 A. I think so, yes.
3 Q. If you read paragraph 1, in the fourth line, it is
4 perfectly obvious, is it not, that he is a branch head:
5 "It is my understanding that some of the
6 intelligence has not been made available to my branch."
7 Do you see?
8 A. Yes.
9 Q. It is also obvious, is it not, that this is not
10 a customary exchange between analysts. I mean, you will
11 see it is addressed to the Deputy Chief of Defence
12 Intelligence at the top of the distribution list.
13 A. I have to say that I probably was not in a position to
14 make that judgment; but for the sake of accuracy, I took
15 this, in fact, to be exactly what you have just
16 described. This was an exchange in relation to some
17 rather detailed points about the language that should be
18 used in the dossier. I think we went through this on
19 the last occasion that I gave evidence.
20 I took this to be a series of very technical but
21 equally precise suggestions as to the precise language
22 that should be used in the dossier. I did not take it
23 in any other way.
24 Q. But you would agree, would you not, that the precise
25 language in the dossier is very important when there is

78
1 an allegation about sexing up the 45 minutes claim and
2 transformation at the heart of political debate at the
3 time?
4 A. I agree; and indeed I would not have wanted to do
5 anything to discourage that kind of debate amongst
6 experts knowledgeable about their subject.
7 Q. Did you notice the date on this document,
8 19th September? That in fact was the day before the
9 drafts were finalised on the 20th, is it not?
10 A. I cannot give evidence about the date on which it was
11 finalised; but I accept that it was close to the date of
12 publication.
13 Q. Can we look at numbered paragraph 3, please? We know he
14 is speaking here for his branch and not merely himself:
15 "We have a number of questions in our minds relating
16 to the intelligence on the military plans for the use of
17 chemical and biological weapons, particularly about the
18 times mentioned and the failure to differentiate between
19 the two types of weapon."
20 So far as the times mentioned, that could only be
21 a reference to the 45 minute claim, could it not, in the
22 context of CBW?
23 A. That is certainly a possible interpretation.
24 Q. Can I just show you the other minute? This is even
25 later. This minute is 20th September. I do not know

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1 whether you were aware of this, but the closing time for
2 JIC member comments was 3 o'clock on 19th September.
3 Were you aware of that, Mr Hoon?
4 A. No, I was not.
5 Q. You must in any event have been aware that this was very
6 late indeed in the process?
7 A. Well, I accept that it was close to the date of
8 publication.
9 Q. If you, please, look at 2(b):
10 "Prime Minister's Foreword, 8th paragraph states:
11 "'And the document discloses that his military
12 planning allows for some of the WMD to be ready within
13 45 minutes of an order to use them.'"
14 A. Hmm.
15 Q. "A similar statement appears in the dossier. This is
16 reported as fact whereas the intelligence comes from a
17 single source. In my view the intelligence warrants no
18 stronger a statement than '... intelligence suggests
19 that military planning allows ...'"
20 We will see a similar criticism at 2(d) on the
21 following page, CAB/33/115.
22 A. That is right. In fact, I think it is -- when I read
23 this originally I assumed that -- actually it is two
24 points repeated in the context both of the
25 Prime Minister's foreword, the executive summary, and

80
1 indeed the substance of the dossier. So it is actually
2 the same points highlighted in relation to different
3 stages of the dossier.
4 Q. Just look at 2(d). There is a slightly different point
5 being made in 2(d), if we look at it carefully. He
6 makes the same point "this is based on a single source",
7 but then he makes another point:
8 "It is not clear what is meant by 'weapons are
9 deployable within 45 minutes'. The judgment is too
10 strong considering the intelligence on which it is
11 based."
12 Did you know, in fact, that it was not known even
13 what weapons were referred to in relation to this quote
14 about the 45 minute claim?
15 A. Sorry, I do not understand your question.
16 Q. Did you know that the 45 minute claim in the dossier was
17 taken from a JIC assessment which does not in fact
18 identify any particular weapon?
19 A. Well, I recall at the time having some discussion in the
20 Ministry of Defence about the kinds of weapons that
21 could be deployable within 45 minutes; and I think the
22 assumption was made that they would be, for example,
23 chemical shells, which were clearly capable of being
24 deployed, as I think Mr Scarlett has indicated to
25 the Inquiry, in a time even less than 45 minutes;

