

Date 910106 -20 [not published in Bulletin]

Text In the USSR, a 13-person UK/US team conducts on-site inspections at four locations as part of the recently agreed [see 901108] Trilateral Process for resolving the issue of Soviet noncompliance with the BWC. The fact of the visit is kept secret by all parties, and remains so for the next year and a half. Only much later are its details reported; by British journalists citing interviews conducted in 1998, some with identified team members and others unattributed.

The joint leaders of the team are Peter Davies, head of the UK Foreign Office Arms Control & Disarmament Department, and Edward Lacey, the Deputy Assistant Director for Verification and Intelligence of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. On the US side, the team includes officials from the State Department, the CIA, the DIA and Fort Detrick (in the person of Dr Frank Malinoski of USAMRIID). On the UK side, they include officials from the SIS, the Defence Intelligence Staff (Surgeon-Commander Christopher Davis) and Porton (Dr David Kelly). The USSR host team is led by Nikita Smidovich of the USSR Foreign Ministry. During 8-9 January, the team visits Lyubchany, its initial inspection location, where it is joined by a senior Soviet technical official, Dr Kanatjan Alibekov, who remains with the team for the rest of its tour. From there the team goes to Obolensk, then back to Moscow and on to Vektor in Siberia at Koltsovo near Novosibirsk. The final site visit is in Leningrad, at the All-Union Scientific Research Institute for Ultra-Pure Biological Preparations, where Vladimir Pasechnik [see 891007], now in England, had once worked. Much detail on what the team observed and what it concluded is contained in the account by the British journalists. They say that both the UK/US team and their Soviet hosts regarded the visits as successful; the former reporting evidence of massive Soviet BWC violation, the latter reporting that the visitors had found no proof that an offensive BW programme existed in the Soviet Union [1].

[1] Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare [title page] or Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare [dust wrapper, and Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data], New York: St Martin's Press, 1999, at pp 118-40 and 418-23.

Footnote

TWP/3/0048

Date 910802

Text In Iraq, a UN Special Commission team of 28 people from 9 countries -- Australia, Canada, Czechoslovakia, France, Germany, the Soviet Union, Sweden, the UK and the USA -- under the leadership of Dr David Kelly of the UK Chemical & Biological Defence Establishment, Porton Down, arrives on a 5-day visit to conduct the first BW-related inspection under Resolution 687 [1] They meet in the evening with Iraqi officials who provide information supplementing earlier disclosures and who, while reaffirming the nonexistence, as previously declared to the UN, of any "central research laboratory for military biological purposes", disclose "the existence of research work regarding the biological factors for military purposes in one of the locations within a general research center which does other research work", a place which the team subsequently inspects[2] and which the UN soon afterwards discloses is at Salman Pak [see 11 Apr 90, 26 Feb] [3] The Iraqi officials say that this biological research work had stopped completely in 1990 Next evening the team meets with representatives of the Ministries of Health and Agriculture [4]

During day 3 of the visit, Dr Kelly tells reporters "It's actually been excellent Every request I have made has been met, or they have said they will meet it "[5]

Footnote [1] R Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 6 Aug 91, p A11, "Iraq admits to germ warfare research".

[2] Iraqi Foreign Ministry spokesman, as quoted by INA from Baghdad, 2100 hrs GMT 4 Aug 91, as translated from the Arabic in FBIS-NES-91-150, 5 Aug 91, pp 35-36.

[3] R Jeffrey Smith, Washington Post, 6 Aug 91, p A11, "Iraq admits to germ warfare research"

[4] Iraqi Foreign Ministry spokesman, as quoted by INA from Baghdad, 2100 hrs GMT 4 Aug 91, as translated from the Arabic in FBIS-NES-91-150, 5 Aug 91, pp 35-36.

[5] Reuter from Baghdad, as in International Herald Tribune, 5 Aug 91, p 1, "UN inspector says Iraq cooperates"

TVP/3/0049

Date 910807 [updated since publication in Bulletin]

Text In Iraq, the first UN biological inspection team [see 2 Aug] concludes its visit Team Leader David Kelly says to reporters: "We have not found evidence that they possess biological weapons at the site we visited". He adds "They were undertaking research, they were using fermentation and therefore they were able to produce reasonable quantities".[1]

There is a news conference on the inspection one week later at United Nations headquarters in New York The Secretary-General's press release[2] for it reads as follows.

"Iraq had previously declared that it had no biological weapons nor carried out any related activities

"In order to verify this declaration, a team of 28 personnel (UNSCOM 7) led by the Chief Inspector, Dr David Kelly, undertook an inspection of Iraq's biological warfare capability from 3rd to 7th August inclusive The team comprised experts in microbiology and biotechnology, safety, medicine and communication

"On the first day, Iraq declared that biological research activities for military purposes were initiated in Iraq in mid-1986 at the Salman site Research was stated to be undertaken on Clostridium botulinum, Clostridium perfringens, and Bacillus anthracis. Military research was later explained to comprise research which could be used for both defensive and offensive purposes

"The inspection undertaken was a full inspection of a site near Salman Pak It required five full days Discussions were also held with senior representatives of the ministries of health and agriculture to define a base of microbiological, especially pathogen, activities within Iraq

"At Salman site, the team discovered a capability to research, test and store biological warfare agents Fermentation, production, aerosol testing and storage existed at that site However, no evidence of biological weapons per se was obtained and no facility for filling weapons was determined The site had been extensively damaged by Coalition force bombardment, and by the recent physical removal by the Iraqis of key buildings

"Iraq admitted to have worked on the following biological warfare agents anthrax and botulinum toxin

"At the last day, before departure, Iraq handed over a collection of biological materials which could be developed as biological warfare agents This material included brucellosis and tularaemia

"At the same time, Iraq stated that it would cease developing biological warfare agents "

Dr Kelly, present at the news conference, is reported as saying that the facility had been capable of producing "200 litres of anthrax a week", and that the botulin capacity was still being estimated [3] He reportedly says, too, that the Iraqis had told the inspectors that their R & D team at the site consisted of 10 people [4] His personal conviction, according to an account published much later, is that the programme had been an offensive one aimed at the production of biological weapons, this was not, however, the consensus view of the team [5]

UNSCOM 7 Senior Scientist David L Huxsoll of the USA later publishes some observations on the inspection [6]

Footnote [1] Reuter from Baghdad 6 Aug 91, as in International Herald Tribune, 7 Aug 91, p 1, AFP from Baghdad in English, 1646 hrs GMT 7 Aug 91, as in FBIS-NES-91-153, 8 Aug 91, p 14.

[2] UN Secretary-General press release at the regular noon press briefing, 14 Aug 91, text from UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office.

[3] John M Goshko and Trevor Rowe (from the United Nations), Washington Post, 15 Aug 91, pp A31-32, "UN panel describes Iraq's anthrax threat", Trevor Rowe (from New York), Independent (London), 15 Aug 91, p 8, "Iraqis had anthrax toxin to wage war"

[4] Reuter from the United Nations as in Washington Times, 15 Aug 91, p A7, "Germ warfare ability found" See also CWCB no 13 p 22

[5] Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, London: HarperCollins, 1999, p 37

[6] David L Huxsoll, "On-site inspection measures and interviews", Politics and the Life Sciences vol 14 no 2 (August 1995), pp 238-240

TVP/3/0050

Date 911207 -21 [not published in Bulletin]

Text In the United States, a 13-person Soviet team conducts on-site inspections at four locations as a return visit [see 910106-20] under the Trilateral Process for resolving the issue of Soviet noncompliance with the BWC [see 911118]. The fact of the visit is kept secret by all parties, and remains so for the next several months. Only much later are its details reported | by British journalists citing interviews conducted in 1998, some with identified team members and others unattributed

The Soviet team is led by Deputy Foreign Minister Grigory Berdennikov, and includes five Defence Ministry people led by Colonel Nikifor Vasileyev and, from Biopreparat, Kanatjan Alibekov [see 910106-20] and the directors of two of the facilities that had been inspected by the UK/US team Nikolai Urakov of Obolensk and Lev Sandakhchiev of Kol'tsovo. The US host team is led by Ambassador John Hawes and a Defense Department official, Lisa Bronson, supported by three colonels. The US team also includes two British observers, Christopher Davis and David Kelly, who had participated in the original UK/US inspection [see 910106-20]. The inspected sites are Fort Detrick in Maryland, Dugway Proving Ground in Utah, Pine Bluff Arsenal in Arkansas, and the vaccine-production facility at the Salk Institute in Swiftwater, Pennsylvania [1]

Footnote [1] Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare [title page] or Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare [dust wrapper, and Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data], New York: St Martin's Press, 1999, at pp 144-57 and 425-27