81
1 I think he suggested 20 minutes.
2 Q. So you knew, did you, that the munitions referred to
3 were only battlefield munitions?
4 A. I was certainly aware that that was one suggestion, yes.
5 Q. Was there any other suggestion that they were not
6 battlefield munitions but strategic munitions?
7 A. I recall asking what kind of weapons would be deployable
8 within 45 minutes; and the answer is the answer that
9 I have just given to you.
10 Q. Which was shells, battlefield mortars, tactical weapons
11 of that kind?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. Would your Department be responsible for correcting any
14 false impression given by the press on an issue of this
15 importance?
16 A. I think on an issue of this importance it would not
17 simply have been the Ministry of Defence that was solely
18 responsible. There would have been an effort across
19 Government.
20 Q. Are you aware that on 25th September a number of
21 newspapers had banner headlines suggesting that this
22 related to strategic missiles or bombs?
23 A. I can recall, yes.
24 Q. Why was no corrective statement issued for the benefit
25 of the public in relation to those media reports?

82
1 A. I do not know.
2 Q. It must have been considered by someone, must it not?
3 A. I have spent many years trying to persuade newspapers
4 and journalists to correct their stories. I have to say
5 it is an extraordinarily time consuming and generally
6 frustrating process.
7 Q. I am sorry, are you saying that the press would not
8 report a corrective statement that the dossier was meant
9 to refer, in this context, to battlefield munitions and
10 not to strategic weapons?
11 A. What I am suggesting is that I was not aware of whether
12 any consideration was given to such a correction. All
13 that I do know from my experience is that, generally
14 speaking, newspapers are resistant to corrections. That
15 judgment may have been made by others as well.
16 Q. But, Mr Hoon, you must have been horrified that the
17 dossier had been misrepresented in this way; it was
18 a complete distortion of what it actually was intended
19 to convey, was it not?
20 A. Well, I was not horrified. I recognised that
21 journalists occasionally write things that are more
22 dramatic than the material upon which it is based.
23 Q. Can we forget journalists for the moment and concentrate
24 on the members of the public who are reading it? Will
25 they not be entitled to be given the true picture of the

83
1 intelligence, not a vastly inflated one?
2 A. I think that is a question you would have to put to the
3 journalists and the editors responsible.
4 Q. But you had the means to correct it, not them. They
5 could not correct it until they were told, could they?
6 A. Well, as I say, my experience of trying to persuade
7 newspapers to correct false impressions is one that is
8 not full of success.
9 Q. Do you accept that on this topic at least you had an
10 absolute duty to try to correct it?
11 A. No, I do not.
12 Q. Do you accept that you had any duty to correct it?
13 A. Well, I apologise for repeating the same answer, but you
14 are putting the question in another way. I have tried
15 on many, many occasions to persuade journalists and
16 newspapers to correct stories. They do not like to do
17 so.
18 Q. Can I suggest to you a reason why this was not done? It
19 would have been politically highly embarrassing because
20 it would have revealed the dossier as published was at
21 least highly capable of being misleading.
22 A. Well, I do not accept that.
23 Q. So your suggestion is that this was a disgraceful
24 exaggeration by the press of what was clear in the
25 dossier as a reference to battlefield munitions?

84
1 A. I am certainly suggesting that it was an exaggeration,
2 but it is not unusual for newspapers to exaggerate.
3 Q. Can you tell me, if you happen to have it to hand, where
4 in the dossier it is made clear that the CBW weapons
5 which were the subject of the 45 minute claim were only
6 battlefield munitions?
7 A. Well, I do not have it to hand; and I do not know
8 whether it was made clear.
9 Q. Have you read the ISC report?
10 A. I certainly saw the summary at around the time it was
11 published, I think a few weeks before the dossier.
12 Q. It says, does it not --
13 A. Sorry, my apologies, you are talking about the most
14 recent report?
15 Q. The most recent one, yes. It is my fault, I should have
16 made it clear.
17 Can I go back, please, to these two letters?
18 A. Hmm.
19 Q. Whatever else they do, they suggest some disquiet with
20 the 45 minutes claim very late in the process, expressed
21 to a very senior level, do they not?
22 A. They certainly indicate some concern about the language
23 used in the draft dossier that was then being
24 considered; and they make some specific suggestions for
25 particular amendments, which is how I read it.