TVP/3/0051

Date  
Text

931009 [updated since publication in Bulletin]

In Russia, a UK/US inspection of a non-military biological site conducted within the framework of the September 1992 Joint Statement on Biological Weapons by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Russian Federation [see 930512] [1] Besides the visit to the St Petersburg Institute for Ultrapure Biological Preparations (which was not conducted within this new trilateral framework) [see 930415], UK/US teams have now visited an installation at Berdsk, near Novosibirsk, where development work on BW weapons had been suspected, and a facility at Pokrov, near Moscow, where BW research had been suspected [2] The team visiting these two sites had been led by Edward Lacey of the US Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, and had begun their work on 3 October [3]

Much later, additional detail is published by two British journalists drawing from interviews conducted in 1998. The two sites, at Pokrov and Berdsk, are both Biopreparat facilities, and the visits to them are the West's first access to Russian BW production and weapons-filling capabilities, so the journalists write. On what they say were "huge, hardened bunkers which held hundreds of thousands of hen's eggs" at Pokrov, they quote the leader of the UK team, David Kelly, as having concluded that the bunker had been set up to grow smallpox virus in the "massive quantities" that would be required to "sustain a strategic weapons system". At Berdsk they see four 64,000-litre fermenters being used to produce *Bacillus thuringiensis* biopesticide, the director of the facility saying that he changed products from the fermenters "twice a month". On the site they see a building where construction had ceased in 1990 that had been designed to hold four rows each of ten 64,000-litre fermenters [4]

[1] Personal communication, 9 October 1993.

[2] Michael R Gordon (from Novocheboksarsk), New York Times, 1 Dec 93, pp A1 & A16, "Moscow is making little progress in disposal of chemical weapons"

[3] Arms Control Reporter no 1-94 at 701 B 119-120.

[4] Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, *Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare* [title page] or *Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare* [dust wrapper, and Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data], New York: St Martin's Press, 1999, at pp 197-98 and 438-39

TVP/3/0052

Date 940110 [not published in Bulletin]

Text In Russia, within the framework of the September 1992 Joint Statement on Biological Weapons by the Governments of the United Kingdom, the United States and the Russian Federation, the second part of the initial round of UK/US site visits [see 930109] commences at Omutninsk, so, much later, it is reported by two British journalists drawing from interviews conducted in 1998. The other site visited is at Obolensk, where the team is able to observe changes made since the UK/US visit in 1991 [see 911006-20]. On these changes, the journalists quote UK team leader David Kelly saying: "In essence, the place had gone dormant rather than been converted by converts" [1]

Footnote [1] Tom Mangold and Jeff Goldberg, Plague Wars: A True Story of Biological Warfare [title page] or Plague Wars: The Terrifying Reality of Biological Warfare [dust wrapper, and Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data], New York: St Martin's Press, 1999, at pp 198-99 and 439

TRP/3/0053

Date 940809 -19 (circa) [updated since publication in Bulletin]

Text In Iraq the eighth UN biological inspection team, led by David Kelly of the United Kingdom and numbering 13 people, continues to lay the groundwork for the ongoing monitoring and verification of sites where BW weapons might possibly be made [see 12 Jul]. The visit is the second of a series of three which the team, UNSCOM 87, initiated on 25 July, its purpose being to draw up comprehensive monitoring and verification protocols for 55 sites identified by UNSCOM as requiring such OMV. The team works on the guidelines, questionnaires and detailed instructions to be followed by monitoring inspectors based at the Baghdad Monitoring and Verification Centre [see 1 Aug]. The team surveys numerous sites around the country, including Iraq's six breweries. It returns to Iraq on 29 August, completing its mission on 7 September [1]

Footnote [1] Jane's Defence Weekly, 20 Aug 94, p 10, "Inspectors resume watch on Iraq", Record (Bergen, NJ), 24 Aug 94, p A16, "Germ- warfare survey completed in Iraq", via Nexis, Nabila Megalli from Manama for AP, as in Daily Telegraph (London), 26 Aug 94, p 11, "UN weapons teams visit Iraq brewers", UN document S/1994/1138 of 7 October 1994, personal communication, 11 March 1997

TVP/3/0054

Date  
Text

950927 -1011 [updated since publication in Bulletin]

In Iraq UNSCOM conducts its 28th biological-weapons inspection, UNSCOM 126. The focus of the mission is on details of the past Iraqi BW programme at particular sites [1]. Leading the team is David Kelly of the United Kingdom, tasked to inspect all the sites now declared by Iraq to have been part of its biological-weapons programme and to verify the new declarations to the extent possible. Much later, former UNSCOM official Tim Trevan publishes the following list of the sites inspected: "-- Salman Pak (the home of the first programme at the al Hazem Ibn al Haitham site, now known to have operated the 150-litre fermenter after its transfer from Muthanna) -- Muthanna (where the modern programme was born) -- Al Hakam (the planned production centre for biological warfare agents) -- Taji single-cell protein production project (whose fermenters had been used for anthrax production) -- The al Dawrah Foot and Mouth Disease Plant (the only negative pressure, high-containment PL-3 laboratory in Iraq, where evidence of additional wall partitions was still evident on the floors in 1991) -- The Agricultural Research Centre at Fudhaliyah, used to produce aflatoxin -- Airfield 37 (where tests of biological weapons were conducted) -- The Azziziyah firing range (also where tests of biological weapons were conducted) -- Camp Bani Sa'ad (where aerosolization of biological warfare agents was tested) -- A railroad tunnel at Mansuriyah, where Iraq claimed to have hidden ten SCUD missile warheads filled with anthrax (later amended to botulinum toxin fill) -- A site on the Tigris canal (where Iraq buried some of the biological weapons it claimed to have detoxified and destroyed in the summer of 1991. The team found remnants of one R400 bomb and fifteen SCUD missile warheads, said to have been filled with either anthrax or aflatoxin)" [2].

[1] UN document S/1995/864 of 11 October 1995, personal communication, 11 March 1997

[2] Tim Trevan, Saddam's Secrets: The Hunt for Iraq's Hidden Weapons, London. HarperCollins, 1999, pp 346-47.

TVP/3/0055

Date 961111 -18 [updated since publication in Bulletin]

Text In Iraq, UNSCOM conducts its 43rd biological-weapons inspection, UNSCOM 163 [1] It is led by David Kelly of the United Kingdom.[2] It is the second of a series [see 961014-23] of "verification inspections" following UNSCOM's assessment that the latest Iraqi "full, final and complete disclosure" of its past BW programme [see 960701] is in fact inadequate and may be deliberately deceptive. The team seeks to take samples of BW agents used in Iraq field trials, but is unsuccessful because, so UNSCOM later reports, of "the apparent unwillingness of Iraq to identify the specific relevant locations".[3] [Note. UNSCOM has stated two main reasons for its minute investigation of Iraq's past biological-weapons programme One is that the still- unverified claim by Iraq that it destroyed the biological weapons which UNSCOM knows it to have produced continues to prevent UNSCOM from reporting that those weapons no longer exist The second reason is that UNSCOM must have a complete assessment of Iraq's past achievements and failures in this proscribed area if it is to succeed in building and implementing an on-going monitoring and verification system that may genuinely be capable of ensuring Iraq's continuing compliance with the prohibition of BW armament It has indeed been the case that, as new information is acquired, so has UNSCOM been modifying the biological OMV system which it has had running for the past 18 months [see 4 Apr 95] 3 new biological sites have been added since October 1995 to the 79 that UNSCOM has been monitoring [4]]

Footnote [1] Arms Control Reporter no 1-97 at 701.B 163, "UNSCOM inspections in Iraq"

[2] Personal communication, 14 May 1997

[3] UN document S/1997/301 of 11 April 1997, p 16

[4] UN document S/1996/848}

JVP / 3 / 0056

Date 981201-06 [updated since publication in Bulletin]

Text In Iraq there is a further UNSCOM biological mission, UNSCOM 253 (BW 70), led by David Kelly of the UK. According to a subsequent Iraqi communication to the UN Security Council, the 13-person team "conducted lengthy interviews and discussions on R&D in the past biological programme" [1]

Footnote [1] Xinhua from Baghdad, 2 Dec 98, item no 1202009, "UNSCOM biological team meets Iraqi side", via Nexis: Iraq, UN document S/1998/1173 of 15 December 1998, Arms Control Reporter no 9-99 at 701 B 212

TVP | 3 | 0057

Date 981210 [updated since publication in Bulletin]  
Text In Iraq a further UNSCOM biological mission, UNSCOM 256 (BW 72), led by David Kelly of the UK begins its work, with completion scheduled for 18 December. According to a subsequent Iraqi communication to the UN Security Council on 14 December, the task of the 7-person team is "focused on the growth media (yeast essence) imported by Samara Drugs Factory [for use] in the manufacturing of medicine" [1]  
Footnote [1] Iraq, UN document S/1998/1173 of 15 December 1998, Arms Control Reporter no 9-99 at 701 B 212.