85
1 Q. Surely the best policy in those circumstances was simply
2 to be open with the ISC, hand the documents over and, if
3 you are right that they amount to very little, let the
4 ISC come to that conclusion?
5 A. Well, I was not suggesting that they amounted to very
6 little. I was suggesting that they were, I think,
7 my Lord, I referred to them as technical amendments when
8 I gave evidence previously. They were not challenging
9 the inclusion in the dossier of the 45 minute point,
10 which is the qualification that I referred you to
11 earlier. What they were doing was, as you I think
12 fairly said, they were changing the emphasis in the
13 language of that particular piece of intelligence. That
14 was properly then considered by those responsible for
15 making these assessments and these particular
16 suggestions were not incorporated, as I understand it;
17 something that I asked about -- I asked about the status
18 of these amendments, what had happened to them and why
19 in fact they had not been included.
20 Q. Mr Hoon, I entirely accept they were not saying: do not
21 include the claim at all. You are obviously right about
22 that. What they were saying is: do not include it as
23 strongly as this; were they not?
24 A. I think that is fair, yes.
25 Q. Is that not something that the ISC should have been

86
1 told, in view of what the Prime Minister had said about
2 them being given all the evidence, in view of the total
3 denial of any disquiet about the 45 minute claim, in
4 view of the Foreign Affairs Committee conclusion based
5 apparently on a realisation by then as far as they knew
6 nobody had distanced themselves from the content of the
7 dossier? Having regard to all that background, surely
8 the straight thing to do was to give these documents to
9 the ISC and let them ask about them if they wished to?
10 A. What I did was in fact paraphrase the details contained
11 here. I indicated to the ISC that people in the DIS had
12 made proposals for amendments. I indicated to the ISC
13 that the amendments suggested that the language should
14 be tightened up in places. I outlined the fact that
15 there was a dispute in these areas; and I specifically
16 mentioned that the dispute was about whether the
17 intelligence "showed" or "indicated" particular
18 conclusions.
19 I went on to explain to the ISC that this had been
20 resolved within DIS; and by the then Chief of Defence
21 Intelligence and by his deputy. I set out at each stage
22 to the ISC precisely the process that had been gone
23 through.
24 Q. That is a perfectly fair summary of what you did say.
25 We see it at BBC/30/6, just for the record. I think the

87
1 two points you have made we find reflected in
2 paragraphs 97 and 99 of the ISC report as published.
3 But what I do not follow at the moment, Mr Hoon, is
4 if you are happy to say that there had been a dispute on
5 "showing" or "indicating", why were you not happy to
6 give them the documents?
7 A. I think there were a number of reasons for that. First
8 of all, this was something, as I understood it, that had
9 been resolved almost immediately; that on the 19th and
10 the 20th these issues had been discussed in DIS, that
11 the particular amendment had been considered and, as far
12 as I was concerned, had been dealt with within the
13 system.
14 Secondly, that I felt that if these particular
15 documents were published at the time, that there was
16 a clear risk that they would be taken out of context,
17 that they would not be seen as being the result of
18 a process that had been resolved in DIS but they would
19 be seen as something more dramatic which, in fact, of
20 course, when this matter was considered by the Inquiry,
21 was precisely what happened.
22 I had also been told to resist calls from the ISC to
23 disclose the identities of the individuals concerned.
24 And, indeed, the speaking note that was attached to the
25 original advice did not specifically say that I should

88
1 reveal that these amendments had been made in writing.
2 So I felt that this was an entirely coherent account of
3 what had taken place, which I set before the ISC.
4 Q. Just one question: who told you that the issues raised
5 by Dr Jones had been discussed with him?
6 A. I understood, by the time that I gave evidence to the
7 ISC, which, I think, was 22nd July, so some, what --
8 some nine months later, I understood -- I was told that
9 the matter had been resolved within DIS. I think that
10 was the expression that I used earlier, that there was
11 obviously a process within DIS for considering what
12 I took to be straightforward suggestions for amendments
13 of a linguistic kind that were addressed, either on the
14 19th in relation to Dr Jones or the 20th in relation to
15 the other suggestions. I -- as far as I was aware, no
16 complaint had been made by either of the individuals
17 concerned, I think, until Dr Jones wrote again, I think
18 to the Foreign Secretary on the 8th July.
19 So from 19th September until 8th July, as far as
20 I was aware, Dr Jones had made no further comment or
21 complaint about the amendments that he put forward,
22 which seemed to me to confirm that these had been issues
23 resolved within DIS.
24 Q. You were aware, were you, that Dr Jones had written
25 a letter of complaint?