TVP/3/0058

Date

001001

Text

On US television, CBS News 60 Minutes presents a documentary on smallpox, subtitled "years after eradicating the virus among the general population, some countries may be using the smallpox virus as a biological weapon" Among those talking to camera are Dr Ken Alibek, who speaks of bioweapons work on smallpox in the USSR, and Dr David Kelly, who had been a member of the secret trilateral-process UK/US inspection team that had visited Vektor [see 10 Dec 99] in Siberia in January 1991 [see 910106-20], and who now speaks of his discovery during that visit of Soviet smallpox work Later in the documentary there is mention of "circumstantial evidence" of smallpox work having been found in Iraq by an UNSCOM inspection that Dr Kelly had led in that country, he himself saying to camera that Iraq "has the capacity to produce and to weaponize" smallpox virus He does not say that Iraq had actually done so, but anchorman Mike Wallace is then to be seen saying "The UN was unable to determine this, but a highly placed Middle East intelligence source told us that Iraq does have the virus and that they got it from a Russian scientist who stole it from a lab in Siberia" No substantiation or any other confirmation of this assertion is presented, other than Wallace speaking of the late King Hussein of Jordan "who, in his dying declaration letter, warned of the danger of smallpox `being reintroduced to the world'" Later, Wallace says: "The problem gets worse. A recent US military report says North Korea has the capability to develop, produce, and weaponize smallpox [see 12 Sep US] And a still-classified intelligence report confirms [sic] there are three countries which are major threats for smallpox. Iraq, North Korea and Russia "[1]

[1] Mike Wallace, CBS 60 Minutes, 1900 hrs ET 1 Oct 00, "Smallpox - years after eradicating the virus among the general population, some countries may be using the smallpox virus as a biological weapons", via Nexis

TVP/3/0059

Date 010216 [not published in Bulletin]

Text In the UK, former UNSCOM Chief Inspector David Kelly of the Ministry of Defence speaks at the University of Sussex on Monitoring Dual Capable Industry in Iraq by UNSCOM Are There Implications for the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol?

Footnote

TVP/3/0060

Date 010502 [not published in Bulletin]  
Text In the UK, David Kelly of the Ministry of Defence gives an in-house briefing to staff of VERTIC [1]  
Footnote [1] Trust and Verify, no 97 (May-June 2001), p 10, "News and events VERTIC BW briefing".

TRP/3/0061

Date 010518 [updated since publication in Bulletin]

Text In London, GeneWatch hosts a meeting on Biological Weapons and the New Genetics Avoiding the Threat The day-long meeting is divided into four sessions The first deals with "biological weapons and the new genetics" and includes presentations by Brian Balmer of University College London, Malcolm Dando, Simon Whitby and Piers Millet of Bradford University, and Peter Biggs of the Royal Society working group on biological weapons The second session, on "verification and compliance", has presentations by Oliver Meier of VERTIC and David Kelly from the Ministry of Defence. The third session, "the Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention", includes presentations by Jez Littlewood of Bradford University, Daniel Feakes of HSP and Jeff Kipling of the Association of British Pharmaceutical Industry A final session, on "additional measures for security", has presentations by Jan van Aken of the Sunshine Project and Alistair Hay of Leeds University

Footnote

TVP | 3/0062

not disclosed - personal .

TVP/3/0063

Date 010626

Text In The Hague, at OPCW headquarters, a lunchtime lecture on Monitoring of Dual Capable Industry: Are There Implications for the Biological Weapons Convention Protocol? is given by Dr David Kelly of the UK Defence Ministry Proliferation & Arms Control Secretariat

Footnote

TRP/3/0064

Date 010902

Text In New York, Atlantic Monthly Press publishes Scourge The Once and Future Threat of Smallpox by Jonathan Tucker [1]

CBS News 60 Minutes includes a segment on smallpox, with D A Henderson, Ken Alibek and David Kelly speaking to camera about weaponization of the virus. In voiceover at one point, anchorman Mike Wallace says: "And a still-classified intelligence report confirms there are three countries which are major threats for smallpox: Iraq, North Korea and Russia" [see also 1 Oct 00, 010421 and 28 Feb]

Footnote [1] David Brown [book review], Washington Post, 21 Oct 01, p 4, "Something in the air"

TVP/3/0065

Date 021010

Text In London, the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office hosts a session of the HSP London CBW Seminar [see 30 Mar 01] at which the topic for discussion is The Legacy of the Soviet Biological Warfare Programme A Stalled and Unresolved Trilateral Process. The main presentation is by Dr David Kelly

Footnote

TRP/3/0066

Date 021213

Text In London, VERTIC launches its Verification Yearbook 2002, which includes a rare account of the process jointly initiated by the UK and the USA in 1990 to promote USSR compliance with the BWC [see 900801], a process that included the Russia-UK-US trilateral agreement of September 1992 [see 10-11 Sep 92] and the on-site inspections conducted in the three countries within its framework [see 20 Sep 99]. The account is by Dr David Kelly [see 10 Oct, London], identified as a Senior Advisor to the Proliferation and Arms Control Secretariat of the British Ministry of Defence and the Non-Proliferation Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. He describes connections -- indirect ones -- between the process, the work of UNSCOM and the design of possible BWC compliance measures, and he relates how the process ultimately foundered on Russia's unwillingness to demonstrate its current compliance with the BWC. Its last act was a letter from Russian Foreign Minister Yevgeniy Primakov to US Secretary of State Warren Christopher in April 1996 that went unanswered. Dr Kelly concludes 'The trilateral process achieved many successes but was not allowed to take all the steps which could have dispelled suspicions and uncertainties about Russia's BW programmes. The precedent has been important, but if similar circumstances ever arise again the states concerned know that they will have to do better' [1]

Footnote [1] David C Kelly, 'The Trilateral Agreement: lessons for biological weapons verification', in Trevor Findlay and Oliver Meier (editors), Verification Yearbook 2002, London. The Verification Research, Training and Information Centre (VERTIC), 2002, pp 93-109.

MP/3/0067

Date 021217

Text In New York City, the inaugural issue of the magazine SEED carries an interview with Dr Vladimir Pasechnik, who, aged 64, had died a year previously [see 21 Nov 01] having been a leading figure in the clandestine USSR BW programme prior to his defection from it in 1989. The interview adds much detail to the public record, for, apart from a sudden burst of publicity some three years after his arrival in the United Kingdom [see 19 Sep 92 and 21 Jan 93], Dr Pasechnik had remained largely out of the public eye, working at the Public Health Laboratory Service Centre for Applied Microbiology and Research in Wiltshire until the end of 1999.

In 1974, Dr Pasechnik had been recruited by General Ogarkov to build the All Union Scientific Research Institute of Ultra Pure Biochemical Preparations, which was to be a part of the FARMPRIBOR production association that would be one of six such associations making up Biopreparat [see 13 May 95]. Headquartered in Leningrad, the new institute occupied three sites when it opened in 1981 and employed around 3500 people. Pasechnik's own work involved the breeding of a strain of *Yersinia pestis* (the plague bacterium) that was capable of resisting 15 types of antibiotic. Pasechnik had also been credited with inventing an 'air mill' capable of converting a dried cake of cultured plague bacteria into ultrafine powder using a blast of compressed air. 'Weapon of Special Designation Number One' was what the Soviet military had called his *Y. pestis* preparation. By 1987, Pasechnik had developed a process for producing it at a rate of 200 kg/week. The preparation had a shelf-life of five months, and a 20-tonne stockpile was maintained. In 1988 Pasechnik was made general director of FARMPRIBOR, and it was while on a purchasing visit to Paris a year later that he telephoned the British embassy, after being rebuffed by the Canadian embassy, to set in motion his defection. One of his subsequent British interrogators, Dr David Kelly [see 2 Aug 91 Iraq and 13 Dec London] is quoted thus: 'He believed that the Soviet BW program was immoral. It wasn't so much that it contravened the BW Convention -- although that was of course a motivating factor -- but it was that, as a person, the whole concept of using these materials for military purposes was unacceptable' [1].

Footnote [1] Simon Cooper, SEED (New York City), January/February 2003, pp 66-68, 70-72 & 104-107, 'Life in the pursuit of death'

TVP/3/0068