89
1 A. I think later I was, yes.
2 Q. Were you aware then?
3 A. I would have to check.
4 Q. The letter was sent to Mr Howard, DCDI, on 8th July.
5 A. I was certainly aware later that he had written.
6 Whether I was aware on the 22nd, I would have to check.
7 Q. Do you know why he wrote, Mr Hoon?
8 A. I think -- well, I -- I can recall some details from the
9 letter. He wrote, I think, because he was concerned
10 about something that the Foreign Secretary had said in
11 evidence to the FAC.
12 Q. Yes. He was concerned that the Foreign Affairs
13 Committee had been misled into thinking that there had
14 been no formal complaint about the 45 minute claim.
15 A. That is right, yes. But could I emphasise that when
16 I looked at these two memos they did not seem to me, and
17 I have looked at them again since, they did not seem to
18 me to be letters of complaint. They seemed to be
19 amendments, detailed amendments, suggested by two
20 individuals, to the wording of DIS. They were detailed
21 amendments. Both of them conceded they had not
22 necessarily seen all of the intelligence. Both of them
23 were of a very technical kind. And I was assured that
24 in relation to both of them the matters had been
25 resolved within DIS.

90
1 Q. Did you agree with me that it would be extraordinary if
2 Mr Howard had not told you that he had received a letter
3 from Dr Jones, who was concerned that a Parliamentary
4 Committee had been misled by Mr Straw?
5 A. Well, I am just checking on his advice. (Pause).
6 I am -- I cannot call that to mind at this stage. I do
7 not see it in the advice; but if anything turns upon it
8 I am perfectly willing to concede that I might well have
9 done. But I looked at these amendments as being
10 a contribution to a debate that was taking place in the
11 Intelligence Service. I was told that that had been
12 resolved within the Intelligence Service. On the face
13 of it these did not look, to me, like letters of
14 complaint. If I thought that they had have done,
15 I might have viewed them in a different light.
16 Q. I have just been reminded by Mr Dingemans I am in injury
17 time, Mr Hoon. I want to deal quickly with one more
18 topic, if I may?
19 LORD HUTTON: Yes.
20 MR CALDECOTT: This is your letter to the BBC of the
21 8th July at MoD/1/66.
22 A. Yes. To Gavyn Davies.
23 Q. To Gavyn Davies, the Chairman of the Governors.
24 A. Yes.
25 Q. Who drafted the letter?

91
1 A. (Pause). I mean, I do not precisely know, but --
2 Q. By your immediate Department for you, was it?
3 A. I would imagine that given the sensitivities of these
4 issues that perhaps Downing Street as well had a hand in
5 making suggestions, but I could not say accurately who
6 precisely drafted it.
7 Q. Can we just look, please, at CAB/11/4? Thank you. This
8 is a note of a meeting which you were not at. It is in
9 fact not a contemporary note but one prepared for the
10 purposes of the Inquiry. If you look at 1.30 at the
11 bottom there, it is the Prime Minister's meeting, do you
12 see the third line:
13 "Decide to draft press statement with separate
14 private letter from GH [obviously you] to BBC Chairman
15 giving the name."
16 A. Yes.
17 Q. Were you ever told as at 1.30 on 8th July the strategy
18 was that the name should be given to you?
19 A. Sorry, the name should be given to me or?
20 Q. I beg your pardon, the name of Dr Kelly should be given
21 to the BBC Chairman by you. My mistake.
22 A. I was not aware of that, no.
23 Q. When exactly were you told that there was a new policy,
24 which was not to give the BBC the name but you would
25 give it if they would confirm or deny? Can you remember

92
1 when it was after 1.30 that you were told of this change
2 of direction?
3 A. No, I cannot. I think I gave evidence on the last
4 occasion about the various discussions that were taking
5 place. The meeting in Downing Street, I think, earlier
6 in the morning had decided in fact to adopt a completely
7 different approach by putting the matter to the ISC; and
8 this approach was one that, in a sense, was used once it
9 had been decided that the ISC could not be approached,
10 I think the Chairman of the ISC had some reservations
11 about publicising documents that had been passed to her.
12 Q. Can I just ask you one or two short questions about the
13 attached statement, MoD/1/67, as sent to the BBC?
14 I will try to take these quickly.
15 A. Yes.
16 Q. The fourth and fifth paragraphs of that statement give
17 Dr Kelly's then account of what he had said to
18 Mr Gilligan. Do you see that?
19 A. Hmm.
20 Q. And you were putting that forward as a credible account
21 to the public, were you not?
22 A. That was the account that Dr Kelly had given to us.
23 Q. And you were inviting the public to conclude really two
24 things: firstly, Dr Kelly might very well be
25 Mr Gilligan's source; and, secondly, if he was, he had

93
1 in fact, when talking to Mr Gilligan, made no criticism
2 of Mr Campbell and nor had he made any criticism of the
3 45 minute claim?
4 A. I do not believe this literally says that he was
5 Mr Gilligan's source.
6 Q. I chose my words carefully, you are right. It led the
7 public to believe he might well be.
8 A. I am not sure that was necessarily the intention, but --